F-35C Lands at Lakehurst For Testing

Actually, the F-35C buy is going exactly to schedule. As production is ramping up to 20+ per year over the next couple of years. This will allow the USN to replace two Squadrons per CVW per Year. Then by time that happens the Super Hornets currently undergoing SLEP will start to retire...



So, what's the issue???

"Actually, the F-35C buy is going exactly to schedule."

Exactly which schedule would that be? The Navy has moved F-35Cs to the right almost every year for the last 10 years (I havent seen the most recent outlook).

Production of the F-35C will increase to at least 24 per year from 2021 onward....Which, is enough for 2 Squadrons per year or one Air Wing (CVW). I would also add the US Congress has a Bad Habit of giving the services more than they request each year. So, don't be surprised if that number goes up.......

QUOTE:

US Navy wants more sailors, jets and an extra ship in 2019
By: David B. Larter
February 12, 2018

The Navy’s buying strategy for the F-35C picks up in 2020 with 16 slated for purchase and then 24 every year from 2021 through 2023 for a total of 97 in the FYDP.

https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal ... p-in-2019/

I agree. More broadly, the Navy has made numerous bureaucratic attempts to extract themselves from F-35 dating from the days of JAST. But, I think this article is an exercise in shaping that probably accompanies a storyline being used in and around the Beltway to justify separate NGAD/F/A-XX funding lines.

"Don't make us do another one of these (i.e. a Joint program) again..."

Future fighter: F-35 begins transition into US service

Jane’s Defence Weekly

QUOTE: "Despite the lack of urgency, and contrary to anecdotal reports that of all the US service arms the USN is the least keen to receive the F-35, the service is keenly anticipating the arrival of its future primary combat aircraft. As one senior navy official, speaking under the Chatham House Rule, put it, “The US Navy has never had a fifth-generation stealthy multirole fighter before – and there is much to be excited about.”

https://www.janes.com/images/assets/854 ... ervice.pdf


To be clear........

an·ec·do·tal


/ˌanəkˈdōdl/

adjective

adjective: anecdotal

(of an account) not necessarily true or reliable, because based on personal accounts rather than facts or research.


The Chatham House Rule reads as follows: When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.

QUOTE: "Despite the lack of urgency, and contrary to anecdotal reports ...

[i]To be clear........
an·ec·do·tal
/ˌanəkˈdōdl/
adjective: anecdotal
(of an account) not necessarily true or reliable, because based on personal accounts rather than facts or research.

For non primary English speakers, and with all due regard to Oxford and it's primary definition ...
to be clear in the specific usage.

The root of "anecdotal" is "little story." That is it's meaning, especially in the usage case of this story. A person told a story about the subject. There is no innate connection to "truth," "validity," or "reliability." Scientific research can be dead wrong if the methodology is flawed... such as poor sample, or implication of cause-effect to coincidence.

An anecdote can be a powerful indicator of truth, such as the credibility or known reliability of the story teller. In some instances, as in a witness seeking to communicate a point .. such as ... "the guy is a crook!", the anecdote may be one sample story of many by a witness where the "guy stole." In that case, while technically not evidence that he will steal, one should discard the validity of the anecdote at considerable risk.

Much as we should examine research evidence carefully, anecdotes bear examining, but beyond courts, and logical discussion, an anecdote is not simply, by nature, "unreliable," any more or less than research is, by nature.

MHO
FWIW,
BP

...
Much as we should examine research evidence carefully, anecdotes bear examining, but beyond courts, and logical discussion, an anecdote is not simply, by nature, "unreliable," any more or less than research is, by nature.

MHO
FWIW,
BP

I bring this up because I am not overly impressed by current practices of science and project management. These systems evolved to allow mediocre talent to replicate the accomplishments of genius. But still, I made good money, cleaning up systemic messes, using other than "proven methods backed up by research." I often used my granddaddy's "anecdote" to fix them.

To this subject, I see neither foot dragging, nor enthusiasm. That's a false narrative with no meaning nor applicability to the subject of the USN getting F-35Cs. There probably is some value in examining what the anecdotes are telling us, however.

MHO,
BP

Back to testing at sea for the F-35C mit SupaDupas:

Navy Builds Up to F-35C IOT&E...
30 Aug 2018 David Donald

"As a prelude to the official IOT&E (initial operational test and evaluation) for the U.S. Navy’s Lockheed Martin F-35C, the service has undertaken a pre-IOT&E trial called Operational Test-I (OT-I). A deployment of six F-35Cs joined Carrier Air Wing Seven (CVW-7) aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln for the type’s first operations as part of a regular air wing....

...The primary aim of OT-I was to assess how the F-35C interacted with the air wing and vessel to identify areas of potential concern and explore the individual characteristics of the F-35 as it is maneuvered around a busy deck. Operating alongside CVW-7’s remaining F/A-18 Super Hornets, E-2 Hawkeyes, and C-2 Greyhounds also gave the Navy a chance to see what the future air wing composition will look like.

