F-35B for USN???

Should the US Navy consider acquiring a modest number of F-35B's??? These could operate along side USMC F-35B's on Amphibious Ships.....or numerous other missions well suited to the type. For example USN Aircraft Carriers often have to transit restricted waters like the Red Sea. This leaves them extremely vulnerable....

Heheh. The USN is 'having troubles' purchasing a modest number of F-35Cs. Don't burden them with F-35Bs. Call MARINES!

...in what appears to be a little known fact that the USMC is a component of the department of the navy, to be specific, since only 1834.

...in what appears to be a little known fact that the USMC is a component of the department of the navy, to be specific, since only 1834.

I am sure most members are well aware of that....

...in what appears to be a little known fact that the USMC is a component of the department of the navy, to be specific, since only 1834.

I am sure most members are well aware of that....

Heheh. The USN is 'having troubles' purchasing a modest number of F-35Cs. Don't burden them with F-35Bs. Call MARINES!

Personally, I am very suspect of the numbers provided by the November Issue of Combat Aircraft about the F-35C Roadmap. They just don't add up as the projected buy of F-35C's is 20+ aircraft per FY. That would be enough for 1.5 Squadrons yearly. Which, assumes the US Congress won't fund pass what the USN requests. Which, they usually do...


As for calling the Marines. They already have far more commitments for their F-35B's than aircraft. From US Naval Amphibious Forces to NATO to the Royal Navy. (i.e. Queen Elizabeth Class Carriers) Hence, the reason for this thread..

Why can't the USMC buy more F-35Bs per year to help the USN out? Ignored so far is that we have seen no interest from the USN about hosting F-35Bs aboard their CVNs. As for the USMC F-35Bs being 'overcommitted' that is another matter.

Its not a question of costs. The reason why marines are onboard carriers were for dedicated air tasking. With only 6-12 Bs on most phibs, there's no issue of navy air tasking and no question of coordinating the Bs with Cs. The Bs only have a role within the marines and the Bs operate as part of the navy. That's why both branches have the same ultimate boss.

The marine F-35B org structure is already based on maximizing every single LHD there is. It'll be hell no for the USMC to relinquish any LHD sqn to anyone other than marines. Other than the USMC, no one else has a use for phibs.

The USN structures its aviation based on CVWs. Why would it buy Bs that won't operate on CVWs? Its already a budget constraint that they can't get enough Cs for their 40 strike sqns, this can't even get past question 1 on role before we even start talking about costs.

This thread is an absolute non-starter.

My reference to Superman and kryptonite on another thread was not casual. The tailhook Navy would cut off important body parts before they would allow F-35Bs on CVNs. Why? Because the jet represents a real world instantiation of alternatives to the 100K, $13B means of putting tacair at sea today. It’s part of the Navy’s aversion to JSF; had F-35B died back in the days of probation, they would have had a circumstantial opportunity to extract themselves from the program (which they wanted to do from the days of JAST). The other relevant observation is that the ‘B’ doesn’t solve any of their challenges (as CSBA and others have suggested) with ‘reach’.

Operational Navy F-35Bs? Snowball’s chance in hell...as they say.

My reference to Superman and kryptonite on another thread was not casual. The tailhook Navy would cut off important body parts before they would allow F-35Bs on CVNs. Why? Because the jet represents a real world instantiation of alternatives to the 100K, $13B means of putting tacair at sea today. It’s part of the Navy’s aversion to JSF; had F-35B died back in the days of probation, they would have had a circumstantial opportunity to extract themselves from the program (which they wanted to do from the days of JAST). The other relevant observation is that the ‘B’ doesn’t solve any of their challenges (as CSBA and others have suggested) with ‘reach’.

QS, why are elements of the Navy so averse to the F-35 / JSF? Is it strictly because it was not originally their program? Or because of the single motor? All of the above? Something different?

I mean, the A-12, a Navy program, was such an overwhelming success... yet the F-35C would appear to meet almost all the A-12 requirements. VLO, 5000+lbs internal ordnance, higher ceiling, faster top speed, more maneuverable. Maximum Or is it that the F-35C does not (yet) have the (magical?) 800nm range of the A-12? Is the fact that the cockpit dwelling requirements of the F-35C are half as great as the A-12 a problem? But that would seem an advantage of the JSF / F-35 in this day and age where finding enough butts for seats can be an issue.

All of the above, but ‘wasn’t their program’ would be top of the list. They were going to be a small participant, numbers-wise in a ‘joint’ requirements fight that was going to force compromises that they didn’t want to entertain (eg one engine vs two). The other large animal in the room was about institutional equities between the systems commands — who’s in charge, how is it organized, whose policies apply wrt oversight in development and test, etc, etc. Then, of course, was the little matter of OSD’s intent to make the program a new model for USG acquisition, or in other words, a major indictment and disruption of the status quo (that the syscoms were a central part of). When the champions of that idea in OSD finally filtered out of the system, the bureaucratic antibodies in acquisition re-emerged to normalize the program back into more conventional strictures.

My reference to Superman and kryptonite on another thread was not casual. The tailhook Navy would cut off important body parts before they would allow F-35Bs on CVNs. Why? Because the jet represents a real world instantiation of alternatives to the 100K, $13B means of putting tacair at sea today. It’s part of the Navy’s aversion to JSF; had F-35B died back in the days of probation, they would have had a circumstantial opportunity to extract themselves from the program (which they wanted to do from the days of JAST). The other relevant observation is that the ‘B’ doesn’t solve any of their challenges (as CSBA and others have suggested) with ‘reach’.

Operational Navy F-35Bs? Snowball’s chance in hell...as they say.

I would actually bet on the USAF embracing STOVL before the USN ever would for this very reason. And the USAF never would.

All of the above, but ‘wasn’t their program’ would be top of the list. They were going to be a small participant, numbers-wise in a ‘joint’ requirements fight that was going to force compromises that they didn’t want to entertain (eg one engine vs two). The other large animal in the room was about institutional equities between the systems commands — who’s in charge, how is it organized, whose policies apply wrt oversight in development and test, etc, etc. Then, of course, was the little matter of OSD’s intent to make the program a new model for USG acquisition, or in other words, a major indictment and disruption of the status quo (that the syscoms were a central part of). When the champions of that idea in OSD finally filtered out of the system, the bureaucratic antibodies in acquisition re-emerged to normalize the program back into more conventional strictures.

another one I heard as well, was with the USMC looking for the "lo end" and the USAF the lo end F-16 replacement of the "hi-lo" mix. The USN had the SH and was now looking for the "high end" The USN drove a lot of requirements that ran afoul of the USMC and USAF. some good. some bad.

If Congress offered the B (on top of planned As) as a replacement for the A-10s, I'd say the USAF would take it. They'd highlight they can get more As for the Bs though so why not just give them more As.

No wavy for the navy.