Forum: F-35 versus XYZ

delvo wrote:

B-2s need specialized hangers which presently only exist in the USA, right?

Yes, although the requirements for a "Forward Operating Base" vs home base do vary.

The other known locations are Andersen AFB in Guam, RAF Fairford in the UK, and several other undisclosed facilities. I suspect that Japan would be a definite possibility.

The B-2 climate controlled hanger situation is somewhat overstated. The coating cannot be properly serviced at non-climate controlled hangars, but a greater issue is that they really don't want to damage a $2.1bn jets coating. They have left them open at Guam before without damage.

There are other suitable hangar facilities available that are large enough and climate controlled in Japan. They are not currently leased by the USAF and do not have a deployed maintenance team to support the B-2. The hangars on shared JASDF civilian facilities are sometimes used to repaint 747s could be quickly re-provisioned for a B-2 forward operating area.

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redbird87 wrote:

There should absolutely be more anti-ship training and capability tailored into USAF. This is a case where the individual service gets stove-piped in it's mission sets due turf wars and funding. The B-1B for example has the potential to be the world's preeminent long range anti-ship platform. It has the loiter time, the sensors (or could have), the situational awareness to track sea-borne targets and attack them on it's terms for maximized effectiveness and survivability.

Yeap, the B-1B & B-2 production was cut short, in part because planners didn't need the nuclear capabilities, and PGM/LGBs hadn't taken center stage. I don't think this became obvious to planners and congress until Panama in 1989, and more so when F-117s attacked downtown Bagdad in during the Gulf War. The TV images of AAA fired blind showed the F-117 stealth and its LGBs became known to general population.

The JDAM was first deployed by a B-2 bomber in 1999 during the Kosovo war.

Considering the Russians have Tu-24s and Tu-160 bombers that are similar in size and configuration (but not avionics) it would be good time to re-evaluate the B-1B program. The current B-1B RCS is between 0.1m2 ~ 1.0m2, but less than the Su-27 series Flankers. The B-2 has a RCS of 0.002 m2, partly due to the S-Ducting of the engine intakes. Upgrading the B-1B design with new supersonic stealth intakes and upgraded engines, along with 5th gen avionics shouldn't be insanely expensive. The F-119 engine is fairly mature technology. The B-1B has an incremental unit cost of $283m and the B-2 was $737m ($2.1bn is the program unit cost).

redbird87 wrote:

The Navy's new P-8 will be a good aircraft, but it can never do what the B-1 could. If properly equipped, supported by other Naval and USAF assets (P-8s, Growler's, Super Bugs to quarterback and provide cover, AWACS, etc) the Bone could dash into the Strait and target dozens of Chinese ships with precision release and forget weapons (such as the Navy's version of the JSOW).

I agree. The P-8 will be a good jet and just as importantly flexible platform. It can also fire SLAM-ER & Harpoon missiles from internal bays at a distance. It may require UAVs or other jets to help with targeting.

The latest JSOW (AGM-154C-1) is moving-target / anti-ship capable (2-way datalink and a IIR seeker with target recognition) and can be dropped by the F-15E/16/35 and the B-1/2/52 (along with its normal USN fighters).

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-154.html

SpudmanWP wrote:

The latest JSOW (AGM-154C-1) is moving-target / anti-ship capable (2-way datalink and a IIR seeker with target recognition) and can be dropped by the F-15E/16/35 and the B-1/2/52 (along with its normal USN fighters).

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-154.html

Agreed, but to my knowledge, the USAF hasn't purchased any and therefore isn't training for that mission. I believe the C-1 has only been purchased by the Navy for use on it's carrier based birds. For persistent sea lane denial, the B-1 or B-2 is a much more efficient option. They can loiter for hours with 24 JSOW outside of the enemy's effective SAM range. This is makes them much more efficient than F-18s or F-35Cs at the same mission. Those platforms would require the execution of multiple carrier take-offs and landings and extensive tanking to keep 24 JSOW airborne and ready for instant employment. Move to mix of similar 500 and 1000lb weapons, and the B-1 and B-2 could engage even more targets in a single sortie. The ability to loiter persistently is golden in this scenario. Even if the carriers are on station, this would free their birds up for other missions. Once one bomber had expended half it's load of precision anti-ship capable stand-off weapons, you'd get the next one up. Therefore, you'd never have a lapse in coverage. Additionally, the joint commander, (presumably a naval flag officer) could at any time assign the on-station bomber the mission of hitting critical land targets in China itself using the same stand-off weapons. This persistent, survivable capability would give the task force commander a great deal of flexibility and firepower. It's a joint mission that has to be appropriately resourced, based, and trained for though. To my knowledge, we are just not there at this point.