Providing the aircraft for the OT-I deployment was the fleet replenishment squadron VFA-125 “Rough Raiders” and VFA-147 “Argonauts,” both from NAS Lemoore, California. VFA-147 is slated to become the first front-line F-35C unit, with an IOC (initial operational capability) scheduled for February 2019 and a first deployment aboard the USS Carl Vinson slated for 2021.

Formal IOT&E is expected to be conducted this fall, with Lincoln being used as it received the necessary modifications for F-35 operations during its RCOH, thus become the first carrier able to host the aircraft operationally. For IOC to be declared, the ability to operate and support a full squadron of 10 aircraft is required. At the same time, the F-35C must demonstrate that it meets operational requirements with its current Block 3F software load.

One F-35C bug that has yet to be fixed is the “green glow” phenomenon in the helmet-mounted LED display that first surfaced in 2012. This glow makes seeing the carrier’s lights difficult, leading to a Navy-imposed restriction that only pilots with experience of more than 50 recoveries can operate in darkness. The problem is especially critical during carrier operations, where pilots can encounter the darkest flying conditions when flying far away from urban light pollution on moonless nights.

Attempts to eradicate the problem with software have not been successful. However, the Navy is introducing an OLED (organic light emitting diode) modification that permits the display to be fully off when it's not required, eliminating the source of the glow. The OLED helmet display is expected to be fielded in early 2019...."

Photo: "F-35Cs undertake routine carrier operations aboard USS Abraham Lincoln alongside F/A-18E and F/A-18F Super Hornets. (photo: U.S. Navy)" https://www.ainonline.com/sites/default ... _f-35c.jpg

Source: https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news ... ilot-flies

Nice to see for true operations 2 fighters types really different since retirement of F-14 in 2006 and with MQ-25 good for Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)

Others pics here
https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.p ... ncoln.html

:lmao:

But an A+ for creativity...

Explain how the Super Hornet would have come about had the YF-17 never appeared. (This should be good.)

The LWF program, from which the Hornet was derived, was a USAF program and designed to USAF requirements. The F/A-18 program was not; no USAF requirements, no USAF SPO, no USAF dudes in PMA-265, etc. SH was derived (essentially pulled off the shelf at McDD) from ‘Hornet 2000’ that macair had created internally in the mid-80s — without an ounce of USAF requirements or inputs.

Only in the blogosphere would SH ever be called a ‘joint’ program. Ever.

“Anecdotes, like other forms of stories, are common and highly effective devices found throughout literature, film, television, theater, and even real life. Anecdotes make conversations or dialogue more personal and interesting. Usually, they are employed in a way that will make the audience and/or other characters laugh or think more deeply about a topic.”

...or —

“Anecdotes and humorous pieces are not only jokes, but exquisite literary devices as well. Their primary purpose is to stir up laughter, to disclose a truth in a general way, or to describe a feature of a character in such a way that it becomes humorous, and at the same time gives us a better understanding of the character.

Anecdotes may also serve as cautions. Writers tell their readers about the possibilities of future happenings, in case they do not follow particular processes and techniques.”

The LWF program, from which the Hornet was derived, was a USAF program and designed to USAF requirements. The F/A-18 program was not; no USAF requirements, no USAF SPO, no USAF dudes in PMA-265, etc. SH was derived (essentially pulled off the shelf at McDD) from ‘Hornet 2000’ that macair had created internally in the mid-80s — without an ounce of USAF requirements or inputs.

None of this is news. It doesn't change the fact that with no YF-17 to crib from there would have been no F/A-18 and no subsequent Super Hornet. And that's a fact.

Only in the blogosphere would it be said the Super Hornet would exist without the YF-17. Ever.

Couldn't have said it better myself.

The issue was about your belief that because the SH design can trace its lineage to an Air Force program, that somehow that makes it 'joint.' It was not, and it is not 'joint' and never was. And then faced with the reality, you intentionally misquote for the sake of being contrary.

If you want to persist in that fantasy, knock yourself out. That's one of the glories of the internet, isnt it?

The issue was about your belief that because the SH design can trace its lineage to an Air Force program, that somehow that makes it 'joint.' It was not, and it is not 'joint' and never was. And then faced with the reality, you intentionally misquote for the sake of being contrary.

If you want to persist in that fantasy, knock yourself out. That's one of the glories of the internet, isnt it?

Let. Me. Talk. Slower. For. You.

If the USAF had not had the LWF competition, for which the YF-17 was the loser, there...would...be...no...Super...Hornet. So while it might not have been officially a "joint" program, there would have never been a Super Hornet without the USAF flying the YF-17. This isn't rocket science. So my initial point, that the F-14 was the last USN aircraft, stands.

Let. Me. Talk. Slower. For. You..

Let's check that original post from quicksilver again:

Not sure how SH would qualify as a "joint" development...

