Forum: F-35 versus XYZ

sferrin wrote:

Fighter Mafia. 'nuf said.

http://etd.auburn.edu/etd/bitstream/han ... sequence=1
Check out the link. The section on the development of what eventually became the F-15 is particularly interesting. John Boyd's and Pierre Sprey's Red Bird proposal for a single-engined, simple fighter was no way close to the Eagle yet their fans are very happy to assign credit to the Fighter mafia. Helps sort out John Boyd the man from John Boyd the myth. Also some insight into Sprey's background.

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Gums wrote:

...USMC Hornets do well supporting their doctrine for assaults and CAS and.... They are not used for deep interdiction missions or battlefield air superiority...

There are twelve active duty Hornet squadrons with MARINES painted on the side of their jets -- they would beg to differ. Both DS and OIF provide more than ample cases in point.

Even the Harriers flew 400nm (radius) missions (unrefueled) into Iraq from the Persian Gulf during OIF-1.

And for some who might be unfamiliar with USMC aviation doctrine, pay particular attention to Chapters 2 and 3 at this link --

http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/gene ... ations.pdf

Gums wrote:

The "B" operational need is still questionable to this old attack puke. USMC doctrine requires very close coord between the grunts and the aviators. But I don't see that the STOVL requirement as 100% essential. USMC Hornets do well supporting their doctrine for assaults and CAS and.... They are not used for deep interdiction missions or battlefield air superiority.

I think it's biggest advantage is STOVL gives us 11 more flight decks we can operate fixed wing aircraft from. In anybody else's navy the Tarawa/Waps/Americas would be considered aircraft carriers.

popcorn wrote:

sferrin wrote:

Fighter Mafia. 'nuf said.

http://etd.auburn.edu/etd/bitstream/han ... sequence=1
Check out the link. The section on the development of what eventually became the F-15 is particularly interesting. John Boyd's and Pierre Sprey's Red Bird proposal for a single-engined, simple fighter was no way close to the Eagle yet their fans are very happy to assign credit to the Fighter mafia. Helps sort out John Boyd the man from John Boyd the myth. Also some insight into Sprey's background.

Yep. The "Fighter Mafia" absolutely hated the F-15.

SecDef McNamara, perhaps emboldened by the successful adoption of the Navy developed F4H into USAF service, cancelled the Navy's proposed F6D aircraft (which some factions of the Navy did not want,) and folded its mission into the USAF proposed tactical fighter, spawning the TFX. But the TFX program failed in its goal to produce a common airframe suitable for use in widely different missions and operational scenarios. The Navy wisely left the program after SecDef McNamara resigned, and the USAF was left with a jet that took years of additional development and tons of cash to correct - (partly because of Navy requirements for carrier operations, although in the end, the F-111B had less than 40% commonality with the -A) - but it never achieved the performance goals originally proposed. The USAF eventually procured about a third of the planned buy at five times the unit cost programmed.

From an abstract of the paper "The Quest for Commonality: A Comparison of the TFX and JSF Programs" by Maj. D.S. Grantham, USMC (AV-8B aviator) for his thesis while attending the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, at Maxwell AFB.

"In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara initiated the Tactical Fighter
Experimental (TFX) program for the US Navy and Air Force. The program was designed to save $1 billion in development costs by using a common airframe to fulfill the Navy’s fleet air-defense fighter requirement and the Air Force’s long range nuclear and conventional tactical fighter requirement. In 1968, the Navy TFX program was canceled due to the test aircraft’s poor performance and incompatibility with carrier operations. After 1968, the Air Force was left with a TFX design that was compromised by McNamara’s original commonality requirement. Ultimately, the Air Force fielded the TFX as different variants of the F-111 at five times the planned unit cost per airframe. The aircraft never developed the performance capabilities proposed in the original program. The failure of the TFX can be directly attributed to the restrictions and requirements imposed by the common development program."

This is a long paper that contains a huge amount of information about the TFX program, as well as the beginnings of JSF (it was written in 1997.)

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA391861

rdale wrote:

to hb_pencil
As for Italy and Spain buying the B model , arn't they broke ?

They won't be broke forever, unlike their Harriers.

alloycowboy wrote:

@Gums..... The question I have about the performance of the F-35A vs the F-16 is if the turn performance of F-35 is on par with a F-16 Block 60 then really how much quicker do you need the F-35A to turn? Haven't we now reached the point where squeezing 1-2% more performance out of the airframe is rather pointless and we should now concentrate on developing advanced missiles instead as there is a bigger performance advantages to be gained there?

