Forum: Air Power

skicountry wrote:

But this debate, back in the 1980s, was not really about CAS but rather about BAI/AI. And this, the Air Force contended, the A-16 could do much better. Under the Army’s extended non-linear battlefield concept (think AirLand Battle), the preponderance of air force support missions shifted away from CAS (30%) to the deeper BAI (70%) type missions for which the A-10 was not considered suitable in a Fulda Gap type environment.

Both the Army and Air Force supported the A-16 not because they thought it was better at CAS than the A-10 but because it was better at BAI and could do a decent job of CAS. There was a bit of subterfuge involved here as the actual requirements for the A-10 replacement changed from a primarily CAS platform with secondary low to mid intensity BAI capability to a primarily BAI platform that could do a good job of CAS. Both the DOD and the GAO called the Air Force on this but in the end it didn’t matter because the Cold War ended and no A-16’s were bought anyway.

What saved the A-10 was not so much its performance in the Persian Gulf but rather the dissolution of that high-intensity WarPac threat. If we weren’t going to be fighting WWIII, then the A-10 could stay.

Excellent point. My rather simplistic opening question did not mention that the Army/AF wanted to move to a primarily BAI aircraft.

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Salute!

Bruant, ya gotta get with ski-breath about doctrine and philosophy, sir.

During the post-VietNam era and the increased focus upon the Fulda Gap scenario, several things changed with respect to USAF and U.S. Army doctrine.

Personally, I was strong supporter of the BAI mission for USAF and Allied jets. CAS was, well, CAS, heh heh.

We needed a point-and-shoot capability and the only jet we had at the time was the SLUF using eggs, rocks, cannon. The Warthog had the cannon and it could do WW2/VietNam bomb delivery, but that was all.

NATO was focused upon tank-busting. Anti-armor.

There was also a good series of plans to eliminate enema airfields in East Germany and Poland at the outset without using tactical nukes. I helped with some of the short-range standoff weapons for that scenario.

Hell, I helped write some of the plans for our Viper Wing at Hill.

The Warthog was not a player in anything except tank-busting and short missions to take out bridges and such.

Because the USAF had killed the SLUF, we Viper dudes sucked up the BAI and medium range strike missions. The deep penetration missins belonged to the 'vaark. We didn't have the stealth stuff yet, so it was down and dirty and fast. And you couldn't beat the 'vaark.

You must realize that we were not provincial. All available jets had their niche, and wise commanders used them per their capabilities.

This came to the fore in Desert Storm.

++++++++++++

As much as I loved flying the Viper and the SLUF, I still open my brain for concepts that employ the best plane for the job, the mission.

The Viper is well-equipped and capable to do a great job on a variety of missions. But I would hate to see us focus on a single platform to meet the mission requirements.

Gums sends....

Gums wrote:

Salute!

Bruant, ya gotta get with ski-breath about doctrine and philosophy, sir.

Gums sends....

Thanks for the tip and for all the pilots' patience here on this site. I believe you mentioned that Ski wrote articles or someting to that effect?

What in your opinion would have been a good BAI aircraft? Does/did one exist?

Bruant,
This actually gets into a really messy area of doctrine and Air Force/Army relations. BAI was sort of a contentious mission introduced in the late 1970s that no longer formally exists within the Air Force (although some might dispute that). It was situated somewhere between CAS and AI. The Army claimed it was closer to CAS and so wanted more control over the BAI mission while the Air Force claimed it was closer to AI and hoped to do it without Army interference. This back and forth over *control* of Air Force air assets was a constant bone of contention between the two services.

Conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) Air Force thinking during the 1970s and 1980s was to a large extent driven by the Army’s plans to fight the armored battle at the Fulda Gap. The Army’s initial plan to do so, published in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5,was known as “Active Defense.” Although the Army denied it, it was in effect a well-orchestrated fall back and mass doctrine that gave away too much initiative to the enemy. The Air Force was expected to provide a lot of CAS to the outnumbered and retreating Army forces while also carrying out some traditional interdiction missions.

