
hornetfinn wrote:I really wonder what was the tactical thinking behind sending only token aircraft against Coalition forces even during the first couple of days before being effectively decimated?
1.Because 96 Squadron deployed only 8 MIG-25PD at Al-Qadisiyah AB and the rest deployed around another bases, therefore it was not wise to launch massive number of interceptors without being covered at lest by the GCI, and as you know the MIG-25PD entirely depends on (RSPN, HOMER, Approach radar, BEKANT i wrote the last one as i pronounce it) to make it's way back, and with out anyone of these the MIG-25PD completely blind and this truly what happened to Capt.Zuhair Dawood, he didn't had any malfunction in the navigation system but because the air base was under attack they shut down the whole radars and RSPN..etc to avoid being targeted by coalition aircraft. So he couldn't make his way back easy and for that you could imagine if they launch two MIG-25PD (with this case) definitely at least one of them will be lost. The MIG-25PDS and MIG-29, Mirage had better navigation system and that's why 97 Squadron at Habbaniyah AB launch two MIG-25PDS at that night.
hornetfinn wrote:Were Iraqis incapable of sending more fighter aircraft into air or were they trying to preserve their precious fighter force?
2.For the same reason above, most the radars and communication unit has been destroyed from the first night of the war, even if we were able to insure the return to air base we can't insure the communication with ground control to locate the targets and follow the rest of orders, so any interception duty will be completely pointless.