The JSOW as a whole is a USN program and the JSOW-C1 just went into LRIP in 2011.

My guess is that the USAF will get them after they go FRP.

Wouldn't buying JSOW-ERs put at risk the JASSM buy? Tot the USAF cancelled JSOW to go JASSM.

JSOW-ERs will likely only have a 250-300lb warhead. The ER is an extension of the C1 which has a BROACH warhead (think tandem - HEAT with a followon GP). Remove the HEAT and slide the GP forward and you have the likely ER setup.

In Feb of this year they tested the proposed warhead/fuse combo (the 2009 test was using the bomb casing as the fuel tank).

http://www.raytheon.com/newsroom/techno ... index.html

redbird87 wrote:

hb

We can agree to disagree to a point and also agree on some points. The EMP question in particular presents difficulties. If the Chinese keep their fleet in port or in the Strait, we would really have no target for an in-kind response. That would mean detonations over the mainland of China. I'm telling you, that is an escalation, and a dangerous one.

Uhh really? I think when I start citing Kahn, Schelling and Brodie, I should have a pretty good understanding what "escalation" is.

I think I and others are getting tired of your "I'm an naval officer and know everything" shtick. This board is populated by a number of officers and experts who have worked on these issues for much longer and at a greater depth than you... to be blunt, your posting on nuclear escalation is poorly thought out and suffers a number of serious misconceptions.

redbird87 wrote:

If they counter with EMP blasts over Japan and Hawaii, or worse yet the US mainland, you are right at the precipice of intercontinental nuclear war.

You don't say? That's the whole point why you don't start launching nuclear weapons in the first place.

redbird87 wrote:

Perhaps the Chinese are smarter than to start those dominoes falling, but history is full of maniacs who have risen to power and done foolish things. I'm just telling you, the POTUS would have a very tough call, and the call may be to pursue other (non-nuclear) options.

No that's not what you're saying. You said this:

And he or she would not go there due to an EMP motivated employment against our fleet.

Which is false, as I pointed out by showing where successive administrations have directly said they would use Nuclear weapons as a first strike capability in the face of conventional superiority... save nothing for being the targeted by a nuclear strike.

redbird87 wrote:

Like I said before, it's even trickier if they use nuke's against our subs. It's very likely they won't be able to defeat our subs through any conventional means for the foreseeable future. And I realize fully that it's a very clumsy, dangerous, and far from automatic approach, so there is no need to attempt to educate me on that fact. Still, it reduces the odds of our being able to simply dominate the Strait with attack subs, and it is more plausibly denied. It would become a he said she said.

That's a plausible scenario when the United States has an arsenal of zero anti-submarine nuclear warheads in service, and haven't since the early 1990s with the deactivation and dismantlement of the B57 depth bomb.

redbird87 wrote:

You seem well read so you probably know this, but in military decision making (an area that I am very experienced in) your intelligence estimate ALWAYS includes at a minimum, the enemy's most dangerous course of action (as well as his most likely COA, his objectives, and his centers of gravity). The scenarios I have mentioned are far from "groundless" worst case ones. The enemy uses the same intelligence process. He knows our centers of gravity in this fight will be the carrier group(s) and our subs. (As well as Japanese based Tac Air, of which, the viability in this fight we will just have to agree to disagree on. I see it as a factor, but not a decisive one).

I guess you really are from the Navy: lets discount an entire service's contribution because of course your tactical fighters have all the answers, yet the other services don't. Lets just remove Air from the Air Sea strategy because we don't need the boys in blue. That will solve the debt problems too!

redbird87 wrote:

So with the Chinese' assumed tactical disadvantages against the before-mentioned sea-based centers of gravity, what can they do to prevail? How can they overcome those disadvantages? I have mentioned a couple, and I promise you, the J-1 (Intel) folks brief our naval CDRs that these very actions are among the most dangerous enemy COAs in this fight. (And no, I've not been to one of these briefings, not my branch, but it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure it out). They need to kill our carriers and subs to take Taiwan and they probably can't do it in a straight up conventional fight. That leaves what alternatives? One, is to overwhelm a politically and militarily weakened Taiwan before we can effectively respond. That is probably the most likely Chinese COA in this discussion. Two, is to use tactical nukes as combat multipliers to their conventional efforts. This is the most dangerous Chinese COA for our fleet (short of simply nuking the fleet directly, which seems unthinkable). With this COA, they would be taking the risk that we will not escalate with a like tactical, effects based (EMP) response over their mainland.

