F-35C Lands at Lakehurst For Testing

https://www.amazon.com/American-Secret-Projects-Interceptors-1945-1978/dp/1857802640

Thank you for that!

Lets do a rerun:

the last non-joint aircraft they (U.S. Navy) got was the Tomcat

Not sure how SH would qualify as a "joint" development... (thereby implying the SH is not-joint too)

But hey, if you want to pretend we'd have the Super Hornet without the YF-17 be my guest. Again, my original point stands: the F-14 was the last USN design.

So in what way is the SH a joint aircraft? Who's requirements, besides the U.S. Navy, were used for the SH?

I'm also not sure why you have to resolve to a straw man argument about the SH not being here without the YF-17. That the SH shares superficial roots with the YF-17 is a given, however that doesn't mean it has the same participants or requirements.

Just to throw gas on the fire, the YF-17 was an evolutionary development of the F-5.

Love this one since it's first design, the N-156, was originally intended to meet a U.S. Navy requirement for a jet fighter to operate from its escort carriers.

It appears to me that there is a significant difference between:

1. One program being an outgrowth of another program, with DNA being derived from earlier designs (where the utilized DNA is relevant to achieving requirements of the current program. . . with irrelevant DNA/requirements being discarded).

And

2. A Joint program where within a single program, large pieces that will be utilized by one Branch are forced to conform to requirements set forth by a separate Branch. If this were not done carefully, the requirements from one Branch would constrain the design of the other due to the inability of discarding irrelevant DNA within the Joint program.

Some in this debate are trying to blur the distinction. If there is a distinction, goal posts have been moved.

If on the other hand, the two concepts are in fact the same, I don't see what the fuss is about--all Military aviation is one big Joint Program started by Orville and Wilbur.

I for for one am keen on picking out where "2" has been successful in the past (and where it has failed). . . . and to what extent history says that it can be successful. Item "1" as a practice will naturally work (assuming the Engineers who selectively choose the DNA to fill the current requirements aren't idiots). Pointing out where "1" has worked does not seem useful or enlightening for understanding the extent to which a Joint program can succeed, and what must be done in order to help it succeed.

Just to throw gas on the fire, the YF-17 was an evolutionary development of the F-5.

Love this one since it's first design, the N-156, was originally intended to meet a U.S. Navy requirement for a jet fighter to operate from its escort carriers.

I didn't know that. I got to learn something today. Thanks!

It appears to me that there is a significant difference between:

1. One program being an outgrowth of another program, with DNA being derived from earlier designs (where the utilized DNA is relevant to achieving requirements of the current program. . . with irrelevant DNA/requirements being discarded).

And

2. A Joint program where within a single program, large pieces that will be utilized by one Branch are forced to conform to requirements set forth by a separate Branch. If this were not done carefully, the requirements from one Branch would constrain the design of the other due to the inability of discarding irrelevant DNA within the Joint program.

Some in this debate are trying to blur the distinction. If there is a distinction, goal posts have been moved.

If on the other hand, the two concepts are in fact the same, I don't see what the fuss is about--all Military aviation is one big Joint Program started by Orville and Wilbur.

I for for one am keen on picking out where "2" has been successful in the past (and where it has failed). . . . and to what extent history says that it can be successful. Item "1" as a practice will naturally work (assuming the Engineers who selectively choose the DNA to fill the current requirements aren't idiots). Pointing out where "1" has worked does not seem useful or enlightening for understanding the extent to which a Joint program can succeed, and what must be done in order to help it succeed.

You're a bit late to the party but I basically claimed that there would be no Super Hornet without the YF-17. Which is true. I made the mistake of saying the F-14 was the last USN "non-joint" aircraft, because the USAF did create the YF-17, not the USN. Two individuals were unable to see past the literal. I don't think anybody on the planet thinks the Super Hornet was a joint effort with the USAF (it wasn't) but there you go.

#1 and #2 in your example are definitely different.

Crusader --> XF8U-3 Super Crusader and F-102 --> F-106 would fit your first example. The F-35 would fit the second. Even the F-4 wouldn't be a literal "joint" effort as the USAF had no say in the initial definition or development of the F-4. Same with the A-7.