Strong criticism of Active Defense forced the Army to start rewriting the doctrine almost immediately. Its successor, AirLand Battle, published in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, was a brilliant masterstroke that many consider the pinnacle of Army thought. Certainly, its creator Donn A. Starry, is a legend in Army circles. AirLand Battle’s basic premise was to fight the initial WarPac echelon at the Fulda Gap while simultaneously striking the second echelon before it could get into the battle. With its new doctrine and new toys (the AH-64, M-1, Bradley, and MLRS), the Army was confident that it could hold the first WarPac echelon (if only barely). But, it desperately needed the Air Force to hold back the second breakthrough echelon at bay by striking it, disrupting it and generally delaying its arrival in the battle area. In truth, the Army probably would have preferred to do this by itself, but it obviously did not have the assets to reach out up to 500km into WarPac territory!

And this is where the BAI mission arose. Under BAI, the Air Force was striking targets maybe 70-300 km from the FLOT and maybe 24-72 hours away. CAS was deemphasized because the Army wanted all the Air Force assets striking that second echelon. But, and this was the big thing, it wanted to tell the Air Force what to strike and when to strike it – i.e. to synchronize the close and deep battles. Airmen did not take too kindly to Corps commanders telling them how to do their jobs and so the mission fizzled. BAI was pretty much dead by the time of the first Gulf War. Much to the consternation of some of the egghead doctrinaires assigned to plan the air war, General Horner did not even use the term BAI - he called it “push CAS.”

As for a good BAI aircraft, I have to side with Gums and others here. By the late 1980s, the Air Force was rapidly shrinking. What it needed were multipurpose aircraft like the F-16 that could BAI/AI/CAS/CAP/Recce/SEAD etc. Heck, the F-16 could even do strategic attack (think of the Israeli Operation Opera – good luck doing that with the A-10).

A purpose designed BAI/AI aircraft like the Jaguar or a CAS aircraft like the A-10 could not fend for itself against WarPac air and was limited in other ways. As twintwin has already alluded to, the chief advantage of an A-10 (beyond its obvious design), is that it establishes a corps of pilots dedicated solely to training for the CAS mission and not wasting its time with say, air-to-air. But, by the late 1980s, with the Air Force shrinking and the doctrine moving away from CAS, something multirole seemed more appropriate.

Salute!

Yeah, ski-breath has it pretty much the way I saw it and went thru it.

The comment concerning specialized training strikes a deep chord with this old attack/fighter pilot. Although the Viper was an outstanding A2A machine ( as originally designed), it had inherent ground attack capabilities since it could carry a decent load at a decent speed and drop very precisely. We could fight our way in and drop, then fight our way out. Witness the first RAF "Bomb Comp" results at Lossiemouth ( google it). OTOH, our training regimen was harsh. And our biggest fear was we would become jacks of all trades and masters of none.

I can tell you that for a few missions it pays to have small groups "specialize". To wit:

- CSAR and helo escort
- tank-busting
- deep interdiction
- air superiority ( think F-22 and Eagle)
- Wild Weasel

The Viper soon became a "swing" fighter. We could go A2A initially, then switch to support the grunts. Or we could do as Ski has pointed out - go shallow and delay follow-up assault forces while the grunts re-grouped and counter attacked. So depending on your deployment base for the "big one" you trained for one or the other scenarios.

BAI came about much as Ski postulated. The further we got from Viet Nam, the more we focused upon the "big one" in Europe. Grunt arty was not as capable as today when hauling butt away from the FLOT and re-grouping. Airpower is inherently flexible and the tactical fighter force soon became highly mobile arty. Funny, but Momyer saw this in Africa as a "yute". His thinking after 'nam was much the same, and his philosophy was reflected in the evolution of the AirLand doctrine and the USAF mission.

Very neat thread here, and I am happy to see the inputs from Ski, as he has studied this for many years and is quite conversant on the matter.

Gums sends...

Ski, Gums thank you for the linking of USArmy doctrine with the AF. So, are you guys advocating a BAI dedicated A-16 or are you saying that the way things worked out was the best that could have happened? IOW, multi-role F-16s(no A-16s) and the A-10 for CAS?

