Forum: F-35 Armament, Stores and Tactics

Fighters, Missiles For Countering Stealth

http://tinyurl.com/d52kq44

Excerpts from the 1st and 2nd page:

[...] Russian choices have been guided by a consistent Western tactical air defense plan that has been centered on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Delays in the JSF program have now given Russia more than 20 years to prepare for its initial operational capability date. [...]

The asymmetric dimension to future Russian air warfare programs entails the development of counter very-low-observable (CVLO) radar technologies and long-range, high-speed surface-to-air missile (SAM) designs, complemented by a new generation of short-range point defense weapons intended to destroy incoming guided weapons, especially anti-radiation missiles, cruise missiles and guided bombs. All systems are built for high mobility, typically with 5-min. “shoot and scoot” times to permit “scooting” inside of the targeting and engagement cycles of most guided munitions.

The focus in Russian CVLO radar has been in the 1-meter VHF band. Stealth shaping in fighters is largely ineffective in VHF because components such as stabilizers and wingtips have dimensions close to the radar wavelength. Radar-absorbent treatments developed for S-band and above are ineffective in VHF due to both electrical behavior and thickness.

The flagship product is the NNIIRT/Almaz-Antey 55Zh6M Nebo M 3-D radar system, of which 100 were recently ordered to re-equip Russian air defense forces. The Nebo M is uniquely a “multi-band” design, comprising three radars and a central data fusion and command post module, all carried on separate high-mobility 8 x 8 24-ton vehicles.

The RLM-M VHF-band, RLM-D L-band and RLM-S C/X-band radars all feed tracking data to the command van’s data fusion system—which resembles the U.S. Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability system—using high-speed narrow-beam digital data links in the microwave band. All radars appear to be solid-state active, electronically scanned array (AESA) designs. The intent of the Nebo M design is for the RLM-M to detect stealth targets, and cue the RLM-D and -S components to produce exact tracking data, bypassing the initial acquisition problems otherwise seen in mid/upper-band radars with VLO targets. Range performance has not been disclosed but the RLM-M is expected to better the earlier Nebo- SVU by at least 40%.

The earlier NNIIRT 1L119E Nebo-SVU VHF AESA does not appear to have been built in large numbers, and used a less mobile semi-trailer configuration. The Nebo-SVU was credited with space-time adaptive processing technology similar to that or the Northrop Grumman E-2D Hawkeye, and in 2002 NNIIRT’s Igor Krylov said “We can see the stealth [F-117A] as clearly as any other plane”.

[...] The push into CVLO radar is paralleled by investment in highly mobile long-range SAM designs with high speed and short flight times. The intent is twofold—to deny airspace to standoff and penetrating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and electronic attack platforms, while permitting SAMs to close with stealth targets before they can retreat from tracking range.

Russia’s future integrated air defense system will be constructed around the S-400 Triumf (SA-21 “Growler”) strategic SAM, and the S-500 Triumfator M or SA-X-NN SAM and missile defense system. The S-400 is now deployed with air defense regiments at Dubrovka, Elektrostal and Vladivostok.

They finally combined forces.

Who combined forces? The Russians and the Chinese?

Al

Who combined forces? The Russians and the Chinese?

Al

Who combined forces? The Russians and the Chinese?

Al

Strictly speaking, the authors have a point. Given that the F-35 program will take about 20 years from program beginning to program ending, China and Russia have plenty of time to begin their own counter programs. Now the authors may oversell the effectiveness of Russian / Chinese technology, but the potential and time for such programs exists.

Furthermore, given the all pervasiveness of cyber warfare, it is quite likely that the Chinese and Russians have a significant, if not total, understanding of the JSF. That will further help the development of any countermeasures.

Strictly speaking, the authors have a point. Given that the F-35 program will take about 20 years from program beginning to program ending, China and Russia have plenty of time to begin their own counter programs. Now the authors may oversell the effectiveness of Russian / Chinese technology, but the potential and time for such programs exists.

Furthermore, given the all pervasiveness of cyber warfare, it is quite likely that the Chinese and Russians have a significant, if not total, understanding of the JSF. That will further help the development of any countermeasures.

sgt:

Of course they will have developmental difficulties, and some of the technologies may not work at all. But the fact of the matter is they have another 8! years to make those countermeasures work. And this is after 10+ years to begin working on those countermeasures. And after another 10 years, since the end of the Cold War, to at least create the theoretical basis for countermeasures against stealth.

So, it is naive to assume that the adversaries haven't already been planning to face the F-35, and that they aren't pursuing innovative means of doing so. The length of the JSF program just helps that production of counter measures. Don't forget, cyber warfare helps level the playing field.

Finally, the Chinese are able to meet the demand, defeating stealth, with sufficient funds to finance the creating of the countermeasures. It is an open question of how much they are cooperating with the Russians on counter stealth equipment.