Isn't it about time that we get to see some evidence (video etc, no classified stuff of course) of the claimed turning performance? From what i could understand the QLR report mentioned maneuverability problems, but that wasn't discussed here in the same way other problems was. I'm starting to get a feeling that this issue is being avoided in LM marketing.

Gums wrote:

Salute!

The "A" should be a decent replacement for the Viper in the ground attack role, but maybe even or less capable as the Viper in A2A ( LO considerations aside for the A2A mission).

Less capable in A2A? You're kidding right? The F-35 has better sensors, better situational awareness, greater agility, greater range, greater speed, stealth, greater A2A weapon envelopes, etc...

maus92 wrote:

SecDef McNamara, perhaps emboldened by the successful adoption of the Navy developed F4H into USAF service, cancelled the Navy's proposed F6D aircraft (which some factions of the Navy did not want,) and folded its mission into the USAF proposed tactical fighter, spawning the TFX. But the TFX program failed in its goal to produce a common airframe suitable for use in widely different missions and operational scenarios. The Navy wisely left the program after SecDef McNamara resigned, and the USAF was left with a jet that took years of additional development and tons of cash to correct - (partly because of Navy requirements for carrier operations, although in the end, the F-111B had less than 40% commonality with the -A) - but it never achieved the performance goals originally proposed. The USAF eventually procured about a third of the planned buy at five times the unit cost programmed.

From an abstract of the paper "The Quest for Commonality: A Comparison of the TFX and JSF Programs" by Maj. D.S. Grantham, USMC (AV-8B aviator) for his thesis while attending the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, at Maxwell AFB.

"In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara initiated the Tactical Fighter
Experimental (TFX) program for the US Navy and Air Force. The program was designed to save $1 billion in development costs by using a common airframe to fulfill the Navy’s fleet air-defense fighter requirement and the Air Force’s long range nuclear and conventional tactical fighter requirement. In 1968, the Navy TFX program was canceled due to the test aircraft’s poor performance and incompatibility with carrier operations. After 1968, the Air Force was left with a TFX design that was compromised by McNamara’s original commonality requirement. Ultimately, the Air Force fielded the TFX as different variants of the F-111 at five times the planned unit cost per airframe. The aircraft never developed the performance capabilities proposed in the original program. The failure of the TFX can be directly attributed to the restrictions and requirements imposed by the common development program."

This is a long paper that contains a huge amount of information about the TFX program, as well as the beginnings of JSF (it was written in 1997.)

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA391861

I read through it. As a rule you need to take masters thesis carefully. Yes they often discuss interesting issues, but they aren't meant to be exhaustive studies. It is a good amalgamation of easily obtainable information. Thomason is different because he's an aerospace engineer with about a half dozen books now on the development of various Navy fighters. In addition to doing first hand interviews, he also digs through the National Archives, something few masters students have the time or inclination to do.

The biggest problem with the monograph is that its inconsistent on its discussion on design parameters and version objectives. Its also of the Navy version of events, which was a smear campaign. It initially states that F-111 would be a common "fighter." The AF version was always supposed to be a F-105 replacement in the tactical nuclear role, with a very secondary fighter role. Any consideration of the F-111 as an "air superiority fighter" was officially dead with the 1965 RFP that resulted in the F-15, but really the air force was already undertaking design studies in late 1963. The Navy was not looking for an air superiority fighter, it was looking for a supersonic missileer. So really the two major specifications were the low level dash, and the fleet defender role.

As Thomason makes clear here, the F-111B met its design parameters for the Navy. Its just they changed them towards greater maneuverability in part due to their campaign to kill the program. Even in 1966, it was likely that an upgraded F-4 would be fielded as a complement to the F-111B in the fleet defense role.

The paper does however do a good job of explaining the initial development culture of JAST... possibly because the author had some experience or internal insight into the program (those are the masters thesis I like reading.) He utilizes the master requirements document, and (without citation, usually an indication of some internal knowledge) the nature of the program dynamics. He utilizes this information well when discussing how the F-35 avoids many of the F-111's failures:

The JAST program, which preceded the JSF, was established under a charter
which emphasized a joint development program. Unlike the TFX program, members
from the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have enjoyed equal status in the develop-
ment of the JSF. The directorship of the program alternates between the Air Force and
the Navy to help ensure that one service does not dominate the program. These efforts
have produced a truly joint development program but they do not guarantee each service
will be willing to compromise essential capabilities in favor of reducing costs or achiev-
ing a common design once aircraft production begins. However, the Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps all plan to use the JSF for interdiction and close support missions.
This congruence in missions between the services should ease the compromises required
to define a common aircraft.

