Forum: Modern Military Aircraft

AAAM - That's truly impressive if the USN could have in fact developed the ST-21 for less than SH's R&D budget. One could argue that someone in decision making back in the day could have had better vision and foresight. It seems like they were repeatedly thinking in just 2-3 yr time frames ahead, with cost being the death sentence for ST-21, let alone the F-14D block IV, only to follow up a few years later proposing the JSF. One's head could hurt trying to follow that one. It's possible that one key issue was that Northrop was perhaps a politically incorrect company at the time (by at least one decider) to want to continue receiving tactical aircraft from. Maybe NG should have proposed making an Air Force variant with an affordable economy of scale production of 1,500+ including FMS sales? It could have complemented nicely until a seamless transition of a 2025-2028'ish next-gen IOC time frame, especially with a common GE engine similar to what was or could have been operated by USAF (in upgraded form) and foreign air forces? Could have ironically saved the DoD a bundle with the bonus of no gap to worry about to boot. Interesting to ponder anyway... Shrug

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Last edited by aaam on Oct 14, 2011 - 01:17 AM; edited 2 times in total

geogen wrote:

AAAM - That's truly impressive if the USN could have in fact developed the ST-21 for less than SH's R&D budget. One could argue that someone in decision making back in the day could have had better vision and foresight. It seems like they were repeatedly thinking in just 2-3 yr time frames ahead, with cost being the death sentence for ST-21, let alone the F-14D block IV, only to follow up a few years later proposing the JSF. One's head could hurt trying to follow that one. It's possible that one key issue was that Northrop was perhaps a politically incorrect company at the time (by at least one decider) to want to continue receiving tactical aircraft from. Maybe NG should have proposed making an Air Force variant with an affordable economy of scale production of 1,500+ including FMS sales? It could have complemented nicely until a seamless transition of a 2025-2028'ish next-gen IOC time frame, especially with a common GE engine similar to what was or could have been operated by USAF (in upgraded form) and foreign air forces? Could have ironically saved the DoD a bundle with the bonus of no gap to worry about to boot. Interesting to ponder anyway... Shrug

OK, I can address these:

First, remember at the time, there was no NG. Grumman was still independent (although a bit too arrogant) and JSF wasn't even a gleam in a Program Manager's eye. Had A/FX not been canceled a few years later, there would have been no JSF, but there probably would have been an ASTOVL to replace the Harrier, which would have suited the Marines better. As for Northrop being politically incorrect, don't forget they build ~ 1/2 of the SH and it evolved from their original design.

Regarding ST21 for USAF, that wouldn't have happened. 1st because ST21 was proposed as an alternative to the NATF, whereas AF was developing the ATF, which was supposed to be morphed into the NATF, so they'd oppose it on those grounds. And, there was no way USAF was going to buy a Navy fighter again, even if the ATF wasn't ongoing. Remember, they had to be forced to look at the F-4. If ST21 would have come to fruition, it's not all that certain export sales would be allowed. In the case of the Tomcat, Iran was permitted because we were developing a closer relationship with them and they paid cash ("What, you don't want us to give/loan you the money to buy our stuff? You're going to use your own money? Not sure we know how to process that."), which helped save the F-14 program . The UK would surely have been allowed to buy, but in the timeframes that would have been involved, they already had bought the Tornado ADV for political reasons, and were ramping up for what would become the Eurofighter for European unity. I don't believe we let anyone else look at the Tomcat to buy, so I bet it would have been the same.