Again, your distinction between EMP and Direct nukes is completely artificial and would not be in practice. The US government's stated threshold for nuclear use is much lower than what you're suggesting even for EMP.

Furthermore your suggested course of action by Chinese government is completely at odds with about 60 years of PLA nuclear doctrine and the reality of its nuclear force. The principle objective of the Chinese nuclear force is deterrence, not offense. It has an official no-use policy that is strictly adhered to. Consequently it has eschewed building a large arsenal, instead to follow an is described as an existential or limited deterrence approach. In short, their force is intended only to threaten damage against an enemy homeland so to deter nuclear weapons use. It is not meant to be overwhelming and it is certainly not designed to engage in a protracted nuclear campaign. Rather it is intended to provide a credible retaliation at most levels that will make an opponent err not to utilize nuclear weapons against China.

Not your defense scenario is not only implausibly strategically, its exceptionally risky for the Chinese because it plays right into the strengths of the United States nuclear strategy of escalation dominance. By detonating a nuclear warhead, it hands the initiative to the US because now the deterrent threat of the Chinese tactical nuclear strikes has been lost. At this point the US can and will freely press its overwhelming advantage in tactical warheads to defeat Chinese sea assets (which would be critical to keep an invasion going after the first 48~72 hours.)

In short, your scenario does not pass the smell test. The Chinese are acutely aware of their vulnerabilities and have made the no first use a bastion of their doctrine and force posture. Conceiving a scenario where they go against that plays right into the weaknesses of their own forces, which they would not do.

redbird87 wrote:

I'm as much of a hawk as anyone you will ever meet, but I disagree with you that such an escalation on our part would be prudent. It brings an intercontinental exchange into the equation. A carrier group, a sub, or Taiwanese autonomy isn't worth that risk to me. Neither of us have any idea if it would be worth it to the man/woman in the White House. You can reference treaty obligations all you want, but the fact is that you just don't know what the decision would be. My best guess is that we wouldn't escalate and risk our very civilization for "prestige" as you put it. If the Chinese planners feel the same, or if a maniacal faction ever comes to power there, our fleet could face those very dangers.

If you look in the 70 year history of American nuclear thought, the key constant is credibility. Credibility on utility, Credibility concerning commitment, credibility about US treaty obligations. Don't believe it? The last time there was any question about the US commitment to an ally caused the so-called Euromissiles crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was when the Russians deployed a new generation of IRBMs that were fast and very accurate. Countries questioned whether the Soviet union could win a localized tactical nuclear exchange and whether the US would intervene with their own nuclear weapons in such a circumstance given the risk of escalation. The following is a statement by a presidential representative to a NATO conference in 1978 which illustrates how important "prestige" is:

I am sure that you will agree that the alliance has faced few, if any, more crucial challenges than it faces today. A challenge to its political cohesion and its ability to make difficult defense and political decisions.... before this group I don't need need to belabor the details of the challenge posed by Soviet Theater Nuclear force deployments. If the Soviet challenge were to remain unanswered, the Soviet Union might come to believe they have achieved what they long sought -- preponderance across the spectrum of military capabilities and decoupling the defence of Europe from US strategic forces and the defense of North America. The question is not whether the US strategic deterrent is firmly coupled with the defense of Europe. There is no question about this as the president has made clear several time. The problem is rather that the Soviets might come to believe that they had in fact achieve their goal of decoupling and begin to act accordingly.

As this quote makes perfectly clear in this case, the US government was most concerned about the perception of the US' preponderance of power. The US had to assuage European fears that it would remain committed to the defense of Europe in the case of a tactical nuclear strike, and show the Russians their determination and ability to respond effectively to any nuclear challenge. It resulted in the deployment of two new theater nuclear systems (pershing and GLCM) and new organizational arrangements to tie US defense commitments closer to Europe. These same logics are evident in our current situation with China over Taiwan. The Bush and Obama administrations have clearly stated their absolute security guarantee for Taiwan and their use of nuclear weapons to defend that sovereignty if need be.

So to say that successive US political leaders do not care about the perceived value of its nuclear deterrent is completely and absolutely false. Saying that it should not care is utterly negligent: its intellectually and strategically foolish, which is what I expect out of Ron Paul and his supporters. It would do more to undermine the US role in the region, having a severely negative effect on its security and that of the region.

