Forum: General F-35 Forum

N-UCAS is going to give the USN a long range, high endurance, reconnaissance platform. Current models envision flight times of 12 hours and combat radii of upwards of 1000nm. Both of those figures are far better than the F-35. Next, the N-UCAS will, in a top-stealth mode like the Northrop model, will be stealthier than the F-35C, as it won't have vertical stabilizers. And, because it will be unmanned, the Navy will have a higher risk tolerance for N-UCAS flights than F-35C flights into defended areas. So, if stealth is truly overvalued, than the N-UCAS makes more sense than the F-35C.

As for the CSBA, I'm sorry popcorn, but unlike the Lexington institute and the SLD, the CSBA is the most influential defense think-tank in Washington. One can persuasively argue that it not only designed the USAF NGB, it also gave the starting point for and best description of Air-Sea Battle. I didn't know about the Boeing study.

And I agree with you, there are significant problems facing unmanned aircraft. But, the N-UCAS represents a more revolutionary development program for the USN than the F-35C. The technology contained in the N-UCAS program, carrier operations for unmanned aircraft, will give carrier battle groups far greater range and persistence, both necessary steps for fighting an AA/AD network. Range to stay away from the enemy threat rings and persistence to enable dedicated hunting and killing of enemy network assets. If the USN were to sacrifice the N-UCAS program to maintain the F-35C program, it could find its carrier battle groups useless in 2 decades, as the carrier groups would lack the necessary recon AND range to conduct operations in the Western Pacific. (More than enough time for the Chinese to advance their submarine, fighter, missile, and recon forces) Hence, it may seem to some to be more logical to sacrifice the F-35C in order to keep the money around to fully develop the N-UCAS.

Finally, say that it takes N-UCAS another decade to become operational. Well, that will only be 4 years after the F-35C reaches IOC... Not exactly a gap that is large enough to be reassuring for the JSF program.

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Another excellent post ark.........but wait, shifting funding away from the F-35 for the Navy and to a more robust UCAV, Aegis anti-missile capability, and more subs would mean that all our services wouldn't have the exact same F-35 capability. We can't have that! We wouldn't want to make the equation more difficult for potential enemies;-)

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Neptune: The sum total for all 340 at $100 million each is $34 billion spread over 13 years (2013-2026)... not a large program at less than $3 billion per year... 260 Navy "Cs"... over 13 years is only $2 billion per year (2012 dollars)

It's probably not a bad estimate putting USN Procurement funding for combat aviation in the $2bn ballpark.

The only problem though, is that at best we're probably only talking around an average of 12x F-35C per year being afforded with that $2bn. (eg 10 or so jets starting in FY13, and then perhaps maxing out at around 13 block V units/yr by FY26, conservatively speaking). That is, we're talking the Gross weapon system unit cost + initial spares when USN procures a jet under a given Procurement budget... not merely the URF cost, or the basic Flyaway Cost, etc.

So probably safer to figure in a total combined force structure (eg, training, combat and test) of say, 155 F-35C units Procured for USN over that time frame...

So, I think that's one of the more dangerous flaws currently. Whereby official policy and decision making is still apparently being based on miscalculated (assumed) unit price estimates and possibly still overstated future budget expectations in the austere budget environment ahead. Yet in reality, the budgets and costs are more likely to be more unreliable - hence the high risk of this 'stay the course' recap gamble.

Geo,

Budgets are always unreliable when the economy is bad. As I keep telling you; if the money isn't there for the F-35, it won't be there for any new-built Boeing products either. Boeing made a big mistake when they failed to properly utilize the resources they inherited from MD, which had a lot more experience in developing workable fighter designs for serial production. It cost them the JSF contract; end of story. Instead of crying now about how disco-era designs are less risky, they should be focusing on development of a replacement for the F-15/SH. Otherwise, they may find themselves looking on as later versions of the F-35 replace those airframes as well, and I don't think anyone here wants to see LM become the sole provider of TACAIR power for the armed services.

arkadyrenko wrote:

delvo - That's a silly argument. Why buy an expensive stealthy fighter, with its dramatically higher flight hour costs, if you're just going to shoot cruise missiles? The lower cost for the legacy systems outweighs the hit on range. (And we still dont' know the final F-35C combat radius, especially with JASSM / SLAM-ER missiles)