Regarding whether they could have brought it in for less than the SH R&D, my bet is yes, costing around $2.5- 3 billion. Grumman had delivered the F-14D on time and on budget. They did this because the Navy in the '80s was pretty innovative. They gave virtually the entire development over to Grumman and concentrated on costs. Unusually for such a big program, on the F-14D the APG-71 and the F110s were CFE and not GFE, so the contractor was able to use greater efficiencies and less bureaucracy, at greater risk on their part. The ST-21 proposal was based on this kind of procurement again. Also, ST21 (like F-14 Block IV) was an evolution of the existing basic F-14 design while SH was, depending on the official position of the week a new aircraft (it actually was). As for why it died, that wasn't directly due to the cost of its development. It was a much less expensive alternative proposed in place of the NATF. Thing was, Navy decided that it really didn't need a new fighter in the short to medium term. They expected that the F-14D with AIM-152 and upgraded sensors would meet their needs in that arena. They needed to concentrate their assets on strike. So ST21 was shelved not because it wasn't good enough or cost too much, but because it was thought that it wouldn't be needed in the short to medium term. Navair never dreamed that DoD/Cheney would not too long after that just kill the F-14 program entirely.

We may never really know what it cost to develop SH, since things kept moving in and out of that program. There was the announced "cap" of $4.88 billion, but at the time it was imposed estimates for the development program were already around $6 billion, so they must have gotten to $4.88 billion by magic. Also, there was a little-known qualification to that cap: changes wouldn't count against the cap if they would "increase combat effectiveness". If you look, you can see them driving the USS Enterprise through that loophole.

Personally, I agree with those who opine that what happened was industrial policy. With the upcoming cuts in budgets, there would not be enough money to keep all the contractors gainfully employed. DoD looked on MDD as a more versatile contractor, while Grumman was looked on as a more specialized builder of Navy aircraft (and at the time they were too arrogant). Plus, they wanted to be sure the C-17 got built, and that there would be a competitor to Boeing in the civil world (funny how that turned out). So Grumman, and with it the F-14 and its derivatives were sacrificed.

Looking back on it, I definitely think building SH instead of F-14 Block IV was not the right call, except for industrial policy, but I'm not so sure about ST21. We'd have greater capability with it than with SH, but what the Navy really needed was A/FX. Now if that had died anyway, then ST21 might have been a worthwhile option, depending on how highly you rate stealth relative to other qualities.

But then, it's all academic now.

Thanks for the recap and perspective. Interesting. Anyway, it would seem in the end to be dictated by circumstances of raw timing in many cases. If Grumman had managed to pull off even 2-3 yrs of F-14 block IV production and possibly stuck around as a player, things might have been different with so many radical and convoluted next-gen requirements, schemes and variations of schemes and intricate joint-venture hybrids of variations being put on the table over the mid-90s?

I guess my current bias is looking back now and identifying the ST21 as probably have being a fair balance to what would have filled an acceptable and reliable mid-term requirement while also having further evolved growth potential and at an acceptable price. What looked unaffordable in the early 90s, might have been perceived differently by the mid the late 90s, etc. It could have set up nicely for a better prepared and assessed common Joint Fighter Program (for USN/USAF and Partners) for a late 2020s introduction. As part of a 'mix', perhaps the hornet Program could have just been modernized in block increments and continued, possibly getting a mini CFT + reduced RCS improvements and the usual avionics upgrades over time.

And who knows, by the late 90s it might have been perfectly acceptable to be offering ST21 for FMS afterall, given the willingness and paradigm shift to export such a thing to allies, as an affordable stealthy 5th gen game-changer? Mr. Green

geogen wrote:

Thanks for the recap and perspective. Interesting. Anyway, it would seem in the end to be dictated by circumstances of raw timing in many cases. If Grumman had managed to pull off even 2-3 yrs of F-14 block IV production and possibly stuck around as a player, things might have been different with so many radical and convoluted next-gen requirements, schemes and variations of schemes and intricate joint-venture hybrids of variations being put on the table over the mid-90s?

I guess my current bias is looking back now and identifying the ST21 as probably have being a fair balance to what would have filled an acceptable and reliable mid-term requirement while also having further evolved growth potential and at an acceptable price. What looked unaffordable in the early 90s, might have been perceived differently by the mid the late 90s, etc. It could have set up nicely for a better prepared and assessed common Joint Fighter Program (for USN/USAF and Partners) for a late 2020s introduction. As part of a 'mix', perhaps the hornet Program could have just been modernized in block increments and continued, possibly getting a mini CFT + reduced RCS improvements and the usual avionics upgrades over time.

