Forum: F-35 versus XYZ

The answer is simple to the question of operating costs:

It will take less F-35s & assets to complete a mission than if you used 4th gen fighters & assets. Less IFR, less escorts, less strikers, less decoys, less ISR, etc. All that adds up to a big savings in the cost of a strike package. If you want to know the cost of a 4th gen vs VLO strike package, read up on "Package Q".

The F-35 also has a much higher survival rate.

And yes, the F-35 can carry the 5k bunker bust if it wanted to.

btw, The F-35 is the quintessential "jack-of-all-trades". It can do any mission on the books, just not as well as specialized airframes. This is the definition of Multi-Role and where all air-forces have been going to the past 30 years.

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arkadyrenko wrote:

I don't know how you can credibly claim that operating the F-35 will be cheaper than operating 4th gen fighters, when the most recent reports show that the F-35's cost per flying hour will significantly exceed the current aircraft.

SpudmanWP and I, and others, have answered that for you. Several times. One more time, in small words: One JSF will cost more than one F-16. But it takes less JSFs to do the same job. Per job, not per plane, the JSF is much cheaper. The JSF can do more jobs than older planes. That means an Air Force that needs to do three types of jobs over the course of a war can do those jobs with one set of JSFs, rather than paying for three sets of planes that each do one of those jobs. Per Air Force, the JSF is much, much cheaper.

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Even without those recent reports, how can a more technologically complex aircraft cost less to operate than a less technologically complex aircraft? That doesn't make much sense.

Which is more "technologically complex:" a 1970 car, or a 2010 car? A Rolex Submariner, or a Casio G-Shock? The analog computer that animated the Death Star hologram in the original Star Wars, or the Compaq Renderplex array that animated all of Ice Age? Now, which of those pairs needs to go in for repairs more often?

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Furthermore, the F-35 won't be as good as the A-10 at CAS. The A-10 has better (lower) loiter speed and a lower general operating altitude. All the reports from Afghanistan and Iraq support the idea that the troops preferred the A-10 to other fast attack fighters.

I never said it would be. In fact, had you read what was written, you'd see I said this exact same thing. However, A-10s are not very good at pentrating airspace defended by SAMs and fighter cover. I think your ground troops would prefer a plane that's there supporting them, vs. one that's just a burning stain on the soil thanks to a SAM, or one that wasn't even sent because nobody thought it would make it to you alive, or one that wasn't even on the carrier deck to send in the first place. Moreover, which of the "other fast attack fighters" had SAR and EO-DAS, hmm? Not a single complaint about "other fast attack fighters" was a complaint about the JSF. You're comparing freshly-picked apples to oranges that have been sitting out on the table in a bowl since the 1970s. It's pretty much a given that the JSF will do better in CAS than the F-16 and -18. It probably won't do better than the A-10. But the fact that they use F-16s and F/A-18s now only proves the A-10 isn't able to do the whole job for everyone, even now.

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Your last paragraph gets to the heart of the matter, if the US doesn't face serious opponents in the next 50 years, the JSF doesn't make any sense. So stop pretending that the JSF is an automatic upgrade for the USAF. It is not. It is only an upgrade in a world where the USAF faces serious threats.

Oh, like the actual world we live in? Laughing

If you think there are no serious threats, why not retire all the fighters and go with an Air Force of all A-10s and Broncos and AC-130s? If we do face threats serious enough to retain the 4th generation fighters, we face threats serious enough to fight them with better planes than the 4th generation fighters. And even that nonsense avoids the deterrent factor: If the US would face serious threats without the JSF, but wouldn't with the JSF because those threats realize they can't reliably defend against the JSF, then the JSF makes even more sense if it never sees combat than if it's needed for combat.

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... trying to fight even the smallest knock against the airframe is rather silly.

