AARGM-ER cleared for EMD [for F-35A/C & other aircraft]

[marauder2048]

I never claimed immunity just reduced utility. By virtue of this and APS.

You said: "These slow-moving sub-munitions aren't going to have much utility against modern SPAAGs"

To me that implies a belief they aren't a threat to them.

Where do I claim that cluster munitions are not a threat?

A C-RAM engagement is targeting a single incoming round

I hope you aren't suggesting that C-RAM engagements don't involve destroying multiple incoming rounds because they do.

come in on a ballistic trajectory,

As opposed to the much slower ballistic trajectory for cluster munitions?

You keep talking about this typical dispensing altitude but as others pointed out it depends on what you're trying to hit. If a particular IADS element is the target it could well be a lower burst just like you saw in the video where there was less than five seconds from from burst until impact. Higher burst has more utility for convoys of vehicles and other dispersed targets.

The median ellipse for a T/FDOA 2-ship receiver configuration against one emitter is 2.5 km^2.
If the target can move during the time-of-the-flight of the munition (for JSOW from typical ranges TOF is *minutes*)
the area you have to cover grows dramatically. This either requires high-altitude dispensing (low-altitude is around 0.4 km^2 area effect) or a large number of weapons.

JSOW will have to deal with the possible interception of the bus and its sub-munitions; both are slow and the latter
are very slow so the number of shots the defense gets against both is high.

AARGM-ER doesn't suffer from this problem and has an active seeker to search out the area of uncertainty.

The average altitude for dispensing is GWI was 3000 feet; I believe I read that in the Gulf War air power survey.
But you could argue that the SCUD hunt (where they went for maximum area coverage) distorts the average.

If you can find median dispensing altitudes that would be helpful; most everything has to be inferred from the patterns
the sub-munitions left on the ground in Iraq, Kosovo, Serbia and Afghanistan.

Even if it was 30 seconds how many submunitions do you really believe could be targeted by a gun given time to track, calculate firing solution, physically aim the weapon, and confirm a shoot down before moving on to the next?

The whole point of pattern fire is that relaxes the need to abide by this firing doctrine.

[spazsinbad]

Here’s how a radar-killing missile is getting a whole lot more capable [VIDEO 'missile for F-35 explained']
03 Jun 2019 Jeff Martin

"Here's how a radar-killing missile is getting a whole lot more capable

Northrop Grumman's Advanced Anti Radiation Guided Missile is in the process of some major upgrades that will see it able to be launched from an F-35."

Source: https://www.defensenews.com/newsletters ... e-capable/

[eloise]

The median ellipse for a T/FDOA 2-ship receiver configuration against one emitter is 2.5 km^2.
If the target can move during the time-of-the-flight of the munition (for JSOW from typical ranges TOF is *minutes*)
the area you have to cover grows dramatically. This either requires high-altitude dispensing (low-altitude is around 0.4 km^2 area effect) or a large number of weapons.

JSOW will have to deal with the ?

How do you come up with the number for the median?

[spazsinbad]

F-35 Anti-Radiation Missile for Weapon Bay from DefenseNews https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eWJ_qe0oCFc

[marauder2048]

The median ellipse for a T/FDOA 2-ship receiver configuration against one emitter is 2.5 km^2.
If the target can move during the time-of-the-flight of the munition (for JSOW from typical ranges TOF is *minutes*)
the area you have to cover grows dramatically. This either requires high-altitude dispensing (low-altitude is around 0.4 km^2 area effect) or a large number of weapons.

JSOW will have to deal with the ?

How do you come up with the number for the median?

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1051/RAND_RR1051.pdf

Page 112 which cites the dissertation:


https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2012/RAND_RGSD308.pdf

[eloise]

"So, lobbing HARMs at radar beams and calling it Weaseling is an extremely dangerous notion." That is the Ironbird mission, goes back to early Vietnam and the Standard ARM! I hate to remind people that that the CJ cannot perform the "Wild Weasel" mission without an RC-135 Rivet Joint.

What are the main difference between that two types of missions? Wild Weasel vs Ironbird
Secondly, I remember HTS R-7 can geolocate the GPS location of target, why F-16 CJ still need RC-135?

The median ellipse for a T/FDOA 2-ship receiver configuration against one emitter is 2.5 km^2.
If the target can move during the time-of-the-flight of the munition (for JSOW from typical ranges TOF is *minutes*)
the area you have to cover grows dramatically. This either requires high-altitude dispensing (low-altitude is around 0.4 km^2 area effect) or a large number of weapons.

JSOW will have to deal with the ?


https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1051/RAND_RR1051.pdf

Page 112 which cites the dissertation:


https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2012/RAND_RGSD308.pdf

2500 m2 eclipse is only 0.0025 km2
Just saying

eclipse.PNG (137.63 KiB) Viewed 42027 times

[aussiebloke]

"So, lobbing HARMs at radar beams and calling it Weaseling is an extremely dangerous notion." That is the Ironbird mission, goes back to early Vietnam and the Standard ARM! I hate to remind people that that the CJ cannot perform the "Wild Weasel" mission without an RC-135 Rivet Joint.

What are the main difference between that two types of missions? Wild Weasel vs Ironbird
Secondly, I remember HTS R-7 can geolocate the GPS location of target, why F-16 CJ still need RC-135?

I think h-bomb meant to write “Iron Hand”.
I replied to h-bomb the next day (see 10 comments down from his) regarding his RC-135 claim, listing various improvements to HTS and suggesting these improvements likely removed the need for RC-135 involvement. He didn’t reply.

