J-20 VERSUS F-35

An SSN with Mk48s would be far more deadly.

B1-B with LRASM is much faster, much more flexible as to where and when, will have better SA currency, unlikely to be counter-detected, much less likely to be counter-attacked than the SSN. I'd focus the SSN on killing subs and let the B1-Bs clean up the surface units, or at least thin them out (and the things that can hunt SSNs).

Yes, and no.  I would not be at all surprised if a Virginia weren't already "riding herd" on any Chinese CVBG in the event of tension/conflict.  As for situational awareness, I doubt an SSN is going to have difficulty locating a carrier it's been shadowing for weeks.  Now if we did like the Soviets did back in the day and planned a combined attack, waves of LRASMs would certainly stir things up and make it easier for SSNs to sneak in a get off a slew of Mk48 shots.

That coordinated approach would get kills, but what bothers me is the opfor will probably detect the torpedo's terminal phase and detonation, and be able to determine the quadrant it approximately came from, which narrows things down a lot, even with a long-range curved swim-out shot.

With the proliferation of air-based ASW and high-performance digital active hull and dipping pingers, plus gobs of computer power, that's still dicey.

It tend to think the desirability of standoff applies to all platforms, especially big slow stealthy ones. And moreso to subs and their torpedoe employment ROE, due to the POB involved.

So I"ve come to the view that torpedo use against protected major naval units may be a bit like WVR IR missile use--likely to get a kill but at what cost? Thus (I think) use mines on defended units, use the Mk48s on subs and softer more isolated surface targets, and a standoff VLO missile salvo to actually shoot at heavy defended units.

A LRASM variant with bigger warhead and shorter range on an SSN makes sense. It provides the standoff to go after the heavy target with much better odds. As for targeting the distant unit, the recent-ish concepts for putting up thousands of cheap distributed micro cube SATs, with high-res EO sensors to detect, locate and track all manner of targets, can complement or actually more or less supersede sonar track techniques at standoff range.

i.e. serious aggressive ambush potential, with much lower risk of a sub crew loss.

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A LRASM variant with bigger warhead and shorter range on an SSN makes sense. It provides the standoff to go after the heavy target with much better odds. As for targeting the distant unit, the recent-ish concepts for putting up thousands of cheap distributed micro cube SATs, with high-res EO sensors to detect, locate and track all manner of targets, can complement or actually more or less supersede sonar track techniques at standoff range.

i.e. serious aggressive ambush potential, with much lower risk of a sub crew loss.

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LRASM already has a 1000lb warhead, so I think it's fine there. It's main shortcoming is it's SLOW. A shame they cancelled LRASM-B.

A LRASM variant with bigger warhead and shorter range on an SSN makes sense. It provides the standoff to go after the heavy target with much better odds. As for targeting the distant unit, the recent-ish concepts for putting up thousands of cheap distributed micro cube SATs, with high-res EO sensors to detect, locate and track all manner of targets, can complement or actually more or less supersede sonar track techniques at standoff range.

i.e. serious aggressive ambush potential, with much lower risk of a sub crew loss.

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LRASM already has a 1000lb warhead, so I think it's fine there. It's main shortcoming is it's SLOW. A shame they cancelled LRASM-B.

If opfor didn't see the ambush coming, there's not so much imperitive to be any faster (I still want a bigger warhead though).

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/08/24/chinas_new_missile_force_new_ambitions_new_challenges_113739.html

The US has nothing at all like this. Sure, it has airplanes. Their reaction time is a joke compared to missiles. Basically, China can hit anything it wants with conventional warheads, out to about 2500 miles from its border, within minutes. The US couldn't hit something 100 miles off it's coast in minutes, let along thousands of miles.

To be fair, China has never demonstrated the capability to target and engage moving targets at that range. They've hit stationary targets at known coordinates, at ~200nm. It's quite another matter to detect, track, and provide precise targeting information on a moving target (that doesn't want to be found), 2500nm away. China has nowhere near the ISR capabilities/assets, that we do. Additionally, any situation where they'd consider attacking a carrier, you can rest assured that whatever sensors they had, would be operating under degraded conditions, if they hadn't been taken out entirely.