And who knows, by the late 90s it might have been perfectly acceptable to be offering ST21 for FMS afterall, given the willingness and paradigm shift to export such a thing to allies, as an affordable stealthy 5th gen game-changer? Mr. Green

Got to set the Wayback machine (or the TARDIS) back to the beginning of the '90s.

The F-14D program was just completing development and ramping up to build/convert 527 of them. The Hornet was scheduled to go out of production, and the A-12 was going to take over the A-6 mission. DoD/Cheney cancels F-14D. A-12 gets canceled and Hornet E/F is ordered by DoD "in the interim" along with extending C/D line F-14D Block IV is proposed to fill interim need instead. F-14D Block IV can be thought of as a seagoing Strike Eagle with better air-to-air capability and sensors, but less payload/range. With F-14D Block IV, there would be no reason for a new model of Hornet. DoD made it clear that SH was it. Period.

ST21 was not being actively pursued at this point since it had been considered as an alternative to NATF, not as a filler for the Navy strike mission (although it would have had all the a/g capability of Block IV and then some). Navy had already decided that what they needed was to address the strike issue , which is one of the reasons they pulled out of NATF, and that the F-14D and evolutions thereof could handle their fighter needs for the short to medium term. So, they didn't want to spend the money there. Who knows, maybe later in the decade the ST21 proposals might have been dusted off, but really, while being a better a/c than SH, ST21 was not as good as what A/FX would have been.

Anyway, in the early n'90s you're at this point: If there is an F-14D, there's no need for S, and if there's an SH there's no room for the F-14D. DoD says there will be no F-14D. It wasn't timing, it was policy.

Thanks for reply but I'd disagree. Timing can always influence and affect policy. Any decade.

The lack of SH meant the loss of quite a few jobs in the American economy at the time.

I seriously doubt ST21 would've come out cheaper, since they wanted to redo the electronics, change the airframe and structure, and make it fly by wire. And add thrust vectoring. It was really a pretty massive change that would've required a lot of development and testing.

The SH alternative that Grumman offered, the F-14D Quickstrike, was itself judged to have a higher total cost (due to life cycle costs rather than development costs) than the SH.

Last edited by aaam on Oct 17, 2011 - 07:24 AM; edited 1 time in total

madrat wrote:

The lack of SH meant the loss of quite a few jobs in the American economy at the time.

The question of whether the US should or should or should not buy a particular weapons system primarily to keep people employed or to maintain a capability (ala SSN-23) is a separate question. Still...

Because there was a SH, there was a loss of quite a few jobs in the American economy at the time because 527 F-14Ds were not built/converted, the rewinging of the A-6 was canceled to pump the SH, the A/FX died, other programs didn't get funded or had it reduced, etc. Sorry, jobs really isn't a valid reason for the SH.

Prinz_Eugn wrote:

I seriously doubt ST21 would've come out cheaper, since they wanted to redo the electronics, change the airframe and structure, and make it fly by wire. And add thrust vectoring. It was really a pretty massive change that would've required a lot of development and testing.

The SH alternative that Grumman offered, the F-14D Quickstrike, was itself judged to have a higher total cost (due to life cycle costs rather than development costs) than the SH.

OK, I can address these as well.

On your first paragraph, it's not that ST21 would have cost less to buy than SH. It's that it would cost less to develop. The reason for this is pretty straightforward. ST21 was an evolution of the existing F-14D airframe and structure. It was not fully fly by wire, BTW, and thrust vectoring was not planned for ST21, it was not considered worth the cost (you're thinking of ASF-14, another project which even Grumman didn't think was worth it) . The initial electronics were also an evolution of the F-14D base, although certainly one could expect that over time there would be increases and changes, just like with any other aircraft, including SH. SH, OTH, was a brand new aircraft and so required a lot more development and testing. To illustrate, you could build ST21 on the same F-14 line and you could modify existing F-14Ds with sufficient airframe life into ST21s. I doubt if you could do the former and I know you couldn't do the latter with the Bug/Super Bug.