Bruant, to tell the truth, I’m not really advocating anything – simply recounting the story as it transpired back in the 1980s. I'm sure Gums has an opinion on it but he's 'been there and done that.' From my perspective, the Cold War’s ending radically changed everything. Today’s Iraq/Afghanistan theaters are incomparable in scale and intensity to the Central Front of the 1980s.

Present day requirements are probably better described in the COIN thread on another part of this forum. In today’s environment, the A-10 remains a fine and useful aircraft with relatively low operating costs, good combat persistence, and a great gun. But even it is too expensive and too much airplane for some missions, so I doubt the A-16, if it had been procured back in the day, would still be operating today. It likely would have met the same fate as that other converted F-16 special variant, the ADF.

Salute!

Well, Bru, I do have a dog in this fight, so I can advocate. heh heh.

Ski is a Cannuck. No offense, but USA and the EPG folks fly a lotta Vipers. Only USAF flies the Warthog. Ski understands my point of view and we have corresponded at length and even had a personal face-to-face for his upcoming study on the evolution of AF/Army doctrine. Can't wait, and he has been in contact with some serious players and thinkers. 'nuff said.

I see the newer Vipers pretty much what the A-16 was thought of. New sensors, new weapons, etc.

I see the Warthog as the ideal plane for the low-intensity, remote scenario. As much as I liked the A-37, it could not take the damage that the 'hog can and has. It also had a terrible engine problem when operating on poor runways, as those motors sucked up sand and grit and such ( despite the engine screens for the big stuff). Avionics are lots easier to add/improve than basic airframe mods.

So I would like to see USAF retain the Warthog or even get some outta the boneyard. Dedicated CSAR is one mission the thing is ideal for employing. Both the Viper and 'hog are excellent for CAS and even BAI.

As with the A-7D and A-10A controversy back in the early 70's, there's a need for both. Their capabilities complement each other, and they are still here. Already here. Just look at how long it takes to develop and field a new plane these days - the F-35 being the prime example.

Gums sends...

P.S. I had a bit over 300 combat missions in the A-37 and 80 or 90 in the A-7D. Low intensity for one, and up over Hanoi a few times in the other. So I flew the COIN mission, interdiction, CAS and CSAR/helo escort. Never flew A2A until I got to the Viper.

Gums wrote:

I see the newer Vipers pretty much what the A-16 was thought of. New sensors, new weapons, etc.

I agree with this statement entirely. There is little an A-16 could offer over today’s CCIP’d F-16s. This is why I do not think a specific A-16 variant would still be flying today. In an ideal world perhaps, but it today’s do-more-with-less world, the multirole F-16 rules. Same fate befell the F-16ADF – other than a unique search light and the ability to fire Sparrow, what else could it do better than a modern Block 50 F-16?

Nice getting your input on this and other things Gums. I agree with what you have to say in the above posting.

Salute!

The only thing a Viper needed to employ the Sparrow back in 1970's was the illuminator doofer in the radome and the "tuning" doofer in one of the store station remote interface units ( RIU's). I ain't making this up.

At the time several guard units converted to the Viper, they had been flying USA continental sovereignty missions. Either Double Uglies or Eagles or ...... So it was relatively easy and cheap to equip those units with the Sparrow capability.

Look at the timeline for the AMRAAM. We all knew it would work on the Viper with little cost due to the avionics architecture. It would also fit on the existing rails. But it wouldn't come on line for a long time.

USAF wanted the Viper and they wanted the Eagle. They had to convince Congress that the Viper was not as capable in the mission as the Eagle. It was like the A-10 vs A-7 debate earlier in the 70's. Deja vu one more time. Hell. Why spend more for an Eagle than for 2 Vipers? Sure, the Eagle had a really big radar dish and could detect and track tgts way out there. But we all knew we would never be allowed to shoot until the bandits were really close due to ROE. So we grit our teeth and gutted out all the comments about us not having a BVR capability.

And then the Slammer came on line!!!

Our NATO Allies flying the Viper were really glad, as they wanted the BVR capability to supplement the 'winder.

So we had the "ADF" variant that was passe. ALL VIPERS NOW HAD A BVR CAPABILITY!!! So it wasn't roles and missions and doctrine. It was reality.