If opfor didn't see the ambush coming, there's not so much imperitive to be any faster (I still want a bigger warhead though).

If it's a time sensitive target you want the speed too.

To be fair, China has never demonstrated the capability to target and engage moving targets at that range.

It's not a matter of "if" but "when".

They've hit stationary targets at known coordinates, at ~200nm.

They've done a lot more than that. Their DF-15, -16, -21, & -23 all have variants with terminally guided RVs like Pershing II had. The -21 and -23 both have more range than Pershing II had. The shortest range on the list, the DF-15B ranges to 500 miles.

It's quite another matter to detect, track, and provide precise targeting information on a moving target (that doesn't want to be found), 2500nm away.

Who says it has to be limited to moving targets? Pershing II didn't have moving target capability but the USSR surely saw it as a threat regardless.

China has nowhere near the ISR capabilities/assets, that we do.

Ours is spread across the world. They don't need as much.

Additionally, any situation where they'd consider attacking a carrier, you can rest assured that whatever sensors they had, would be operating under degraded conditions, if they hadn't been taken out entirely.

What makes you think attacking a carrier is the only thing those missiles can do?

There's obviously a lot those missiles can do, against stationary targets, at known coordinates. That's not why people discuss them in relation to A2AD, though. They may have a ballistic range of X nautical miles, but that doesn't translate into a capability to threaten moving targets (i.e. carrier battle groups, hence the claim of being anti-ship ballistic missiles.) One of the reasons why we haven't deployed long range conventional ballistic missiles, is the concern that nuclear powers have no way to know which type of warhead is on the missile. A limited conventional attack, could have an unintended nuclear response.

China and Russia are not proven to have enough success rate in intercepting sea skimming and stealthy targets.

Could you direct me to "research papers that passed peer review" that support your claim?

You can't find research papers that contradict my claim.

Basic principle:

If you can't find proof of neither "having a capability" nor "not having a capability", we should pick the latter.
This is the basic rule of discussion, otherwise, one can claim whatever she/he likes without proof contradicting it, such as:"sferrin is world's No.1". You can't find proof that confirms it, but you can't find proof that contradicts it either.

Remember how HR screen candidates? During a job interview, if the HR specialist can't confirm whether the candidate has the capability required or not, the candidate is assumed to not to have it.

If opfor didn't see the ambush coming, there's not so much imperitive to be any faster (I still want a bigger warhead though).

If it's a time sensitive target you want the speed too.

You can't have it all. A hot fast noisy high-speed missile launch from a sub draws unwanted attention from many sensor types and leaves its own tell-tail. You want the sub-launch to be as low-profile as possible--as little hot boosting use as possible. A fast hot steep boost just points a finger at where the sub is.

Lower flight speed means exponentially less leading-edge plus skin IR emissions and far less airframe pre-heating in flight, prior to terminal homing. So keep it low-transonic in -35°C air.

Thus modern 360° hemisphereic naval staring-arrays of EO sensors near the top of the mast don't get an early whiff until it's too late to effectively react in time. Systems like Vampyre are sensitive enough to see the thermal effect of wind filling the sail of a sailing boat. So you need the weapon to be cold, low thermal transmissivity, looking almost like a hole in warmer ambient lower-atmosphere, when closing.

High-speed approach means very early detection, rapid alerting, low-maneuverability, multiple engagement opportunities, time for communications traffic to track and alert.

Direction to launcher is known by +/-5°, distance to launcher can be estimated, a systematic search can get under way--fast.

But a slow-cold weapon works and avoids all of that response action. A high-alt LO JSOW gravity glide-launch approach, thus limits both the radar and EO detection radius. The radar LO treatment does not need to be exceptional, as the IR emission will probably give it away first at some point on modern targets, especially if the approach is too fast in colder air (higher contrast). In which case even slower is better, hence gliding it in to a very short detection radius works, then a terminal fast dive. Sweep wings, let gravity accelerate it, to time-compress, once inside detection radius.

