UK MOD in a muddle over F-35C

[FlightDreamz]

Slower and shorter range that way geogen (lower altitude as well).

[geogen]

Maybe you're right Flight Dreamz... no doubt - better to stick with the E-2. That, and perhaps either a tethered AEW aerostat of some kind or even an autonomous cruising fleet protection AEW based airship being part of the optimal, layered early warning and situational awareness mix?

[spazsinbad]

CONVERTING [CVF] CARRIERS TO BE CONVENTIONAL
By permission/courtesy of the Editor of the 'Marine Engineers Review', December 2010/January 2011

http://www.fleetairarmoa.org/pages/pdfs/1218.pdf (37Kb)

"...Launching
Today’s generation of aircraft, which typically weigh 20t upwards (the F35C carrier version of the Joint Strike Fighter has a maximum take-off weight of 31.8t) and has a stall speed of 140kts, require around 100MJ of energy to be launched off a carrier. Even with a wind over the deck of 30kts (from the weather conditions and/or vessel speed) this only reduces to 65MJ or so....

...Recovery
Modern US Navy aircraft carriers are currently equipped with the Mk 7 Mod 3 arrester gear which has the capability of recovering a 22.7t aircraft at an engaging speed of 130kts in a distance of 104m. The system is designed to absorb a theoretical maximum energy of 64.4MJ at maximum cable run-out...."
____________

All good stuff:

GENERAL ATOMICS ELECTROMAGNETICS DIVISION OVERVIEW

http://www.brandtelligence.com/Maglev/D ... ojects.pdf (3Mb)
___________________

Latest Arresting Gear stuff:

http://www.esco.zodiacaerospace.com/dow ... bility.pdf (1.7Mb)

[spazsinbad]

Royal Navy Chief visits NAVAIR Lakehurst Oct 18, 2011

http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fu ... ry&id=4797

"First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope paid a visit to the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Lakehurst at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (JB MDL) on Monday, October 17th....

...EMALS delivers the necessary higher launch energy capacity as well as substantial improvements in system maintenance, efficiency, and more accurate end-speed control. The system’s technology allows for smooth acceleration at both high and low speeds, increasing the carrier’s ability to launch aircraft in support of the warfighter. The system will provide the capability for launching all current and future carrier air wing platforms – lightweight unmanned aircraft to heavy strike fighters.

AAG is a modular, integrated system consisting of energy absorbers, power conditioning equipment and digital controls that will also replace the Mk-7 arresting gear on all existing carriers. The Mk-7 system is a linear hydraulic machine that requires hands-on, aircraft specified tension adjustments for each landing. The AAG design is rotary-based and operates with a digital control system which provides greater control of the arresting forces. The aircraft energy is absorbed by a combination of hydraulic shock absorbers, water twisters, friction brakes and electric motors.

Admiral Stanhope’s visit to JB MDL is one in a series of visits by British naval officials to understand the working of these systems and determine if they will be compatible and cost effective for eventual procurement within the Royal Navy’s fleet.

According to Ms. Donnelly, “sharing technology and engineering concepts are key elements in maintaining good working relationships with close allies such as Great Britain. We are pleased to host Admiral Stanhope and his staff in discussing the advantages of EMALS and AAG.”

[spazsinbad]

Ward has some incorrect or vague fudges (some not obvious to me though but suspected) in this long look at the F-35C for the RN CVF. Already I have pointed out the wrongness of the carrier approach 'light air' issue he has kept in this blog post, in previous pages on this forum F-35 Approach AoA.

http://www.f-16.net/f-16_forum_viewtopi ... rt-30.html
&
http://www.f-16.net/f-16_forum_viewtopi ... rt-45.html


This is a long post so the beginning Executive Summary will give a clue (watch for the light airs).

THE F-35C Lightning II: IS THIS THE CORRECT CHOICE FOR OUR NEW CARRIERS? October 26, 2011

