The Marine Corp is still alive!

battleshipagincourt wrote:[....Okay, so how does this point relate to the F-35B?

Back on a relevant topic of; how will the USMC best use the "Bee" as an ISR platform coupled with the mini-UAVs and differences between how the AV-8B is currently used in SW Asia as CAS. Will the gun pod and laser-guided rockets be more useful than the Hellfires or will the "Bee" be hauling more types of JDAMs? Inquiring minds want to know!

Okay, why don't I ask the base question: was there any real need for STOVL in the F-35 program?

Those for it I assume do so because the feature makes the F-35 even more versatile and flexible in unfavorable combat situations where you can't normally launch a fighter. If your runways are bombed, or you can take advantage of roads or small airfields where other fighters wouldn't work... the F-35 becomes especially useful.

The opposite side of the argument claim STOVL is an expensive feature(in R&D + procurement + upkeep), it limits what the fighter can do(as the A and C variants had to conform to the B variant), and that the feature isn't especially vital (as in that other solutions exist which eliminate the need for a STOVL fighter), or that there is rarely a situation where your runways are destroyed and your other fighters become useless.

Saying the Falkland war was where STOVL proved its tactical value... that only happened because the Royal Navy were supplanted of their most favorable platform and carrier-based aircraft, leaving them with only the harrier to work with. The fact that the Royal Navy can now transition back to their larger carriers and adopt the F-35C over the B variant shows that they likely always favored carrier-based fighters over their STOVL counterparts. Now that they aren't restricted to using only the F-35B or harrier, how likely are they to show interest in STOVL fighters anymore?

In the end I can't say the F-35B is any less versatile than the A or C variants, but they certainly paid a heavy price for the marine requirements. Shorter range, less agile, more expensive, smaller internal war load... these all came at the expense of having VSTOL.

BSAC, you can re-invent RN history all you wish but your imagined history remains bogus. Yes there are always those who want the opposite in any group however because the RN at one point had no fixed wing carriers the 'through deck cruiser' as it was called in those days was the RN's only entry back to fixed wing NavAv via the Harrier. As I have said several times now: If the RN had their way (and the UK had the money) then they would have continued with conventional NavAv via new carriers and aircraft but that was not to be. Go read some history.

The change recently from F-35B to F-35C is a mystery wrapped up in an enigma where b/s baffles brains. A decision was made many years ago to firstly build the CVF and purchase suitable numbers of F-35Bs for them. Plans were then unmade recently for reasons not always stated publically yet. Did you not read an article on the other page by HOBBS about this. There are many others out there on the web. HOBBS does not particularly favour the F-35B or the Harrier from long ago now because he was and is now an old fixed wing RN FAA pilot. Whatever. The Brits a decade or more ago decided on 'expeditionary forces' where the CVFs and F-35Bs would play their part. Events overtook this idea and what their plans are today I do not really know nor care to find out. Why? Because knowing the Brits they will change and change again due to budget and political constraints. Be patient grasshopper.

Now if one has the big bucks/dollors then it does make sense to have LARGE carriers - by gosh even Nuclear Ones - but we know who has those eh. Others less fortunate make do with the money constraints and for a time the Brits were going to do well with the CVFs and F-35Bs - doing much work to improve how these assets would be used. See the very long thread. Nevertheless as we all know the future is unpredictable and the SDSR made sure that the RN plans were mangled. They will recover but there are predictions that the FAA is finished.

Be doom and gloom about the F-35B all you wish but it has been made clear on a recent thread and many earlier that the F-35B was the reason for the F-35 in the first place so stop complaining and get over it. I'd post the thread links and suchlike but I don't want to SPAM anyone eh.

OK THEN! Start at this page - be amazed...

http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_prejast.htm

for neptune... Some old ideas perhaps but even in 2001 the F-35B was considered useful for both RN and USMC see....

www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/news/signals/s ... mmer01.pdf (1.3Mb) pp 7-9

Article titled "Lifting Power" [2001]
"...The JSF is also more capable and may find itself being used in a wider range of roles than the Harrier – for example, as a replacement for the EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft. Its weapons bay is capacious enough, and its load-carrying capabilities big enough, to haul the necessary equipment..."

battleshipagincourt wrote:Okay, why don't I ask the base question: was there any real need for STOVL in the F-35 program?...

