
Elite 5K
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Director, Operational Test and Evaluation | F-35A Joint Strike Fighter
Readiness for Training Operational Utility Evaluation Feb 2013
http://pogoarchives.org/straus/ote-info ... 130215.pdf (0.7Mb)
Several sites including this one at BattleLand reference this PDF. I'll go read the PDF now.
More F-35 Turbulence Winslow Wheeler March 06, 2013
http://nation.time.com/2013/03/06/more-f-35-turbulence/
_________________________
Winslow Wheeler: Treason They Name is F-35A — We Expect Hagel to “Do A Cheney” 06 March 2013
http://www.phibetaiota.net/2013/03/wins ... -a-cheney/
"...Table 3-1 (starting on p. 14.) outlines the many limitations. The following are prohibited:
· Descent rates more than 6,000 feet per minute (for reference, Wikipedia shows the F-16C rate of climb to be 50,000 feet per minute);
· Airspeed above 550 knots per hour or Mach 0.9 (not the 1.6 Mach or 1,200 mph Wikipedia says the F-35 is capable of);
· Angle-of-attack (attitude of flight) beyond -5 and +18 degrees (e.g. not the +50 degrees the aircraft is capable of);
· Maneuvering at more than -1 or +5 gs (nowhere near the stated +9g capability);
· Take offs or landings in formation;
· Flying at night or in weather;
· Using real or simulated weapons;
· Rapid stick or rudder movements;
· Air-to-air or air-to-ground tracking maneuvers;
· Refueling in the air;
· Flying within 25 miles of lightning;
· Use of electronic countermeasures;
· Use of anti-jamming, secure communications, or datalink systems;
· Electro-optical targeting;
· Using the Distributed Aperture System of sensors to detect targets or threats;
· Using the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Interrogator;
· Using the helmet mounted display system as a “primary reference;”
· Use of air-to-air or air-to-ground radar modes for electronic attack, sea search, ground-moving targets or close-in air combat modes. (pp. 14-16.)..."
_____________________________
Just some of what is in this report apparently. Some of this stuff seems to be reasonable in the circumstances of 'early days' 'still under test' etc. But youse knew that - right? For example from the report PDF - an explanation of the circumstances at moment:
Executive Summary...
"...The Block 1A training syllabus used during the OUE was limited by the current restrictions of the aircraft. Aircraft operating limitations prohibit flying the aircraft at night or in instrument meteorological conditions, hence pilots must avoid clouds and other weather. However, the student pilots are able to simulate instrument flight in visual meterological conditions to practice basic instrument procedures. These restrictions are in place because testing has not been completed to certify the aircraft for night and instrument flight.
The aircraft also is currently prohibited from flying close formation, aerobatics, and stalls, all of which would normally be in the familiarization phase of transition training, which typically is an introduction to aircraft systems, handling characteristics throughout the aircraft envelope, and qualification to operate/land in visual and instrument meteorological conditions. This familiarization phase is about one-fourth of the training in a typical fighter aircraft transition or requalification course. In a mature fighter aircraft, the familiarization phase is followed by several combat-oriented phases, such as air combat, surface attack, and night tactical operations. The F-35A does not yet have the capability to train in these phases, nor any actual combat capability, because it is still early in system development...." DUH.
&
..."The limitations, workarounds, and restrictions in place in an air system this early in development limit the utility of training. Also, little can be learned from evaluating training in a system this immature. However, the evaluation indicates areas where the program needs to focus attention and make improvements. The radar, the pilot’s helmet-mounted display (HMD), and the cockpit interfaces for controlling the radios and navigational functions should be improved. Discrepancies between the courseware and the flight manuals were frequently observed, and the timelines to fix or update courseware should be shortened. The training management system lags in development compared to the rest of the Integrated Training Center and does not yet have all planned functionality...."
&
"...Given its many significant limitations, the results of the OUE should not be used to make decisions regarding the readiness of the JSF system to support training inexperienced pilots in an F-35A initial qualification course.
Recommendations
The program should:
- Complete testing of the pilot escape system (transparency removal and ejection seat) under off-nominal ejections as soon as possible.
- Complete certification and installation of the water-activated-release system for the ejection seat as soon as possible to enhance pilot survivability in the event of an overwater ejection.
- Fully resolve Category 1 deficiency reports relevant to training operations at Eglin AFB as soon as possible.
- Continue to track air and ground abort rates and discovery rates as indicators of
system maturity.
- Implement pilot-vehicle interface improvements in the cockpit displays and touch
screen controls for communication and navigation functions as identified by pilots in
the OUE.
- Address the discrepancies identified in the simulation certification report, coupled with the student pilot's experience in the aircraft during the OUE, to assure the simulated flameout training for F-35 pilots is adequate.
