Forum: Air Power

Gettin' either Ritchie or Croker (preferrably both) to chime in on anything would be a big feather in this board's cap, methinks! Thumb

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I'd love to hear from both. Anytime you get to hear what a situation was really like firsthand, is better than hearing theories and "what ifs" from people who weren't there. Which leads me to my next questions...

Gums, a fella that worked with my pops was a Bronco driver in 'Nam, and he told me about missions he flew in the OV-10 over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. He said their job would be to paint targets in the VC cave and tunnel system, and then Phantoms would come in and attack. Did you ever fly any missions in the Dragonfly over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, or were A-37s primarily used for CAS?

Also, did you ever have someone fly in the right seat in the Dragonfly on combat missions, or did you only fly solo? The reason I thought about this question was because I was recently thinking about LT. Michael Blassie, the former Vietnam Unknown Soldier. He was found alone, and I never heard anyone mention anything about the need to find a second man at the crash site. I assumed then, that no one was flying with him when he was shot down.

Thanks for your insight Gums. It's always highly enjoyed and appreciated! Thumb

Beers and MiGs were made to be pounded!

Bring 'em all in - the more the better Very Happy

! Thanks for all your contributions on this board, Gums! I love hearing the real story from the guys who were there!!!

Yo Ho!

TNX for nice words.

I think I can get the 34th troop (Mig killer) to jump in here, so we shall see.

I also know another of Olds' WSO's that might agree to comment.

As for the "Pave Nail" OV-10's, it is true that they would steer LGB's into caves and such. They would illuminate the bottom of the cave until the last second, then shift the dot to just above the cave opening. The LGB could not make the turn and would fly right down the opening - heh heh. Only the best Nail jocks could do that.

'tis true. I flew night interdiction and armed recce over the Trail in Jan/Feb of 1968 in the A-37. We flew outta Plieku, and our callsign was Dragon. Was part of the test program to evaluate the little jet in weird missions. My best war story was one of the night missions when I nailed 5 trucks on one pass with CBU. At the time, no OV-10's, and we had O-2's for night FACs - the Covey's. In daylight, we had Covey's and sometimes Ravens for FACs.

Blassie was one of ours, and a dedicated squadron commander at Bien Hoa worked for a few years to convince USAF that the recoverd body was Blassie.

We flew solo. Unfortunately, because we had the empty seat, we were targeted for press folks and others that wanted a ride. Due to supply problems, many of our jets did not have a functional right seat ejection system, thereby limiting the amount of 'tourists' we had to put up with. Funniest war story was one of our guys holding an oxygen mask on a CBS reporter who had crapped out on the way home. After awhile, the A-37 jock just let the sucker "go to sleep" and hope he didn't suffer permanent brain damage. Plane was not pressurized, so we were limited to 25K (legally). I personally flew a Reuters babe that was about 55 years old! She handled it nicely, as it was a fairly benign tree-buster.

late, gonna log

Gums,

Rolling out the red carpet!

stefaan

Well if you want to hang out with Gums bud Steve, he's speaking at 16:30 May 20 at a remembrance and memorial service at Selfridge ANGB http://www.macombdaily.com/stories/0219 ... l001.shtml ,
or just go to any of our airshows as we have two Mig killers on the team, Dave with two gun kills from the F-105, and Steve with five Aim-7 kills from the F-4. Dave is also responsible for Steve being the only AF ace as Dave got his guns kill before Robin Olds could get a Sparrow lock on the Mig...

I've read several of the articles offered on this topic and would like to add my two cents worth on several issues.

On training, it is correct that DACT was not on the training agenda for crews bound for sea as of late 71. In fact, the Aggressors at Nellis started in either late 72 or early 73 (someone correct me if I am wrong) followed by the one at Zaragosa in Spain and the one I built in the P.I. (First Commander was Major/LC Wells). However, in 71, at Luke we did receive 8 sortie each of BFM, ACM, and ACT. In BFM and ACM half were with I/Ps in the pit and half with our GIBs. In ACT 2 were with IPs and the rest with our GIBs. Additionally, three quarters of our IPs were recent SEA returnees who saw the elephant. So we did know what the aircraft could and couldn't do as far as performance goes which really helped in listening to the aircraft (bells and whistles, groans, beepers, etc) but nothing against dissimilar birds.

