Yes, I basically agree with everything you said and yes, you're right about the PR issue above. However, I still feel that if LM started to pay attention to PR much sooner (IMO, I still think that they started late) what happened above and people Bill Sweetman & his minions or other similar wannabes would have been exposed much sooner.
And this could (I believe) even prevented the pathetic current situation around the Canadian procurement.
You don't really start "late" when the PR battle starts before the airplane is even picked, Sweetman was busted back in 2010.
a quick note on
Canadian PR:
What hurt the F-35 in Canada was BASICALLY (because theres a lot to it and I'm leaving some out):
1. Political football between the various Canadian parties and classic political opportunism, political failures. (this entire thing really is basically 90 percent politics.)
2. F-35 cost escalation
3. Bureaucratic miscommunication between Canadian agencies (namely the cost estimators vs the auditor general who made a stink of them of not calculating the costs out as far enough as he thought they should)
4. SOLE SOURCING (the inability to compare multiple fighters left the F-35 overanalyzed and its competition not analyzed at all- it wasn't until the silly interim fiasco that we finally got a comparative look at the Super Hornet costs after 7 years of sh!t talking) I could go on about sole sourcing, and might in another post.
5. The horribly timed engine fire
6. Amazingly successful Boeing propaganda (see 4)
7. "PR"
Have you noticed that only Canada seems to be having those uniquely Canadian style procurement issues that only the home of "Cadillac helicopter" has?? Thats probably someone else's fault. why is Norway not having the same "PR" problems that Canada has? or Australia? UK? Japan? South Korea? Poland? Belgium? You can complain about PR all you want, but there is not an actual centralized PR firm responsible for how each government explains their decision to the people. Norway handled it well, Canada did not.
In all my time I can safely say Canada is like an alternate universe of F-35 misinformation that NO other country really has, and its far more severe because even your Prime Minister (Trudeau) has been caught falling for it a great example would be those "65 million dollar" Super Hornets that never existed but that the Liberals said were real. for YEARS. ever see that in any other country? is any other nation actually do the silly BS we have seen from Canada for a decade? no other country is having these problems.
One of the big mistakes the old Harper government made was that they forbid people in uniform from speaking publicly about the F-35. You would not believe what an effective PR tool it is, to have someone in a military uniform calmly talk and explain something. those uniforms give a sense of authority, officialdom, credibility, experience, and even trust! Almost like they were designed for that. Since Canada put the stops on that (and it got even WORSE with the Trudeau Gag order) it left people like Billy Flynn to carry the weight the RCAF should have been carrying all along. I know a few heads of the RCAF publicly stated for F-35 here and there but they were rarely covered by the media over all the years.
one of the most vocal and rabidly Gripen Fans on BF4C admittedly tried and failed to get into the Swedish armed forces. He couldn't make it to training day 1 basic training, but is somehow smarter than all the experts who actually do this for a living. but there's no one in a Canadian uniform to tell him to shut up the way Air Marshal in Australia did their detractors. one guy in uniform will wipe out 1000 wannabes. Thats how we do it in the states, thats how most people do it that aren't stupid:

Again its interesting that through uniquely Canadian actions Canada finds itself in uniquely Canadian problems.
theres no amount of "PR" that could save Canada from the internal games and self destruction.
PUBLISHED SEPTEMBER 27, 2012
When the Harper government comes calling for advice on replacing the country's venerable CF-18 fighters, the new commander of Canadian Air Force says he'll repeat what his predecessor has said — the F-35 is the best choice.
But Lt.-Gen. Yvan Blondin was also quick to paint himself as a pragmatist.
"In the end, I'm a military guy. I'm going to salute and carry on with orders and the equipment the government judges adequate," said Lt.-Gen. Blondin shortly after taking over from retiring lieutenant-general Andre Deschamps, whose stalwart defence of the troubled stealth-fighter program occasionally landed him in hot water.
Since the auditor general's scathing assessment of the program last spring, almost everyone in the government, from the prime minister on down, has insisted that a new secretariat overseeing the replacement of the older fighter bombers will look at all options as it analyzes the F-35 program.
Lt.-Gen. Deschamps' insistence that the Lockheed-Martin-built, multi-role fighter is the only choice has irked opposition MPs, who've pointed to his testimony before a House of Commons committee as proof that the fix is in for the F-35.
Lt.-Gen. Blondin, a former fighter pilot and 33-year veteran, said his best advice would be to stick with the program.
"I truly believe, given the mandate that we have now, the F-35 is, from all airplanes that are available, is the best airplane that's out there," he said, but then quickly added: "Now, I'm not a man of absolutes."
Lt.-Gen. Blondin's show of deference is a bit of a departure from Lt.-Gen. Deschamps, who was heavily invested in the 2010 stealth-fighter decision. The auditor general accused both National Defence and Public Works of hiding the full cost and not following proper procedures with the multibillion-dollar program.
Defence expert Phil Lagasse at the University of Ottawa said it's disturbing to note that even though it said the secretariat will look at other options, the government doesn't seem to have ordered the air force to do the same.
"It signals the lack of clear guidance from the government about exactly what they want to do," he said. "It signals a recognition that the file is uncertain and (has) become extremely political, and that military advice and cost alone may not be what determines the outcome anymore."