Forum: General F-35 Forum

sferrin - The capabilities of the Brahmos vs. the P-700 / Kh-22 depends on the trajectories of the missiles. If the Brahmos really does to a sea skimming attack at Mach 2.5, that's pretty nasty. If I recall correctly, the big Soviet missiles did high altitude / high speed flight followed by a terminal dive against the target. That's a simpler engagement, with regards to radar time and ability to shoot - look - shoot.

Here's another question, if the attacked ship already has its high-powered defense radar on, how effective will a sub-sonic stealth missile actually be? If the JASSM can be picked up at 10 - 20 nm, then its slow speed gives the defense time to react and shoot it down. (Also, how will the JASSM be guided and what's its terminal trajectory?) Given that 10 - 20 nm is the same distance, roughly, to the horizon for a non-stealthy sea-skimming missile, then one can see how the two approaches can become more equal. The metric here is: time spent approaching during which the opposing ship can see the incoming missile. (And please don't respond with tactics / jamming support from Growlers, of course an Alpha strike from a US carrier will be better than a couple of long range Brahmos missile shots)

Finally, luckily the US doesn't face Oscar II's or regiments of Tu-22's, right now, but that's not really the question here. The question is: given the Indian military's limitations, is the Brahmos a good weapon.

On the topic of tactical nukes, I happen to think that the US should build a 'conventional SRAM' for JSF internal carry. Such a weapon may be necessary to penetrate the final 50+ nm of a hyper defended region or respond to time sensitive targets. That would also be a ripe candidate for nuclearizing and giving the F-35 a better way of conducting the tactical nuclear attack.

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arkadyrenko wrote:

On the topic of tactical nukes, I happen to think that the US should build a 'conventional SRAM' for JSF internal carry. Such a weapon may be necessary to penetrate the final 50+ nm of a hyper defended region or respond to time sensitive targets. That would also be a ripe candidate for nuclearizing and giving the F-35 a better way of conducting the tactical nuclear attack.

Wish granted (well, as a demonstration at least): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z83zXB8j5ow

Presenting JSOW, an LO glide-weapon already sized for internal F-35 carriage, now featuring its own powerplant as the JSOW-ER. Range: ~ 300 miles. Hey, they needed to do something with all that empty space in the tail-cone.

arkadyrenko wrote:

sferrin - The capabilities of the Brahmos vs. the P-700 / Kh-22 depends on the trajectories of the missiles. If the Brahmos really does to a sea skimming attack at Mach 2.5, that's pretty nasty.

Vandal/Talos did the same thing. It cruised at Mach 2.5 on the deck and could perform 10g "bathtub" weaves. That means it's not just weaving like a snake, it's also bobbing up and down at the same time. At Mach 2.5. And SM-2, ESSM, and RAM still shot them down regularly.

arkadyrenko wrote:

The question is: given the Indian military's limitations, is the Brahmos a good weapon.

It always comes down to targeting. Against a threat like the USN I doubt enough Brahmos-toting Flankers could even get close enough to launch, let alone fire enough off to hope a few make it through the defenses.

arkadyrenko wrote:

On the topic of tactical nukes, I happen to think that the US should build a 'conventional SRAM' for JSF internal carry. Such a weapon may be necessary to penetrate the final 50+ nm of a hyper defended region or respond to time sensitive targets.

You mean like AS-16 Kickback? Yeah, we've shot analogs of those down for years too. Orbital even offered retired SRAMs as targets for some time, but the main simulator is the AQM-37.

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-37.html

"Some of the latest AQM-37Cs have further improved heat insulation, and can also be used to simulate ballistic missile threats, being able to fly ballistic trajectories to an altitude of 100 km (330000 ft) and a range of 425 km (265 miles), with terminal speeds of Mach 5. Typical equipment of current AQM-37Cs includes the AN/DRQ-4B and AN/DSQ-37A (or AN/DSQ-50) miss distance indicators, the AN/DPN-88 (or AN/DPN-90(V)) radar beacon, and the AN/DPT-2 pulsed RF ECM transmitter. "

We shoot those down too.