Someone mentioned glide ratios recently. Consider, a cold LRASM with a ~20:1 glide ratio could add 75nm to final range while still retaining a terminal dive capability from colder air, once it has crossed inside the IR and radar detection radius, for prevailing conditions.

If its time-sensitive then shoot earlier.

It's not as if such a target will be a 'pop-up' threat, it will have been tracked for days, at least. Hopefully the sub has laid some mines for it and its escorts first, before setting-up for a LRASM strike. They come looking for you and a mine wrecks them.

As far as I'm concerned subs are far from ideal for time-sensitive strikes, it's intrinsically a slow-paced stealthy mode of operation. Yes, it could go faster, take bigger risks, but why? That's not a good idea.

Let B1-B or B-21 do time-sensitive strikes.

One of the reasons why we haven't deployed long range conventional ballistic missiles, is the concern that nuclear powers have no way to know which type of warhead is on the missile. A limited conventional attack, could have an unintended nuclear response.

That logic cuts both ways--and apparently China isn't likewise concerned about the possibility.

Nor are many others who've thought about this (and I thoroughly agree with them), for instance:

Pentagon Shifts Focus From Ballistic Missile Defense

Aug 23, 2018

Lee Hudson | Aviation Week & Space Technology

The Pentagon is shifting its focus from ballistic missile defense to intercepting hypersonic and cruise missiles in order to keep pace with Chinese and Russian advances.

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Samuel Greaves has even gone so far as to remove the word ballistic from the organization’s mission statement to emphasize a broader missile threat spectrum.

The reason? If the U.S. goes to war with a global power, Michael Griffin, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, believes it will be a conventional fight—nuclear, chemical or biological weapons will not be used—not involving attacks on each other’s homelands. ...

http://m.aviationweek.com/missile-defen ... le-defense

I think that this Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Michael Griffin, has got it perfectly correct. That is what it would be--a conventional war. The sort you can win. All the rest of it is unrealistic media sensationalism, as no one's going there.

Nuclear deterrence deters nuclear use and it keeps doing it relentlessly--even if in a conventional war, it won't cease to rigorously deter their first use, just because you're shooting precision theatre BM's or such at each others forces.

The Chinese have clearly concluded the same things hence their highly realistic and practical tactical emphasis on high-speed conventional ballistic strike--on everything, not just on nuclear powered carriers.

Plan for a high-intensity conventional conflict, yes, with BMs, as that is what you will be getting.

Michael Griffin? Was he the Bush-era NASA admin? The man behind the Ares I? Not heard from him for a long time.

https://dod.defense.gov/About/Biographi ... d-griffin/

I think it's the same guy.

BTW. I'm a bit confused with the Generation of AESA Radars. As far as understand a APG-63(v)2 and APG-77 is 1 Generation. APG-63(v)3, APG-79, APG-80, APG-77v1 and RBE2 AESA are 2 Generation. And the APG-81 is a 3 Generation AESA?

It isn't that simple.

APG-63(v)2/3, APG-79, APG-80, and RBE2 are all MSA radars that were upgraded with an AESA antenna (oversimplified). They were not designed from the ground up as an AESA radar integrated into a fused sensor suite. APG-77/(v)1 and APG-81 were. As such even APG-77 will be more advanced as a whole system than APG-63(v)3, as it has improved back-end processing capability. SABR is (oversimplified) an APG-81 with modified software and a resized antenna to be used in any platform.

So a APG-77(v)1 is closer to the APG-81 thanks to the more advanced back-end. Would be also interesting what is the difference between

a "2 Generation" and "3 Generation" AESA. Of cours the performance, and maybe to use the Radar as a Energy Weapon?

And i assume the APG-83 (SABR) is roughly on the same level as the APG-80. I know there was a intense discussion on F-16 wich one is better.