I was referring not just to its combat radius, but also to how far it can fly into defended territory that an F-18 must stay out of or face the likelihood of getting shot down. And this difference between the two planes will hold in the future, because any hypothetical improvement that increases the enemy's odds of being able to detect and shoot down a 35 will also make it better at shooting down 18s.

arkadyrenko wrote:

N-UCAS is going to give the USN a long range, high endurance, reconnaissance platform. Current models envision flight times of 12 hours and combat radii of upwards of 1000nm. Both of those figures are far better than the F-35. Next, the N-UCAS will, in a top-stealth mode like the Northrop model, will be stealthier than the F-35C, as it won't have vertical stabilizers. And, because it will be unmanned, the Navy will have a higher risk tolerance for N-UCAS flights than F-35C flights into defended areas. So, if stealth is truly overvalued, than the N-UCAS makes more sense than the F-35C.

F-35 detractors are interpreting the CNO's comments that Moore's Law will overtake advances in stealth so why won't this apply to the N-UCAS?

r the CSBA, I'm sorry popcorn, but unlike the Lexington institute and the SLD, the CSBA is the most influential defense think-tank in Washington. One can persuasively argue that it not only designed the USAF NGB, it also gave the starting point for and best description of Air-Sea Battle. I didn't know about the Boeing study.

Don't confuse coming up with a bomber concept that CSBA put out with a design, particularly since this is a black program and info in media is speculative and or fudged.
As for Air-Sea Battle, the AF and Navy have been undertaking joint initiatives to,create,synergy long before CSBA entered the picture. You can google the Boeing study.

And I agree with you, there are significant problems facing unmanned aircraft. But, the N-UCAS represents a more revolutionary development program for the USN than the F-35C. The technology contained in the N-UCAS program, carrier operations for unmanned aircraft, will give carrier battle groups far greater range and persistence, both 8 necessary steps for fighting a n AA/AD network. Range to stay away from the enemy threat rings and persistence to enable dedicated hunting and killing of enemy network assets. If the USN were to sacrifice the N-UCAS program to maintain the F-35C program, it could find its carrier battle groups useless in 2 decades, as the carrier groups would lack the necessary recon AND range to conduct operations in the Western Pacific. (More than enough time for the Chinese to advance their submarine, fighter, missile, and recon forces) Hence, it may seem to some to be more logical to sacrifice the F-35C in order to keep the money around to fully develop the N-UCAS.

Finally, say that it takes N-UCAS another decade to become operational. Well, that will only be 4 years after the F-35C reaches IOC... Not exactly a gap that is large enough to be reassuring for the JSF program.
I'd like to see the N-UCAS do counter-air ..,CSBA envisions UAVs parking themselves in denied airspace protected by stealth.. obviously CSBA doesn't believe in,Moore's Law.

......

503 - about your last comment. You're wrong, I bet a solid number of people on this forum would support Lockheed becoming the sole provider of not only US, but the 'US aligned' world TACAIR. And much of that concern seems to come from those who aren't entirely favorable of the F-35.

There has been precious little concern for the future of Boeing's fighter development program on these boards. Sure, they say that the US should consider Boeing's fighter plane for the next contract, but then the argue that the next contract should be in 15 years, and that Boeing should keep its fighter development team just for the off chance that it'll win that contract 15 years from now. (Which is a long shot, as Boeing would have been out of the fighter development business for 10+ years and would have far less experience, come 2027, than Lockheed.)

Moving on down the comments.

delvo- if you've decided that your deep strike is going to be Tomahawks, then the limitations imposed by non-stealth airframes and the 300nm JASSM won't affect the strategy as much. In other words, the carrier won't be doing much 'deep strikes' into mainland China under the CNO's proposed CONOPs. That lack of deep striking capability, however, won't be a massive loss because Tomahawks and/or the NGB will take up that slack. The carrier air wing will focus on hitting naval forces, facilities, and coastal installations.

Popcorn - if stealth is truly obsolete, then this discussion is moot, as fighters / bombers will not be around long enough to have any impact. I thought the CNO's point was that stealth is useful, but not as useful as it had been in the past. Furthermore, the requirements to achieve the necessary stealth in the future, all bandwidth and all aspect, is so expensive that it may make more sense to rely on stand off munitions than a penetrating fighter.