Shooting down such target sends a clear message to the enemy. (Or anyone that laments the idea to become one.)

The problem with JSOWs, and perhaps the idea I was suggesting, is that air defense networks are planning to shoot down smart bombs as well as air craft. Stealth is one way to do it, or some sort of exotic engagement speed and angle (Mach 3+ on the deck?)

sferrin - you really have far too much faith in the invulnerability of AEGIS defenses. The question is not "can the US shoot down Brahmos regularly," the question is "can the US battle group survive a feasible attack by Brahmos equipped aircraft." And if the carrier battle group is threatened by a few dozen flankers with Brahmos missiles, we really need to question whether such a unit is worth it in the 21st century. (read that as, of course the carrier battle group won't be threatened by few flankers. To assert otherwise is ridiculous.

Heck, 5 years ago there were stories about the USN's inability to counter the sizzler. And, in a recent defense technology international story about developments in missile and air defense, several french sources suggested that the US had so far been unable to hit the Coyote target.

Though, if the target is a surface action group, one can't be as sure.

A key factor is going to be how far away the missile can be detected. Aside from the upgraded Hawkeye, SA is going to take a big leap forward when the F-35 and, later on, UCLASS bring their formidable sensor suites to bear.

Early detection will allow for "launch on remote" capability to maximize the kinematic performance of the SM-6 and intercept either the launcher or it's payload while still hundreds of kilometers away. The SM-6 will be guided to within proximity of the target at which time it's active radar seeker will kick in to complete tthe interception. Note that this will be well before the AShM will execute any preprogrammed evasive maneuvers, further increasing the,chances of a successful interception.

arkadyrenko wrote:

sferrin - you really have far too much faith in the invulnerability of AEGIS defenses. The question is not "can the US shoot down Brahmos regularly," the question is "can the US battle group survive a feasible attack by Brahmos equipped aircraft."

Aegis certainly has a much longer and proven track record than Brahmos.

arkadyrenko wrote:

And if the carrier battle group is threatened by a few dozen flankers with Brahmos missiles, we really need to question whether such a unit is worth it in the 21st century. (read that as, of course the carrier battle group won't be threatened by few flankers. To assert otherwise is ridiculous.

Nice way to twist words. I said even if they sent a few dozen in hopes that a few would get through. But don't let the facts get in your way.

arkadyrenko wrote:

Heck, 5 years ago there were stories about the USN's inability to counter the sizzler.

Brahmos is not Sizzler. That may have escaped your attention.

arkadyrenko wrote:

And, in a recent defense technology international story about developments in missile and air defense, several french sources suggested that the US had so far been unable to hit the Coyote target.

Sources?

AEGIS and Brahmos have no combat experience and no proven track record. Just to make that very clear. (Unless you count shooting down an Iranian airliner..) What we're discussing here is the pure hypothetical. What I will say is this: the Russians and the Indians jointly developed the Brahmos missile and decided its particular characteristics. It would be very odd if the Brahmos was not designed, in part, to attack the AEGIS / AEGIS-like defensive systems. That doesn't mean it'll be successful, what it does mean is that they wouldn't choose an attack geometry that is completely beaten by the AEGIS system.

Sorry, what did you mean? Of course the Indians will send in a few dozen to attack US ships, what I meant is that if they did that against a carrier group and it worked, the US needs to re-evaluate carrier groups. I have less faith in the successful defense of a surface action group. On that topic, I don't know if they'll network in F-35C's, probably the USN will focus on the E-2D's first. (Also, SM-6 shows the problem the USN has with the new breed of anti-ship missiles). Furthermore, Sizzler and Brahmos have similar attack trajectories, but I don't know the terminal maneuvering capabilities of either. I only meant to say that the USN is having problems with the most modern anti-ship missiles.

The source for that statement about the Coyote is the air defense article here: http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx? ... 6fcdc3fc6a

Look for the discussion about the recent Aster 15/30 tests.

