FNG

[neurotech]

JB

haha that is funny you mentioned that......exactly where I am at, or where I'm trying to get away from now My first couple of approach turns, you guessed it, I was sawing the throttle like you do in a Hornet......except the thing has so much power and is so slick (even with speedbrakes out) that you just accelerate to like 200 knots in the process. Completely different animal in the landing pattern.

When I worked as a civilian contractor, mainly in the simulator, we had a few test pilots who flew both F-16s and F/A-18s. The pilots were always instructed to "use the tailhook" because the F/A-18 is designed to make a trap, and we'd look really dumb overrunning the runway. The F-16s would also go for an arrested landing somewhat regularly.

The two comments that might be useful in the F-16 is always be prepared to go around, especially when "a little" high on landing. If the nose attitude isn't maintained for aerobraking, there is a real risk of an overrun. The video of the 2011 mishap at Oshkosh is a classic example.


Here is the mishap report.
https://timemilitary.files.wordpress.co ... 6c_aib.pdf

[jbgator]

In the case of Oshkosh there is no arresting cable so the hook does you no good. Going around with a fast/long touchdown is a good idea in any airplane. In this case he indicated his vision was too obscured to safely go around. I have seen bad ECS fogging but never that bad.

But this does go in line with my previous post to 35 AOA about pilots regularly landing at 8-9 AOA as a technique to avoid speed brake/tail strikes. You get away with it on a long dry runway but it puts you in a bad situation when it is short and/or wet. They won't always get to land at Fallon. That is why I would never let a student keep landing like that. They would have to show me an 11+ AOA landing consistently before I cleared them solo. Proper Aerobraking is obviously important and I think the F-15/16 were the first USAF fighters to use the technique (obviously not in F-4) and it was not used in the T-38, so all our students needed to learn it as something new. It definitely impacts landing roll if you do it wrong but I am skeptical in the case of this accident, as fast and long as he landed, that it would have made a difference.

[neurotech]

In the case of Oshkosh there is no arresting cable so the hook does you no good. Going around with a fast/long touchdown is a good idea in any airplane. In this case he indicated his vision was too obscured to safely go around. I have seen bad ECS fogging but never that bad.

But this does go in line with my previous post to 35 AOA about pilots regularly landing at 8-9 AOA as a technique to avoid speed brake/tail strikes. You get away with it on a long dry runway but it puts you in a bad situation when it is short and/or wet. They won't always get to land at Fallon. That is why I would never let a student keep landing like that. They would have to show me an 11+ AOA landing consistently before I cleared them solo. Proper Aerobraking is obviously important and I think the F-15/16 were the first USAF fighters to use the technique (obviously not in F-4) and it was not used in the T-38, so all our students needed to learn it as something new. It definitely impacts landing roll if you do it wrong but I am skeptical in the case of this accident, as fast and long as he landed, that it would have made a difference.

I'm kind of skeptical of the Oshkosh mishap explanation. There have been numerous reports of cockpit fogging, but very few resulted in a mishap. I also knew that there was no arresting gear on the runway at Oshkosh.

You can imagine why it would be unacceptable for a test pilot to damage an aircraft in a 'pilot induced' mishap by being complacent with landing technique. Apparently, some Air Force pilots seem to think that arresting gear is only for emergencies. Navy pilots are usually quite experienced with arrested landings, obviously. There have been times when gusty winds (technically within NATOPS limits) were enough that the pilot opted for arresting gear.

Most Naval Aviators have heard the tragic story of Capt. Hank Kleemann, and how his F/A-18 flipped over, and why the NATOPS recommends against aerobraking on landing. Doing a no-flare landing in a F-16 could quite easily wreck the jet. One of the factors in Capt. Kleemann's mishap was "negative transference" from techniques he used in the F-14.

Your posts on F-16 landing technique make a lot of sense, not disagreeing with you.

