Forum: Program and politics

Who's numbers are rubbish?
If you want to argue number of aircraft in the Scenario there is one that has no hope of being seen in Practise.
The US Navy having 240 Operational F35's by 2018 in the Pacific Ocean.
At least read the Submission to the Senate Inquiry on the above link and then comment.

APA did not do the simulation you will notice. If you read it you will then know who you are calling an idiot.

There is no way you know more than one of the people in particular.
Just read the thing - I know you will still say "rubbish" but just read it.
Your numbers are Rubbish on China and Aircraft numbers.
CHINA NOW: 220 - J10A & S/B -- 100 - SU30MKK & MK2 --- 140 - JHA & JHB --- 76 - SU27SK & VBK PLUS hundreds of older Aircraft that will be Obsolete by the time the F35 is around in numbers.
Total - 536 Aircraft NOW - PLUS NEW T-10 TYPE AIRCRAFT IN THE PIPELINE.
I know you are going to say the 76 old SU27's are rubbish - maybe? maybe not? - it there hours are low enough they can be upgraded easily or have been - I don't know.
I know you will say the J10 is rubbish - other reports say it should be as good if not better than a Viper.

Other Rubbish you talk: Sukoi can only build 1 SU35 each year.
Sukoi is building 48 - SU35's for the Russian Airforce by 2015. After that they want the PakFa.

Production started last year and they should be at full production this year.
They say they can at the moment build 20-30 per year.

If I remember correctly it only had its first test flight in 2008. Sounds good to me - About 3 Years from test flight to Production with an accident in 2009 while testing one of the prototypes.
"I forgot it will have to be typical Russian rubbish if they had a runway accident in testing." I give up - You win.

Furthermore, the JSF is still a supersonic capable fighter with fighter performance and agility at least equal to F/A-18 and F-16 fighters and an operational ceiling of 50,000 feet. It's hardly sufficiently lacking in "traditional" fighter qualities if needed...

Using the version of flight control software available at the beginning of 2011, undesirable wing roll-off, airframe buffet, and sideslip occurred in transonic flight regimes. Through changes to flight control software, the program improved these handling qualities. By the end of November 2011, testing of the latest flight control software change (version R25.0.7) indicated the handling qualities did not meet the current criteria. No further software modifications specific to transonic roll-off are planned.

@ hb_pencil

A couple of points:

Transonic roll-off is still an issue, the FCS changes have improved the situation but not removed it. If you read the DOT&E 2011 annual report (p26) you’ll see that they “reduced the impact of transonic roll-off”, not eliminated it. If you go further down to page 33 you can see they tried the new FCS changes in the C model too and experienced “the predicted intensity of uncommanded rolls” so again an improvement but not a fix.


So they think they’ve done as much for the transonic roll-off issue as they can with changes to the FCS. You can read about the buffet issue on page 30 and a couple of other spots. I get the impression that they haven’t really got a handle on it yet but that the handling in general isn’t “meeting the current criteria”.

Briefly:
Your point about “India’s problems with their missiles” refers to an issue the Indians are having with the shelf life of the weapons not their reliability once they are checked “ok” and put on the aircraft.

Russian “problems with new missile developments” refers to trouble the Russians were having with a new three-stage solid and liquid fuelled SLBM. Apart from both designations including the word “missile” I fail to see the connection.

The Ethiopian – Eritraen conflict featured Senior Russian Air Force pilots (recently retired) flying Su-27s and Ukranian trained and supplied Eritreans flying MiGs. Both sides were armed with the same weapons and thus were intimately aware of their capabilities and weaknesses. It’s impressive that there were zero hits with the R-27 but possibly there are other factors involved:
http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/11/09.pdf

Finally, the last entry simply shows why even the Russian air force should be developing SEAD/DEAD tactics and how effective an area denial tool SAMs can be if you don’t have the tactics and weapons to hunt them down.

Popcorn
By the time the group was 30 minutes into its presentation at least five of the committee members had left the room. HAHAHA[/b]

Do yo know why they had to leave.

Conan
RAAF disagrees with that assumption, which is why it is pushing for a sole air combat fighter type in-service in the longer term.

I agree with and accept what you say overall for Australia.
Most of what you say is the point I was trying to make but it looks like I will have to spell it out in detail. We can't afford to get it wrong. We can't afford to be supporting 3 types of aircraft if we do get it wrong. Once we get the F35 we are going to be stuck with it for a long time. We now have 2 types and that is one too many. We can't afford to commit to early F35's that will need extensive changes etc. We can't afford to risk again believe-ing LM spin about it will be OK with only about 20% testing done in some areas and no real weapons testing done yet. The list of things that need rectifying can only grow - not shrink.

More like 2016 or later maybe 2020 - who knows?. They were experienced US Plane Designers saying that. The very people that did design the equipment that did put the US at the top for about 15 years in design. Those good designers of that period when there was real competition amongst US Corporations - produce or fail.
Before it more or less became an extension of the Public Service as far as military aircraft are concerned.

... Once we get the F35 we are going to be stuck with it for a long time. We now have 2 types and that is one too many. We can't afford to commit to early F35's that will need extensive changes etc. ... The list of things that need rectifying can only grow - not shrink.

The real experts said - don't believe them - that is just LM marketing talking sh*t again. More like 2016 or later maybe 2020 - who knows?. They were experienced US Plane Designers saying that. The very people that did design the equipment that did put the US at the top for about 15 years in design. Those good designers of that period when there was real competition amongst US Corporations - produce or fail.

