mixelflick wrote:I can't see how an air superiority fleet of just 325 jets (more than half of which are elderly) and only at best, at parity with the enemy is justified, vs. 1,700 or so strike fighters.
Consider the following factors:
(a) potential aggressor sortie rates
(b) the capability of 180 F-22s + x number of F-35s to affect aggressor attrition rates
(c) the A2G impact 3400 minus above fighters (don't forget the navy) on enemy air bases and the impact to those aggressor sortie rates.
One would then realise that the real constraints would be:
(d) How many and how fast fighters can be deployed to the fight
(e) the A2G impact of aggressor that actually get thru the F-22s, F-35s, F-16s, F-15s and F-18s on air bases.
Think about it. How many sorties would an aggressor aircraft be able to launch if there are always "only" 100 F-22s in between. 2... 3....max? That would be halved just by adding 100 F-35s. Then add in USMC F-35Bs that shoots and scoots which reduces any impact from (e). That's not even counting Allied airpower. People worried in 2003 when US used less than half the combat forces in Iraqi Freedom. No worries after that.
What's the aggressor doing about it, knowing that? In China's case, they try to develop asymmetric combat capabilities e.g. ASBMs to take out carriers. TBMs to take out air bases. Stealth fighter to take out tankers, AEW i.e. reduced and less effective sortie rates. Defence dollars then goes to missile defence, stealth detection and a PCA that may not need to rely on tankers. Smart!