Modern Naval Vessels

[marauder2048]

Interesting, thanks for the input. Can I just clarify what is meant by threat D? I vaguely remember seeing it mentioned online some time ago but haven't managed to find a reference to it since.

Out of interest, have any of your sources shed any light on how the USS Mason's systems performed against Houthi C802 attacks? AFAIK the inbounds were defeated but it was not clear whether hard or soft kill measures were responsible for defeating them.

Threat D is SS-N-27 Sizzler/ 3M-54 Klub. Subsonic first stage; supersonic SRM second (sprint) stage. It's pretty nasty.

No idea about the USS Mason but soft kill enhancements (obscurants, advanced offboard decoys) seems to be all the rage
at the moment. The observation being that the faster the ASCM is the lower the amount of time it has to discriminate
between decoys and the ship.

[boogieman]

Threat D is SS-N-27 Sizzler/ 3M-54 Klub. Subsonic first stage; supersonic SRM second (sprint) stage. It's pretty nasty.

No idea about the USS Mason but soft kill enhancements (obscurants, advanced offboard decoys) seems to be all the rage
at the moment. The observation being that the faster the ASCM is the lower the amount of time it has to discriminate
between decoys and the ship.

Gotcha, yes I am familiar with the Klub. The Chinese appear to have used much the same concept with the YJ18 which is being fitted to many of their newest surface combatants. Interesting in that their other major supersonic ASM, the YJ-12, is reported to be heavily influenced by none other than the Kh31.

As for soft kill techniques, they probably don't get the publicity they deserve. I guess it's just sexier to shoot an ASCM down than it is to simply make it miss. I remember watching with interest here in Australia as the Nulka decoy was developed. I note that the USS Mason deployed it in the Red Sea against Houthi C802's. Would be interesting to find out what ultimately defeated them.

[weasel1962]

Mason, based on public literature apparently fired the SM-2 + ESSM to defeat the C802 (after an earlier successful attack against the HSV swift).

Was reading about the development of the GQM-173B. The budget was moved out of weapons into R&D in FY15, and the 173A was terminated. However, it looks like the issue became moot after Orbital (which makes the 163) and the aerial target part of ATK (which was developing the 173) merged (before being acquired by Northrop Grumman in 2018). Based on what Marauder has said, it looks like Orbital may have integrated the 173 tech into the 163.

[boogieman]

Mason, based on public literature apparently fired the SM-2 + ESSM to defeat the C802 (after an earlier successful attack against the HSV swift).

Yes, although it was never explicitly confirmed that the SM2 and ESSM salvo successfully intercepted the C802's. As far as I am aware the official reports simply state that the weapons crashed into the ocean ~10nm from the Mason, with no accounting for precisely why. That range would seem consistent with a successful interception of ASMs picked up as they crested the radar horizon, and I would expect the C802 to be a trivial target for SM2 and ESSM. That said I would love to know the full story regardless. Alas, this may not be publically available information.

Was reading about the development of the GQM-173B. The budget was moved out of weapons into R&D in FY15, and the 173A was terminated. However, it looks like the issue became moot after Orbital (which makes the 163) and the aerial target part of ATK (which was developing the 173) merged (before being acquired by Northrop Grumman in 2018). Based on what Marauder has said, it looks like Orbital may have integrated the 173 tech into the 163.

That would make sense if true. It would be interesting to find out more about how the Russian Tsirkon works. I wouldn't be surprised to find that it uses velocities and approach vectors/angles that current target missiles can't readily replicate.

[boogieman]

An interesting read on the YJ18 below:

The YJ-18’s wide deployment and long range would increase China’s ability to launch standoff* multi-axis, multi-missile attacks against U.S. Navy surface ships. Such attacks are formidable challenges for shipboard defenses, and the YJ-18’s supersonic sprint capabilities will further increase the likelihood some missiles would penetrate a U.S. ship’s missile defenses The YJ-18 is one of a variety of antiship missiles that provide China a multilayered anti-access/area denial capability in its near seas and beyond (see Figure 2). In a 2014 volume on China’s cruise missiles, China military experts Dennis Gormley, Andrew Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan assessed, “It appears that China’s increasing ASCM inventory has increasing potential to saturate U.S. Navy defenses.”

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/file ... issile.pdf

Bear in mind the range rings in the attached image estimate the YJ-18's kinematic range from notional submarines, but do not factor in the PLAN's ability to provide them with effective targeting data. I suspect their effective coverage would be more restricted once this is taken into account. Nevertheless, the sub-launched variant seems to be the most dangerous of all, mainly due to the elusiveness of the launch platform.

[marauder2048]

As for soft kill techniques, they probably don't get the publicity they deserve. I guess it's just sexier to shoot an ASCM down than it is to simply make it miss. I remember watching with interest here in Australia as the Nulka decoy was developed. I note that the USS Mason deployed it in the Red Sea against Houthi C802's. Would be interesting to find out what ultimately defeated them.

The issue with soft kill is that it tends to be last ditch so timing is crucial; Nulka needs to be programmed
prior to launch which when combined with its short (2 min) hover duration is the reason the US
is shifting towards a long duration (1 hour) expendable with a datalink controlled by the AOEW helicopter.

Nulka is getting a new payload (ADAP) though so it'll be around for some time.

[boogieman]

As for soft kill techniques, they probably don't get the publicity they deserve. I guess it's just sexier to shoot an ASCM down than it is to simply make it miss. I remember watching with interest here in Australia as the Nulka decoy was developed. I note that the USS Mason deployed it in the Red Sea against Houthi C802's. Would be interesting to find out what ultimately defeated them.