Quickstrike was indeed offered as an alternative to the SH for the interim a/c to hold the line until AX-A/FX could be fielded. Quickstrike, for the rest of the folks, is the same thing as the Block IV upgrade. If you accept the initial MDD estimates for the cost of SH development in the first year it was proposed, then the Quickstrike mod would cost ~ 1/22 of the original estimates for SH development; it was just upping the strike capability of the F-14. And this excludes the arguably applicable costs of extending Hornet C/D production to keep the production workforce "warm" pending start of SH production.

Regarding total overall cost, F-14D Block IV did cost more, but then you also got more capability. It cost more to operate, but nowhere near as much as was said. This was because one of the smoke and mirror tactics was to factor in F-14A operating costs to make Quickstrike's costs artificially high. This was bogus because all Block IVs were F-14Ds, so that was the only valid point of comparison. Remember also that both of these birds were to be interim aircraft.

In any case, it wasn't a case of higher total costs that killed it. It was that Cheney had already said there were to be no more F-14Ds, no matter what. For the Grumman proposal to come to fruition, that decision would have to be reversed and that kind of thing simply doesn't happen in the the power games in Washington.

aaam wrote:

Sorry, jobs really isn't a valid reason for the SH.

It matters if your political support comes from the states that depended on those jobs. You have to remember this was after a huge political swing back to the red from the blue. This was one impetus for new defense procurement rules, to spread the wealth of work around the country, to prevent abuses in the future. Unfortunately the waters are so polluted in this country that we find the same problems popping up yet again when the pendulum swung back to the blue.

madrat wrote:

aaam wrote:

Sorry, jobs really isn't a valid reason for the SH.

It matters if your political support comes from the states that depended on those jobs. You have to remember this was after a huge political swing back to the red from the blue. This was one impetus for new defense procurement rules, to spread the wealth of work around the country, to prevent abuses in the future. Unfortunately the waters are so polluted in this country that we find the same problems popping up yet again when the pendulum swung back to the blue.

One could opine that the powers that be might consider Missouri jobs more important that New York jobs (and leaving out all the other around the country jobs I mentioned or programs that consequently didn't come to fruition), but I don't think that's what was in play here.

It wasn't like there were two competitors and one was selected over the other. Although there were still -14Ds coming off the line, the program had already been terminated by DoD/Cheney, to the point that F-14As under conversion were to be abandoned on the line (this was later reversed under Congressional pressure). When the A-12 was canceled, not that long afterward it was simply announced that the SH would be developed for the interim period until AX (later A/FX) could be fielded. Grumman then proposed the F14 Block IV as a solution for the interim that could be developed for a lot less and sooner.

Like I said, though, I'm in the camp that felt that DoD would rather have MDD survive than Grumman due to its perceived greater range of capabilities (and to make sure the C-17 survived). MDD didn't have much else. AV-8 was not going to be developed that much more in the future. F-15 would not be allowed to go too much further lest it threaten ATF, so SH was it as far as a vehicle to keep MDD around.

aaam wrote:

OK, I can address these as well.

On your first paragraph, it's not that ST21 would have cost less to buy than SH. It's that it would cost less to develop. The reason for this is pretty straightforward. ST21 was an evolution of the existing F-14D airframe and structure. It was not fully fly by wire, BTW, and thrust vectoring was not planned for ST21, it was not considered worth the cost (you're thinking of ASF-14, another project which even Grumman didn't think was worth it) . The initial electronics were also an evolution of the F-14D base, although certainly one could expect that over time there would be increases and changes, just like with any other aircraft, including SH. SH, OTH, was a brand new aircraft and so required a lot more development and testing. To illustrate, you could build ST21 on the same F-14 line and you could modify existing F-14Ds with sufficient airframe life into ST21s. I doubt if you could do the former and I know you couldn't do the latter with the Bug/Super Bug.

Considering how much the F-14D rebuilds cost compared to the new ones (I believe the early conversions cost more than the new-builds) and the limited number of F-14D's, conversion cost is not a compelling argument. Going from A or B to ST21 would have been even more expensive.

Wasn't the ST21 going to have an AESA, or was that just discussed?