The RBE2 is a PESA when i remember correct.

There are two versions of RBE2. Old one was PESA and newer is AESA. Thales talks about "AESA RBE2" or "RBE2-AESA" and usually just "RBE2" (PESA version).

AESA generations are not well defined and every manufacturer uses their own definitions. Northrop Grumman has pretty decent documents about their definition of AESA generations:
https://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabil ... s/AESA.pdf

• First Generation: Ultra Reliable Radar - URR (1985)
• Second Generation: Advanced Tactical Fighter - ATF (1989)
• Third Generation: APG-77 (1996)
• Fourth Generation: APG-80 (F-16), APG-77(V)1 (F-22), APG-81 (F-35), and Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR)

https://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabil ... epaper.pdf

Northrop Grumman ES has been designing and perfecting airborne radar systems for over 60 years, however the heritage of the phased array radar and particularly, Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) is relatively short. In fact, our first passive phased array radar was constructed in 1974 and the first active phased array was built just 17 years ago in 1985. This breakthrough in technology allowed for the demonstration of the concept of steering beams generated by distributed transmit and receive modules.

Our 2nd generation AESA was the first to fly just three years later. This 2nd generation AESA was the first AESA to proceed to the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase. Our 3rd generation AESA met the high performance requirements in clutter, which mechanical or passive electronically scanned arrays are unable to meet. With the high performance standard set, we focused on reducing cost and weight.

This led to our 4th generation AESA that is half the cost and weight of the 3rd generation AESA. The 4th generation AESA design requirements were the result of merging requirements for airborne, sea based, and land based platforms. Due to the nature of the changing defense environment dictating commonality across the services and our own limited research and development funds, drives one to the practical decision of seeking common solutions. This 4th generation AESA and its associated T/R modules achieve the design commonality while satisfying unique airborne, sea borne and ground based platform requirements with high performance to meet the mission needs

So first couple of generations were really prototypes and technology was also progressing very fast that those generations never saw operational use. It seems clear that USA could've had AESA radar in fighters back in early 1990s, but that would've been costly and there was also not much need back then. The cost/capability calculation was not good enough then. 3rd gen AESA in late 1990s was still big, bulky and costly but performance was already excellent.

I think AN/APG-63(V)2 in those Alaskan F-15Cs was also third gen radar using that NG definitions. AN/APG-79, RACR and AN/APG-63(V)3 are probably 4th gen radars. Of course that only refers to radar components. AN/APG-81 in F-35 likely has much better capabilities compared to SABR or AN/APG-79 for example. This is because it's not a standalone radar system, but one part of integrated sensor fusion system which allows things not possible in standalone system. Of course 4th gen systems have likely evolved a lot and latest 4th gen systems are likely much better than early ones. I'd say 5th gen is going to be using GaN technology instead of GaAs and have much better performance and reliability.

It's really impossible to say how Chinese or Russian (or even French) AESA technology compares to US tech. We would need to know the internal function and specs of the radars and their components to know that. They could easily use similar packaging as most modern US radars and still use couple of generations older internals. Or they could have pretty modern technology in the components. Then a lot would depend on computing and processing systems and software.

I have not seen 2 sec interval from any official sources, and I have seen at least one time from a video showing a Burker launches 3 missiles simultaneously during an exercise.

Post it.

1-2 second interval is what you typically see in live Tomahawk launches. The Russian cruise missile launches shown were definitely faster by comparison.

Skip ahead to 2:30

Staggered launches are due to other factors.

I have not seen 2 sec interval from any official sources, and I have seen at least one time from a video showing a Burker launches 3 missiles simultaneously during an exercise.

Post it.

1-2 second interval is what you typically see in live Tomahawk launches. The Russian cruise missile launches shown were definitely faster by comparison.

Skip ahead to 2:30

Staggered launches are due to other factors.

Nice. This capability was already confirmed in MK41 official data sheet. A video is good to shut somebody up.