Corsair1963 wrote:Does anybody really believe. That Canada won't acquire the F-35 in the end....(anybody)

*puts hand up*
I don't, and I've warned numerous times that its much more likely than you all seem to believe (just like all the other things I've warned about thats come to pass.)
Here's the scary thing, Bestfighter4Canada better reflects the thought of the Canadian electorate, and some politicians than F-16.net on this issue. Let that sink in for a minute when you think that the F-35 is the assured option.
I'd urge you all to read this by Alan Stephenson - it explains why the consortium doesn't mean anything for the industrial benefits program and the government's desire. They don't care if we get a Mig-21, so long as they get the political points from the purchase.
https://www.cgai.ca/anatomy_of_a_buy_th ... for_canadaThe latest concession is that “Ottawa will no longer force all bidders to commit 100 per cent of the value of the aircraft’s acquisition and sustainment on spending in Canada. Instead, manufacturers will lose points in the scoring system if they do not make this commitment.”31 This is still inadequate, particularly as the latest reshaping change increases the ITB requirement point score from 15 to 20 per cent of the bid. In a bid, every point counts and the government still fails to concede that the JSF program has already created high-end, sustainable jobs in Canada but that the consortium it belongs to cannot guarantee comprehensive economic outcomes. The current objective scoring system disadvantages the subjective nature of the consortium agreement in which projected potential economic benefits could ultimately surpass the returns required by the ITB policy. A more equitable approach would be to revise the scoring to account for the projected potential earnings from the JSF program as well as the negative repercussions from job losses when JSF contracts are inevitably suspended as a consequence of Canada no longer being a consortium partner. Given the re-emerging great-power competition, it is important to ensure that socioeconomic factors do not inordinately bias the overall cost-benefit analysis needed for Canada to receive the best product for military requirements that still meets beneficial economic returns.
Further explanation for the decision to retain the ITB requirement and preserve a large bidder pool stems from the governing party’s short-term parochial interests. In an election year, qualified suppliers will be encouraged to support economic announcements in key political ridings with the expectation that this will positively position their bid when ITBs are assessed. The promise to assemble aircraft in Canada certainly provides work-related incentives, but one must question the long-term economic benefits and export potential of building fighters in a country that refuses to sell civilian helicopters to the Philippines. Additionally, the offer of complete transfer of intellectual property for relatively unique European platforms is a double-edged sword. Without the benefit of a large pool of resources, the costs associated with developing and continually modifying the Operational Flight Program (OFP) – the embedded software that performs the functions and sub-functions necessary for aircraft weapon systems to operate – are huge. After 15 years of operation, Canada stopped producing unique OFP software for the CF-18s and purchased off-the-shelf upgrades from the U.S. Navy due to the costs associated with development and the stringent test and evaluation requirements. Getting the OFP wrong results in accidents such as the recent crash of the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max. Attempting to integrate discordant equipment into unique platforms is difficult and imprecise. Modifying military requirements to meet short-term parochial socioeconomic interests and benefits can entail unintended costs and consequences.