When the "knock" is just someone parroting falsehoods, it's not a knock, it's a lie. There are knocks against the JSF that are true. The C model failed to match legacy fighters in transsonic acceleration. (I'm not at all surprised; putting bigger wings on the same body was bound to mess up the area ruling.) The A model fell 6 miles short of its range spec. (Inconsequential, but true. Bleed air needs for cooling the computers, and drag on the EOTS turret, had been underestimated.) It has taken longer to become operational than was hoped. (True, but better to put it into full rate production after the bugs have been worked out.) The tailhook on the C model (currently) doesn't work right. (True, hopefully will be fixed. Surprisingly, it didn't remind people that the C, not the B, was actually the most troubled variant through most of the development process. The B did hit more serious problems later on, but they've been fixed or, in the case of the cracking lightweight bulkhead, are being fixed.) The helmet has some issues, some of which are being fixed. Last I heard they still don't have a complete fix to the night vision projection lag and resolution issues. The plane is fully operational with greater capabilities than legacy fighters even without real-time 360 degree spherical night vision (no legacy fighter has that either now) but just not with all the capabilities that had been hoped.

Try sticking to the "knocks" that are factual, and nobody will "fight" you on them.

My argument is that in certain cases, having more 4th gen fighters is more important than having a fewer 5th gen fighters, even if the 5th gen force is cheaper and per airplane superior. Obvious example, if the US faced a nuclear bomber / missile threat across the pole, going with cheap and expendable 4th gen interceptors is better than 5th gen fighters. Less obvious example, when doing ops in Afghanistan / Iraq, individual capability is less important than planes overhead.

Quick aside on the A-10: if they had more A-10s, then there wouldn't be the need to use the F-16 as much.

We agree on the fact that the F-35 is necessary for a high threat environment. Though, there is still disagreement in what the high threat environment will do. I think that the F-35 won't dominate in such an environment. Rather, it will be the acceptable aircraft for the high threat environments. (Which means that any 4th gen won't be useful at all)

[Link pending approval] did a heck of a job. Kudos

/and spud too

arkadyrenko wrote:

My argument is that in certain cases, having more 4th gen fighters is more important than having a fewer 5th gen fighters,

You just made my point for me. The DoD and our Partner nations realize that the added expense of having multiple types of aircraft that are only going to be used in "certain cases" (your words) is not an economical or militarily viable solution.

arkadyrenko wrote:

Obvious example, if the US faced a nuclear bomber / missile threat across the pole, going with cheap and expendable 4th gen interceptors is better than 5th gen fighters.

Exactly... and when is this likely to happen? How about NEVER. So what is the purpose of spending all that money preparing for a mission that will likely? never happen.

arkadyrenko wrote:

Less obvious example, when doing ops in Afghanistan / Iraq, individual capability is less important than planes overhead.

Which is why we are transitioning into larger use of larger UCAVs (Reaper sized) and why I personally would like to see the OV-10X in production for the COIN role.

One of the reasons why we do not want a diverse group of fighters (ie the move to multi-role) is that when it is needed, the DoD can draw upon a larger group aircraft to get the job done. There is also the issue of lifetime cost control as it relates to parts prices and availability. Having a large number of fighters of the same type allows you to order parts cheaper and stage them around the world easier. This allows for rapid repairs and greater availability when needed.

Well, we're now agreeing on stuff. I think this is a step forward. Odd question, what's the solution for cruise missile attacks against US bases? Some sort of ANG anti-cruise missile aircraft?

I agree with the OV-10X, though I'd say the Brazilian plane would be just as good, that is arguing airframes, not roles. It is rather silly to be buying F-35s to do basic COIN warfare. The plane wasn't designed to do it and it would be highly capable overkill.

The problem with multi-role is the loss of a particular capability. Going to an all F-35 + NGB force will limit the USAF in some ways. In particular, it won't have a high altitude air dominance fighter and it won't have a fast deep strike capability. I hope that the USAF won't just go to a single airframe, the F-35, but will leverage the F-35's technology for other airframes for different roles. That's probably the worse casualty of the this dragged out acquisition process.

For effective CM defense from the air, you need a good AESA and avionics package to pick them out from the clutter. That ain't cheap.

Second, you need plenty of AAMs

The F-16 can carry 6 AAMs

The F-35 can carry 12 (later 14) AMRAAMs and two 9Xs

Another option for CM defense that involves a fighter in the kill chain, is for a fighter to act as airborne targeting sensors for SAMs. This is one of the reasons why I liked the SLAMRAAM idea. The F-35 would be able to provide not only detection, but tracking and target updates to the rising AMRAAMs.

