Forum: Program and politics

johnwill, thanks for explanation. I have to download the F-16D flight manual PDF again to see what it might say.

outlaw162 is saying the opposite - that the HUD DISPLAY with the AoA bracket indication is the same as the AoA INDEXER - if I have read his terse explanation correctly.

My question remains: Should not the (AoA) INDEXER be reflected by the HUD DISPLAY as shown in my amended graphic?

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You mis-read me.

The HUD bracket can be thought of as a visual thrust command indication in relation to flight path that is held constant using the FPM (a velocity vector symbol).

The indexer chevrons are referenced to pitch direction not throttle movement direction, even though primarily thrust with minimal pitch change may be used to get back on the indexer donut, or make flight path adjustments.

In comparison, in my opionion, the best system was the F-4 aural AOA.

No, your graphic is not correct. (Two countries separated by a common language. Very Happy

)

'outlaw162' fair enough. Hence my question - completely separated by Navy - Air Force. Very Happy

I'll have to think about this all (and investigate for myself) but I certainly don't comprehend the way the F-16 HUD DISPLAY is set up that way. Perhaps a quick guess is that for a Naval Aircraft on Carrier Approach the throttle controls glideslope/rate of descent whilst pitch/nose attitude controls AoA/Airspeed. Is this how you landed the aircraft? I guess not.

The Brits AFAIK invented the aural headset tone but quickly went to other indications similar to what the USN eventually decided upon the AoA Indexer. I wonder if the USN/USMC F-4s also used the tone or the AoA Indexer from the start of their ops? I have no idea. However I have an USMC RF-4 NATOPS to check out. Here is an excerpt from same:

"LANDING TECHNIQUE: [FCLP] (NATOPS RF-4B)
“For a normal field landing with a gross weight of approximately 31,000 pounds, fly the pattern as illustrated in figure 3-4, Enter the pattern as local course rules dictate, utilizing the throttles and speed brakes, as necessary, to maintain pattern altitude and airspeed. At the break, reduce thrust and extend the speed brakes (if required), As the airspeed decreases through 250 knots lAS, lower the landing gear and extend the wing flaps. Retract the speed brakes to decrease buffet, however, some buffet and noise will come from the nose wheel well as the landing gear extends. This noise and buffet will disappear as approach speeds are reached, Continue to decelerate to, and maintain, 150 Knots IAS. After the gear and flaps have been checked and reported, roll into the base leg and establish a mild rate of descent, maintaining an "on speed" angle of attack indexer light (140 to 150 knots lAS). Use the angle-of-attack indexer and maintain the "ON speed" indication except that 125 knots will be the minimum final approach speed, When on final approach, utilize a power setting of 84 to 86% rpm, This will provide an "on speed" angle of attack indexer light with a 2 1/2° to 30 glide slope and a rate of descent of approximately 700 fpm. Attempt to land within the first 1000 feet of runway whenever possible, however, do not chop power prior to crossing the end of the runway. The sudden loss of boundary layer control air will cause the airplane to settle immediately. At touchdown, retard the throttles to IDLE and deploy the drag chute,...”

CARRIER LANDING PATTERN [RF- 4B]:
“The carrier pattern (figure 3-6) starts with the break at 600 feet, 250-300 knots IAS maximum on the star-board bow of the ship. The break interval will be one-half of the desired ramp interval time.... Fly the pattern at 600 feet above mean sea level. The 180 turn is commenced when abeam the LSO platform, On rollout to final, slightly overshoot the ships wake. GLIDE SLOPE: The technique of flying the glide slope is the same as FCLP except that more power may be required and line-up will be much harder to maintain. With rough seas and subsequent pitching decks, some erratic meatball movements may be encountered. If this is the case, average out the "bouncing ball" to maintain a smooth and safe rate of descent. In no case overcorrect if the ball moves to a high indication....”

The Royal Air Force it seems is worried about a Royal Navy contingency plan to acquire F/A-18s seems to have favor with politicians:

"There is an emerging debate between the RAF, which is keen to get its hands on the JSF’s stealth capabilities, and some Royal Navy officers and planners, who are beginning to look at the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet as a “bird-in-the-hand” solution. RAF sources see the politicians—alarmed by the idea of empty decks—as leaning in the navy’s direction."

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/ ... mp;next=10

For sure the muddle will continue for some time yet. All sorts of options will appear and disappear from one day to the next in daily UK papers and elsewhere. Probably best to wait for official announcements I reckon but then again they will change with the wind.

'outlaw162' said above: "...The indexer chevrons are referenced to pitch direction not throttle movement direction..."

That would be the same as the AoA Indexer chevrons/arrows pointing in the direction that the nose should go to stop being fast or slow by increasing/decreasing AoA. Arrow/Chevron points down - put nose down. But of course flying an accurate glideslope for carrier landing is not that simple. Perhaps it will be with the new 'carrier landing software' under development (mentioned elsewhere) perhaps to be used with a 'Bedford Array' setup as well as the IFLOLS. I digress.