[ricnunes]

JSOW will have to deal with the possible interception of the bus and its sub-munitions; both are slow and the latter
are very slow so the number of shots the defense gets against both is high.

On the other hand JSOW is a stealth weapon.

For example the JSOW-C1 variant is meant to be used against warships (among other targets of course), some of which are by far the most well protected surface target/assets in existence (more than any land based SAM site). So, I would say that this alone means that it's expected that the JSOW has at least a good chance of survival when used against well protected targets.

Regarding interception of sub-munitions I doubt that's feasible within current weaponry/technology. Perhaps in the future with more powerful and mobile lasers or other direct-energy weapons there's a way to effectively destroy many of the incoming sub-munitions. But until then, I doubt it.

[marauder2048]

On the other hand JSOW is a stealth weapon.

For example the JSOW-C1 variant is meant to be used against warships (among other targets of course)

JSOW-C1 was a defensive move on the Navy's part of avoid being co-opted into a JASSM Maritime Interdiction buy.
Which failed; the Navy killed the JSOW-C1 purchase pretty quickly and is buying LRASM.

You can see why: engaging the faster, maneuverable surface combatants would require an uncomfortably close
release for the Super Hornet.

Against those surface combatants, close JSOW-C1 release by the F-35C would work.
And JSOW-ER eliminates some of the other criticisms.

Regarding interception of sub-munitions I doubt that's feasible within current weaponry/technology.

There is a semi-official US Army view that the Russian APS seen in Ukraine has utility against sensor fused munitions.

And a recent US Army RFI for APS had sensor fused munition defeat as a requirement.

[boogieman]

There is a semi-official US Army view that the Russian APS seen in Ukraine has utility against sensor fused munitions.

And a recent US Army RFI for APS had sensor fused munition defeat as a requirement.

Which APS is that? AFAIK the T72s used in the Ukraine were not fitted with APS, which leaves Shtora on the T90 which does not have a hard-kill capability?

I am not aware of any T80s appearing in the theatre, which might have been able to bring the Arena system along (but it can't hit top attack inbounds). Even Afghanit only does soft kill on top attack weapons (smoke screen) and that is the most modern APS they have.

[marauder2048]

There is a semi-official US Army view that the Russian APS seen in Ukraine has utility against sensor fused munitions.

And a recent US Army RFI for APS had sensor fused munition defeat as a requirement.

Which APS is that? AFAIK the T72s used in the Ukraine were not fitted with APS, which leaves Shtora on the T90 which does not have a hard-kill capability?

I am not aware of any T80s appearing in the theatre, which might have been able to bring the Arena system along (but it can't hit top attack inbounds). Even Afghanit only does soft kill on top attack weapons (smoke screen) and that is the most modern APS they have.

The author does not identity the APS type.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038759.pdf

[boogieman]

The author does not identity the APS type.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038759.pdf

I don't see any mention of Russian APS being able to reliably defeat top attack munitions? It's noteworthy that the paper cites Dr Phillip Karber's testimony quite heavily. The Russian APS issue was always one of the shakier areas of Karber's account of fighting in the Donbass. He often attributed cases of Ukrainian ATGMs mysteriously flying up into the air to the effect of the Arena APS. This is despite the fact that:
a.) A hard kill system like Arena would not have this effect on an ATGM - it would just destroy the missile outright
b) There were no documented cases of Arena-equipped tanks in theatre (T80).

Don't get me wrong, it is only a matter of time until APS systems capable of intercepting top attack munitions start to proliferate, but AFAIK the Russians haven't fielded one yet.

[ricnunes]

JSOW-C1 was a defensive move on the Navy's part of avoid being co-opted into a JASSM Maritime Interdiction buy.
Which failed; the Navy killed the JSOW-C1 purchase pretty quickly and is buying LRASM.

Do you have a source for such claim of yours?

I'm asking this because everything I've read points out exactly for the 'opposite', or more precisely the US Navy is fielding the JSOW-C1 which already achieved Full Operational Capability with the US Navy.
Here:
https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.p ... biliy.html

https://www.businessinsider.com/navy-de ... ile-2017-5

https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_disp ... d=300&ct=2

And then there's this news from last week (CSB accelerates JSOW C-1 NEW integration on F-35):
https://www.janes.com/article/95608/csb ... on-on-f-35


So and don't get me wrong but it sure doesn't seem to me that the US Navy is killing "the JSOW-C1 purchase" but by the contrary.
Or putting into another perspective, JSOW-C1 and LRASM purchases aren't or don't seem to be mutually exclusive.

[boogieman]

The author does not identity the APS type.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038759.pdf

On closer inspection this appears to be somebody's masters thesis (ie. not really an official US Army document) and a pretty rough one at that. AFAIK of all Russian active protection systems only the Afghanit APS could plausibly respond to a top attack sensor fuzed munition, and the only countermeasure it has available is a last-ditch smoke screen. Even so, the Afghanit is unique to the T14, which is unlikely to be fielded in significant quantities for quite some time (if ever).

[marauder2048]

The author does not identity the APS type.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038759.pdf

On closer inspection this appears to be somebody's masters thesis (ie. not really an official US Army document) and a pretty rough one at that. AFAIK of all Russian active protection systems only the Afghanit APS could plausibly respond to a top attack sensor fuzed munition, and the only countermeasure it has available is a last-ditch smoke screen. Even so, the Afghanit is unique to the T14, which is unlikely to be fielded in significant quantities for quite some time (if ever).

Which is why I said semi-official. The author's opinion about APS vs. SFM is on page 60.
The author is a program manager in the area of cannon/rocket delivery of anti-armor/anti-infantry munitions.

So I'm going to attach a little more weight to his opinions.