[jbgator]

Arresting gear IS only for emergencies in AF aircraft as they are not designed for regular arrestment. We did not use the hook to stop in any normal situations. All use of the hook is addressed in the emergencies section of the Dash-1 and checklists. As such, it is by USAF definition an emergency procedure. The only time I used the hook for other than emergency situations was to test an arresting cable. This was done at about 100 knots. USAF aircraft cannot raise their hook after it is dropped and in the F-16 there is a sheer pin that must be replaced by MX after an engagement so it isn't something done routinely.

And it is "unacceptable" for any pilot, not just a test pilot, to damage an aircraft due to complacent landing technique. All pilots know that and AF pilots are no less interested in avoiding it than Navy pilots or test pilots. I trained a lot of student test pilots to fly the F-16 after they had several accidents at Edwards and decided that handing a test pilot a Dash-1 and saying "go fly it" doesn't work so well. After one crashed an F-16 doing an SFO they added them to the TR phase of our classes at Luke and they got conversion academics and several TR rides before they could go back to the TPS and fly F-16s.

And you would be surprised to know how much sink rate an F-16 can survive on landing without "wrecking the jet" as I have experienced multiple times with new students who mess up the flare.

[35_aoa]

I'm kind of skeptical of the Oshkosh mishap explanation. There have been numerous reports of cockpit fogging, but very few resulted in a mishap. I also knew that there was no arresting gear on the runway at Oshkosh.

You can imagine why it would be unacceptable for a test pilot to damage an aircraft in a 'pilot induced' mishap by being complacent with landing technique. Apparently, some Air Force pilots seem to think that arresting gear is only for emergencies. Navy pilots are usually quite experienced with arrested landings, obviously. There have been times when gusty winds (technically within NATOPS limits) were enough that the pilot opted for arresting gear.

Most Naval Aviators have heard the tragic story of Capt. Hank Kleemann, and how his F/A-18 flipped over, and why the NATOPS recommends against aerobraking on landing. Doing a no-flare landing in a F-16 could quite easily wreck the jet. One of the factors in Capt. Kleemann's mishap was "negative transference" from techniques he used in the F-14.

Your posts on F-16 landing technique make a lot of sense, not disagreeing with you.

Yeah, have seen some pretty good fogging as well, but nothing as apparently incapacitating as that. Was the Kleemann accident the one at Miramar where the guy drowned in the drainage ditch just north of RWY 24? First planing link failure for the Hornet IIRC. Funny thing is that guys in the Super now will actually aerobrake to some extent, but just given the FCS and the Aileron/Rudder Interconnect, it is not a great thing to do in a crosswind. I'd tend to say it is just a bad idea in any F/A-18, but I didn't grow up in the Rhino. There are enough weird directional control issues to deal with as it is, better to just plant it on the ground and start using NWS and get yourself into a PIO or worse, smack a horizontal stab on the runway (which has been done).

[35_aoa]

And you would be surprised to know how much sink rate an F-16 can survive on landing without "wrecking the jet" as I have experienced multiple times with new students who mess up the flare.

Interesting to hear, I guess I have been pretty cautious about letting a sink rate develop because I just figured the mains wouldn't take much.....that and I don't want to get the inevitable bounce......so I will typically be in the flare a little longer before touchdown than maybe is ideal for a shorter runway.

Another interesting difference is that the flaps come up with the gear handle. Anyone ever settle back onto the runway being too aggressive/bringing up the gear too slow? I've heard 190 is a good minimum number, pretty similar to 180 in the Hornet before you move the flaps up to "auto"

[neurotech]

Yeah, have seen some pretty good fogging as well, but nothing as apparently incapacitating as that. Was the Kleemann accident the one at Miramar where the guy drowned in the drainage ditch just north of RWY 24? First planing link failure for the Hornet IIRC. Funny thing is that guys in the Super now will actually aerobrake to some extent, but just given the FCS and the Aileron/Rudder Interconnect, it is not a great thing to do in a crosswind. I'd tend to say it is just a bad idea in any F/A-18, but I didn't grow up in the Rhino. There are enough weird directional control issues to deal with as it is, better to just plant it on the ground and start using NWS and get yourself into a PIO or worse, smack a horizontal stab on the runway (which has been done).