Still and all in a carrier approach: Throttle controls glideslope/height and AoA controls airspeed but Optimally. This would be where Air Force landings and Navy landings fundamentally disagree (having been trained basic/advanced by RAAF then gone back to RAN to learn 'carrier approaches at Optimum AoA). It is interesting to me how the Air Force cope with the Navy aircraft AoA Indexers and HUD displays. For example the RNZAF had A-4Ks and they did not have any land based mirrors but flew Optimum Angle of Attack till touchdown using a visual glideslope (some said they often might cushion the landing and they had also a brake parachute etc.). Then when the KAHU upgrade provided a HUD display with similar AoA bracket some of these older chaps were a bit flummoxed by it - one touched down short to break off a wheel necessitating a 'short field arrest' on empty drop tanks.

Assembling a Carrier Aviation Program

http://www.hrana.org/documents/PaddlesM ... ry2012.pdf

"Regular readers of Paddles Monthly are familiar with the ongoing role that the U.S. Navy’s LSO community has played in the development of the Royal Navy’s fixed-wing carrier aviation program. Back in September of 2011, a group of engineers from the prime contractor building the HMS Queen Elizabeth (Aircraft Carrier Alliance), as well as several representatives from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force convened a week-long meeting at the LSO School to discuss many details of the QEC’s construction.

In January 2012, the same group reassembled in the LSO School’s classroom to begin working out the actual deck and flight procedures that British F-35s will use while embarked. This included everything from taxi, launch, pattern entry, and recovery. Special care was taken to evaluate how standing U.S. Navy carrier procedures would fit in with some of the unique design aspects of both the QEC (As well as the follow-on HMS Prince of Wales) and the F-35C.

While the LSO School staff can offer plenty of insight when it comes to waving a safe recovery and landing, additional assistance was solicited from many other players involved in carrier based aviation to include Shooters, ALRE (Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment) Experts, Handlers, and the Air Boss and Mini-Boss from the USS Harry Truman (CVN-75).

Keeping in mind the desire to avoid ‘re-inventing the wheel’ for the U.K.’s carrier program, the most significant challenge of the weeklong conference was to adapt long-established U.S. Navy procedures to the unique operating environment aboard the QEC. One example that required a rather lengthy discussion was the issue of the weight board. Because the QEC’s flight deck was originally designed to accommodate the VSTOL F-35B, no deck crewman had yet been designated to be the weight board operator. In order to avoid overtasking the currently-allotted deck positions - as well as avoiding the addition of another sailor to an already-crowded flight deck - the decision was made that launch weight information will instead be shown to the pilot via a digital display on the applicable catapult’s ICCS [Integrated Catapult Control Station] bubble. This particular method - while modified from the U.S. Navy method - satisfies both the requirement to avoid the addition of flight deck personnel and ensures pilots will be able to verify that they will receive the appropriate catapult shot.

Occupying much of the week was a series of roleplaying exercises designed to test and then modify U.S. procedures to some of the design-driven differences between the QEC and a Nimitz-class. With different players playing the various roles - including the Boss, Mini-Boss, Handler, Shooter, Flight Deck Chief, CATCC, and Paddles - many different procedures and evolutions were acted out in order to determine what would work most effectively given the layout of the new U.K. carriers. These exercises consisted of walking through everything from starting an aircraft, to taxiing that aircraft, and eventually shooting the aircraft. Even the necessary radio communications and hand signals were discussed in great detail.

In addition to assisting with the general standup of the UK’s fixed-wing CV program, the U.S. Navy representatives at the conference were also interested in establishing a certain level of continuity between both nation’s carrier procedures. Should joint operations be necessary sometime in the future, this will minimize the amount of training necessary for U.S. Navy pilots to operate aboard British carriers (and vice versa)."

I can't tell you how happy I am that we're working this closely with the USN on getting those QE's into operation - they're the best at carrier ops by far and having this kind of exchange is superbly helpful,

Ian

Britain won't decide on [FINAL] F-35 fighter numbers till 2015 By Rhys Jones LONDON Feb 7, 2012

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/0 ... YZ20120207

"LONDON (Reuters) - Britain has deferred to 2015 a firm commitment on how many Lockheed Martin Corp F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets it will buy, adding to uncertainties over the multinational programme which has recently been questioned in the U.S. Congress.

"We will not make final decisions on the overall number of aircraft we will order before the next planned Strategic Defence Review (in 2015)," a Ministry of Defence MoD spokeswoman said on Tuesday, adding an initial order would be placed next year [2013]...

...A spokesman for Lockheed, the top U.S. defence contractor, said Britain's total order had not been revised down and remained at 138. Britain was due to receive its first F-35 in June....

...While there have been reports Britain will cut its order to 50 F-35s, the MoD said it did not recognise that figure.