All, please don't waste your time or blog space trying to convince me otherwise, my mind is made up and you can't confuse me with your facts! That said, I offer an answer to Why? The USMC will not accept CAS (only) from any other organization, the same with LHAs. The AV-8B is worn-out and it flys from the LHA and the beach (STOVL). I will Never! believe that either the Force or the Boat guys have let the Marines dictate the F-35 design. I do believe that the USMC did take the opportunity of the F-35 program to add-on the "Bee". The Frankenstein plane that it is, it is new and the Corp was not getting any other new plane. The boats control the Corp budget and the Corp has never flown a Force a/c (A-10C??). LM made the "Bee" fly and it is not going away "I hope", for the Corp does need this new plane. The Corp is an amphibious organization and is supposed to operate near the Sea (Afghanistan??). Those short legs are OK for its mission of CAS for their brother Marines (on the beachhead) and that short trip back to the boat for re-arm, refuel. That having been said, the book is still being written on the F-35. As LO goes, the F-22 has set a high bar and no one (in their right mind) will go one on one, against it with a competent pilot. History will show where the F-35 will rate but as LO goes, I wouldn't bet against it.

Cut and paste how you please - this is my attempt at F-35 history - very much driven by F-35B requirements.

http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_prejast.htm
"...Advanced Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) 1983-1994
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began a program in 1983 to begin looking at the technologies available to design and manufacture a follow-on supersonic replace for the AV-8 Harrier. The program, known as ASTOVL, would eventually lead become a joint U.S.-U.K. collaboration. In 1987 the results of the ASTOVL program made clear that the technologies available were not yet advanced enough to generate a replacement that the U.S. and U.K. would have been satisfied with. At this time, DARPA secretly approached the Lockheed Skunk Works in the hopes that they would be able to develop an aircraft like they had hoped would have appeared from the first phase of ASTOVL. Lockheed told DARPA that they had some ideas that could be matured and that, if they were successful would meet the goals that DARPA was trying to achieve. At the same time, DARPA continued with ASTOVL Phase II as a cover for the covert work being done at the Skunk Works.

i. STOVL Strike Fighter (SSF) 1987-1994
In the late 1980s the Lockheed Skunk Works was involved in a classified, non-acknowledged program with NASA Ames that looked into the feasibility of designing a stealthy supersonic STOVL fighter. This was a cooperative program that utilized the assets of NASA (wind tunnels, personnel, super-computers, etc.) along with the expertise of the Lockheed Skunk Works in designing stealthy air vehicles. The results from this highly classified program proved that a SSF could be successfully flown. Management at the Lockheed Skunk Works was convinced that the SSF design could be sold to both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. (The U.S. Navy (NAVAIR) is the procuring office for Marine Corps aircraft.) The Skunk Works proposed a teaming between the USAF and the USN. The services agreed, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the services and the SSF program began to come out of the black."


http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_jast.htm
"History
What is known today as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program was originally known as the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) Program. The goal of the JAST program was not to have developed a new aircraft, but instead it was to mature the technologies that a new series of tactical aircraft could use.

JAST was chartered to mature technologies, develop requirements, and demonstrate concepts for affordable next-generation joint strike warfare. As JAST plans took shape, it became apparent that JAST would be funding one or more concept demonstrator aircraft starting in 1996–about the time the ASTOVL program planned to enter its Phase III (full-scale flight demonstrators). The ASTOVL project, as an advanced concept for a future joint-service strike/fighter, appeared consistent with the JAST charter. It was therefore agreed by the management of both programs, that JAST would become the U.S. service “sponsor” for the flight demonstration phase of ASTOVL, if Phase II were successful and if the concept appeared to be able to satisfy the requirements of at least two of the three U.S. services participating in JAST. However, FY95 budget legislation passed in October 1994 by the U.S. Congress directed that ASTOVL be merged into JAST immediately."

Some excerpts (sorry SPAM) for youse reading pleasure:

V/STOL SHIPBOARD RECOVERY: “IT’S NOT JUST ANOTHER CARRIER LANDING” by Major A. G. Shorter, USMC 12 April 2002

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Lo ... =ADA407726

"...As early as February 1963, the chief test pilot for the P1127, Bill
Bedford, made the first successful launches and recoveries on HMS Ark Royal,
underlining the unexpected success and ease of the first launch, notes:

These first-ever jet V/STOL trials at sea made use of the same
principles and virtually the same techniques as are employed today.
Launch by vertical take-off or short take-off and recovery by vertical
landing…there were no cliff-edge effects, the deck did not buckle due
to the hot jets, vertical landing whilst formatting on a moving platform
was indeed not a problem and turbulence caused no concern. Most
importantly, the techniques developed for P1127 land operation proved
equally applicable at sea with all the implications this held in respect of
future pilot training. Bill Bedford had never before flown a fixed-wing
jet aircraft from a deck....

