ALANG F-16 overruns runway in Oshkosh

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VPRFIXER

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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 03:17

Anyone find the AIB report that ACC put out on Tuesday????
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That_Engine_Guy

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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 03:23

[Airplanes are] near perfect, all they lack is the ability to forgive.
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VPRFIXER

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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 03:32

That_Engine_Guy wrote:http://www.airforce-magazine.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Reports/2012/February%202012/Day22/022112_ACC_%20F-16C_AIB.pdf

Happy reading! TEG


Thanks TEG. John
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uncleslashy

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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 07:29

Anybody else find any mention of the lack of full aft stick during the braking phase of the landing roll? I can certainly believe not using speedbrakes wouldn't greatly affect the landing distance, but I imagine full aft stick is pretty important in stopping distance. Maybe the jet would still have departed, but I found it strange the report didn't mention it.
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That_Engine_Guy

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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 11:52

uncleslashy wrote:Anybody else find any mention of the lack of full aft stick during the braking phase of the landing roll?

The report calls this "aerobreak", but yes it's mentioned.

As the MP began to set a pitch attitude for the aerobrake passing through 10-11 degrees, he lost sight of the HUD gun-cross and was unable to use the Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) indictor and AOA indexers for a visual reference (Tab V-1.5, V-1.12). CSFDR data indicates that the aerobrake varied between 5 and 11-degrees AOA during the rollout (Tab DD-26 – 28 ).

The MP momentarily read 140 knots on the MA airspeed indicator during the rollout and thought he had enough runway, but could not see any runway remaining markers (Tab V-1.12). The MP then applied main landing gear wheel brakes and the nose came down from the aerobrake (Tab V-1.15).

Furthermore, the fog causing him to lose his reference point for the desired angle of attack in order to perform a proper aerobrake. He stated that “I just obviously wasn't high enough” (Tab V-1.5--1.6). The fog caused the MP to lose track of his closure rate and ground speed, which ultimately led to an unsafe situation.

OPINION SUMMARY
I find by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was extreme fogging in the MA cockpit, caused by the MA ECS, that completely obscured the MP’s vision. I find by a preponderance of the evidence that substantially contributing factors were an inadequate aerobrake, a fast touchdown speed, and closed speedbrakes. The ECS had a significant impact on the MP’s execution of normal landing procedures, and the lack of visual cues precluded his ability to stop the aircraft in the available runway distance.


Important thing - nobody got hurt. No loss of pilot, nor airshow disaster.

:shrug: TEG
[Airplanes are] near perfect, all they lack is the ability to forgive.
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outlaw162

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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 18:41

Is any other F-16 driver here comfortable with touching down 30 knots fast?

With no arresting gear available, the hairs on the back of my neck would have been standing up with an impending touchdown 30 knots fast.

The juxtaposition and weighting of causal factors by the board is interesting in light of those which actually came first…and the care taken to point out that had the ECS not created ‘extreme fogging’, the aircraft could have been stopped with 1000’ remaining even given the excess speed at touchdown, as if that is somehow a normal option. (Close the gate; we’ll get the horses later.)

It begs for the board to have recommended establishing a new memory procedure in the interest of future safety:

“Unexpected Extreme ECS Fogging Following Touchdown At Excessive Speed”

or more generally,

“Unexpected Anything Following Touchdown At Excessive Speed”
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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 20:33

I have a tough time seeing this as an aircraft failure after reading the F-22 accident report found the pilot at fault. Maybe just me...
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uncleslashy

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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 22:53

Important thing - nobody got hurt. No loss of pilot, nor airshow disaster.

Absolutely right about that.

The report calls this "aerobreak", but yes it's mentioned.

I was actually talking about the Dash 1 procedure that occurs after the nosewheel is lowered. By selecting full aft stick after the nose is settled on the runway, a great deal more force is applied to the contact between tires and the runway and anti-skid braking is more effective. Seems strange that an AIB would leave this detail out.

Is any other F-16 driver here comfortable with touching down 30 knots fast?

Agreed. Also surprised that complacency wasn't mentioned.
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ygbsm

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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 22:59

outlaw162 wrote:Is any other F-16 driver here comfortable with touching down 30 knots fast?

With no arresting gear available, the hairs on the back of my neck would have been standing up with an impending touchdown 30 knots fast.

The juxtaposition and weighting of causal factors by the board is interesting in light of those which actually came first…and the care taken to point out that had the ECS not created ‘extreme fogging’, the aircraft could have been stopped with 1000’ remaining even given the excess speed at touchdown, as if that is somehow a normal option. (Close the gate; we’ll get the horses later.)