Love this one since it's first design, the N-156, was originally intended to meet a U.S. Navy requirement for a jet fighter to operate from its escort carriers.

The implication being that the F-5 has it's roots in a USN project is incorrect. The N-156 designation was used for two separate Northrop projects. The first was the USN design, the second was the one that led to what we know as the F-5. See below:

USN "N-156":

and then. . .

"N-156F"

From the book mentioned earlier.

Crusader --> XF8U-3 Super Crusader and F-102 --> F-106 would fit your first example. The F-35 would fit the second. Even the F-4 wouldn't be a literal "joint" effort as the USAF had no say in the initial definition or development of the F-4. Same with the A-7.

Thanks! I was wondering if there has really ever been something comparable to the F-35 program before it. Was a little fuzzy on whether F4 would fit. Thanks for the clarification. I am really growing fairly partial to the way the F-35 was done.

The implication being that the F-5 has it's roots in a USN project is incorrect. The N-156 designation was used for two separate Northrop projects. The first was the USN design, the second was the one that led to what we know as the F-5.

The PD-2706, or the "USN N-156" as you like to call it, was part of the evolution that resulted in the F-5:

The PD-2706 had the short fuselage and T-tail to make maximum use of the carrier stowage volume and is definitely part of the evolution line towards the F-5.

Heh. Obviously you got your hands on something more detailed than that book. Where is yours from?

edit: Looks like you visited the Flight Global DB?

Heh. Obviously you got your hands on something more detailed than that book. Where is yours from?

edit: Looks like you visited the Flight Global DB?

Glad you like it.

And it's indeed from the Flight Global archives:
https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive ... 00046.html

I love reading through the older archives due to the spirit of the times feeling it gives.

Page 49 this thread & earlier pages there is info about the Naval Version of the F-111 - tradition continues below & here :

viewtopic.php?f=57&t=15767&p=400495&hilit=Bernier#p400495

General Dynamics F-111/FB-111 Structural Breakdowns
11 Mar 2017 Aviation Archives

"General Dynamics Manufacturing Engineering report FZM-12-6282 on the F-111/FB-111 Structural Breakdowns, dated 1 September 1969"

https://www.filefactory.com/file/52z1o5 ... kdowns.pdf (60.5Mb)

Source: http://aviationarchives.blogspot.com/20 ... tural.html

Page 49 this thread is an article 'bout F-111B online. Same article in PDF format 6 pp Air & Space Mag'n Sep 2018 below.

Was the Navy’s F-111 Really That Bad? viewtopic.php?f=57&t=15767&p=400495&hilit=bernier#p400495

Page 45 this thread has a FCLP Coupeville Magic Carpet (now PLM Precision Landing Mode) story and so this is another one.
viewtopic.php?f=57&t=15767&p=303521&hilit=FCLP+Coupeville#p303521 [good explanation of need for FCLP follows]

Navy chooses to add 36 Growlers to NAS Whidbey Island
13 Mar 2019 NAS Whidbey Island

"After carefully weighing the strategic, operational, and environmental consequences of the proposed action analyzed in the Growler Final Environmental Impact Statement, the Navy has made the decision to implement Alternative 2A (the preferred alternative), which adds 36 EA-18G operational aircraft at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, stations additional personnel and their family members at the NAS Whidbey Island complex and in the surrounding community, constructs and renovates facilities at Ault Field, increases airfield operations at both Ault Field and Outlying Landing Field Coupeville and changes the distribution of field carrier landing practice to 20 percent occurring at Ault Field and 80 percent occurring at OLF Coupeville....

...The preferred alternative places the majority of FCLP operations at OLF Coupeville because OLF Coupeville provides more realistic training for our aviators. OLF Coupeville has been continuously used for FCLP since the late 1960s. OLF Coupeville’s pattern best replicates the aircraft carrier landing pattern, building and reinforcing the correct habits and muscle memory for pilots. OLF Coupeville sits on a 200-foot ridge surrounded by flat terrain, similar to the aircraft carrier operating on the water.