http://www.sharkeysworld.com/2011/10/f- ... l#comments

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
"i. This paper investigates the requirements for, the expected operational capability and the costs of the F-35C Lightning II Carrier Capable Strike/Air Defence Aircraft in the context of operations from the new Queen Elizabeth class carriers.
ii. It examines
a) The health of this Project,
b) The expected cost of this Project and
c) Shortfalls in aircraft capability that may have escaped the attention of the Government.
iii. In that process, it compares the F-35C Lightning II with the F/A-18 Super Hornet, an alternative option (whether interim or permanent), to establish their relative ability to meet the requirements of an effective Queen Elizabeth carrier air group in the
most cost-effective manner.
iv. It draws on well-established naval air warfare expertise, “hands-on” carrier deck landing and take-off expertise (both conventional and VSTOL).
v. The paper does not address the industrial impact of turning away from the F-35C Lightning II option. This has been mooted as being severe for British Aerospace Systems but an objective Inquiry into this matter has not been carried out. It is for
consideration that a formal Inquiry should be conducted with the following in mind:
a) The defence of the realm should not be arbitrarily subjugated to the interests of defence contractors.
b) British Aerospace Systems is already benefiting from its involvement with the F/A-18 Super Hornet project on several fronts including the manufacture of the associated deck training aircraft, the Goshawk. Such involvement would undoubtedly increase significantly if the Super Hornet were to replace the F-35C Lightning II (such benefits are now being realised in Australia).
c) British Aerospace Systems is already deeply involved with the F-35 Lightning II project and will continue to benefit from that involvement irrespective of the choice made by the UK government (albeit possibly at a lower level of financial return)."

[stobiewan]

His assumed flyaway cost for the F35C is 190 million, based on unreferenced table that presumably he pulled out of his @rse.

QED.

[spazsinbad]

stobiewan, weird huh. Must just rely on stuff given to him - then not checked - is all I can think. Some really old out of date data there AFAIK.

[stobiewan]

stobiewan, weird huh. Must just rely on stuff given to him - then not checked - is all I can think. Some really old out of date data there AFAIK.

He also claims buddy buddy refuelling will cost 1.6 billion USD to make happen but doesn't reference this claim either. Given the kit already exists and will just need plumbing in and clearing for flight use, I'm wondering where that estimate comes from.

Recall Mr Ward spends a lot of time posting on a site that persistently claimed you can buy a SH for $45 million.

Hmmm..

Ah:

"78. At the end of the 70s, the F/A-18 Hornet unit price was US$24 million. Adjusted for inflation[10], this equates to a price today of US$89.5 million. The ‘Fly Away’ cost of the 4.5 generation F/A-18 Super Hornet today is US$58 million and the sophisticated E/A-18G Super Growler costs approximately US$90.00 million. In other words, capability has been significantly increased but real costs have been kept the same or reduced. As given at Table2, above, the projected total cost of this Project (for just 80 aircraft) is expected to be $US12.9 billion (£8 billion)."


Slight problem with that - and the hint is to look at inflation in the late 70's.

Worse, the figure for SH is still wrong - the last set sold were to Australia and that was $3bn for 24, which is nearer 127 million a copy, including support.

That plus the whole light airs thing...meh..

[spazsinbad]

Bit of RN FAA Olde Style Fixed Wing... RN Phantom (& Buccaneer) HMS Ark Royal CarQual nostalgia?


HMS Ark Royal aviation opération [sic]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jv8prm4mGEQ

[1st503rdsgt]

Great video, shame they let this capability laps. It would have made the Falklands War a lot easier (might not have taken place at all).

[BigVette]

Always been a big fan of at least two types of aircraft on a carrier flight deck. I remember in the Summer of 1999 when the East Coast Marine Harriers got stood down for a good six weeks while deployed (LHD-3 / 26th MEU) while they pulled the wing to inspect a cotter pin on the engine. Sure would suck if you only have one a/c type and you have a safety stand-down.

[spazsinbad]

A lot of words in this 1987 article but it gives a good overview of what the RN (and any other newbie) has to learn again about conventional carrier ops. It is not a 'how to' manual but gives an idea of the order of complexity of the task.

The Self-Designing High-Reliability Organization: Aircraft Carrier Flight Operations at Sea
By Gene I. Rochlin, Todd R. La Porte, and Karlene H. Roberts

The following article was originally published in the Autumn 1987 issue of Naval War College Review. Reprinted here with the kind permission of Naval War College Review.

"A hundred things I have no control over could go wrong and wreck my career . . . but wherever I go from here, I'll never have a better job than this. . . . This is the best job in the world." -- Carrier commanding officer

http://govleaders.org/reliability_print.htm

"...In an era of constant budgetary pressure, the Navy shares with other organizations the need to defend those factors most critical to maintaining performance without, at the same time, sacrificing either operational reliability or safety. Following many conversations with naval personnel of all ranks, we are convinced that the rules and procedures that make up those factors are reasonably well known internally, but are written down only in part and generally not expressed in a form that can be readily conveyed outside the confines of the Navy.

The purpose of this article is to report some of our more relevant findings and observations to our gracious host, the Navy community; to describe air operations through the eyes of informed, yet detached observers; and to use our preliminary findings to reflect upon why carriers work as well as they do.

