Threat Data Biggest Worry F-35A’s IOC; It ‘Will Be On Time'

[spazsinbad]

Best to read this in toto tonto:

Threat Data Biggest Worry For F-35A’s IOC; But It ‘Will Be On Time’
11 Mar 2015 Colin Clark

"PENTAGON: The F-35‘s highly sensitive sensors suffer a basic problem right now: They often aren’t sure what they are detecting. That results in a high rate of false alarms. The key to fixing this lies in building highly complex data files — what we can colloquially call the threat library — and integrating them with the Joint Strike Fighter‘s software.

“I think the probably the biggest concern is with these mission data files [threat library],” Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian told me in his first interview since being named at the end of January to coordinate procurement and integration of the F-35A into the Air Force. “With any detection systems, it’s always a chore to work through what the sensor is actually seeing.”

Creating those threat files is complex enough. The data on missile launches, frequencies, opponents’ weapons and their sensors come from the Intelligence Community (IC). The Office of Secretary of Defense’s Intelligence Mission Data Center gathers the data from across the IC. A lab at Nellis Air Force Base turns that information into threat data for the Air Force’s weapons.

The Air Force civilian who handles F-35A integration, Thomas Lawhead, said the missile warning data fusion for the F-35 “is still a little too sensitive.” An Air Force officer involved with the building of the threat library told me recently that most of it is still being built and much of the combination of the plane’s fusion software and threat information won’t be ready until close to Air Force IOC.

But Harrigian several times told me calmly variations on this: “I’m very confident we are going to get to IOC on time.”...

...On top of the challenges of assimilating and integrating the threat library data, Herrigian says they are looking hard at how to get the huge quantities of data collected by the F-35 from the plane to ground forces and ships. “As we look long at this airplane and look at the capability of the airplane to bring in all this information, how do we get it off the airplane to support the joint warfighter? We’ve talked about it, but this will take some thinking and working with the joint team to figure out how to do it appropriately.”..."

Source: http://breakingdefense.com/2015/03/thre ... e-on-time/

[bring_it_on]

Software Patch Being Tested For F-35 Multiship Attack

Aerospace Daily & Defense Report Mar 16, 2015, p. 4, Amy Butler, Guy Norris

EDWARDS AFB, California – Engineers here at Edwards AFB have begun flying a software patch on two test jets to explore the effectiveness of upgrades designed to improve the “fusion” of the threat picture among multi-aircraft F-35 formations.
So-called fusion is a hallmark selling point for the stealthy, single-engine F-35. Prime contractor Lockheed Martin and officials from the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) claim that data collected through the aircraft’s electro-optical targeting system, radio-frequency electronic warfare system and advanced electronically scanned array radar will be blended for the pilot in a single display by onboard software an in unprecedented manner. The result is expected to be a reduced pilot workload and improved awareness of the battlespace, including threats as well as objects that should not be targeted.

Adding to the capability is that the jets are designed to work in a network, sharing the same threat picture among pilots in ship formations through use of the new Multifunction Advanced Datalink (MADL). This link is designed to transmit data covertly to allow for use in protected air space; Link 16, the current data-sharing standard, by contrast, is a broadcast and does not function stealthily. The result should be to allow multiship formations to more quickly and effectively distribute the workload during missions and more wisely use the limited munitions onboard the aircraft to attack targets.

Data fusion would seem to be simple, as the use of mobile phones with fused data applications is widespread. However, for the F-35, the data must be extremely precise – the system cannot confuse a school bus for a mobile missile erector, for example. The threat data relies on thousands of mission data files that cue the F-35’s software, indicating what objects are (a surface-to-air missile site, enemy radar, enemy vehicle, etc.).

Doing so on a single jet is a challenge in and of itself, but creating a single, fused picture based on data collected by four jets in different locations with varying views of the battlespace is another challenge altogether. But this is the latest of many unprecedented tasks being tackled by the F-35 team.

Late last year, Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, the F-35 program executive officer, said the latest software challenge was to create an accurate “fused” picture across multiship formations. This latest software patch – referred to by testers as the “engineering test build” or ETB – is not a full software release. It is akin to an update one might implement on a mobile phone and it is geared specifically to address multiship fusion shortcomings. But, it was decided among the test team and JPO to move forward with it in parallel with work to certify the 2B software with which the U.S. Marines plan to declare F-35B initial operational capability (IOC) in July.

“We think before we release this to the Marines there need to be some improvements,” said Air Force Col. Roderick Cregier, F-35 program director at Edwards.

The Marine Corps has said it will proceed with the IOC this summer with or without these improvements. But JPO officials hope to have them on those early jets before the milestone, JPO spokesman Joe Dellavedova says.

The ETB altered about 900 lines of code specifically to ensure that each pilot in a multiship formation sees the exact same threat picture as his wingmen, the testers say.

Originally, the program called for fielding the jet with its more robust 3F software. With 3F, pilots can make use of external weapons stores, the infrared search-and-track function of the Electro-Optical Targeting System and a wider variety of weapons. However, obstacles earlier in development prompted the Pentagon to prioritize the B version – optimized for Marine Corps short takeoff and vertical landing – and allow for IOC with this baseline software.