Next, the cannon on the E was a very viable and effective weapon. This was especially true in the Air to Air environment because of the very restrictive ROE that required hard visual ID before any actions could be taken. So unless you spoted "Charlie" profiled against a cloud (DeBellevue spots on third (?) kill with Steve up front) some distance away you are rapidly going to go through the 7 and 9 parameters to get the ID when all you have left is the gun. If you got down to a gun only engagement you were in real trouble unless you were low with a lot of smash and you didn't try to turn with Charlie (Take it vertical or disengage). A good example of effective use of the gun was Gary Retterbush who was TDY to Korat with the 35th on Sep 12 and Oct 8. On these dates hr took two Mig 21s down after 7's and 9's failed to do the job. Finally, on Max-Go's up north we prioritized the 34th and 469th e models over the 35th. D models before of the added advantage of the gun. THe D's we'd use for missions down south.

ROE was the "Holy Grail" especically when operating up north in PAC 6 and if you violated it you were raw meat on the table. Even in the heat of battle when everyone has something unimportant to say the spooks were listening to you, and Charlie, and could re-construct your mission better then today's Red Flag's magic. McNamara was so convinced that "Commonality" and a controlled response was the key to winning the minds of Charlie that we just couldn't get any relief from the heavy heavy restrictions that were placed on us. We finally got our say for the 11 days of Christmas in 72 when a majority of the restrictions were lifted and the war ended shortly thereafter.

For Robin1, didn't we lose Cice Brunson in the late summer of 72 (I forget who was with him) when they were escorting a strike package into 6 just above an undercast by a SA-2. He was in-turned in the Hilton until the POW release in early 73.

Snake-1

Welcome Snake!!!

Need to get a few other dinosaurs here.

Can talk about the air-to-mud tactics as we go along, but most folks here want to know about air combat.

The Christmas blitz was a joy for all of us. Just ask any of the POW's that came back a few months later.

Find some more folks, Snake, and let them chime in here.

Gums sends.............

Gums

Talking about the Christmas Blitz there is one story that is still pretty much unknown and that is about the Chaff bombers out of the Wolfpac. This group of balls fliers was run by a great guy and superb pilot by the name of Charlie Hollingsworth. We shared a tour in SAC together before Nam when we split with him 0-1 FACing in 4 Corp on his first tour and the Pack on his second. Some of you old timers may have flown with him and if my remembrance of the facts are sketchy, or wrong, jump in.

At the time (71-72) Charlie and his guys would lay a chaff corrider for the ingressing B-52s along the ingress route, over the target, and egress route. Thus you had a finger in the sky on the "gomers" radars plotted and then he put all the guns in the world around that corridor. Additionally, the corridor could only be put down at about 26 to 28,000 feet because of the operational capability of the F-4 with those huge cans of Chaff hung under the wings. Conversely the 52s would fly their strikes in the mid to high 30's. So unless the enemies radars were directly under the chaff corridors some burn through from offset radars could easily track the strike package. THe 52s also flew a set timing interval between each of the three ship cells. So Gomer started stop watches as the first cell entered the corridor and stopped the watches when the second cell entered the same corridor. The timing between cells was forwarded to more gomers at the end of the corridor who again started their stop watches as the first cell exited the corridor and unloaded a salvo of SAS-2s at the timing between cells at the exit point as the second cell came into the clear. Alot of 52s died under these conditions and it was sad watching those fireballs dropping around you and there was nothing you could do. This corridor was dictated by SAC some 7000 miles away and Charlies hands were tied as to what he could and could not do. Doing his duty Charlie laid the corridors and then from a distance watched the carnage of the first three nights when 9 B-52 were shot down.