- Re-evaluate the 96 information assurance controls once the information assurance
deficiencies and the lack of an Information Assurance Manager have been corrected
for the Unclassified Operational Environment.
- Once the classified network is in place, accomplish an assessment similar to the
information assurance assessment of the Unclassified Operational Environment.
- Evaluate reliability performance and make adjustments to assure interim reliability
growth targets and, eventually, ORD thresholds can be met.
- Assure adequate sparing of HMD parts and equipment are in place at the training
center and at follow-on field units to meet requirements.
- Track all hours for personnel supporting F-35A sustainment to enable accurate
assessments of direct and indirect maintenance man hours.
- Collect information on ALIS availability, reliability, maintainability, logistics
supportability, and data administration to support evaluation of performance...."
&
LATER:
"...The training syllabus used in this evaluation, the Block 1A syllabus, is an early phase – termed here as the familiarization phase – of what will eventually become the complete training syllabus for experienced pilots who have flown in other fighter aircraft and are transitioning to the F-35A. This partial syllabus is the first 6-8 weeks of a full syllabus that will take approximately 40 weeks to complete. Another syllabus, used for initial qualification of inexperienced pilots, is under development and will be more robust, include a more expansive familiarization phase, and take longer to complete. The Air Force intends to start training with inexperienced pilots in 2014...."
_______________
_______________
Reminds me of the first A4G OFS at NAS Nowra (although I was not there at the time I arrived soon afterwards to hear the 'tales of woe') from around end of 1967 until end of 1968. [I arrived at NAS Nowra beginning of 1969.] More than one year was taken for that first Operational Flying School course (mostly with seasoned Sea Venom pilots) due to aircraft unavailability for many diverse reasons such as lack of spares, maintainers unfamiliar with the aircraft being trained on the job (initial cadre trained in USofA then training others back at NAS Nowra). Even lack of boarding ladders could be a real hassle at the time, but youse get the picture. Life ain't easy for the 'plank owners'. Later the second course took one year then my course took 4 months from Feb to May 1971, whilst most following courses took around 3-4 months with many variables such as weather and such. Having few aircraft at beginning (ten and later 20) exacerbated the availability issues whilst having 20 made a big difference to the training squadron VC-724 with ten (4 trainers and 6 single seaters).
'plank owner': http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plankowner
Readiness for Training Operational Utility Evaluation Feb 2013
http://pogoarchives.org/straus/ote-info ... 130215.pdf (0.7Mb)
Several sites including this one at BattleLand reference this PDF. I'll go read the PDF now.
More F-35 Turbulence Winslow Wheeler March 06, 2013
http://nation.time.com/2013/03/06/more-f-35-turbulence/
_________________________
Winslow Wheeler: Treason They Name is F-35A — We Expect Hagel to “Do A Cheney” 06 March 2013
http://www.phibetaiota.net/2013/03/wins ... -a-cheney/
"...Table 3-1 (starting on p. 14.) outlines the many limitations. The following are prohibited:
· Descent rates more than 6,000 feet per minute (for reference, Wikipedia shows the F-16C rate of climb to be 50,000 feet per minute);
· Airspeed above 550 knots per hour or Mach 0.9 (not the 1.6 Mach or 1,200 mph Wikipedia says the F-35 is capable of);
· Angle-of-attack (attitude of flight) beyond -5 and +18 degrees (e.g. not the +50 degrees the aircraft is capable of);
· Maneuvering at more than -1 or +5 gs (nowhere near the stated +9g capability);
· Take offs or landings in formation;
· Flying at night or in weather;
· Using real or simulated weapons;
· Rapid stick or rudder movements;
· Air-to-air or air-to-ground tracking maneuvers;
· Refueling in the air;
· Flying within 25 miles of lightning;
· Use of electronic countermeasures;
· Use of anti-jamming, secure communications, or datalink systems;
· Electro-optical targeting;
· Using the Distributed Aperture System of sensors to detect targets or threats;
· Using the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Interrogator;
· Using the helmet mounted display system as a “primary reference;”
· Use of air-to-air or air-to-ground radar modes for electronic attack, sea search, ground-moving targets or close-in air combat modes. (pp. 14-16.)..."
_____________________________
Just some of what is in this report apparently. Some of this stuff seems to be reasonable in the circumstances of 'early days' 'still under test' etc. But youse knew that - right? For example from the report PDF - an explanation of the circumstances at moment:
Executive Summary...
"...The Block 1A training syllabus used during the OUE was limited by the current restrictions of the aircraft. Aircraft operating limitations prohibit flying the aircraft at night or in instrument meteorological conditions, hence pilots must avoid clouds and other weather. However, the student pilots are able to simulate instrument flight in visual meterological conditions to practice basic instrument procedures. These restrictions are in place because testing has not been completed to certify the aircraft for night and instrument flight.