The EODAS would also allow for detection & tracking all around the F-35, not just where the AESA & EOTS are pointing. There is no sneaking past the EODAS.

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Going to an all F-35 + NGB

At no point will we ever be at that point. We also have B-2, F-22, F-15E, Golden Eagles, A-10s (for at least another 15-20 years), F-18E/F/G.

If you're doing SAMs, the current option is the balloon mounted radar, there's no reason to put a plane on patrol. And, why bother with a stealth aircraft when you're going to be radiating the whole time.

How about a Gripen with an AESA radar pod + SAMs? Cheap airframe, only need 1 or 2 radars per flight. In either case, the issue of cruise missile attacks against US bases not on the front line is a serious problem will need to be dealt with in the Pacific. The Chinese can build their own SSGNs as well.

With regards to force composition, given the trends in the USAF procurement, if they want to start replacing the F-22 and the F-15E/Golden Eagles, they have to start now. Unfortunately, there isn't the money there due to the JSF program. Unless the USAF wants to do the US a huge favor and try to compress / simplify the acquisition program.

In particular, the COIN air support is probably going to be shifted more and more to Army UCAVs, letting the Air Force and Navy focus on more high-level threats.
Honestly, I think congress screwed up in banning the Army from making their own fixed wing CAS, but an-manned technology will probably make that irrelevant at some point.

arkadyrenko wrote:

If you're doing SAMs, the current option is the balloon mounted radar, there's no reason to put a plane on patrol. And, why bother with a stealth aircraft when you're going to be radiating the whole time.

How about a Gripen with an AESA radar pod + SAMs? Cheap airframe, only need 1 or 2 radars per flight. In either case, the issue of cruise missile attacks against US bases not on the front line is a serious problem will need to be dealt with in the Pacific. The Chinese can build their own SSGNs as well.

With regards to force composition, given the trends in the USAF procurement, if they want to start replacing the F-22 and the F-15E/Golden Eagles, they have to start now. Unfortunately, there isn't the money there due to the JSF program. Unless the USAF wants to do the US a huge favor and try to compress / simplify the acquisition program.

Balloons can't get anywhere fast, and AESA radar isn't the same thing as "radiating the whole time".
Also, lets not forget that you are talking about developing and deploying yet another set of specialized units rather than using the same thing you need to have on hand for other uses.

Cm defense is all about layering. While a balloon is all fine and dandy for short ranged defense in relatively flat terrain, there is the issue of mountains, valleys, radar horizon, etc that have to be dealt with. Having F-35s patrolling farther out towards the threat means that there is less of a chance of surprise and overwhelming of the target's defenses.

btw, There is no such thing as an A2A AESA pod, especially with the A2A capabilities of the APG-81. It would also lack the spherical sensor coverage of the EODAS.

Designing the replacement for the F-22 will begin within 10-20 years, depending on if the USAF jump on the F/A-XX bandwagon or goes it alone.

AESA pods have been investigated, though more for SAR use. This actually is an ideal role for a non-stealthy drone carrying a big radar pod. Think a mini- Rivit Joint modified for cruise missile defense.

The reason why stealth is redundant in this role is that the planes are operating far away from enemy air activity and their mission involves constant flying with constant radar emissions.

Essentially, the scenario I'm imagining is if the Chinese decide to mount land attack cruise missiles in containers on some of their commercial ships. They would 'sortie' these containers in a crisis period and at the initiation of a conflict this ship would conduct cruise missile strikes against bases on the West Coast. In that situation, the problem is sustaining cruise missile defense flights at the lowest cost possible for the largest defended area. And it gets to the question of: does the ANG really need stealth strike fighters for air sovereignty missions.

The issue for the F-22 replacement is that the current airframes will be getting on in years in 20 years, and the F-15's will be ancient by then.

'arkadyrenko' said: "...why bother with a stealth aircraft when you're going to be radiating the whole time...."