It begs for the board to have recommended establishing a new memory procedure in the interest of future safety:

“Unexpected Extreme ECS Fogging Following Touchdown At Excessive Speed”

or more generally,

“Unexpected Anything Following Touchdown At Excessive Speed”


Don't forget it was a guard jet. They are notorious for covering the facts with this kind of gobblygook. We all know what happened.

"Experienced" pilots who don't remember or retain the skills to handle the situations that present themselves in our hazardous vocation will win out with political persuasions and arm twisting.

In this case, no harm is done...if we are talking about lives. Unless this pilot, and those that follow him, get someone killed in the future.

My condolences to the maintainers who work so hard on such magnificent machines. Did you get this one airworthy again? I bet you did!
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deadseal

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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 23:13

It is a shame. Somehow the Pilot of an F-22 is at fault, and this guard colonel isn't? I swear the AF loses more integrity everyday. This guy had a shitty approach and everyone knows it. to back it up further there is a procedure called a descent check that blows out the fog anyway soooo.........He's responsible for that too.
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exfltsafety

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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 23:24

That_Engine_Guy wrote:
uncleslashy wrote:Anybody else find any mention of the lack of full aft stick during the braking phase of the landing roll?

The report calls this "aerobreak", but yes it's mentioned.

As the MP began to set a pitch attitude for the aerobrake passing through 10-11 degrees, he lost sight of the HUD gun-cross and was unable to use the Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) indictor and AOA indexers for a visual reference (Tab V-1.5, V-1.12). CSFDR data indicates that the aerobrake varied between 5 and 11-degrees AOA during the rollout (Tab DD-26 – 28 ).

The MP momentarily read 140 knots on the MA airspeed indicator during the rollout and thought he had enough runway, but could not see any runway remaining markers (Tab V-1.12). The MP then applied main landing gear wheel brakes and the nose came down from the aerobrake (Tab V-1.15).

Furthermore, the fog causing him to lose his reference point for the desired angle of attack in order to perform a proper aerobrake. He stated that “I just obviously wasn't high enough” (Tab V-1.5--1.6). The fog caused the MP to lose track of his closure rate and ground speed, which ultimately led to an unsafe situation.

OPINION SUMMARY
I find by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was extreme fogging in the MA cockpit, caused by the MA ECS, that completely obscured the MP’s vision. I find by a preponderance of the evidence that substantially contributing factors were an inadequate aerobrake, a fast touchdown speed, and closed speedbrakes. The ECS had a significant impact on the MP’s execution of normal landing procedures, and the lack of visual cues precluded his ability to stop the aircraft in the available runway distance.


Important thing - nobody got hurt. No loss of pilot, nor airshow disaster.

:shrug: TEG


I also found the lack of discussion about full aft stick during braking interesting. You'd have to get the full AIB report and look at the CSFDR data to see if full aft stick was used. Full aft stick is an important part of "max effort braking". The "aerobrake" discussed in the report seems to focus on the aircraft's pitch attitude before the nose came down.

AIB reports that get released to the public are not the safety investigation board reports that are used to recommend actions to prevent recurrence. I also found it interesting that both this AIB report and the F-22 AIB report stated just one "cause". Mishaps generally result from a chain of events, more than one of which would be considered a "cause". Safety investigation reports list a chronological order of events (findings) and some of the findings are causes. The AFI that governs the AIB report says the released statement of opinion needs to list the cause(s). But the (s) part of that seems to get pushed into what the AIB world calls substantially contributing factors.
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Unread post23 Feb 2012, 23:55

Ztex wrote:Looks to me like the engine fire may have been caused by the injection of a large amount of mud?

http://www.wpix.com/news/nationworld/wi ... otogallery


Looking at the photos....I don't see any condensation on the canopy?? :?

hmmm.....
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Unread post24 Feb 2012, 05:06

Don't get to read the SIBs anymore, so hopefully they were a bit more forthcoming. The AIB is generally a throwaway unless there's something to pursue legally - doesn't happen too often.

If your not comfortable (30 knots fast) and can't see - whataya gonna do? The best path would be go around. Comma, there's a crowd watching. Sometimes you make less than optimal decisions based on ego rather than judgement. Been there and more by luck than anything else didn't end up under a microscope. I'll leave it to others to beat this horse. Lord knows ain't anyone going to be more critical of this than the MP himself.
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Unread post24 Feb 2012, 06:39

ygbsm -

One helluva clarification and interesting insight there... Regardless, thanks for your service, the service of the maintainers, and yes... the service of the still vital 'experienced' pilots whom have all played their respective parts along in the force over the decades. Respects.
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Unread post24 Feb 2012, 07:46

TJSmitty wrote:Looking at the photos....I don't see any condensation on the canopy?? :?
Fog prolly dissipated after the canopy came up. Had a look at a couple of YouTube vids of the rollout and couldn't tell for sure if there was excessive canopy fogging. Too far away.
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