Quote:

Quickstrike was indeed offered as an alternative to the SH for the interim a/c to hold the line until AX-A/FX could be fielded. Quickstrike, for the rest of the folks, is the same thing as the Block IV upgrade. If you accept the initial MDD estimates for the cost of SH development in the first year it was proposed, then the Quickstrike mod would cost ~ 1/22 of the original estimates for SH development; it was just upping the strike capability of the F-14. And this excludes the arguably applicable costs of extending Hornet C/D production to keep the production workforce "warm" pending start of SH production.

Regarding total overall cost, F-14D Block IV did cost more, but then you also got more capability. It cost more to operate, but nowhere near as much as was said. This was because one of the smoke and mirror tactics was to factor in F-14A operating costs to make Quickstrike's costs artificially high. This was bogus because all Block IVs were F-14Ds, so that was the only valid point of comparison. Remember also that both of these birds were to be interim aircraft.

In any case, it wasn't a case of higher total costs that killed it. It was that Cheney had already said there were to be no more F-14Ds, no matter what. For the Grumman proposal to come to fruition, that decision would have to be reversed and that kind of thing simply doesn't happen in the the power games in Washington.

The only increased capability from the Quickstrike compared to the SH was range, and the SH can buddy tank to get its way around that. SH is more flexible and carries more payload. The SH has greater survivability (significantly lower RCS, even with weapons), newer architecture that made weapons integration easier, and newer electronics and interfaces in general. Upgrading the systems on the F-14 to be competitive would have just increased its cost further.

Considering that the SH is the paragon for cost effectiveness (half the price of other 4.5 generation aircraft), I have a hard time swallowing the argument that the F-14D+ or any further F-14 development would be justifiable. The F-14 could have been made more capable, sure, but it have been much more expensive on top of what it already was.

Last edited by aaam on Oct 18, 2011 - 10:19 PM; edited 1 time in total

Prinz_Eugn wrote:

aaam wrote:

OK, I can address these as well.

On your first paragraph, it's not that ST21 would have cost less to buy than SH. It's that it would cost less to develop. The reason for this is pretty straightforward. ST21 was an evolution of the existing F-14D airframe and structure. It was not fully fly by wire, BTW, and thrust vectoring was not planned for ST21, it was not considered worth the cost (you're thinking of ASF-14, another project which even Grumman didn't think was worth it) . The initial electronics were also an evolution of the F-14D base, although certainly one could expect that over time there would be increases and changes, just like with any other aircraft, including SH. SH, OTH, was a brand new aircraft and so required a lot more development and testing. To illustrate, you could build ST21 on the same F-14 line and you could modify existing F-14Ds with sufficient airframe life into ST21s. I doubt if you could do the former and I know you couldn't do the latter with the Bug/Super Bug.

Considering how much the F-14D rebuilds cost compared to the new ones (I believe the early conversions cost more than the new-builds) and the limited number of F-14D's, conversion cost is not a compelling argument. Going from A or B to ST21 would have been even more expensive.

Wasn't the ST21 going to have an AESA, or was that just discussed?

Quote:

Quickstrike was indeed offered as an alternative to the SH for the interim a/c to hold the line until AX-A/FX could be fielded. Quickstrike, for the rest of the folks, is the same thing as the Block IV upgrade. If you accept the initial MDD estimates for the cost of SH development in the first year it was proposed, then the Quickstrike mod would cost ~ 1/22 of the original estimates for SH development; it was just upping the strike capability of the F-14. And this excludes the arguably applicable costs of extending Hornet C/D production to keep the production workforce "warm" pending start of SH production.

Regarding total overall cost, F-14D Block IV did cost more, but then you also got more capability. It cost more to operate, but nowhere near as much as was said. This was because one of the smoke and mirror tactics was to factor in F-14A operating costs to make Quickstrike's costs artificially high. This was bogus because all Block IVs were F-14Ds, so that was the only valid point of comparison. Remember also that both of these birds were to be interim aircraft.