At the LineBacker debriefings the next day at 7th AF we in the fighter force literally begged SAC to; send a SAC rep who flew the previous days missions so we could talk and develop tactics together to stop the hemorraging, and also modify their tactics so the WEasels, Chaff Bombers, and Fighter escort could try to protect them better. THe answer we got from SAC was not only no, but also don't ask the question again. This attitude continued until they lost the 9th. aircraft on the third night and Charlie was ready for them.

Charlie and his guys had, on their own, developed the Chaff blanket to cover the ingress, the target and Egress routes. It was much bigger, wider and deeper then the corridor, and would provide a much greater degree of security even if laid at 26 grand. It also meant that Charlies guys would be in the target area a heck of a lot longer to go up turn around and come back down (much like a farmer does plowing a field) to lay the whole blanket. Charlie also recommended that if timing to ingress was critical the bomber should scatter and come out of the target area anywhere on the compass rose to screw up the Gomers tracking and solution problems. SAC bought the plan and the next couple of nights were alot safer for the 52 crews that were ready to mutiny.

Morale of te story; Tactics need to be developed by the guys doing the mission and standing in Harm's way. Not by some putz 7000 miles away who has never seen the blood of battle.

Footnote: Charlie would have been on of the most respected Generals of todays Air Force but he was run off the road by a drunk and killed in an automobile accident enroute to visiting his folks some two or three years later

Snake-1.

Snake, thanks for the stories! It's really great to hear it from someone who was there. Thanks for your service, too Salute

!

Chaff? Oh yeah!!!!

During the Christmas blitz we had chaff birds spewing out tons of aluminum just in front of us. We could see it on our air-to-ground radar in the SLUF. lokked same as a thunderstorm would.

My first mission up there was perfect. The chaff cloud was right in front of us and the radar-directed stuff didn't start shooting accurately until we rolled in from about 20K. Callsigns for the chaff birds were fruits - like "apple", "peach", etc.

Of course, after a minute or so there was so much shrapnel in the air from the exploding flak that we didn't need "no steeenkeeng, feelthy" chaff anymore, heh heh.

out,

Gums

You're right, the first couple of nights were like the fourth of July ten times over. SAM plumes going off in every direction trying to find the evasive 52s coupled with the AGM 45s and 78s the Weasels were throwing back at the sites to suppress them. Oranges from the triple A all over and even small arm tracers if you got low enough to see them. To offer a better view of what I'm talking about remember the real time TV coverage from Bhagdad on CNN back in 91? Well multiple that by ten or twenty. Even the old rule of thumb of "if the orange (tracer) is showing any motion you are safe, if that orange is in the same place on the canopy make it move by changing the attitude of the aircraft" was useless as you didn't have time to look at every orange they fired.

Night four it started slacking off and by night six or seven it was so quiet it was scary. Not a peep on the RHAW gear, no calls of MIGs from Disco or Red Crown, the weasels carried their ordnance back home cause the gomers ran out of SAMs, not a single tracer, not the usual panic calls from a flight in trouble, nothing, zilch, zero, nada. Talk about Air Superiority, if one mig had come up to play those nights a real 800 pound gorilla would have eaten his lunch. It was like being somewhere over the center of the Pacific in a quiet moment where it was just you, the bird, and the almighty.

Around Christmas eve it was still as quiet as a church mouse and one fearless double ugly crew decided to leave a calling card. So they unloaded went into full AB and in a roaring dive crossed the Hanoi Hilton, just above the rafters, at Mach many to let the guys in-turned there know they hadn't been forgotten and wish them a Merry Christmas and an unspoken assurance that we'd be back. This crew was never identified but the high command was looking for them for quite a while afterwards. They are still out there. A lot older, a little grayer, but still steely-eyed and they'll never tell.

Salute!

Snake is on to something that should be in the history books for all you yutes that frequent this forum.

I was a part-time Sandy, full-time pig iron delivery expert.