Active Electronically Scanned Array - (AESA) Radar 10 April 2010

http://123seminarsonly.com/Seminar-Repo ... -Radar.pdf (2.4Mb)

"An Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA), is a type of phased array radar whose transmitter and receiver functions are composed of numerous small solid-state transmit/receive (T/R) modules. AESAs aim their "beam" by broadcasting a number of different frequencies of coherent radio energy that interfere constructively at certain angles in front of the antenna. They improve on the older passive electronically scanned radars by spreading their broadcasts out across a band of frequencies, which makes it very difficult to detect over background noise. AESAs allow ships and aircraft to broadcast powerful radar signals while still remaining stealthy
GOKULA KRISHNAN S

p. 29-30
Low Probability of Intercept
Radar systems work by sending out a signal and then listening for its echo off distant objects. Each of these paths, to and from the target, is subject to the inverse square law of propagation. That means that a radar's received energy drops with the fourth power of distance, which is why radar systems require high powers, often in the megawatt range, in order to be effective at long range.

The radar signal being sent out is a simple radio signal, and can be received with a simple radio receiver. It is common to use such a receiver in the targets, normally aircraft, to detect radar broadcasts. Unlike the radar unit, which has to send the pulse out and then receive its reflection, the target's receiver does not need the reflection and thus the signal drops off only as the square of distance. This means that the receiver is always at an advantage over the radar in terms of range - it will always be able to detect the signal long before the radar can see the target's echo. Since the position of the radar is extremely useful information in an attack on that platform, this means that radars generally have to be turned off for lengthy periods if they are subject to attack; this is common on ships, for instance.

Turning that received signal into a useful display is the purpose of the "radar warning receiver" (RWR). Unlike the radar, which knows which direction it is sending its signal, the receiver simply gets a pulse of energy and has to interpret it. Since the radio spectrum is filled with noise, the receiver's signal is integrated over a short period of time, making periodic sources like a radar add up and stand out over the random background. Typically RWRs store the detected pulses for a short period of time, and compare their broadcast frequency and pulse repetition frequency against a database of known radars. The rough direction can be calculated using a rotating antenna, or similar passive array, and combined with symbology indicating the likely purpose of the radar - airborne early warning, surface to air missile, etc.

This technique is much less useful against AESA radars. Since the AESA can change its frequency with every pulse, and generally does so using a pseudo-random sequence, integrating over time does not help pull the signal out of the background noise. Nor does the AESA have any sort of fixed pulse repetition frequency, which can also be varied and thus hide any periodic brightening across the entire spectrum. Traditional RWRs are essentially useless against AESA radars.

High jamming resistance
Jamming is likewise much more difficult against an AESA. Traditionally, jammers have operated by determining the operating frequency of the radar and then broadcasting a signal on it to confuse the receiver as to which is the "real" pulse and which is the jammer's. This technique works as long as the radar system cannot easily change its operating frequency. When the transmitters were based on klystron tubes this was generally true, and radars, especially airborne ones, had only a few frequencies to chose among. A jammer could listen to those possible frequencies and select the one being used to jam.

Since an AESA changes its operating frequency with every pulse, and spreads the frequencies across a wide band even in a single pulse, jammers are much less effective. Although it is possible to send out broadband white noise against all the possible frequencies, this means the amount of energy being sent at any one frequency is much lower, reducing its effectiveness. Moreover, AESAs can be switched to a receive-only mode, and use the jamming signals as a powerful source to track its source, something that required a separate receiver in older platforms.

AESAs are so much more difficult to detect, and so much more useful in receiving signals from the targets, that they can broadcast continually and still have a very low chance of being detected. This allows the radar system to generate far more data than if it is being used only periodically, greatly improving overall system effectiveness...."

? - LPI has absolutely no bearing to the discussion of detecting sea skimming cruise missiles off the West Coast. Unless you think the Chinese are going to deploy a carrier group there.

arkadyrenko wrote:

? - LPI has absolutely no bearing to the discussion of detecting sea skimming cruise missiles off the West Coast. Unless you think the Chinese are going to deploy a carrier group there.

Nothing under discussion here has anything to do with "sea skimming cruise missiles off the West Coast".

Forum: F-35 versus XYZ

Marines view F/A-XX as threat to F-35