The aircraft also is currently prohibited from flying close formation, aerobatics, and stalls, all of which would normally be in the familiarization phase of transition training, which typically is an introduction to aircraft systems, handling characteristics throughout the aircraft envelope, and qualification to operate/land in visual and instrument meteorological conditions. This familiarization phase is about one-fourth of the training in a typical fighter aircraft transition or requalification course. In a mature fighter aircraft, the familiarization phase is followed by several combat-oriented phases, such as air combat, surface attack, and night tactical operations. The F-35A does not yet have the capability to train in these phases, nor any actual combat capability, because it is still early in system development...." DUH.
&
..."The limitations, workarounds, and restrictions in place in an air system this early in development limit the utility of training. Also, little can be learned from evaluating training in a system this immature. However, the evaluation indicates areas where the program needs to focus attention and make improvements. The radar, the pilot’s helmet-mounted display (HMD), and the cockpit interfaces for controlling the radios and navigational functions should be improved. Discrepancies between the courseware and the flight manuals were frequently observed, and the timelines to fix or update courseware should be shortened. The training management system lags in development compared to the rest of the Integrated Training Center and does not yet have all planned functionality...."
&
"...Given its many significant limitations, the results of the OUE should not be used to make decisions regarding the readiness of the JSF system to support training inexperienced pilots in an F-35A initial qualification course.
Recommendations
The program should:
- Complete testing of the pilot escape system (transparency removal and ejection seat) under off-nominal ejections as soon as possible.
- Complete certification and installation of the water-activated-release system for the ejection seat as soon as possible to enhance pilot survivability in the event of an overwater ejection.
- Fully resolve Category 1 deficiency reports relevant to training operations at Eglin AFB as soon as possible.
- Continue to track air and ground abort rates and discovery rates as indicators of
system maturity.
- Implement pilot-vehicle interface improvements in the cockpit displays and touch
screen controls for communication and navigation functions as identified by pilots in
the OUE.
- Address the discrepancies identified in the simulation certification report, coupled with the student pilot's experience in the aircraft during the OUE, to assure the simulated flameout training for F-35 pilots is adequate.
- Re-evaluate the 96 information assurance controls once the information assurance
deficiencies and the lack of an Information Assurance Manager have been corrected
for the Unclassified Operational Environment.
- Once the classified network is in place, accomplish an assessment similar to the
information assurance assessment of the Unclassified Operational Environment.
- Evaluate reliability performance and make adjustments to assure interim reliability
growth targets and, eventually, ORD thresholds can be met.
- Assure adequate sparing of HMD parts and equipment are in place at the training
center and at follow-on field units to meet requirements.
- Track all hours for personnel supporting F-35A sustainment to enable accurate
assessments of direct and indirect maintenance man hours.
- Collect information on ALIS availability, reliability, maintainability, logistics
supportability, and data administration to support evaluation of performance...."
&
LATER:
"...The training syllabus used in this evaluation, the Block 1A syllabus, is an early phase – termed here as the familiarization phase – of what will eventually become the complete training syllabus for experienced pilots who have flown in other fighter aircraft and are transitioning to the F-35A. This partial syllabus is the first 6-8 weeks of a full syllabus that will take approximately 40 weeks to complete. Another syllabus, used for initial qualification of inexperienced pilots, is under development and will be more robust, include a more expansive familiarization phase, and take longer to complete. The Air Force intends to start training with inexperienced pilots in 2014...."
_______________
_______________
Reminds me of the first A4G OFS at NAS Nowra (although I was not there at the time I arrived soon afterwards to hear the 'tales of woe') from around end of 1967 until end of 1968. [I arrived at NAS Nowra beginning of 1969.] More than one year was taken for that first Operational Flying School course (mostly with seasoned Sea Venom pilots) due to aircraft unavailability for many diverse reasons such as lack of spares, maintainers unfamiliar with the aircraft being trained on the job (initial cadre trained in USofA then training others back at NAS Nowra). Even lack of boarding ladders could be a real hassle at the time, but youse get the picture. Life ain't easy for the 'plank owners'. Later the second course took one year then my course took 4 months from Feb to May 1971, whilst most following courses took around 3-4 months with many variables such as weather and such. Having few aircraft at beginning (ten and later 20) exacerbated the availability issues whilst having 20 made a big difference to the training squadron VC-724 with ten (4 trainers and 6 single seaters).
'plank owner': http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plankowner
Last edited by spazsinbad on 06 Mar 2013, 22:37, edited 7 times in total.
A4G Skyhawk: www.faaaa.asn.au/spazsinbad-a4g/ & www.youtube.com/channel/UCwqC_s6gcCVvG7NOge3qfAQ/videos?view_as=subscriber