Unlike OLF Coupeville, Ault Field sits in a valley surrounded by higher terrain, limiting pattern options and providing a visual picture unlike conditions at sea. The City of Oak Harbor and Ault Field both have artificial lighting and visual cues not experienced by pilots at sea. Furthermore, Ault Field is a busy, multi-mission airfield. FCLP at Ault Field often disrupts departures and arrivals of other aircraft not participating in FCLP; this disruption results in extended flight tracks and longer hours of operation which in turn affect more residents overall living in the community....

...24,100 operations at OLF Coupeville. Because FCLPs involve both a takeoff and a landing, and because each takeoff and each landing are counted as a single operation, the projected total of FCLPs at OLF Coupeville is 12,000. Since each airfield “operation” is defined as either a takeoff or landing under this scenario, about 12,000 FCLP “passes” would occur annually at OLF Coupeville. This change amounts to an increase from approximately 90 hours (1 percent of total hours per year) to 360 hours (4 percent of total hours per year) in aircraft activity at OLF Coupeville.

Operational levels at Ault Field and OLF Coupeville have varied historically depending on Navy mission requirements. Projected operational levels from implementation of Alternative 2A will be comparable to historic flight operations experienced from the 1970s through the 1990s at NAS Whidbey Island complex.

The implementation of Alternative 2A will include measures that reduce noise impacts in the community, including the mitigation measures identified in Appendix H of the Final EIS and the use of Precision Landing Mode (PLM, a.k.a. MAGIC CARPET) to reduce the overall number of FCLPs compared to the number proposed in the Draft EIS. The Navy will continue to invest in new technologies to reduce aircraft engine noise...."

Source: http://www.sanjuanjournal.com/news/navy ... ey-island/

The F-5E was just beautiful, gorgeous aircraft. Still looks sleek, all these years later..

Precision Landing Mode upgraded, makes strike pilot landing smoother
03 Sep 2020 Lt. Karl Suabedissen Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 23

"The first version of Precision Landing Mode (PLM) for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler did away with much of the stress on pilots flying behind a ship—and PLM Version 40 (V40) intends to do away with most of what remains.

VX-23 continues to test PLM software with a wide array of flight control and other aircraft malfunctions in hopes of delivering a more robust and redundant product for the fleet. The test team’s ultimate goal: make PLM the default landing mode for all passes.

Last year, VX-23 executed shipboard testing with a variety of failed flight control surfaces that characterized flying qualities behind a ship. The team also tested the addition of a backup automatic throttle control (ATC) with the ability to control throttle response via communication from the flight control computer (FCC) to the full authority digital electronic control all through the mission computers, as opposed to analog wires in the event that normal ATC is not available.

In December 2019, the VX-23 Carrier Suitability Department took one Super Hornet and one Growler aboard USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) to test new software changes for incorporation in the fleet’s release of PLM V40. Most notably, V40 adds capability that allows pilots to fly PLM with a single angle of attack (AOA) probe failure, in gain override or with an Inertial Navigation System (INS) failure. Additionally, regular ATC is now available in the gain override mode, allowing pilots to fly a “normal PLM” approach even in the case of a complete AOA failure.

To safely test malfunctions such as the failure of an AOA probe or flight control surface, test aircraft are equipped with a unique feature called dial-a-function (DAF) in the aircraft’s FCCs. DAF allows the pilot to change individual numerical parameters within the flight control software itself to turn off flight control surfaces or mimic an AOA probe failure by sending a specific AOA value to the FCCs and mission computers. The pilot can remove any of these mimicked failures by pressing the paddle switch or performing a Flight Control System reset, returning the aircraft to a nominal condition....

[some details]

...Version 40 promises to make PLM available in nearly every degradation that is still recoverable at the ship, greatly reducing a pilot’s workload during the final phase of landing and enhancing their concentration on other emergency-related tasks. Fleet release of PLM V40 begins this year. Although not tied to any particular system configuration set (SCS), the full functionality and redundancy of PLM V40 is only available on aircraft with H10+ SCS or newer."

Source: https://www.dcmilitary.com/tester/tenan ... a6c7c.html