Forum: General F-22A Raptor forum

1st503rdsgt wrote:

wrightwing wrote:

The F-22 was never cheap enough for a 1:1 replacement of F-15Cs.

I didn't say it was as cheap as the F-15C, but the F-15C wasn't a high volume aircraft and it's stupid to say that we couldn't afford enough F-22 airframes to to finally retire the old warhorse. 300-400 wasn't too much to ask. On the other hand, effectively replacing the F-16 and the A-10 with a plane that costs almost as much as the F-22 is a very tall order indeed, and I don't think the USAF is going to follow through.

I agree that we should've gone with 381 F22s, but the F-35 will cost half or less, than what an F-22 costs. Full rate production F-35As should be in the ~$60m range. The B/C models will be $10-15m more.

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wrightwing wrote:

I agree that we should've gone with 381 F22s, but the F-35 will cost half or less, than what an F-22 costs. Full rate production F-35As should be in the ~$60m range. The B/C models will be $10-15m more.

Those figures are wishful thinking from 10 years ago. All the recent sources I've seen indicate that the cost has already gone well North of $100m and is still climbing.

Here's my Monday morning Two Cents

. The F-22 should have replaced the F-15C. The F-35A should have been slated to replace the F-15E sometime after 2020 (with priority given to the naval and STOVL variants). The left over F-15s of all types (along with some new F-15 airframes) could have replaced the the F-16 (seeing as the Eagle is such a bargain these days).

This would have left the USAF with a well balanced 4th/5th generation capability that wouldn't break the bank.

I'm sure someone has already posted this, but here it is anyways. Pay attention to the end.

By Adam J. Hebert, Executive Editor, Air Force Magazine

Gordon England, the Pentagon’s No. 2 official, has claimed that the F-22 is "designed for a specific mission" and 183 of them are "enough to do that mission," so USAF should buy no more. His words do not reflect the way the Air Force sees its requirements.

England’s comment was a non sequitur. The Air Force does not build a fighter inventory—whether F-22 or F-35—to any "specific mission." It seeks the number needed to maintain 10 rotational air and space expeditionary forces. That number, insists the Air Force, is not 183 Raptors. It is not 250 Raptors. It is not 400 Raptors. It is exactly 381 Raptors.

Where does the figure 381 come from? Is it justifiable?

In simplest terms, the force-sizing exercise begins with the squadron, the basic unit of organization and building block of an AEF. The Air Force has determined that each AEF requires at least one F-22 squadron for air superiority, interdiction in high threat areas, and so forth.

The standard squadron contains 24 combat-coded fighters. The F-22’s Operational Requirements Document validated that metric. The ORD was signed by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Do the math: 10 squadrons times 24 aircraft equals 240 fighters.

Does that mean that 240 F-22s are enough? No. Note that the requirement is for 240 combat-coded F-22s. In order to maintain that many fighters constantly in a combat-ready condition and able to deploy on a wartime mission, the Air Force needs more F-22s for other needs. The question is: How many?

The Air Force has analytic formulas for determining the answer. Here they are:

For training, 25 percent of the combat-coded force, or 60 more fighters.
For test purposes, five percent of the total of combat-coded and training aircraft, or 15 more fighters.
For backup inventory, 10 percent of the combat-coded, training, and test aircraft, or 32 more fighters.
For attrition reserve, 10 percent of everything above, or 34 more fighters.
Those four categories, taken together, generate an additional requirement for 141 F-22s. Add up those fighters and the combat-coded ones and you come to—voila—381 fighters.

The Air Force has stuck to that figure since 2002. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council, comprising the vice chiefs of staff of each service, validated the number in February 2004.

England’s view notwithstanding, this number is not derived from some specific mission, specific threat scenario, budget levels, or wishful thinking. It does, however, provide the Air Force with the fifth generation fighter in numbers sufficient to avoid the creation of yet another low-density, high-demand weapon system.

Indeed, the AEF system provides continuous capability for combatant commanders without breaking the force. The difficulties the Army experienced in recent years (and the Air Force in the 1990s) show what happens when a force is not properly structured for long-term deployments.

Now consider what happens when the Air Force is forced to buy substantially fewer numbers.