The more manuevering the more it bleeds kinetic energy. Either conceal the attack to where point defenses cannot target the strike or its clearly getting countered. The USN has a lot of faith their torpedoes will get by any ciws equivalent. Not many nations have enough missile platforms, let alone submarines, to prosecute an attack with any measurable probability of success.

arkadyrenko wrote:

AEGIS and Brahmos have no combat experience and no proven track record. Just to make that very clear. (Unless you count shooting down an Iranian airliner..) What we're discussing here is the pure hypothetical.

Except that Aegis has about 30 years of service and billions of dollars of tests behind it. To say that it doesn't have a proven trackrecord or to equate it with a recently developed Russian-Indian missile that has barely reached service and probably has less then a dozen tests behind it is a ridiculous comparison.

arkadyrenko wrote:

What I will say is this: the Russians and the Indians jointly developed the Brahmos missile and decided its particular characteristics. It would be very odd if the Brahmos was not designed, in part, to attack the AEGIS / AEGIS-like defensive systems. That doesn't mean it'll be successful, what it does mean is that they wouldn't choose an attack geometry that is completely beaten by the AEGIS system.

I actually think that Russian involvement in this field was completely dictated by the MTCR and their own export interests (and I didn't need Wikipedia to tell me that.) I don't think Russia developed this missile for their own purposes. They have a range of weapons that offer similar capabilities. Rather this was a weapon that they undertook to get export sales with India and riskshare in some common technologies. Given the limitations of the MTCR on India, it may well be that the Brahmos is not an Aegis killer at all because it can't be.

Then again, should it be? The India is less likely to face Aegis, than it is lesser systems fielded by the Chinese and the Pakistanis.

arkadyrenko wrote:

Sorry, what did you mean? Of course the Indians will send in a few dozen to attack US ships, what I meant is that if they did that against a carrier group and it worked, the US needs to re-evaluate carrier groups. I have less faith in the successful defense of a surface action group. On that topic, I don't know if they'll network in F-35C's, probably the USN will focus on the E-2D's first. (Also, SM-6 shows the problem the USN has with the new breed of anti-ship missiles). Furthermore, Sizzler and Brahmos have similar attack trajectories, but I don't know the terminal maneuvering capabilities of either. I only meant to say that the USN is having problems with the most modern anti-ship missiles.

The source for that statement about the Coyote is the air defense article here: http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx? ... 6fcdc3fc6a

Look for the discussion about the recent Aster 15/30 tests.

So your evidence consists of an unpublished, unrevealed French comment, in response to no information at all forthcoming from the United States military about a test they claim WAS a success? That's about the lamest piece of evidence I've ever seen.

As a final reparte, its getting tiring to read how every aspect of US Carrier group is in trouble. If its not Anti Ship Ballistic Missiles, then its Sea Skimming anti-ship missiles. Next thing you'll be going to be going on about Russian torpedoes. Can they do anything right in your eyes?

The US has invested hundreds of billions into AD systems in the past two decades, far more than any other nation has put into missile capabilities... and even are fielding a new version of Standard, the ERAM that is primarily aimed at low flying threats like the Brahmos. I agree that cruise missiles present a threat, and actually I think they present more of a threat to US operations than the DF-31 or other types of ASBMs do. However I think its ridiculous to claim that these require a complete rethink of carrier battle groups. Armchair generals do that, not serious analysts.

At this point, I have to ask, are you actually here to discuss and analyze issues critically, or just revell to your constant anti-america viewpoint.

arkadyrenko wrote:

On that topic, I don't know if they'll network in F-35C's, probably the USN will focus on the E-2D's first. (Also, SM-6 shows the problem the USN has with the new breed of anti-ship missiles).

Actually it shows nothing of the sort. What it DOES show is they want to be able to hit anything in the bubble they can see. E-2Ds will be able to cue SM-6 where before they were limited by line of sight. There is nothing magic about Brahmos. In difficulty it's roughly in the same class as Sunburn and Shipwreck. It's "specialness" if you will, is that it has more range than Sunburn and is more compact than Shipwreck. IMO Sizzler is the scarey one.