Maybe you can talk to yourself in a mirror even slower so that you might notice that quicksilver was talking about the SH not being a JOINT development and that he couldn't care less about your "buht mom, its uh YF-17 derivuhtive" goalpost move.

Let. Me. Talk. Slower. For. You..

Let's check that original post from quicksilver again:

Not sure how SH would qualify as a "joint" development...

Maybe you can talk to yourself in a mirror even slower so that you might notice that quicksilver was talking about the SH not being a JOINT development and that he couldn't care less about your "buht mom, its uh YF-17 derivuhtive" goalpost move.

Never "moved any goal posts". But hey, if you want to pretend we'd have the Super Hornet without the YF-17 be my guest. Again, my original point stands: the F-14 was the last USN design. If you want to explain how we'd have gotten the Super Hornet without the YF-17 I'm all ears. (Apparently "quicksilver" isn't up to the task.) If the two of you are going to get wrapped around the axle over the world "joint" then consider it a point given. It doesn't change the facts. No USAF YF-17, no Super Hornet. The End.

Just to throw gas on the fire, the YF-17 was an evolutionary development of the F-5.

Just to throw gas on the fire, the YF-17 was an evolutionary development of the F-5.

Pretty much. I don't recall how much DNA there is between the F-5E and the P-530. There were a lot of different iterations along the way, including single-engine variants. IIRC the T-38 was N-156, and this one starts at N-300.

There is a pretty good map in this book:

https://www.amazon.com/American-Secret- ... 1857802640

Can't recommend it enough if you're into that kind of thing.

Also, there is this thread over at Secret Projects:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/ ... ml#msg2977

From another thread over there:

"After the YF-17 lost the LWF contract for the US Air Force to the F-16, Congress directed the US Navy to look at the contenders to provide a smaller fighter/bomber complimentary to the F-14 in the same way that the F-16 complimented the F-15. Northrop painted Navy markings on the second prototype YF-17 and displayed it widely. Navy pilots spend plenty of time away from handy diversion airfields that can be used in event of an engine failure, so were partial to the twin engines and the YF-17 was selected as the basis for the F-18. Northrop had no experience with carrier-based aircraft so they teamed with the St Louis-based McAir division of McDonnell Douglas. Northrop designed and built the center fuselage, aft fuselage and vertical tails, while McAir had primary design responsibility and worked the forward fuselage, LEX, the wing and horizontal tail surfaces. In addition Northrop retained the rights to sell a land-based variant to non-Navy overseas customers.

I joined the F-18 program in 1976 as detail design was beginning so I was not party to the design iterations as the F-17 evolved into the F-18. Later some aero issues arose and the slots in the LEX changed several times, eventually disappearing, as well as saw-tooth notches in the wing and horizontal tail which came and went. A careful examination of the various pictures and models shows most of these variations.

In 1977 our primary focus was the F-18L and most of the F-18A Configuration folks moved to a new office in Plant 111 that previously housed the Northrop 747 design effort. The program was managed by Ed Jacobs and Lee Begin with Haig Asdurian as Engineering manager. The primary goal of the F-18L was to eliminate as much as possible, the extra weight added in order to provide carrier capability. At the same time most of the F-18A systems and avionics were retained. Specifically the main landing gear was changed from the kneeling cantilevered design to an oleo strut similar to the YF-17; we were also able to smooth out the mold line under the MLG tire which had been bump.ed out when the tire size was increased after the mold lines had been frozen. The nose gear was also modified to remove the launch bar and the tail hook was lightened since land-based operations are less demanding. The wing fold was eliminated and an additional outboard pylon station was provided at WS 170 with a unique pylon. The net result was the elimination of about 2500# empty weight for a significant performance improvement over the F-18A.

Pretty intense marketing was undertaken to a variety of overseas customers and Canada. A key tool was the mockup; it was built full size and mounted on a sting so that it could be rolled and pitched. Visitors were brought in to a balcony at the second level with the main room dark and were given a briefing. At the end of the brief the lights came up and visitors found that they were in a huge room with the F-18L moving before them- an impressive sight. In spite of Northrop efforts, eventually it became clear that customers felt the performance benefits were out weighed by having an aircraft common with the US Navy and it’s support infrastructure. Early on in the course of sales efforts it was noticed that McAir had been marketing the F-18A in competition with Northrop and moreover had been promising parts of the Northrop sections of the aircraft as offsets for foreign countries to produce. Northrop felt this was in violation of the agreement and a protracted lawsuit ensued. The genealogy chart was prepared as a potential trial exhibit, but the matter was eventually settled out of court. I don’t think terms were released but in early 1982 Northrop agreed to a settlement and to stop marketing the F-18L; the center/aft fuselage and vertical tails continued to be made in El Segundo. The F-18L was shelved and Northrop since that time has supported MDD and later Boeing in F/A-18 marketing and the F/A-18E/F was, and still is a successful team effort. The F-18L design group was merged with the white world Advanced Design as the YF-23 Program began."