The issue with soft kill is that it tends to be last ditch so timing is crucial; Nulka needs to be programmed
prior to launch which when combined with its short (2 min) hover duration is the reason the US
is shifting towards a long duration (1 hour) expendable with a datalink controlled by the AOEW helicopter.

Nulka is getting a new payload (ADAP) though so it'll be around for some time.

Indeed, clearly the solution to the ASM problem does not reside in any one system, but in the system of systems. The USN is in a uniquely good position to deal with it using its unmatched access to elevated sensors (E2D & P8A + AN/APS-154), high quality datalinks and the new generation of hard kill (SM2 Blk IIIC, SM6, ESSM Blk II) and soft kill measures. The ability to intercept inbound ASMs well before they crest the radar horizon strikes me as being invaluable going forward.

[boogieman]

So regarding the Chinese ASBM threat, I did some digging to find out just what targets get used for BMD testing, and I think I figured it out. Interesting though, that AFAIK there isn't a target missile out there that could properly replicate the behaviour of an HCM like Tsirkon.

GROUND LAUNCH TARGETS
HERA

In 1992, the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command awarded AR Coleman the Theater Missile Defense Targets contract to develop a ground launched target missile to test missile defense systems such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot PAC-3. The two-stage HERA launch vehicle was powered by surplus SR19 and M57A1 solid rocket motors from the Minuteman II program. The target vehicles were launched from White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico and Fort Wingate, New Mexico.

AIR LAUNCH TARGETS
AR Coleman's air launch capability allows the launch of target missiles from cargo aircraft positioned anywhere in the world, and at any azimuth/orbit inclination to simulate a target with mobile launch capability. This capability allows target missiles to mimic a variety of realistic threat scenarios to thoroughly test U.S. missile defense technologies.

SRALT

AR Coleman's Short Range Air Launch Target (SRALT) is a short range air launched target vehicle that supports tests of American anti-ballistic missile systems. The single stage vehicle that was first launched in 1999 is powered by surplus SR19 solid rocket motors from retired Minuteman II ICBMs.

LRALT

The Long Range Air Launch Target (LRALT) is a two-stage launch vehicle AR Coleman developed for testing theater missile defense systems. Powered by two surplus SR19 solid rocket motors, the LRALT completed a demonstration launch in May 2004; followed by its first operational mission in September 2005.

E-LRALT

The Extended Long Range Air Launch Target (E-LRALT) includes two SR-19 motors, an Orbus 1A motor and a reentry vehicle. It completed its first mission in October 2012 when it was air dropped from a C-17 cargo aircraft off Wake Island where it ignited and headed toward the Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll. The target was successfully destroyed by a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor launched from Meck Island at Kwajalein.

MRBM

In February 2014, AR Coleman was awarded a contract from the U.S. Department of Defense’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to provide Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) target vehicles for use in tests of missile defense systems. Once operational, these target vehicles will enable MDA to continue to assess the performance of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and THAAD systems.

https://www.rocket.com/defense/targets- ... le-targets



These all strike me as very modern systems, many of which ought to be capable of replicating a variety of threat ASBM behaviours (MaRV but not HGV as yet). The question that occurred to me was whether or not an Aegis vessel would be able to use SM3 to defend itself from an ASBM attack, or whether it would need to be pre-positioned between the launcher and the target (say, a CSG) to "catch" the ASBM in its exo-atmospheric mid-course phase(?).

SM6 would be in there too of course (intercept in terminal phase) but SM3 could theoretically add an additional outer layer of protection if the inbound ASBM could be detected early enough. Seems plausible given the immense capability of a sensor like AMDR.

[marauder2048]

I was under the impression that Chinese ASBMs would be flown on depressed trajectories very close
to (if not under) SM-3's altitude minimum.

[boogieman]

Not to my knowledge. AFAIK DF-21D and DF-26 are essentially adaptations of existing IRBM tech to a naval target set. Happy to be corrected if I am wrong.

[milosh]

Not to my knowledge. AFAIK DF-21D and DF-26 are essentially adaptations of existing IRBM tech to a naval target set. Happy to be corrected if I am wrong.

Both are listed on wiki as quasi ballistic missiles:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ballistic ... c_missiles

[weasel1962]

Pg 21, DoD's China military power report 2009. How ASBM appears to differ from standard ballistic missiles is the addition of terminal guidance maneuver capability including possibly depressed trajectories.

[boogieman]

That's interesting, was not aware of that. The question then becomes one of whether SM3 has the range to catch the ASBM in its mid-course phase/before it ducks too low to be engaged. The (much) greater reach of SM3 Blk II (A&B) may be useful here.

[wrightwing]

That's interesting, was not aware of that. The question then becomes one of whether SM3 has the range to catch the ASBM in its mid-course phase/before it ducks too low to be engaged. The (much) greater reach of SM3 Blk II (A&B) may be useful here.

The SM-3's "official range is ~2500km, so an ASBM would have to shed its booster, and and begin a steep descent, to stay out of range. Of course the SM-6 is an endo-atmospheric interceptor, so it could take over once a threat reentered the atmosphere.

[boogieman]

Yes, and I would question how far the MaRV would be able to travel once it re-entered the atmosphere - diving early to avoid SM3 must have a negative impact on range. The solution to this problem would presumably be to replace the MaRV with an HGV, but I am not aware of the Chinese having done this as yet.