Forum: Program and politics

neurotech wrote:

Secondly, they DO design the airframe around the engine and mission systems.

I used the word "leverage" for a reason. The F-14 isn't a follow-on in the same way the F-15D and F-15E share commonality. The program was a follow-on, not the design itself.

For 4th gen or newer fighters, the avionics and mission systems is a significant part of the "design". If the F-111B had been a resounding success, do you think the Navy would have said to Grumman "Okay, now build us a F-14 for dogfighting?" I don't think so.

I think you're confusing yourself. I'm well aware the F-14 wasn't a follow-on design from the 111B. The F-14 'design' was NOT based in ANY part on the 111B...it WAS based around engines, and some systems, and Grumman kept the swing wing concept. So we DO agree.

The Navy NEVER asked for a dogfighter, they asked for a long range interceptor.

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johnwill wrote:

No, sixx, don't agree. Why don't you get some sleep and tomorrow, read what you have just written. Makes no sense to me. How about you, neurotech?

Neurotech's post most certainly agree's with my opinion and the facts. Why in the world would I need sleep? The sun just came up and the day just started!!

johnwill wrote:

No, sixx, don't agree. Why don't you get some sleep and tomorrow, read what you have just written. Makes no sense to me. How about you, neurotech?

I don't really agree with sixx on this. Engine + Radar IS a large part of an aircraft design.

You actually worked on the F-111 series for GD, didn't you? Were you around for Sec. McNamara vs Vadm. Connolly argument over the F-111B?

Doesn't really matter who was around for what and where...Facts are facts. You are right...engine, radar, internal systems ARE a huge part of aircraft design. What wasn't part of the F-14's design, was the inherent design of the 111B. That's fact. If you disagree with then I can't help you at all...it's plain as day.

checksixx wrote:

The Navy NEVER asked for a dogfighter, they asked for a long range interceptor.

Actually they did. It was Sec. McNamara who asked for a Navy interceptor, based on the F-111 to save costs. The problem was that the F-111 wasn't particularly agile, and I quote "There isn't enough power in all Christendom to make that airplane what we want!", comment by Vadm. Tom Connoly. It's called TOMcat for a reason.

It is the ghosts of the F-111A/B program that echoed in the F-35 program, for good reason. The Navy won't accept a compromise fighter that doesn't suit it needs. If the F-35A could handle arrested landings, it probably wouldn't be successful on the boat due to the higher AoA and airspeed on approach. The F-35C is a good solution.

The F-35 needs to be successful for all the 3 services, and I think it will be.

Nope...the program was ALWAYS for a fleet interceptor. Its called Tomcat for a reason, yes. Folks at Grumman were already going to name it as they had done for years, the Grumman cat family, and had been calling it Tom's Cat because of all the mouth running he was doing over it. I highly suggest looking at historical documents and company history as it will show what the program requirements were at the time.

checksixx wrote:

Nope...the program was ALWAYS for a fleet interceptor. Its called Tomcat for a reason, yes. Folks at Grumman were already going to name it as they had done for years, the Grumman cat family, and had been calling it Tom's Cat because of all the mouth running he was doing over it. I highly suggest looking at historical documents and company history as it will show what the program requirements were at the time.

The Navy wanted a jet that could function as an interceptor, but still dogfight like a F-4 Phantom or better. To be fair, the Navy DID change the requirements based on their experience in Vietnam. This probably played a large role in why the F-111B was no longer suitable.

neurotech wrote:

You actually worked on the F-111 series for GD, didn't you? Were you around for Sec. McNamara vs Vadm. Connolly argument over the F-111B?

Right, I spent ten years on the 111 program, including assignments at Grumman and as GD lead structural engineer on the carrier suitabilty test at Pax in 1968.

Although I wasn't at the hearing where Connolly made his infamous claim, I was well aware of the Navy position. By the way, the NY Times agrees with you about naming the F-14.

Back to checksixx, "leverage" means to take advantage. The F-14 took advantage of the previously mentioned hardware and also of much that GD and Grumman had learned from the 111, neurotech's original claim is correct in my opinion.

checksixx wrote:

Nope...the program was ALWAYS for a fleet interceptor. Its called Tomcat for a reason, yes. Folks at Grumman were already going to name it as they had done for years, the Grumman cat family, and had been calling it Tom's Cat because of all the mouth running he was doing over it. I highly suggest looking at historical documents and company history as it will show what the program requirements were at the time.

You seem to have forgotten that Grumman also worked on the F-111B. Do you seriously expect us to believe that they didn't use what they learned in that process?

neurotech wrote:

hb_pencil wrote:

However I think posts like that illustrate the frustration some feel at those certain parties who have the arrogance to continually argue that the military is making a terrible mistake with the F-35 and should go with upgraded F-35s or F/A-18E/Fs. Almost all the views they post are just to attack the program, without any discussion of the context or alternative views.