I don't know if the USN has tested the AEGIS system against the original threat. Yes, it has been around for longer, but the threat matrix has changed so its 'effective age' is probably not 30 years. I have no indication, but I would be interested in seeing, if the USN has conducted an AEGIS test against a swarm attack of supersonic cruise missiles. That's the Brahmos / future threat and what the AEGIS will have to deal with.

The principles behind active ship defense with phased array radars are well known by now. Given that the Brahmos, Sizzler, etc., all have similar characteristics (low altitude and high speed terminal attack), it stands to reason that this particular attack trajectory was assumed or calculated to be the best trajectory for attacking a defended carrier battle group. And we don't know about the electronic developments on both sides. From one website, it claimed a fairly electronically complex attack for the P-800. (Active phase, descent to low altitude + passive receiver, RWR + evasive maneuvers, jamming with radar in terminal phase, etc.) No reason to believe that's true or not, but the capabilities have certainly been developed and need only integration and miniaturization.

As for that story about the Aster 15/30, its one line, an interesting line, but besides it I can find no evidence on way or another. (Though such evidence is hard to come by in either case).

Finally, about the carrier battle groups and overall pessimism. I find myself more pessimistic about the US "known" capabilities against other countries because I assume that foreigners have had the time to catch up on the technological revolution of the past 20 years and they have capable scientists working on a fixed problem. If you look at the USN's development since the end of the cold war, first it spent 10 - 15 years or so focusing on short ranged air attacks against marginal opponents. This led to the acceptance of the Hornet and the integration of FLIR pods / smart bombs and an atrophy in Naval strike technology and range with the retirement of the A-6 and cancellation of A-12. Next, the USN has spent the previous 5+ years working all out on developing a missile defense complex. Now it is turning towards conducting combined air and sea operations against the PRC. On the other hand, Russia and anyone it will work with have had the previous 15 years to continue their work on developing advanced air and ship launched anti-ship missiles. While the US has advanced AEGIS to deal with this, to a certain degree and with new capabilities, it seems incontestable that the anti-ship missile threat is of secondary importance compared to the ballistic missile defense role or support of NATO and US ground campaigns in Iraq and the Balkans.

What this means is that the USN perhaps has not been given the time, budget, or internal inclination to work through the consequences of the new threat environment. (At least publicly) Also, it represents a doctrinal distraction for sea battles to land battles. It was acceptable because of the US's geopolitical focus, but it gave other countries time to react. Witness the development of the Sizzler, fielding of the Brahmos / P-800, and pursuit of the ASBM. This is beginning to change, notice the crash course in anti-ship missile development (LRASM) and the Navy's single minded pursuit of N-UCAV capability. The other side(s), however, have had time to catch up in certain areas. Personally, I am afraid that the USN will find itself like the Israeli's in 2006, an advanced military force who has spent too long worrying about small threats and is surprised to find that other people can fight advanced just like them. And when such a fight comes, the USN will face an unpleasant surprise.

For another example of this, look at the USAF's nuclear mission following the end of the Cold War and the shuttering of the SAC. This is another example of a force, which while receiving money and upgrades, still suffered because of doctrinal and organizational lack of focus.

(about the SM-6's flight profile. You're right, it does help extend the battle group's range, but it also has the helpful capability of hitting Sizzler's before they start their rocket stage.)

ps. proof that the USN hasn't been as serious as they need to be: little provisions, as far as I know, about reloading VLS tubes on present or future warships at sea. It is a bit of a downer if the battle group has to return to a fixed location in order to reload the ship's weapon tubes regularly. Or gets destroyed by the 3rd or 4th attack wave.