Thats the crash I was referring to. The planing link failure sent the jet off the runway and he drowned.

We had Rhinos (early 2000s) for operational testing (operated by Boeing) and the test pilots were not big on aerobraking, even with the FCS update. We had an incident where a Rhino did a firm landing in a crosswind, then started PIOing down the runway. The pilot powered up and grabbed the cable on the next approach. It was a combination of pilot handling, and a minor FCS software glitch. Aerobraking is not a good idea in the Rhino.

Have you had any instruction for the F-16 for Navy vs USAF procedures?

[johnwill]

Of course, I'm not a pilot and am not trying to horn in on your very interesting conversation, but concerning aerobraking and sink rates, I can offer a comment. Aerobraking was used routinely by F-102, F-106, and B-58. It should be obvious why, the very large area delta wings common to those three provided a lot of drag with the nose up.

F-16 landing sink rate capability is designed for two gross weight conditions, "landplane landing weight" and "max design landing weight". Landplane landing weight is roughly what you have returning from an air to air mission and max design landing weight is what you have returning from an air to ground mission. Those weights are specified in structural design requirements and vary with Block Number to account for the increased gross weight of the various blocks. Way back when, Block 1, 5, 10, and 15 airplane gear design landing weights were about 19.5k and 27.5k. Anyway, design sink rate for landplane landing weight is 10 ft/sec and for max design landing weight it is 6 ft/sec. A normal 12 or 13 deg AoA on speed landing will result in a sink rate of 1 or 2 ft/sec. So you can see there is a large margin of gear strength for higher sink rates.

For really heavy landings, brake energy limits are more critical than sink rate limits. That's where aerobraking helps.

[35_aoa]

Yeah, have seen some pretty good fogging as well, but nothing as apparently incapacitating as that. Was the Kleemann accident the one at Miramar where the guy drowned in the drainage ditch just north of RWY 24? First planing link failure for the Hornet IIRC. Funny thing is that guys in the Super now will actually aerobrake to some extent, but just given the FCS and the Aileron/Rudder Interconnect, it is not a great thing to do in a crosswind. I'd tend to say it is just a bad idea in any F/A-18, but I didn't grow up in the Rhino. There are enough weird directional control issues to deal with as it is, better to just plant it on the ground and start using NWS and get yourself into a PIO or worse, smack a horizontal stab on the runway (which has been done).

Thats the crash I was referring to. The planing link failure sent the jet off the runway and he drowned.

We had Rhinos (early 2000s) for operational testing (operated by Boeing) and the test pilots were not big on aerobraking, even with the FCS update. We had an incident where a Rhino did a firm landing in a crosswind, then started PIOing down the runway. The pilot powered up and grabbed the cable on the next approach. It was a combination of pilot handling, and a minor FCS software glitch. Aerobraking is not a good idea in the Rhino.

Have you had any instruction for the F-16 for Navy vs USAF procedures?

Yeah, just like you said, not something I am interested in doing in an -18......the brakes are very good, there is really no good reason to do so; I've really gotten on them on a couple occasions, and never saw anything close to having "hot brakes" or blowing fuze plugs or anything like that. As for instruction of USN vs USAF procedures, our training is 100% in house now, after Tuscon stopped teaching block 15. That being said, our syllabus leverages pretty heavily off the USAF program......all the ground school products are pretty much pirated from the USAF. Are there any specific procedures you had in mind? Would be interested to hear if there was something that we aren't getting.

[jbgator]

JW, just as soon as I posted it I remembered the Deltas and aerobrake...good catch. But by the time I was teaching F-16 pilots (1986-1989) at FTU there were none left so all TX course studs came from F-4 (the real Rhino), A-7, A-10, etc. and had little to no experience with aerobrake. Landing in a heavy sink rate still produces a bounce and if it was a B-model with me in the pit the AutoThrottle (i.e. me) was already coming on to go around anyway. With the sidestick controller you could not "help" a student and they could not feel your inputs if you made them. Paddling them off in close was not good either as the flight controls would temporarily go neutral till you made your input. So I just kept my hand resting on the throttle and if they did something dumb I shoved it forward. Obviously the F-16 would not take a sink rate like the F-4 and some of my hardest landings were F-4 pilots who didn't flare.