I suggest you read some basic Nuclear histories like Lawrence Freedman'sThe Evolution of Nuclear Strategy to get a better sense of these issues.

redbird87 wrote:

The best way to prevent this from ever happening is to keep Taiwan strong militarily and economically and to invest in more state-of-the art submarines. If the latter has to be done at the expense of one or two fewer carriers groups, I'm all for it. That's a whole separate Geo-political discussion though.

It wouldn't be enough given the massive disparities in military sizes. The only conceivable way that the Taiwanese can defend themselves is with our security guarantee and our forces in reserve. Giving them more weapons buys them more time, but it will not appreciably alter the outcome over the long term.

I personally believe that Taiwan should be focusing on anti-access technologies similar to what China and Iran are reportedly doing. This would primarily mean SAMs, ASMs, and dispersed land and air forces. The goal would be to present a hardened and dispersed defense network that would require more time to dismantle piece-by-piece than the Chinese have before the US commits its own forces.
The current RoCAF strategic SAM inventory is 3-10 PAC-3 batteries, 6 Sky Bow batteries, and 19 Hawk batteries supposedly being replaced with 12 Sky Bow batteries. The Sky Bow system seems roughly comparable to a Patriot battery. Overall, it seems fairly capable, though I am unsure how well it would actually stack up to the PLAAF.

southernphantom wrote:

I personally believe that Taiwan should be focusing on anti-access technologies similar to what China and Iran are reportedly doing. This would primarily mean SAMs, ASMs, and dispersed land and air forces. The goal would be to present a hardened and dispersed defense network that would require more time to dismantle piece-by-piece than the Chinese have before the US commits its own forces.
The current RoCAF strategic SAM inventory is 3-10 PAC-3 batteries, 6 Sky Bow batteries, and 19 Hawk batteries supposedly being replaced with 12 Sky Bow batteries. The Sky Bow system seems roughly comparable to a Patriot battery. Overall, it seems fairly capable, though I am unsure how well it would actually stack up to the PLAAF.

In that case, they may want to look into small attack subs.

count_to_10 wrote:

southernphantom wrote:

I personally believe that Taiwan should be focusing on anti-access technologies similar to what China and Iran are reportedly doing. This would primarily mean SAMs, ASMs, and dispersed land and air forces. The goal would be to present a hardened and dispersed defense network that would require more time to dismantle piece-by-piece than the Chinese have before the US commits its own forces.
The current RoCAF strategic SAM inventory is 3-10 PAC-3 batteries, 6 Sky Bow batteries, and 19 Hawk batteries supposedly being replaced with 12 Sky Bow batteries. The Sky Bow system seems roughly comparable to a Patriot battery. Overall, it seems fairly capable, though I am unsure how well it would actually stack up to the PLAAF.

In that case, they may want to look into small attack subs.

That is also a very viable approach. I'm frankly not up on naval strategy, but I could see the use in a dozen very quiet attack submarines to occupy PLAN (such an odd name for a navy) assets, and introduce a degree of uncertainty into potential amphibious assaults on the islands.

I remember reading that Germany has some fuel cell powered subs that fit the bill.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_212_submarine
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_214_submarine

count_to_10 wrote:

I remember reading that Germany has some fuel cell powered subs that fit the bill.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_212_submarine
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_214_submarine

S Korea already has those, and the SSKs built by Japan are even better. There's no reason for the US to build pigboats that have to be transported to the Western Pacific theater by salvage barge.

1st503rdsgt wrote:

count_to_10 wrote:

I remember reading that Germany has some fuel cell powered subs that fit the bill.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_212_submarine
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_214_submarine

S Korea already has those, and the SSKs built by Japan are even better. There's no reason for the US to build pigboats that have to be transported to the Western Pacific theater by salvage barge.

I think you may have misunderstood my post. I meant that the submarines would be owned and operated by the RoCN.

southernphantom wrote:

1st503rdsgt wrote:

count_to_10 wrote:

I remember reading that Germany has some fuel cell powered subs that fit the bill.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_212_submarine
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_214_submarine

S Korea already has those, and the SSKs built by Japan are even better. There's no reason for the US to build pigboats that have to be transported to the Western Pacific theater by salvage barge.

I think you may have misunderstood my post. I meant that the submarines would be owned and operated by the RoCN.

Taiwan has been going about begging this or that country to sell them some new submarines for awhile now, but no one (not even the US) wants to risk pi$$ing the PRC off.

Forum: F-35 versus XYZ

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