That's okay, they haven't been carrying full ordnance since the second world war. Chances are they still do not. And the press has been bad for the navy with regards to their readiness state being below par. Not that it doesn't already exceed the rest of the world. The USN found it can get its systems up when necessary so no reason to expect perfection in peacetime.

arkadyrenko wrote:

What this means is that the USN perhaps has not been given the time, budget, or internal inclination to work through the consequences of the new threat environment. (At least publicly) Also, it represents a doctrinal distraction for sea battles to land battles. It was acceptable because of the US's geopolitical focus, but it gave other countries time to react. Witness the development of the Sizzler, fielding of the Brahmos / P-800, and pursuit of the ASBM. This is beginning to change, notice the crash course in anti-ship missile development (LRASM) and the Navy's single minded pursuit of N-UCAV capability. The other side(s), however, have had time to catch up in certain areas. Personally, I am afraid that the USN will find itself like the Israeli's in 2006, an advanced military force who has spent too long worrying about small threats and is surprised to find that other people can fight advanced just like them. And when such a fight comes, the USN will face an unpleasant surprise.

I'm sorry, but you're completely wrong about this. I think by any objective measure, fleet defense is the area where the Navy has invested the greatest proportion of resources into development and procurement. Its why almost every major US navy surface combatant now possesses a large Phased Array, effective networking capabilities and a huge VLS loaded with a variety of highly lethal missiles. ITs also why you're likely to see the first employment of a laser based air defense system on US vessels.

Really I don't know what more the US Navy could do to better secure their battle groups in this area. So to say that they are "going to face an unpleasant surprise" is really just ridiculous given they have known about this threat for years and have been preparing for it. Its even arguable that the Navy has never left the cold war mentality and has maintained its competence in this area. You see large joint development schemes with the Japanese on radars and weapons, who were also never distracted by "small wars" and were always concerned about the challenges of fighting a large maritime wars against a proper state.

And this is partly because of real world requirements and experiences. Both the US Navy and Army were critical in providing active ABM defense during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. PAC-3 and the PAC-2 GEM interceptors were extremely good at knocking down BMs. However they were wanting against cruise missile type threats. This led to ERAM. They found that their networking systems were particularly useful for the lethality of their systems, so they beefed that up significantly as well.

So, I think its really mistaken to claim the US is unprepared for ABMs or Cruise missiles. Its one of the areas that the US is particularly interested in, and has been for several decades.

I see your point, but I think that it doesn't capture the full evolution in the past 20 years. AEGIS has been steadily upgraded, along with the missiles, radars, connectivity, etc. However, those developments are increases in degree, apart from the DDG-1000's X-Band terminal illumination and the E-2D's CEC, I don't think that any of those steps in and of themselves are really revolutionary. Other countries have fielded who new classes of anti-ship missiles and have had the previous 20 years to determine whole new methods of anti-ship attack. So we're stuck with this question: did the USN's advances match that of their opponents?

I believe that answer is mixed. On the one hand, potential opponents of the US have vastly fewer launching platforms for the anti-ship missiles. This dramatically eases the USN's problem. But, opponents have pushed their technology (perhaps not to the same degree as the US) and their doctrine. Brahmos / Sizzler represent new ways of attacking battle groups. Brahmos has higher degrees of autonomy, reducing the need to punch one's way into the carrier's air defense ring. Luckily for the US, the present model is constrained by export requirements. Otherwise... Sizzler gives you a vastly improved means of penetrating a ship's final defenses. And doctrine has shifted. Iran no long has serious pretensions to a surface fleet, they're pursuing a better strategy. That combination of doctrine and technology has the potential of providing a very nasty shock to the USN. Hence, my pessimism. eg. What good is CEC when the opponent does a shore launched missile trap in the straits of Hormuz?

I think that in recent years, we've seen a more focused move towards a more durable idea of fleet air defense, witness the shifting of the railgun and laser development to systems that can be fielded in 10 years as opposed to 20+, that matches my statement above. What I meant was that the Navy is only now playing catch up on the bigger changes in the fleet air defense environment. Changes which cannot be adequately matched with better and faster surface to air missiles and require improvements in other areas or completely new directions altogether.

But I still stand by my statement. For all of the Navy's upgrades in fleet defense, I believe it will fast a nasty surprise the next time some one actually starts shooting at it. (Here's the better question: would it have been possible to prevent that nasty surprise.)

Forum: General F-35 Forum

F-35 and a nuclear attack