rkap wrote:geogen wrote:
Put me in the camp assessing that RAAF would have been more strategic and prudent in better calculating the future of Australia's Hornet/F-111 recap plan back during the early/mid-2000s, by deciding on an F-15AU.
You are correct - The problem was of course we were led to believe by LM and the US DOD the F-35 would be available and operational and coming off the production line by about 2010 or soon after from memory when we formulated our plans in the early 2000's.
Then about 5 years ago when it became critical we get replacements we were led to believe it would be well into production by 2013 and would be proven up and operational by 2015 and we could expect to receive them about then or soon after. Now it will be 2020 at least - more like 2022 or later before we have a chance of having an operational Squadron. About 10 years later than expected.
When we bought the SH's was our last chance of changing - the Government instead went for 24 of the less expensive SH's as an interim stop gap. There were many in Australia who would have preferred us to buy the best available proven and operational aircraft at that time and abandon the F35.
An F15 would have been the most likely aircraft we would have bought if we had a competition. It is all we needed to stay competitive with any potential adversary up until about 2030/2035.
In simple words we were "conned".
I'd unfortunately have to concur with that synopsis.
2001-2002 (post 9/11) was indeed the green light for foreign customers and partners to sign up once it was clear that USAF budgets were to get plump, at least for long enough to kick-start the Program to ensure a point of too big to fail and no option but to push onward. Pre-9/11, there was a slight Procurement budget issue, in which no way could the envisioned 80+ FRP USAF units per year could be procured (or advertised/estimated in an official scheme to be procured).
And of course, without the estimate/business model to produce over 3,000 total units and top off at an estimated 220 units annually under peak FRP as a requirement for the Program to offer affordable jets, then the business model and Program as an entity could not be sustainable or viable as being 'proposed/sold' to partners.
Kind of a circular, round-about acquisition scheme and process, one could contend.
Moreover, I concur with your 2007-2008 timeframe too, as probably being the final point of no return for selecting an alternative recap strategy with F-35 only being placed as a potential 'down the road'.
In 2007, it was still being reassured to foreign govts and USG, that F-35 was pre-conceived as being 'on schedule' to hit SDD completion by Oct of 2012 and achieve IOC by 2013. With those expectations and 'estimates', who would argue to their respective policy makers to back out in dissent, when everything was to be fine...and all the costs and schedules would ensure everyone best to stay on track and keep focus on those lucrative 4-30x returns on every dollar invested into Program!?!
Ironic how what was a sure bet is now one of the most speculative and risky gambles in Tacair recapitalization history with possibly significant and potentially catastrophic consequences to maintaining force structure capability and deterrence in a highly uncertain post-Cold-War era, in staying on track as is.
The Super-Viper has not yet begun to concede.