Upgraded F-35s?.

That's a typo.

neurotech wrote:

I'm not one to call the program a "terrible mistake". Lets not forget that the F/A-18 was basically created because the YF-16 won the LWF competition, but wasn't viable as a Navy jet. Does that make the LWF competition a mistake.. hell no

Similarly, the F-14 was created out of the unsuccessful F-111B program. Does that make the F-111B program a failure? Nope.. The F-14 leveraged a significant part of the F-111B design.

Calling the F-35 program a "terrible mistake" is down right stupid. The fact is that if LM imploded and the USAF buys Block III++ Super Hornets, you can bet your a** they'll use technology from the F-35 program to improve the design in fairly short order.

I wasn't really referring to you at all. I can understand and accept your viewpoint, you're reasonable, intelligent and well informed. However the original poster was responding to another person who thought a fair and balanced article on the F-35 was about 20+ paragraphs of negative statements weighed against one paragraph of positive statements. The delusional point is suggesting that we should transfer funds from developing and procuring F-35s (when that program now seems to be operating as planned) in order to buy a much older and less capable airframe as well as the development of another airframe that won't see service until 2030. I would completely agree with having an alternative plan... the Navy has done that with its current recapitalization plans and keeping the F/A-18E lines open until 2015. If the Marines at that time will be (or close to) operating a squadron of F-35Bs, then I think the USN can be reasonably assured of the program's future success.

However I'd vehemently disagree with taking funds away from your primary program (and diminishing its chances for success) to push forward a much less capable and riskier alternative. I might not call it delusional... but its certainly foolhardy.

hb_pencil wrote:

neurotech wrote:

Calling the F-35 program a "terrible mistake" is down right stupid. The fact is that if LM imploded and the USAF buys Block III++ Super Hornets, you can bet your a** they'll use technology from the F-35 program to improve the design in fairly short order.

I wasn't really referring to you at all. I can understand and accept your viewpoint, you're reasonable, intelligent and well informed. However the original poster was responding to another person who thought a fair and balanced article on the F-35 was about 20+ paragraphs of negative statements weighed against one paragraph of positive statements. The delusional point is suggesting that we should transfer funds from developing and procuring F-35s (when that program now seems to be operating as planned) in order to buy a much older and less capable airframe as well as the development of another airframe that won't see service until 2030. I would completely agree with having an alternative plan... the Navy has done that with its current recapitalization plans and keeping the F/A-18E lines open until 2015. If the Marines at that time will be (or close to) operating a squadron of F-35Bs, then I think the USN can be reasonably assured of the program's future success.

However I'd vehemently disagree with taking funds away from your primary program (and diminishing its chances for success) to push forward a much less capable and riskier alternative. I might not call it delusional... but its certainly foolhardy.

My last comment about LM "imploding" was very much hypothetical.

I do agree that at this point there is significantly less technical risk in bringing the F-35 to FRP, than making a FA-18E/F III++ jet to be competitive to the F-35. So yes, that would be foolhardy to divert funds from the F-35 procurement, to do a major airframe refresh of the F/A-18E/F

Williams Foundation questions Super Hornet LOR
Item by australianaviation.com.au at 10:09 am, Thursday December 20 2012

http://australianaviation.com.au/2012/1 ... ornet-lor/

"The Williams Foundation think tank has questioned the government’s decision to further delay a decision on Australia’s air combat capability transition plan and to submit an LOR to the US government for 24 more Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornets. In a December 17 release, the foundation laid out the four options which government considered before announcing the LOR, including a previously unreported option to accelerate the F-35A acquisition under Project AIR 6000 Phase 2A/2B and return it to the original schedule before it was delayed by two years in May’s federal budget.

http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/blogentry/177

“There are two very important points that highlight government inconsistency in defence acquisition policy by the Minister’s recent announcement,” the release reads. “The first relates to tolerance for risk, and the second relates to attitude towards Australian industry. In terms of risk the government appears to be willing to accept an extreme level of risk with the Future Submarine Project, a program where Australia would be taking the lead and be the sole customer for a small fleet of conventional submarines, that are yet to be designed, that are pushing the edge of technology… This is in stark contrast to the JSF Program where the US has the lead of a nine-nation partnership, development and testing is now largely complete, production is ramping up such that by the end of 2018 over 400 F-35 aircraft will have been delivered and there is a clear upgrade path well into the future.”

The release also compared “the treatment of the Australian aerospace sector versus the land and maritime sectors”, describing it as “stark,” and claiming that, “Ongoing lack of support for Australian aerospace industry and ongoing questions about Australia’s commitment to the F-35 program will further undermine Australia’s aerospace industry sector.”

That is it.

Forum: Program and politics

Australia delays delivery of 12 F-35 fighters