...The U.S was quick to seize the initiative in
testing the aircraft at sea, including shipboard suitability trials aboard the aircraft carrier
USS Independence and the assault ship USS Raleigh during May of 1966....

...The USMC was quick to capitalize on the earlier
shipboard trials completed in 1966 by the Kestrel aircraft, and started operations as early
as February 1971 with ship compatibility trials....

...Deck landing accidents have long been related to approach speed.
This is a fact of naval aviation life, which encouraged the development of
arrestor gear, angled decks, and mirror landing sights and other complex
deck aids. The precise point through which the naval pilot must aim on is
final approach to the deck is known as the “gate.” He must hold a precise
speed of up to 130 knots, and keeping a precise heading, he must pass
through this “gate”….Imagine what it is like when the deck is pitching and
rolling at the same time. It is clearly not a job for the fainthearted or the
unskilled, but the adrenalin that conventional fixed wing pilots expend on
deck landing, the Harrier pilot can save for combat. In the decelerating
transition from wingbourne to hovering flight, he does not even have to
aim at the ship. Errors of speed can be corrected by adjusting the length of
the transition to the hover. In the final hover, if the deck is partially
blocked, the Harrier can “air-tax” to a clear part of the deck. Kinetic
energy, the energy associated with motion, has always been the problem in
recovering heavy aircraft at sea. The Harrier gets rid of that energy,
before it lands, not after it has hit the deck....

...As part of my experience with the Royal Navy, I was allowed to embark aboard
HMS Illustrious for an operational deployment without any FCLP or CQ periods even
though I was flying the more challenging and less stable Sea Harrier and I had not flown
to a ship for at least three years. Even so, it was not difficult, and the 30-40 vertical
landings that I had done to the simulated carrier deck in the previous six months had
prepared me adequately for the experience....

...V/STOL operations are a primary skill taught extensively in the training
squadron; they do not change, and they are practiced routinely at the end of each sortie.
It is important to ask why, in regards to preparations for shipboard operations, the current
V/STOL requirements account for a relatively large percentage of the training focus.
Historical examples tend to support the adaptability of V/STOL operations at sea and use
a “don’t make it any harder than you have to” approach as the RAF practiced in 1970.
The RAF was quick to exploit its new aircraft by embarking a pair of Harriers on HMS
Eagle, with the intent to carry out sea trials so that a service release could be written for
deck operations. It wasted no time thereafter in taking their Harriers to sea aboard HMS
Ark Royal and conducting mishap-free operations, without any of the squadron pilots
ever having flown to or from a ship....

...The greatest difference between the V/STOL environment and the CTOL
environment would be in the final approach and landing itself. The historical documents
referenced above have related to this subject, but the following passage by LCDR Robert
Bennett, a U.S.Navy F-18 pilot, qualified LSO, and former Sea Harrier exchange pilot
with the Royal Navy, provides an additional perspective to consider. His perspective
bears on the differences in training, particularly with regard to landing at sea, which
V/STOL pilots require as opposed to those flying in conventional carrier operations.
According the LCDR Bennett:

In exploring the difference [between landing a Sea Harrier and an
F-18 onboard an aircraft carrier], the logical place to begin is the basic
manner in which the aircraft is flown. In conventional carrier operations,
the pilot is taught early on to always fly his approach at optimum angle of
attack (AOA), holding this condition all the way to touchdown. In
practical terms, this means that airspeed must be held within + or - 5
knots, the attitude of the aircraft must be held within + or – 2 degrees of
pitch while the control rate of descent within a tolerance of roughly + or –
50 feet per minute. Thrust must be continuously adjusted to hold optimum
AOA. The pilot is taught to religiously fly this AOA throughout the
approach and to be capable of making the required changes to rates of
descent without varying the AOA or the aircraft’s airspeed, all the while
responding to changing conditions. Flying optimum AOA ensures two
things: first, that the closure airspeed does not exceed the ability of the
ship’s arresting gear engines to stop the aircraft and, second, it ensures that
the tailhook and main gear impact the deck at roughly the same moment.
Too shallow an AOA could mean the hook flies over the wires with the
main gear on deck, too great and (sic) AOA could mean the tailhook
engages the wires while all landing gear are still in flight, a potentially
disastrous condition.