Expectations for the number of F-35s Britain will eventually order have been curtailed since the MoD's decision to use only one aircraft carrier, which will routinely have 12 fast jets embarked for operations, while retaining a capacity to deploy up to 36...."

Quote:

spazsinbad
MoD's decision to use only one aircraft carrier, which will routinely have 12 fast jets embarked for operations, while retaining a capacity to deploy up to 36...."

Is Britain still keeping the first carrier built as a "heli-carrier" and the second as a conventional carrier? At least the heli-carrier has the potential to use F-35B's that way....

Yes the first in class Queen Elizabeth is 'too far gone' to convert during build to cat/trap. However... there is plenty of speculation that when money found the first in class will be converted to cat/trap also. In the meantime it will serve as a 'rubber wing' carrier but also more importantly work up ship crews in general CVF ops - this crew would then transition to first cat/trap PoW with perhaps QE being converted to cat/trap when next refit is due? Early days.

And for sure the original ski jump QE will have F-35B potential. There will be studies also in how to operate USMC F-35Bs from the modified cat/trap CVFs also. Watch for the USMC F-35Bs belting aboard the ski jump QE to have a go. The SKI JUMP at Pax River is a CVF replica.

Right then so let's build a 65,000 ton aircraft carrier and then decide to maybe operate it marginally, or not at all, perhaps sell it eventually, or try and find the money someday to rebuild it, say 10 to 15 years after it's completed.

One might be forgiven for suspecting that switching to the F-35C was a smoke screen for cutting the total buy to around 50 and going from two to a single carrier. It's rather telling that the decision was made before anyone did any serious analysis of the costs of converting the carriers.

lb, your theory is probably one held by the RAF in their long term work to get rid of the RN FAA. I would suggest that the UK politicians are not smart enough to have such a 'plan'; but over the decades since WWII (when just before the RN took back the FAA from the RAF) that the RAF have been attempting to be the only air power in the UK. The sleight of hand performed at the last moment by the RAF (in discussions with Brit PM) to see the end of the Harrier is tellingly told by 'Sharkey' Ward. I'll look for a link.

lb wrote:

Right then so let's build a 65,000 ton aircraft carrier and then decide to maybe operate it marginally, or not at all, perhaps sell it eventually, or try and find the money someday to rebuild it, say 10 to 15 years after it's completed.

One might be forgiven for suspecting that switching to the F-35C was a smoke screen for cutting the total buy to around 50 and going from two to a single carrier. It's rather telling that the decision was made before anyone did any serious analysis of the costs of converting the carriers.

Actually, the switch was probably just a shortsighted accounting stunt by the MoD to show some quick savings on the books (fewer planes are necessary with the C model), more bureaucratic incompetence than a smokescreen, as they utterly failed to account for the ancillary costs of switching to a CATOBAR deck arrangement.

Yep, incompetence always trumps conspiracy in my book but I will insist that the RAF have a long term game plan to get rid of the RN FAA (can I prove that? - check how well the RN FAA goes in relation to the RAF since WWII - despite the Falklands War for example [which the RAF claim always that they won]). Anyway here is the info mentioned immediately above:

http://www.sharkeysworld.com/search/lab ... %20Debate[

YEAR 2010
"...56. The National Security Council came to the conclusion that Harrier and HMS Ark Royal should be retained in service and the Tornado GR4 fleet should be withdrawn from service in its entirety. Prior to this conclusion being confirmed within SDSR 2010 final recommendations, the Chief of the Defence Staff (Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) intervened and (in private discussions, reportedly at Brize Norton) persuaded the Prime Minister to reverse this decision and to withdraw Harrier and HMS Ark Royal from service, while retaining the obsolescent Tornado. At that juncture, it is beyond doubt that false arguments and statistics must have been presented to the Prime Minister. [Stage 5 complete.]

57. Apparently, it was claimed that: (my emphasis)

a) The expected in service life of the Tornado GR4 was greater than that of the Harrier – with the planned operational life of the Harrier being up to 2018 and the Tornado being several years longer. It now transpires that Tornado GR4 has serious fatigue and airworthiness problems and it is understood that it may not be supportable by British Aerospace Systems much beyond 2015.

b) The Tornado was a better close air support aircraft than the Harrier for Afghanistan operations. This is not the case. The Tornado does not respond adequately to urgent close air support requests from ground forces in need, as did the Harrier, and as a result of Tornado’s poor performance in theatre, the main UK air vehicle that delivers such support to our ground forces is now the Apache Attack Helicopter of the Army Air Corps.

58. Stirrup’s private advice to the Prime Minister appears also to have ignored the fact that the full withdrawal of the Tornado from service would have saved the nation £7.5 billion whereas withdrawal of the Harrier and HMS Ark Royal from service would save the nation only £1.5 billion...."

Forum: Program and politics

UK MOD in a muddle over F-35C