As for the budgeting issue, that is the crux of the matter. If the Navy envisions a budget crunch come mid decade, and they fear that the F-35C will suck up too much aviation money from the other necessary programs: N-UCAS, BAMS, etc., then the F-35C may be cut. The Navy, we should remember, has shown that it is not above continuing the purchase of 4th gen fighters. Here, the concept of opportunity lost comes into play. What is the opportunity lost to the Navy by continuing to pursue the F-35C? The CNO has already stated that he doesn't think the combat capabilities of the F-35C are irreplaceable..

Finally: if the F-35C had been on time and on budget, or even a little delayed, we wouldn't be having this discussion because the F-35C would be ready a decade before N-UCAS and would not cost so much as to throw the Navy's purchase program entirely out of wack. In that case, the F-35C would be entering the fleet as it would be nearly complete and cost an acceptable amount of money.

I for one think having a single fighter manufacturer is a very bad development. For decades, Mac, General Dynamics, Lockheed, Grumman, Northrop all kept each other sharp. Competition tends to do that. We are witnessing first hand in the F-35 and F-22, with their repeated slipping of IOC projections and perpetual cost over-runs, what happens when you get a monopoly. At this point, the only true hope for competition going forward seems to be Northrop Grumman and their UCAV. If they can get that right - make it reliable, affordable to buy and maintain, and get it fully linked in and interoperable with existing systems, it could be a home run. As for Boeing, as Ark said, they are really in a tough spot in this niche. They have secured a good contract with the Saudis for the F-15E so that line will run for a while. More F-18 SHs aren't out of the question either, but as he said, that's not going to be enough to keep things going until another fighter design is required. Fearing competition from Airbus in the early 2000s, Boeing tried TOO HARD to diversify, leaping headfirst into satellites, defense communication, and ground systems. The problem was, they didn't have the expertise required in those fields and failed to execute. During this time, while their commercial aviation base was down, they did ride on back of MDs successes in the AH-64, C-17, F-15 and F-18. The V-22, CH47, and P-8 are other current successes. When they stick to their core - aviation - they seem to do OK. There was some talk of a merger with Northrop Grumman but I don't see that happening. Now that the 787 is finally coming on-line, 737 sales are strong, and they have the tanker contract, you wonder if they shouldn't go the other direction and concentrate on developing larger aircraft and sell the fighter division to Northrop or someone else who might be able keep it more competitive?

You keep saying that, but most of the big primes are involved in some part of the F-35. LM is just doing all of the final assembly.

1st503rdsgt wrote:

Budgets are always unreliable when the economy is bad. As I keep telling you; if the money isn't there for the F-35, it won't be there for any new-built Boeing products either.

Not necessarily true at all. Why would you keep prejudging that? Even when facing a bad economy and austere budget environments for the indefinite future (as some of the more critical-analysis has been warning about for years), it's perfectly reasonable to contemplate a sustained USN combat aviation Procurement budget of around $2bn in 2012 dollars.

The only decision in the interim period then would need to be... do we continue procuring 10-13 F-35C units per year for the next 10+ yrs out, or do we acquire say 24 incrementally upgraded F-18E+ units, potentially complemented by UCAV? So it would seem in the end to be a platforms numbers, as well as a reliability issue which satisfy requirements and factor in on the decision making.

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Instead of crying now about how disco-era designs are less risky, they should be focusing on development of a replacement for the F-15/SH..

I'm not sure if that's a fair assessment. It should actually be pretty apparent to the mil-aviation observer that Boeing seems to be taking a dual-approach to their combat aviation Programs and future strategy. 1) further evolve and incrementally upgrade their legacy platforms... while 2) researching, developing and evaluating next-gen designs, both unmanned and manned.

geogen wrote:

do we continue procuring 10-13 F-35C units per year for the next 10+ yrs out, or do we acquire say 24 incrementally upgraded F-18E+ units...?

Gee, that's a hard one. Rolling Eyes

Surprise, surprise, new thing costs more than the old one with new bits bodged on. I wonder what F-14 costs were versus updated F-4s back in the 1970s.