V/STOL flying does not require anywhere near the same
technique. AOA must be monitored within wide limits, but absolute
precise control of AOA or airspeed is not required. This greatly reduces
training requirements....

...In the past, there was seldom a mention of instrument or night recoveries with
respect to the Harrier. That is not because these recoveries were not executed early in the
aircraft’s development; on the contrary, history is replete with examples of Harriers
recovering in weather conditions that would have normally grounded CTOL aircraft.
This fact is best described by a passage from V/STOL in the Roaring Forties, dealing with
the RN’s experiences during the Falkland War of 1982:

For much of the task force’s time in the South Atlantic, the
weather was almost a second adversary. It was not without good reason,
in the heyday of the sailing ship, that these ports of the southern ocean
became known as the roaring forties. The flight decks of the carriers were
moving vertically at times through 30 feet and the weather produced cloud
bases typically [down to] 200 feet and often down to 100 feet during
flying operations. Visibility was typically ½ nautical mile and often much
less. One Harrier recovered to the deck of the [HMS] Hermes in
horizontal visibility of 50 meters [on] one notable occasion. The timehonoured
carrier trick of dropping flares at intervals into the ship’s wake
was used, but it was the Sea Harrier’s facility to approach the ship using
its internal approach aid and Blue Fox radar at part jetborne [slow] closing
speeds of a few tens of knots which primarily provided the safety and
hence the success in bad weather recovery.

No conventional fixed-wing naval aircraft could have operated
with adequate safety in such conditions, thus supporting the claim that the
greatest military contribution made by the V/STOL and STOVL aircraft is
in the vertical landing phase of operation. In the Harrier, this phase is
made safer, easier and more flexible than in any other combat aircraft....

More SPAM - in this article the relevance of the TORNADO is discussed viz a viz Harrier and the SDSR in Britain recently....

Military experts' warning over defence spending review
Below is a copy of a letter (Jan 29th 2011) sent to David Cameron by military experts and retired commanders warning of the risks posed to British forces by the Strategic Defence Spending Review.
25 Feb 2011

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstop ... eview.html

"Jan 29th 2011
Dear Prime Minister,
The SDSR was conducted, as it had to be, under the pressure of a financial crisis of unprecedented severity. This led to a very rapid and radical disposal of assets, which, more alarmingly, has demanded the loss of some core strategic capabilities. In our carefully considered view, it is in this latter respect that, in certain key areas, the decisions now about to be implemented merit rapid re-evaluation to avoid the potentially permanent loss of important military capabilities.

The publicly declared proposition that ‘the risks inherent in the currently envisaged Defence structure are acceptable’ seems to us to be unduly trusting in an uncertain, fast moving and dangerous world.

Flexibility is essential and the SDSR report advocates this but cuts the very capabilities that offer it best. Defence in peace means deterrence by showing capability and determination. Failure to do so leads to war e.g. Falklands (now showing again with Brazilian support in withdrawing permission for a ship visit to Rio).

Royal Navy cuts 'will put lives at risk' 24 Feb 2011
Our focus is the maritime dimension of Defence strategy, the most flexible arm of our military capability. In particular, the retirement of the Joint RN/RAF Harrier Force which could be viewed with equanimity were it not for two profound downstream consequences that strike at the heart of our Defence structure in both the immediate and the longer term.

The first is the deprivation of fixed wing carrier-borne air capability for at least a decade. This not only removes a very important component of the offensive and defensive capabilities of the Fleet but also undermines support of the Army and of the Royal Marines in their amphibious role. This valuable operation can no longer be attempted even against a lightly armed aggressor without considerable risk.

Annex A shows how this might be avoided and also shows a saving of £5 billion pounds.

The second is the break in continuity of all sections of the fixed wing element of the Royal Navy and its unique expertise to deliver air power from the sea, with all the wide-ranging tactical and strategic benefits that this prowess can endow. This is not a capability that can be easily and quickly reinstated or carried out by inexperienced air or ground crews. Continuity of operations is highly desirable if the new carriers are to be brought into operational service quickly, with the right experience and supporting elements such as flight deck crews, command and staff officers at all levels.

The operational and financial arguments for maintaining the Harrier in favour of the Tornado are clear to us and to the wider defence community. We therefore wish to bring to your attention a cost-effective option for retaining some Tornadoes and some Harriers, the latter under Royal Naval command, and both in reduced numbers. This is explained at Annex B.