The table on this page compares USAF’s preferred program and the one DOD has actually approved. With a 183-aircraft inventory, the table shows, the Air Force can generate only 115 combat-coded F-22 fighters—less than half the required number.

That translates into only one-half a squadron of advanced fighters per AEF, much less than is needed.

To compensate, the Air Force has altered the traditional per-squadron aircraft numbers so as to increase the number of squadrons. It now considers the standard F-22 squadron to have 18 airplanes, not 24. Even so, the plan struggles to flesh out seven squadrons, and the smaller units have higher overhead costs with less flexibility and combat power.

Even the one-squadron-per AEF metric is a change. USAF has historically used roughly 1.5 squadrons of F-15s per AEF, but the F-22 is more capable and so, the thinking goes, the Air Force can get by with less in the way of numbers. As matters stand, the 381 F-22s would have to replace roughly 700 F-15s.

When it comes to the F-35 fighter, the situation is less mature and therefore much looser and subject to revision down the road. The Air Force requirement, at present, is for 1,763 F-35s. That number roughly equals today’s number of legacy fighters other than the F-15s.

The Air Force would use the F-35 to replace about 1,300 F-16s, 350 A-10s, and 50 F-117s. However, few believe the Air Force will be able to replace those aircraft on a one-for-one basis, as the 1,763 number implies.

The irony is plain. Though the F-35 requirement number is squishy, the Pentagon refuses to allow the Air Force to revise it downward, and, while the Air Force’s F-22 number is firm, the Pentagon will not allow the Air Force to pursue it.

Excellent summarization on all points, lb.

Many would concur - there was very poor long-term planning and policy making. And indeed, because of it, USAF's future force structure will likely see substantial, additional reductions by default, than would have otherwise been planned under any calculated force down-sizing/re-structuring.

And back to battleship...

thank you for your elaborate follow-up, I appreciate it. One comment that popped out in your post though I guess, was the claim that because there is not 'Cold-war' level funding today, the USAF cannot afford an adequately recapitalized Tacair force. Well, to the contrary, when considering FY12's Defense budget of roughly $550B (base budget), and given the steady base budget growth since 2001, there has arguably been PLENTY of budget available to afford an adequate USAF Tacair recapitalization plan.

I.e., it's about planning and decision making, as lb alludes. Certainly, a decision to build muscle and cut fat does require a definite plan, not pre-conceived notions. (my emphasis).

To think that in FY12, with $550B, USAF will only be able to procure 19 tactical combat jets - whether operational or pre-SDD complete - one has to wonder how many jets will be afforded then when the budget sees real reductions in the imminent future!

Thus, the calculus and strategic planning is the issue, as truly significant muscle can be built for such a budget. Even pre-2001 level budgets can sustain sufficient muscle build with a proper effort.

Quote:

. Two F-22's acting as mini AWAC's ahead of 20 F-16's (each armed with 4 AIM-120D's) could offer force multiplication capabilities for older fighters, making each F-16 worth almost as much as an F-35 in the air superiority role.

This is pure nonsense you keep repeating here. You clearly have no idea how air battle looks like. You think it’s simple and predictable. Like – we’ve detected enemy aircrafts ‘over there’ so we send 2 Raptors ahead followed by a dozen of F-16s, fire our missile and get out. That’s not that simple. Everything changes very quickly, you’re never sure what happens next. There is different terrain, weather and you never can detect everything in the battlefield. So, no, the F-16 will never be worth as much as the F-35 in the air superiority role.

350 front line F-22's would be good because the US could have substantial numbers in Europe,Japan/South Korea while maintaining significant F-22's in the US,and also start seriously reducing the F-15 fleet.Hell maybe even get a few F-16E's!!!
Guiness

And better still would be 381 Raptors, no F-16Es, and 1763 F-35As.

wrightwing wrote:

And better still would be 381 Raptors, no F-16Es, and 1763 F-35As.

That would be best, if they ever get the things to work. My patience with Lockheed is wearing thin.

1st503rdsgt wrote:

wrightwing wrote:

And better still would be 381 Raptors, no F-16Es, and 1763 F-35As.