1st503rdsgt wrote:

geogen wrote:

do we continue procuring 10-13 F-35C units per year for the next 10+ yrs out, or do we acquire say 24 incrementally upgraded F-18E+ units...?

Gee, that's a hard one. Rolling Eyes

Surprise, surprise, new thing costs more than the old one with new bits bodged on. I wonder what F-14 costs were versus updated F-4s back in the 1970s.

But that argument cuts both ways 503. If we had never developed and bought the F-14, would the free world have ended? If we had continued to modernize the F-4 until the F-18 came along to replace it, using the money saved for other military priorities, would our kids be taking Russian rather than English classes in school right now? Would the Libyans have wiped us out of the air in 1989 in the Gulf of Sidra. The answer to both questions of course is no.

The Navy is obviously pondering the same question right now. "If we arm our F-18 fleet with the latest weapons and avionics; fully integrate UAVs; supplement all that capabilities with the Marine F-35Bs we are already committed to; and take the money saved and invest it in other priorities; where will we stand as compared to the threat?" If the answer is that we will be far and away the 1st or 2nd best air fighting force in the world (rivaled by only the USAF), then why spend the extra money on the F-35C at the expense of other areas???

Here are a couple good recent quotes from the NDIA. Perhaps the CNO is thinking outside the box and trying to correct these issues:

"The Defense Department did spend significant sums on new equipment, but so-called modernization of the last decade was imbalanced. The systems that were procured over the past decade were more a reflection of the services’ identities, and only slightly and grudgingly influenced by the wars that U.S. forces have been fighting (and the threats we face). The services essentially bought what they always wanted to buy and what they were predisposed to buy."

"Similarly, the U.S. military put less emphasis on systems that address cybersecurity, command, control and communications, and logistics and personnel management. Focusing on top systems only constitutes tepid and partial modernization. It’s like providing stimulus funds to only the country’s top five most populous metro areas and declaring that you’re stimulating the entire American economy."

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1st503rdsgt
I wonder what F-14 costs were versus updated F-4s back in the 1970s

Anyone else remember how long the Marines used (and purchased new) F-4 Phantoms?
On Topic

Not too surprising a former sub commander(?) isn't too crazy about the carrier fleet. Although you can't call back a missile once launched, but then again if one gets shot down you don't have to worry about the pilot. Shrug

redbird87 wrote:

1st503rdsgt wrote:

geogen wrote:

do we continue procuring 10-13 F-35C units per year for the next 10+ yrs out, or do we acquire say 24 incrementally upgraded F-18E+ units...?

Gee, that's a hard one. Rolling Eyes

Surprise, surprise, new thing costs more than the old one with new bits bodged on. I wonder what F-14 costs were versus updated F-4s back in the 1970s.

But that argument cuts both ways 503. If we had never developed and bought the F-14, would the free world have ended? If we had continued to modernize the F-4 until the F-18 came along to replace it, using the money saved for other military priorities, would our kids be taking Russian rather than English classes in school right now? Would the Libyans have wiped us out of the air in 1989 in the Gulf of Sidra. The answer to both questions of course is no.

Been watching you for awhile now; and so far, I've been careful to avoid feeding you, but your last post can't possibly be ignored. That is, without a doubt, the most ridiculous argument you could have possibly come up with, along with the rest of your ramble on economic theory. At exactly what point do you think all fighter development should have been frozen? Are you actually dumb enough to think that the F/A-18 wasn't substantially more expensive than the F-4 as well?

arkadyrenko wrote:

delvo- if you've decided that your deep strike is going to be Tomahawks, then the limitations imposed by non-stealth airframes and the 300nm JASSM won't affect the strategy as much. In other words, the carrier won't be doing much 'deep strikes' into mainland China under the CNO's proposed CONOPs... The carrier air wing will focus on hitting naval forces, facilities, and coastal installations.

OK, so if you're approaching a coastal target from somewhere out on the sea, and you can count on the coastal defenses to try to reach out to you over the sea, how close can you get to the coast (and thus to the point at which you can release your weapons and hit your targets) and still survive the coastal defenses? Different attack planes have different answers to that question.

Forum: General F-35 Forum

Did CNO just take a big swipe at F-35?