Several of our pilots at Hill flew the simulations for the Slammer and contributed to various aspects that were incorporated in the production model. This would be 80 or 81. Some of them had also flown in the AIMVAL/ACEVAL program, which really helped with the Lima and Mike version of the 'winder. That program also defined the AMRAAM capabilities to a great extent.

So fairly straightforward avionics can provide a lotta bang for the buck versus developing a new airframe and such. You must have a capable airframe to begin with, though. So the Double Ugly went to the boneyard, even though the Marine versions we trained with had smokeless motors and a pulse-doppler radar. Those guys were great, but the Sparrow had its problems and if we got within min range they were toast. Same for almost anything out there at the time. It was usually one turn and then the last ditch maneuver.

Make no mistake, we need both the F-22 and the F-35. You can only do so much with a design from the early 70's. And I salute the folks that came up with the F-16 and those that improved upon it. You can expect more depot level work on the Viper for another decade to keep it flying without ripping the wings off.

Gums sends....

skicountry wrote:

From my perspective, the Cold War’s ending radically changed everything. Today’s Iraq/Afghanistan theaters are incomparable in scale and intensity to the Central Front of the 1980s.

Present day requirements are probably better described in the COIN thread on another part of this forum. In today’s environment, the A-10 remains a fine and useful aircraft with relatively low operating costs, good combat persistence, and a great gun. But even it is too expensive and too much airplane for some missions, so I doubt the A-16, if it had been procured back in the day, would still be operating today.

The end of the Cold War annihilated an entire generation of weapons on both sides and those that did survive (ex:F-22, SSN-21) were heavily cut in numbers. I could not agree more with you. When people say we need a new generation of weapons beyond the Cold War era they are talking out of their holes. Those weapons were/are far beyond any need to fight Ahmed and his RPG. And I am not referring to nuclear weapons.

The A-10 is great up to a point. In the Gulf War It did fine until it moved past the standard front line units further back to the area where the better equipped Republican Guard was. It had one of the highest loss rates of the war. The slow speed made it vulnerable to among other things IR missiles

wilder_bill wrote:

The A-10 is great up to a point. In the Gulf War It did fine until it moved past the standard front line units further back to the area where the better equipped Republican Guard was. It had one of the highest loss rates of the war. The slow speed made it vulnerable to among other things IR missiles

Slow speed, but high maneuverability. They lost just as many Harriers as T-Bolts, 4 each I believe. Now look at how much hardware they dropped or fired to destroy a major portion of Iraqi vehicles and equipment. Those losses were nothing compared to the amount and severity of the missions they succeeded in. Considering they were basically out in the open all the time with none of the terrain they would normally use for masking, their losses were pretty low. It's always nice to bring all of the birds home, but the cold reality is that it is virtually impossible to fight and have NO losses- especially in the CAS and SAR environments. Only the Su-25 comes remotely close to the firepower capability and survivability of the A-10.

The Harrier didn't fly anywhere near the missions of the Thunderbolt and it didn't come home banged up as often. When Harriers get thumped they go down. The Thunderbolts often make it back and quite a few of that number return to service after some work. When you put raw numbers into the mix the Harrier is not such a good performer across the board. It fills a niche, a niche the Marines are sold upon. Whether that's a good or bad thing depends on which side of the aisle you sit.

My mistake- I was referring to the equal losses. I was continuing on about the A-10 only and did not clarify it due to being rushed this morning. Disregard the Harrier comment except in relation to combat losses.

The A-10 had a phenomenal record from combat, something like over 8,100 missions flown by them all and using ridiculous quantities of ordinance in the process. The loss of only 4 and the damage that the others made it back with, combined with their turnaround that you mentioned, says it all. I am reminded of a video clip of one that took a burst of like 4 57mm HE rounds across its belly, made it back to base and rolled off the runway side upon return. Flat tire caused the pilot to go into the dirt, everyone was checking it out- even a sidewinder had launched from the damage incurred and the pilot thought it was a SAM going by him! At the end, a crewchief or crewdog comments:

"Tell me a Hog can't take some hits!"

Amen to that.

Forum: Air Power

A-16 Close air Support vs. A-10