So show up for Sandy alert first night of the blitz ( about oh-dark hundred) and we got 6,7, or 8 downed planes on the board. WHOA!!!! Then we noted the coordinates and callsigns. Another WHOA!

So no SAR's that day due to position of the buffs( as in, like downtown Hanoi). And I flew day after next as "green" sixteen( 356th Green Demons), diving outta the chaff cloud for a railroad yard in the middle of town. The pics from 'raqi I on CNN don't come close to what we saw. There were layers of airbursts, depending upon what calibre the flak was. Some was tracking, some was just random. I am talking a layer about 3,000 ft, another about 10,000, another about 15,000 and the 85's at 20-25,000 feet. Not real fun.

So down we dive and forget about our wife, our kids and our own skinny butt. All we had to do was put the doofer on the target and fly the line on our HUD until the bombs went. Pull up and jink, and "thanks, GOD, I'll take over from here".

Then we had a stand dow for Christmas - no sierra, we actually didn't fly until the 26th.

I'll continue with that sortie later.............

Awesome stories guys! Every pilot from 'Nam that I've ever talked to that was there then always say what a great feeling it was to finally "Go Downtown."

One story that I always love is hearing John McCain talk about a night close to Christmas (possibly even Christmas Eve '72) and those hacks running the Hilton let our boys assemble in the old chapel and have a Christmas prayer service.

Meanwhile, outside, the air raid sirens are going off. McCain said something to the effect that as he started praying he said "I'd have a longer prayer God, but I think you've already answered it." Great stuff.

I also like your input Snake about the SAC bomber generals. It adds a little creedence to some of my earlier posts. Also, welcome to the boards. Always good to hear some insight from some of you older, and much wiser drivers.

Beers and MiGs were made to be pounded!

TC

Thanks for the good words.

When I look at the word "wisdom" in relation to this subject matter I view it as being able to learn from previous mistakes and avoid them in the future. And so far, in this uncertain world, the young Lieutenants and Captains of SEA like Powell, Schwartykauf, our own Chuck Horner, and Presidents willing to stand to the issues are doing just that. They went to school on that awful period, married that knowledge with their first hand experience and vowed never to make the same horrible and costly mistakes again. Let me offer some examples.

The President defined the mission, the objectives, and the desired end result, gave it to the JCS and then got out of the way. He placed his trust and confidence in the men and women who had been there, fought the fight, learned the lessons, and shed the blood to come up with a course of action to meet the objectives with minimum risk.

THe JCS in turn turned the task over to the best and the brightest within the ranks of all the services to blend their particular expertise to the objective and came up with a plan that was a joint U.S. Military one and not one of Army, Navy, Air Force, TAC, or SAC parantage or ownership. Then the plan was given to each of the commanders to figure out the particular and unique tasks, timings, routes, etc, associated with their weapons systems for maximum effect. All of these player inputs were melded in to the overall plan that proved so successful.

The overall result was Top down mission objectives and bottom up mission preparation and planning by the people who had to go out and do the job. Everyone, from the Generals down to the brown bar Lieutenant flying blue four had ownership and more importantly planning experience in what was coming. Many, if not all of the mistakes made in SEA were avoided and our people went out and did the job the military was suppose to do ---Win the Conflict ----not the minds of the enemy. Imagine if you will flying the 11 days of Christmas of 72 in 68 or 69 using these concepts. I firmly believe that there would be fewer names on the wall today and the war would have been much shorter. But that is my opinion.

THe above is called leadership and I for one am very glad to see it is being brought back into the mainstream.

A footnote: I had two brass plaque signs in my office that I tried to live by. One said "Lead, Follow, or get out of the Way!!!!" and the second said "You LEAD people, You MANAGE assets". Both seemed to work just fine.

I know its long, but I feel it had to be said.

Snake-1

"For those who fought for it Freedom has a taste the protected will never know".

Forum: Air Power

Air tactics during the Vietnam War