In any case, it wasn't a case of higher total costs that killed it. It was that Cheney had already said there were to be no more F-14Ds, no matter what. For the Grumman proposal to come to fruition, that decision would have to be reversed and that kind of thing simply doesn't happen in the the power games in Washington.

The only increased capability from the Quickstrike compared to the SH was range, and the SH can buddy tank to get its way around that. SH is more flexible and carries more payload. The SH has greater survivability (significantly lower RCS, even with weapons), newer architecture that made weapons integration easier, and newer electronics and interfaces in general. Upgrading the systems on the F-14 to be competitive would have just increased its cost further.

Considering that the SH is the paragon for cost effectiveness (half the price of other 4.5 generation aircraft), I have a hard time swallowing the argument that the F-14D+ or any further F-14 development would be justifiable. The F-14 could have been made more capable, sure, but it have been much more expensive on top of what it already was.

It is true that the first rebuilds cost way too much, but that was probably due to two factors. The first was that since there were so few of them there was no learning curve. The 2nd was that the rebuilds were done at & by the gov't. Regarding how few F-14Ds there were, well that was because Cheney stopped the program. That's kinda the point. As and Bs would not have been rebuilt into ST21s (remember, ST21 was not the alternative to SH, in fact it predates both Block IV and SH). F-14Ds with sufficient life could have been, if the Navy so chose.

AESA would have been an option had the Navy so chose, but don't forget we're talking late '80s here. AESA technology was still in its early stages then, and there were issues with power requirements, heat, range and look angle limitations (most AESAs just ended up accepting the latter, as it turned out) SH did not get an AESA for many years, remember. A PESA, similar to what Rafale did, was the initial proposal, with an AESA as a follow-on if the Navy wanted to spend the bucks once we knew how to build them right.

Be careful not to compare the F-14D of 1990-91 with the SH of 2010-11. You must compare the Quickstrike with what was promised for the initial SH. In addition to payload/range, it had a more powerful radar and fire control, ask the company that made both aircrafts' systems; more sensors; could use off-the-shelf a/g targeting systems instead of requiring new development; planned sensor fusion from the get go; greater air-to-air, etc.

The architecture of the D was a major change from that of the A/B. Flight International in its coverage of the plane punned that the "...D stands for Digital". The F-14D Block IV was equivalent to an enhanced version of the Strike Eagle of the time, but didn't have the latter's payload/range. MDD, who built both, never said the SH as initially specified would be able to match the F-15E's capabilities. Yes, they have done amazing things to the SH's sensors and computing but that kind of thing could have been done with the Tomcat over the same amount of time (including adding a buddy store). But if you're going to use them for comparison then you would have to add all of their costs to the cost of developing the SH (along with the extended C/D production), and there goes the paragon for cost effectiveness, assuming we ever can get a definitive accounting of just what was in the SH's development costs..

It is true that the E/F can stagger into the air with a higher ultimate bomb load and then bomb the end of its runway, but the real question is what it, or any a/c, does with the normal operational load. How does the SH compare with say, the Rafale?

Plus with F-14D Block IV, we probably would have gotten A/FX, and that's what we really needed. All part of the world of might have been...

IMHO,

And as much as I currently support the SH and it's growth potential...

But a typical CVN deployment today, going back 15 yrs and rethinking a strategic long-term approach... should consist of:

1 squadron F-14D follow-on build. (re-engined around 2002-2005 to common ST-21 engine)
1 squadron ST-21 (undergoing it's next increment upgrade)
2 squadron new-build, enhanced F/A-18C+ (post-99, under a should have been, continued production) with earlier builds being sold under FMS, or transferred to USMC to replace older hornets. These legacy hornets would be currently under-going an MLU consisting of mini-CFT integration and RACR-radar replacement.

Plans for transitioning into 5.5 gen + UCAV fleet starting in 2022 would be already well underway.

Cheers

If someone was really budget conscience then would it have made sense to operate the F-14D in the USAF as a interim solution for tactical strike while they were retiring F-111 airframes. Or was the F-15E really all that more cost effective?

Forum: Modern Military Aircraft

supertomcat instead of superhornet?