That would be best, if they ever get the things to work. My patience with Lockheed is wearing thin.

I'd say LM is well beyond the point of trying to get the planes to work. They getting the program mature now.

Is a production run of 100 B-1s usefull? Or a couple dozen F-117s? How about a dozen or so ballistic missile cruisers?

The answer is that it depends on the mission. It's quite obvious that the -22 is a silver bullet force akin to the F-117 of the 1980s. In other words whereas the -117 was fielded for ground threats, the -22 is likewise to be fielded against aerial threats. We will have roughly 3x the number of F-22s as we had of the F-117s.

If we have 18 per squadron to deploy, say 20% down for maintenance, leaving 14 for ops. say those 14 run in flights of four at a time, two wing pairs. Place them in a manner that brackets the "kill zone" and run their racetrack pattern. Smaller enemy forces can allow the F-22s to act as FAWACS (Forward AWACS) and direct F-15/16/18/35 to attack, while if the "Holy Crud, the whole enemy Air Force just Launched!" scenario arises the two wing pairs can direct other AC while doing a pincer on the attack force and the other 10 raptors scramble. The first 4 have 24 AIM-120C between them. IIRC AMRAAM is 10 for 13 for a real world PK of 77% using legacy tactics. Assuming the Pk stays the same, that means the 18 most dangerous of the enemy threat aircraft are toast (from beyond the detection range of a radar or IR system).

I know this is simplified and assumes that a squadron has an AOR of a mere 250-300 mi, but it gives an example of how a small force of F-22 can still be effective. Dont get me wrong, I dont approve of 183 as a final count.

sewerrat wrote:

Is a production run of 100 B-1s usefull? Or a couple dozen F-117s? How about a dozen or so ballistic missile cruisers?

The answer is that it depends on the mission. It's quite obvious that the -22 is a silver bullet force akin to the F-117 of the 1980s. In other words whereas the -117 was fielded for ground threats, the -22 is likewise to be fielded against aerial threats. We will have roughly 3x the number of F-22s as we had of the F-117s.

That's brings up a question that I've been kicking around in my head lately. Does the majority of our TACAIR fleet really need to be stealth? Perhaps it would have been better to ditch the JSF and focus on developing the Raptor into a low volume platform that could handle the air-dominance and SEADs roles in the early stages of a conflict. That seems to be the direction China is going.

sewerrat wrote:

..It's quite obvious that the -22 is a silver bullet force akin to the F-117 of the 1980s. In other words whereas the -117 was fielded for ground threats, the -22 is likewise to be fielded against aerial threats..

Actually, that is becoming the perceived 'mission-creep' (regressive) interpretation of the F-22 today, by default. But it's NOT exactly the true definition of what the F-22 was designed or intended to solely be.

We can go back and look at what the F-22 was designed to be and intended to be in the official USAF Procurement budget estimates... it was clearly described as a multi-mission aircraft able to achieve air-superiority against emerging threats and to also penetrate denied air space. Simply, multi-mission is multi-mission... i.e. intended for future flexibility to meet particular high-end mission requirements as they may emerge.

So a bit more than silver-bullet... designed to be part F-117 replacement, part F-16CJ replacement, part elint and arguably capable to be part F-15E and F-111 replacement as well as more the obvious F-15A-D replacement.

In closing, yes, more than 187 was required and justified... But the bottom-line issue there was not in continued F-22 procurement being either 'useful or required' or not.

Simply, the raw budget realities would dictate the decisions. And since the operational (and said to be mature) F-22 was not coming in at well under the $100m unit Weapon system costs originally being Estimated and since there was simply not the necessary USAF Procurement budget being funded to do both, there could not commence an entirely separate, simultaneous 5th gen F-35 LRIP acquisition in addition to continued F-22 buys. Risks aside, the confidence and assumption in the F-35 would thus need to be re-doubled virtually over-night and be further pre-determined/pre-conceived to be the successful, affordable, on-schedule and now 'beefier' fighter, to cover the considerable void. imho.

Care to link to any pre-1990 (when the ATF was being designed) budget doc (or any other source) to back up that the F-22 was meant to be multi-mission?

Forum: General F-22A Raptor forum

Is 187 a Useful Number?