Self-Design and Self-Replication
"So you want to understand an aircraft carrier? Well, just imagine that it's a busy day, and you shrink San Francisco Airport to only one short runway and one ramp and gate. Make planes take off and land at the same time, at half the present time interval, rock the runway from side to side, and require that everyone who leaves in the morning returns that same day. Make sure the equipment is so close to the edge of the envelope that it's fragile. Then turn off the radar to avoid detection, impose strict controls on radios, fuel the aircraft in place with their engines running, put an enemy in the air, and scatter live bombs and rockets around. Now wet the whole thing down with salt water and oil, and man it with 20-year-olds, half of whom have never seen an airplane close-up. Oh, and by the way, try not to kill anyone." -- Senior officer, Air Division...

...Some Preliminary Conclusions
"The job of this ship is to shoot the airplanes off the pointy end and catch them back on the blunt end. The rest is detail." -- Carrier commanding officer

Even though our research is far from complete, particularly with regard to comparisons with other organizations, several interesting observations and lessons have already been recorded.

First, the remarkable degree of personal and organizational flexibility we have observed is essential for performing operational tasks that continue to increase in complexity as technology advances. "Ordinary" organizational theory would characterize aircraft carrier operations as confusing and inefficient, especially for an organization with a strong and steep formal management hierarchy (i.e., any "quasi-military" organization). However, the resulting redundancy and flexibility are, in fact, remarkably efficient in terms of making the best use of space-limited personnel.

Second, an effective fighting carrier is not a passive weapon that can be kept on a shelf until it is needed. She is a living unit possessed of dynamic processes of self-replication and self-reconstruction that can only be nurtured by retaining experienced personnel, particularly among the chiefs, and by giving her sufficient operational time at sea. This implies a certain minimum budgetary cost for maintaining a first-line carrier force at the levels of operational capability and safety demanded of the U.S. Navy.

The potential risk of attempting to operate at present levels under increasing budgetary constraints arises because the Navy is a "can-do" organization, visibly reluctant to say "we're not ready" until the situation is far into the red zone. 37 In time of war, the trade-off point between safety and effectiveness moves, and certain risks must be taken to get units deployed where and when they are needed. In peacetime, the potential costs of deploying units that are less than fully trained are not so easily tolerated. If reductions in at-sea and flying time are to be taken out of workups to preserve operational time on deployment, training and evaluation procedures will have to be adapted to reduce stress--perhaps by overlapping final readiness evaluations into the beginning of the deployment period...."

[1st503rdsgt]

I'm not concerned that the CVFs will be too slow. My concern is that the fuel consumption required to maintain speed for CATOBAR operations was not factored in to the original design, meaning reduced tactical flexibility (due to more frequent refueling) and higher operating costs.

What's the status on laying up the QE? Construction, sea-trials, commissioning, and mothballs all back to back? Britain is really streamlining the process.

http://www.comedycentral.com/videos/ind ... -comic-con

CVF was always built for CATOBAR ops from day one and the original assumptions at the core of the design was that at some stage, conversion to CATOBAR could occur. That's why space was reserved for either steam generators or additional GT's to provide electrical power for catapults. CATOBAR is not some new requirement that appeared from nowhere. The option was always there to be exercised either a decade or two in the future for other aircraft or from launch if Dave-B was cancelled or failed to meet requirements.


Where the surprise came is the coalition announced that this would be happening prior to commissioning, so late in the build cycle. I firmly believe that at least some of this was just to move the costs associated with fitout and commissioning out of the life of the current parliament (as was the Trident replacement)

QE will be completed with ski jump etc as it's apparently too late to change her construction to an angle deck - and as she's sitting right where the POW needs to be to be built, the quickest way to get to that is to float out the QE, and get that space free for the POW, which is assumed to be good to go with cats and arresting gear from day one.

It's not a case of it being too expensive to cancel her, it's just too late in her build cycle to match the change in requirements.

There's strong talk of both carriers being fully fitted out in time, to be revisited in 2015.

Hang in there, we'll get it sorted. It's not like we started designing and constructing a whole class of ships before defining requirements, like, say, DDG-1000. Or LCS...

Ian

Thought I would drag up this issue again with a new twist on the fuel consumption issue. Here's a congressional report stating that by 2040 (well within the QE class' lifespan), it may be more economical to operate many surface vessels (especially the larger ones) under nuclear power rather than with petroleum fuel.

http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=12169

Any thoughts on the UK's decision to "go smokey"?

[bjr1028]

Great video, shame they let this capability laps. It would have made the Falklands War a lot easier (might not have taken place at all).

Falklands wouldn't have happened at all. The argies waited until Ark and Eagle were scrapped and took advantage of the Harrier's lack of range, BVR capability, and deep strike capability. Phantoms and Bucs would have been able to strike the FAA and Armada at their bases and the Phantom's cap would have been much more extensive.

[neptune]

[quote="1st503rdsgt...Any thoughts on the UK's decision to "go smokey"?[/quote]

More Romantic!