35 AOA, the gear up settle you mention has not, to my knowledge, resulted in runway impact but your ROT is good. As to firm touchdowns, there is one time when it is a good idea. When you land on a wet runway you need to make sure you get enough friction to get the wheels spun up before braking. As I tell people, all the notes, warnings, and cautions in the F-16 Dash-1 have names for me. In 1984 an F-16 landed in a good thunderstorm in Incirlik Turkey and went off the side of the runway (Looked like the Oshkosh, mud all the way through the motor). Turns out he landed so smoothly no WOW and wheel spin up before he applied the brakes. Wheels lock up, when WOW finally occurs both tires blow simultaneously and he was along for the ride. That jet was at the Lik for almost a year getting fixed as the nose gear went up through the intake.

Fogging is jet specific, some are worse than others. Don't know why. Usually in humid environs you needed to blow out the moisture before flight. This meant, despite the heat, going to full-hot and defog forward. I have seen it blow out snow in some situations.

JB

[neurotech]

Yeah, just like you said, not something I am interested in doing in an -18......the brakes are very good, there is really no good reason to do so; I've really gotten on them on a couple occasions, and never saw anything close to having "hot brakes" or blowing fuze plugs or anything like that. As for instruction of USN vs USAF procedures, our training is 100% in house now, after Tuscon stopped teaching block 15. That being said, our syllabus leverages pretty heavily off the USAF program......all the ground school products are pretty much pirated from the USAF. Are there any specific procedures you had in mind? Would be interested to hear if there was something that we aren't getting.

Some Navy pilots in F-16s (USAF FTU trained) were carrying too much AoA in close, and not adding enough power, causing a high sink rate. Navy pilots were making late power corrections, when a "wave off" would have been safer.

Landing on a wet, slippery runway was another area where the -1 was vague, but the NATOPS specifies what is not recommended, and what is prohibited.

Another issue was pilots were misjudging their fuel state, especially for mixed formations. NATOPS is more explicit and recommends briefing fuel states before the flight. On certain missions, the F/A-18s were buddy tanking, but not the F-16s. This led to a few close calls.

I'm sure someone will point out that most of this is either obvious, or just good airmanship. NATOPS is explicit in some areas where the -1 is a little vague.

[35_aoa]

Yeah, just like you said, not something I am interested in doing in an -18......the brakes are very good, there is really no good reason to do so; I've really gotten on them on a couple occasions, and never saw anything close to having "hot brakes" or blowing fuze plugs or anything like that. As for instruction of USN vs USAF procedures, our training is 100% in house now, after Tuscon stopped teaching block 15. That being said, our syllabus leverages pretty heavily off the USAF program......all the ground school products are pretty much pirated from the USAF. Are there any specific procedures you had in mind? Would be interested to hear if there was something that we aren't getting.

Some Navy pilots in F-16s (USAF FTU trained) were carrying too much AoA in close, and not adding enough power, causing a high sink rate. Navy pilots were making late power corrections, when a "wave off" would have been safer.

Landing on a wet, slippery runway was another area where the -1 was vague, but the NATOPS specifies what is not recommended, and what is prohibited.

Another issue was pilots were misjudging their fuel state, especially for mixed formations. NATOPS is more explicit and recommends briefing fuel states before the flight. On certain missions, the F/A-18s were buddy tanking, but not the F-16s. This led to a few close calls.

I'm sure someone will point out that most of this is either obvious, or just good airmanship. NATOPS is explicit in some areas where the -1 is a little vague.

Yeah, I have noticed that about the -1. Also the CAPs are written in a much more vague manner IMO, specifically OCF I'd say. However, we don't have a NATOPS for the F-16, not sure if there was one at one point in time, but all I have is the -1. Obviously there is the 3710 which covers general NATOPS (separate manual, not type/model/series specific), which I'm assuming is what you are getting at here.