... If we had bought 24 F15's we may have bought another 75 and the "Sacred Cow" the F35 would be discarded.
That was the last real chance we had to change HORSES - we missed it.
If the Government had decided to go for say 4++ F15's at that time and cancel the F35 you would still be hearing the screams from the F35 Mafia.

ALL I WAS TRYING TO SAY ORIGINALLY WAS having missed that chance the only safe option now is to buy some more Super Hornets until we know for sure the F35 problems are all solved.

I was speaking a few days ago with members of an industrial team of another jet fighter, they felt that the delays and challenges faced by the F-35 mirrored their own. The F-35 has problems, particularly with delays, and this is the main sticking point for most customers (and potential ones)

Cost is the lingering problem that is critical to the program's ultimate success. The technical issues with the plane will be solved through redesign, revision of requirements, or the less likely nuclear option of canceling a model or two. Cost is what will ultimately control the numbers of airframes purchased by the US services, partner nations and other customers.

No, in most cases cost is more related to the delivery point. They have a specific price point that was contingent on a certain delivery window. That Window has now been moved back due to delays.

Furthermore, there has not been significant increases in the projected per-unit price. Certainly the current LRIP lots are seeing cost increases about 5 to 10% above projected: in historical perspective that's actually not that bad, particularly given the program is now emerging from a major restructuring. Most countries have a contingency built into their figures that account for that.

Furthermore technical issues relating to design are not large drivers of cost either. The development process is covered by RDT&E and therefore not relevant for partner costs. Actually implementing the fix often does not increase the cost substantially either, because it is a different configuration of a current part.

Cost is everything when looking at the program as a whole. One major stated goal of the program was to control the cost of developing and acquiring tactical jets. This has not been successful. The program is projected to cost twice as much as originally envisioned, suffering several Nunn-McCurdy breaches and restructures. The jets themselves will cost 2-3 times as much estimated in the 1990s.

Units have been cancelled to pay for overruns.

Partners have curtailed orders.

Potential customers threaten cancellation if cost metrics are not met.

Current US cost projections assume all currently (not historically) planned aircraft will be built - if not, cost increase accordingly.

Sequestration could affect shorter term buys, resulting in upward cost pressure.

The looming issue downrange is whether further jets will be cancelled in favor of longer ranged assets like the LRS-B, and the Navy's NGAD.

Cost will always be a major factor in determining program success, particularly if you measure it in terms of aircraft eventually built. F-16 program, a success. F-15, a success. Super Hornet, success. F-22, great aircraft, but programmatically not successful due to costs of airframes and maintenance. B-2, same. F-14, another great aircraft, but ultimately unsuccessful in the sense that the best version was built in small numbers, and prematurely canceled and withdrawn for a cheaper aircraft.

And yet after all that, countries are still lining up to purchase the F-35. The problem is that you're just repeating things you think that look bad, without any relevance what the partner and SCPs actually are concerned about. They care about delivery date and price... though the former is a greater concern than the latter due to the rust out of their current fighter fleet.



What, three aircraft?



Really the countries that have really curtailed orders had unrelated issues; massive fiscal austerity measures. Italy and the UK basically cut everything. The mere fact that Italy chose to only cut 30% of its order is probably more telling of its commitment to the project. In reality most states have chosen to rearrange their purchase dates to accommodate the new production schedule. The only exception is Australia, but again, that reflects the problem with delivery needs.



That's a risk any program faces.



Again for about the eight time, per unit costs are a year by year issue, particularly for the partner states. What the "total number" is a secondary factor as it relates to production lot sizes and their total number. However the total buy for the US is less relevant for the partner countries, which was the focus of my posts.

Furthermore the learning curve predicts that after 700 units, there is really very little in savings possible through manufacturing efficiency.




I think the whole out of cycle Quadrennial review undertaken by the SECDEF was an effort to avoid that. I get the feeling that it was successful at blunting any further cuts.



Frankly, the implication that they would replace a strike fighter with a long range bomber, is kinda ridiculous, particularly if you're arguing it would be based on cost considerations. Its possible that they might curtail after 2020 due to the NGAD, but in reality I doubt they will ever introduce the F-X before 2030. Yet whether the US decides in 2022 that it only needs 800 of a remaining 1500 it wouldn't affect the per unit cost prior to that or after, if they continued at the same production scale until the premature close.



By 2019 DoD will have produced more F-35s than any of those programs, save for the F-16.

As a final point, I get that you're critical of the program... however lately you just seem to point out anything you think is wrong as proof this is a disaster of a program. I'd suggest you reconsider your position. For me, I take the long view on the F-35, putting it into context with all the other programs I've watched over the decades. I can find statements by critics of the F/A-18E in the late 1990s that eerily reflect yours. Yet today you're here singing its graces. Last week I was digging through discussions about the CF-18 back in the early 1980s. It amused me about how similar they are to the ones in Canada today about the F-35. Yet I doubt anyone would claim that we did not get good value for money out of those fighter over the last 30 years.

I suggest you think about how this program might look in five years time (especially if the program avoids major problems and goes into FRP) and consider how you're going to feel about the statements and views you're making today. I understand that as a journalist you feel the need to be skeptical about the truth. However being mindlessly critical rather than objective doesn't reflect well with several years of hindsight.