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From 2008 there is a good historical overview of the issues with no hint of the RAN/RAAF operating F-35Bs from the LHDs. However it is mentioned that the USMC is likely to do so when appropriate. Read on....
A HISTORICAL APPRECIATION OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF NAVAL AIR POWER 2008
by Andrew T. Ross and James M. Sandison
with an introduction by Jack McCaffrie (former TACCO S-2E/Gs, CDRE rtd.)
http://www.navy.gov.au/w/images/PIAMA26.pdf
Introduction pages 11-13
"...The second line of criticism of the larger amphibious ships is that they represent part
of a Navy agenda to regain its status as an operator of aircraft carriers.49 The far more
prosaic reality is that the plan to acquire two large amphibious ships is a response to
an Army generated and government approved requirement for the transport, landing
and support ashore of a battalion group and their equipment.
This writer is aware of no Navy agenda to re-introduce an aircraft carrier capability,
yet there are elements of the accusation that merit some reflection. The acquisition of
the amphibious ships recognises the need for an expeditionary capability in the ADF.
To dominate the maritime battlespace and to project power in defence of Australia and
its interests, the ADF must be able to conduct sustained operations at considerable
distances from home bases. Even operations in the waters to the near north of Australia
can be categorised as being at considerable distance from home bases and so the
term ‘expeditionary’ does not apply only to operations in distant parts of the region
and beyond.
Wherever they are deployed, but depending on the potential threat, however, the
amphibious ships would expect to be escorted by Aegis-fitted air warfare destroyers
and other surface combatants to provide protection against submarine, surface or air
threats during transit and in the area of operations. The surface combatants would also
be able to provide air defence and naval gunfire support to ground forces, especially in
the early part of an operation and while they remained relatively close to shore.
Depending on the threat type and level, the air defence capability could also include
support from airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft and tactical
fighters – which might also conduct ground support operations. The presence of these
aircraft could depend on the availability of air-to-air refuelling (AAR) and of friendly
airfields near the area of operations. The five AAR aircraft being acquired under
project AIR 5402, depending on the nature and location of operations, could be both
reliant on the availability of friendly airfields and hard-pressed to support intensive
air operations.
Those who see the amphibious ships as an answer to years of suspected silent but
intense Navy prayer might be granted one point. If Australia is to embark on a genuinely
expeditionary approach to the use of military force it must surely be prepared to
consider a tactical air capability in its deployments. RAAF tactical aircraft, such as
the F/A-18 or the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in future, will not always be needed,
either because the threat level or type will not demand their presence, or because they
will be provided by another Service – in our case this would most likely be one of the
US Services if we are part of a coalition force.
Nevertheless, in cases where tactical aircraft are needed and will not be provided by
another country’s forces, RAAF aircraft must be a part of the expeditionary force. They
could be needed as part of the air defence shield for the deploying ships and for the
ships and ground forces in the area of operations. They could also be tasked for attack
missions in support of the ground forces. If air support of this kind is needed, the
RAAF would in present circumstances need access to one or more overseas air bases,
depending on the location of the area of operations. This kind of access can be difficult
to arrange and in some cases may not be achievable. It would also depend on a very
significant logistics support effort, which might itself depend on sea transport.
An alternative solution to the provision of tactical aircraft for expeditionary operations
could involve the operation of STOVL JSF aircraft from one or both of the large
amphibious ships. For this to be a viable option, the amphibious ships would need to
be capable of operating the aircraft. The Spanish design meets this requirement and the
ship is fitted with a ski jump. Additionally, the ships would need to be able to embark
and operate the JSFs as well as the helicopters embarked for troop lift. Clearly, only a
limited number of JSFs could be embarked and thus the air defence or attack capability
provided would also be limited. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the AEW&C aircraft
and the air warfare destroyer’s Aegis air defence capacity, the aircraft could provide
a credible capability in many scenarios.
This suggestion that the RAAF could operate STOVL JSFs from the amphibious ships
is in line with the UK situation in which the Royal Air Force will fly STOVL JSFs from
the Royal Navy’s new attack carriers. In this sense then it is not in any way a return
to the ‘glory days’ for the RAN but simply a way to ensure that air support is always
available for expeditionary operations, through making full use of the capabilities of
the amphibious ships and of two versions of the JSF aircraft. Even if the idea is not
taken up, however, selection of the Spanish amphibious ship design will enable allied
or coalition partner STOVL aircraft to operate from the ships. US Marine Corps STOVL
JSFs would be the most likely partners.
Conclusion
The recent government decision to acquire two large ‘flat-top’ amphibious ships for the
RAN will provide the ADF with an unprecedented capability to project military force
from the sea. Acquisition of any kind of ships for the RAN, but especially large ones,
often generates criticism, informed and otherwise. The acquisition of these amphibious
ships is no exception, with some commentators seeing them as simply ‘too big’ and
others seeing in them some devious Navy plan to reintroduce aircraft carriers.
The attached 1978 Central Studies Paper, supported by some more recent material
in this introduction, aims to meet these criticisms and to provide a rationale for the
acquisition of these ships. The paper itself shows that in the years up to 1976 there
were many instances in which the capability proved to be invaluable in both peacetime
and wartime or warlike operations. This introduction provides more contemporary
examples to reinforce the point. It also shows that several countries either have
already introduced amphibious ships of the LHD type to their navies, or have plans to
do so. Finally, the introduction provides some thoughts as to how the expeditionary
force capabilities of the ADF could be extended with the embarkation of STOVL JSF
aircraft in these ships."
A4G Skyhawk: www.faaaa.asn.au/spazsinbad-a4g/ & www.youtube.com/channel/UCwqC_s6gcCVvG7NOge3qfAQ/videos?view_as=subscriber