A further option (Annex C) is for a mix of Harriers and F18s under naval command while retaining a reduced RAF Tornado force. Either option would help retain a highly desirable operational capability and, in doing so, give a marvellous fillip to morale of the Royal Naval air and ground crews that would be welcomed and, importantly, would ensure their retention in service.

However, perhaps the most effective way to save money while maintaining capabilities and operational availability would be to ensure that the different productivity levels – the ‘ harmony’ rules of the three Services – are made similar. At the moment, all three services have different rules, measured over different timescales, which makes comparing the resulting productivity of any one service with another unsatisfactory. One result is that to conduct an enduring operational deployment, such as Afghanistan, the RAF needs 36% more people in their force structure than does the RN. This does not take into account the extra operational and financial costs of roulement to and from airfields that need extensive guarding.

This lack of a common standard unfortunately makes any attempt to compare costs difficult.

However, it is clear that if the rules were harmonised between all three services, there would be significant savings in the Defence budget in the longer term. This could well preserve the capabilities addressed earlier.

It is recommended that the improvements to the armed forces productivity and the two formulae detailed at Annexes B and C be given full consideration.

Yours Sincerely,
Dr Duncan Redford BA, MA, PhD, F.R.Hist.S. Centre for Maritime Historical Studies, University of Exeter.
Professor Eric Grove, Any MAs PHDs Professor of Naval History and Director of the Centre for International Security and War Studies, Salford University.
Professor Andrew Lambert BA (Law) MA, PhD. Laughton Professor of Naval History in the Department of War Studies at King's College, London.
Professor N. A. M. Rodger FBA. Any MAs PHDs Senior Research Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.
Field Marshall the Lord Bramall KG GCB OBE MC JP DL.
General Sir John Waters GCB CBE.
Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Pike KCB DSO MBE.
Major General Julian Thompson CB OBE RM.
Major General Nick Vaux CB DSO RM.
Admiral Sir Raymond Lygo KCB.
Admiral Sir John Treacher KCB.
Admiral Sir John Woodward GBE KCB.
Admiral Sir Jeremy Black GBE KCB DSO.
Admiral Sir Michael Layard KCB CBE.
Admiral Sir Ian Garnett KCB.

Copies to:-
The Rt. Hon. Nicholas Clegg MP.
The Rt. Hon. William Hague MP.
The Rt. Hon. George Osborne MP.
The Rt. Hon. Dr Liam Fox MP.
The Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot MP

WHAT IS LOST BY WITHDRAWING THE HARRIER?
More than £5 billion pounds in the short and the longer term to keep the more expensive Tornado in service.
The expertise of the fixed wing Fleet Air Arm that has taken 100 years to generate and nurture.
Our only fighter/fighter ground attack aircraft capable of
Operating from roads, damaged runways and rough airstrips close to where they are needed.

Operating from carriers with their advantage of flexibility of manoeuvre, avoidance of diplomatic and over-flight problems and independence from vulnerable land and air supply lines.

Providing air support for expeditionary/amphibious operations at short notice throughout the world.

The most rapid and reliable response to urgent tasking in support of ground forces in Afghanistan
(Harrier: 12 minutes. Tornado: 30 minutes or more. The Tornado failed to satisfy more requested ground support missions in one month than did the Harrier in five years.)

Our only fighter ground attack aircraft capable of delivering highly accurate GPS precision-guided munitions in Afghanistan without the risk of collateral damage to civilians/own forces. (The Tornado requires extra expenditure to be fitted with the Harrier Sniper Pod - £100 million plus.)
The respect of our allies in Afghanistan who consider the Harrier to be the best and most popular Close Air Support aircraft to have been deployed in that theatre.

WHAT WOULD BE LOST BY WITHDRAWING TORNADO?
Little, if anything. The Tornado replacement, Typhoon, is now in service and is available for land- based operations and will be able to deploy the Storm Shadow short ranged cruise missile as well as the Brimstone anti-armour missile. It should also be noted that the Harrier GR9 can deploy the Maverick -armour missile in place of Brimstone.

WHAT IS GAINED BY KEEPING HARRIER RATHER THAN TORNADO IN SERVICE?
A major saving in cost over the next 15 years (approx. £5 billion) and a significant saving in cost in the short term (four years).
An additional embarked contingent capability through to 2018 that cannot be provided by Tornado or Typhoon.
The approval and support of our allies in Afghanistan who have the highest respect for the combat effectiveness of the Harrier in theatre. The same cannot be said for the Tornado.
Political and military respect for the visible power that the Royal Navy can continue to present around the world in order to deter those that would harm our interests.
The retention in service of personnel who have unique and irreplaceable expertise in the field of naval air warfare and carrier operations.