Where does he get it wrong in the F-35's discussion with the benefit of hindsight? Avionics was never discussed. Its such an critical driver of development and cost these days, yet there is no discussion of the potential risks.

rdale wrote:

to hb_pencil
to alloycowboy ,
isn't the turn rate now limited by the G force the the pilot can stand ?

@ rdale..... That was might point exactly. Turning performance of a fighter is limited by the human body to about 9G's. However the only limits to how fast a missile can turn are structural and aerodynamic. Since missiles can now turn 3-4 times faster then fighter jets the classic dog fight may no longer viable as every one dies.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4b-BwMi19JE&feature=related

There's also structural limits to fighters too. The design load factor is usually about 9-10 Gs for fighters.

There are missiles like ESSM that can perform maneuvers far in excess of 20 Gs so maneuverability of fighters is practically irrelevant as the Northrop moniker would have us believe.

Last edited by maus92 on Feb 01, 2012 - 01:19 AM; edited 1 time in total

@hb_pencil:

I agree that these papers generally review previously published works, but it does not mean that they are inaccurate or the the conclusions they draw are necessarily wrong. The good thing is that they cite their sources for all to see.

Among his sources, the author references two of the seminal works about the TFX acquisition program:

"The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military," by Robert J. Art, and
"Illusions of Choice: The F-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform," by Robert Coulam.

I have read the first, but I'll have to go over to Nimitz to read the second book. Additionally, I have not read Thomason's book about the F-111B, but I just ordered it from Amazon. Maybe there is data in it that is contemporary to these works that the author cites.

Art's book covers up to the decision to develop the GD proposal. Interestingly, the USAF-led Source Selection Board (with the Navy's concurrence) recommended to develop the Boeing design, which both services felt offered operational advantages. McNamara overruled them, citing three factors: less commonality, risky, unproven technology (thrust reversers / the use of titanium,) and unrealistic cost projections.

Anyway, the program apparently was quite scandalous at the time. I look forward to reading both Coulam's and Thomason's analyses.

maus92 wrote:

@hb_pencil:

I agree that these papers generally review previously published works, but it does not mean that they are inaccurate or the the conclusions they draw are necessarily wrong. The good thing is that they cite their sources for all to see.

Among his sources, the author references two of the seminal works about the TFX acquisition program:

"The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military," by Robert J. Art, and
"Illusions of Choice: The F-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform," by Robert Coulam.

I have read the first, but I'll have to go over to Nimitz to read the second book. Additionally, I have not read Thomason's book about the F-111B, but I just ordered it from Amazon. Maybe there is data in it that is contemporary to these works that the author cites.

Art's book covers up to the decision to develop the GD proposal. Interestingly, the USAF-led Source Selection Board (with the Navy's concurrence) recommended to develop the Boeing design, which both services felt offered operational advantages. McNamara overruled them, citing three factors: less commonality, risky, unproven technology (thrust reversers / the use of titanium,) and unrealistic cost projection.

Anyway, the program apparently was quite scandalous at the time. I look forward to reading both Coulam's and Thomason's analyses.

The big difference is Thomason's recent discoveries from the Grumman Archive, which resulted in this post:

http://thanlont.blogspot.com/2011/01/f- ... -time.html

Coulam's book is more complementary with Thomason's view, talking about the bureaucratic processes and infighting that occurred at the time. Thomason is more interested in the technical challenges the fighter faced, but without the information he later gleaned from the archive.

I think you also have to understand the major change that occurred in Defence culture as a result of the Goldwater Nichols reforms in the 1980s. There is a much more collegial attitude now than in the 1960s. You probably wouldn't see the same level of institutional infighting that went on back then.

When the TFX was envisioned, the idea of fighters fighting other fighters within visual range was thought to be totally extinct: sparrow and phoenix missiles would take down other fighters by a guy sitting in the right seat looking at his radar scope.

Thus, the TFX was never designed to be a maneuvering aircraft, with a pilot making lightning quick throttle inputs; hence it never had an engine suited to a fighter. The engine was suited to long range cruising.

By the time the TFX program came into being... and this is important, the DoD had already established a long track record of building fighters that weren't fighters: the F-101, the F-104, the F-4, and others... The TFX was the epitomy of that failed and well established philospophy.

Hence, (the F-111) was a big, unmaneuverable, aircraft that the pilot could break the engines making throttle inputs too rapidly, the way that happens in combat. It was designed around a big heavy radar; it was designed around crusing at constant speed, launching missiles over the horizon. Again, it was what happened when the failed philosophy of fighter design was taken to its final conclusion.

The failures of the F-111 are in no way inherent in the F-35A/B/C. The only things I see in common with the TFX program is that both programs were begun under a democratic Commander in Chief.

Deleted

Forum: F-35 versus XYZ

F-35 compared to TFX (F-111)