WHAT CAN THE TORNADO DO THAT THE HARRIER CANNOT?
The Tornado has a small advantage in its radius of action in temperate climes but both aircraft can in-flight refuel. (In 1982, the RAF Harrier GR3s flew 4,000 nms to embark in HMS Hermes.)

THE COSTS OF RETAINING HARRIER GR9 AND TORNADO GR4 OVER THE NEXT 4 YRS.
The RAF are possibly reducing the number of GR4 Tornados to 60; using their existing operational availability (1 in 5) and harmony figures this means that a maximum of 12 are available at any one time for operations. If a common operational availability/productivity and harmony measure of 50% is used (a slight reduction on the Royal Navy’ s current 60% figure to ease roulement issues) the Tornado and Harrier force structure could be:-

Tornado 40 (generating 8 aircraft and crews always available for operations.)

Harrier 40 (generating 16 aircraft and crews always available for operations.)

The Harrier force number is calculated using a 50% productivity level for the Royal Navy as follows:-

Task
Total required

8 aircraft for aircraft carrier operations
16

8 aircraft for close air support of land forces in Afghanistan
16

8 aircraft for an operational conversion unit
8

Grand Total
40

Costs Based on Official MoD DOC Audit. Costs are in £1,000’s

Mod DOC Audit figures for in life cost
Per Annum
4yrs
Plus Sniper pod upgrade*

60 Tornado to 2025
£3,284,000
£219,000
£975,000
£975,000

40 RAF Tornados to 2025
£2,189,000
£146,118
£583,471
£683,471

74 Harrier to 2018
£1,100,000
£137,500
£550,000

40 Royal Navy Harriers to 2018
£595,000
£74,000
£297,000

* Tornado Upgrade to fit Sniper Pod to Aircraft - more than £100 million

Therefore, keeping 40 Tornado & 40 Harrier (but using a higher level of productivity to compensate for a smaller fleet) for 4 years costs c £981 million.

This is approx the same as the cost of maintaining 60 Tornados only for 4 years and produces a Force Element at Readiness of 24 aircraft rather than just 12 with the Tornado option.

A further option
There is another solution to the Harrier/Tornado problem that would eradicate the Carrier Strike gap and save money in both the short and the long term. This option would guard against the real possibility that the F35C may be delayed and increase in cost. Consideration should, therefore, be given to retaining:-

3 x RAF Squadrons of 12 Tornados + 12 in reserve/operational conversion unit. (48 A/C) = £800 million.

3 x RN Flights of 8 Harriers + 6 in reserve/operational conversion unit. (30 A/C) = £223 million.

And procuring/leasing:-

1 x RN Squadron of 18 F/A18 -Super Hornets. (18 A/C) = £360 million (a total of £1,382 million).

With the Queen Elizabeth’ s being fitted with catapults and arrestor gear, procuring the F/A-18F’ s would provide very capable aircraft to operate from them. Until the Queen Elizabeth’ s enter operational service a British F/A18 squadron could:-

1 . Operate from USN carriers to provide experience and continuity of high performance carrier operations.

2 . Support our forces in Afghanistan from USN Carriers.

3 .Supplement or replace the Tornados currently deployed should that be required by the operational tempo.


It should be noted that the F/A18 Super Hornet is better at air defence than the Typhoon, better at ground attack than Tornado and Typhoon and around one third to one fifth of the cost of the Typhoon.

This F18 squadron would not be difficult to form due to existing partnerships and training which the Royal Navy has, and is expected to continue to have, with the USN. Furthermore, Britain would not be buying a substandard aircraft, as the Super Hornet is a very capable aircraft now being procured by the United States Navy and the Australian Armed Forces.

In the meantime, the Harrier establishment would allow Britain to provide 3 flights of eight aircraft; if necessary one operating in Afghanistan, one available for contingency embarkation in HMS Illustrious and one at home providing for pilot and ground crew training. In time, these flights could also be converted to F/A-18s and their numbers moderately expanded to produce, depending on the hull availability and operational posture of the single operational Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier and the impact this will have on the structure and size of the air component to match such a posture, a fleet of 60 to 72 aircraft. This option would generate considerable long-term cost savings and provide Britain with a very strong strategic military capability."