“Block 2 was never intended to be fielded software. So, the fact that we can get to a point where we have these discussions of how usable this aircraft is in an operational environment right now is a success,” says Lt. Col. Andrew Allen, director of the integrated F-35 test force at Edwards. “If the Marines are going to use it right now … in our expert opinion [we need to know] what needs to be addressed. ... We want to do better than this. We think we can. We still have time to do it, so let’s go do extra stuff.”

The team created the software patch in about 22 days from when the decision was made to proceed, which was in February. Test sorties are planned through the end of March.

The patch was loaded onto two test aircraft, which conducted their first flights with it on March 12. The teams also plan to load it onto a third and possibly fourth F-35. The requirement to determine mission effectiveness is for three aircraft to have the mod, but a fourth could add more data to the final determination, Allen says.

“Fusion development is an extremely iterative process. It almost crippled the F-22 program. Now you are taking multiple, federated sensors and trying to integrate them,” he says. Allen also participated in the F-22 program.

“What we have done in the program up to this point has been full software releases. There have been no quick [patches]. …What we are getting for the first time ever is a little bit more agile. It is a patch [and] if it is good we will roll it into the next software release,” Cregier said.

As they continue testing, engineers are assessing just how much of which type of data should be transmitted among the aircraft to create the threat picture. “Inviting other aircraft into your fusion system … that is an extremely difficult thing [and] you have to find that sweet spot of how much data do you let in” to the network, Allen said.

If needed, the schedule could allow for an additional ETB patch or two, he added.

[spazsinbad]

ADD ON Paragraphs now available to above story from here as seen on F-16.net GollyGoshGoldarnit Probably BEST to read it all again at the jump eh. Wonderful World of Internet Journos ReCycles Everything. SLDinfo is very trendy in this regard.

Software Patch Tested For F-35 Data Fusion
Software patch designed to fix snag in ship-to-ship F-35 data ‘fusion’
20 Mar 2015 Amy Butler & Guy Norris Aviation Week & Space Technology

"...Meanwhile, the team is also conducting early testing on Block 3F software. Thus far, they have begun conducting asymmetric load tests on AF-1. External weapons carriage is a feature added with Block 3F, with which the Navy will conduct IOC by February 2019; it is unavailable for Blocks 2B and 3i for the Marine Corps and Air Force IOCs.

The conversion to 3F from 3i takes about a week, according to David -Nelson, a Lockheed Martin test pilot.

Thus the test fleet is working with the 2B, 3i and 3F software packages at varying levels. This is possible, in part, because of the infusion of five mission systems aircraft—some pulled or on loan from other locations and missions. These were added when the program was restructured in 2011 to mitigate risk in the software work delaying fielding. Originally, the team planned for a single mission systems jet.

Earlier in the program, officials assumed the bulk of mission system testing would take place in ground-based laboratories or in the Combined Avionics Testbed, a flying Boeing 737 modified with an F-35 radar, sensors and leading edges, Cregier says.

Thus far, the F-35 is about 60% through development, which is slated to finish in 2017."

Source: http://aviationweek.com/defense/softwar ... ata-fusion

"COMMENT: 'CharleyA' on Mar 19, 2015

"When you think about it, each F-35 has a slightly different view of a target, and probably derives a slightly different fix for it - akin to parallax error - and might even ID it as a different type of target. Depending on what data is actually transmitted over a datalink, it's easy to see how multiple symbols might be displayed for the same target. How the software will resolve the conflict between each aircraft's opinion about the target type and position and push it out to all the participants - by altering only 900 lines of code is interesting."

[popcorn]

Putting the money where your mouth is... "It will be on time".

http://pensacolatoday.com/2015/04/eglin ... f-35-labs/

Elgin Getting 2 New F-35 Labs

EGLIN’S $300 MILLION REPROGRAMMING LAB PROVIDES THE F-35 WITH MISSION DATA TO GIVE IT COMBAT SMARTS, AND NOW TWO MORE MULTIMILLION-DOLLAR LABS WILL BE BUILT AT THE BASE TO CUSTOMIZE DATA FOR F-35 PARTNER NATIONS

When the United States Reprogramming Laboratory was established here nearly five years ago, the then-squadron commander made it clear why the lab was important to the F-35.
“Without mission data, the F-35 is a very pretty, and some would say very loud, aircraft,” said Air Force Lt. Col. Tim Welde, 513th Electronic Warfare Squadron (EWS) commander. “With mission data, the F-35 is pure lethality...

The F-35s will go into battle packed with more data than other fighters.

“If you take two other Air Force platforms, the F-22 and the F-15, our mission data loads that we’re building are, in rough terms, about twice as big as that of an F-22 and about 10 times as big as that of an F-15,” said Perez.

All that information leads to the most distinct feature of the F-35: data fusion. Massive amounts of information from an array of sensors and mission data files are fused and provided to the pilot as clear, integrated, actionable information. It’s presented within a cyborg-like, custom-fitted helmet that’s the epitome of what the F-35 is all about. It’s where the intelligence of man and machine comes together

[spazsinbad]

Putting the fight in the F-35
April 2015 David Tortorano

"When the United States Reprogramming Laboratory was established here nearly five years ago, the then-squadron commander made it clear why the lab was important to the F-35.

“Without mission data, the F-35 is a very pretty, and some would say very loud, aircraft,” said Air Force Lt. Col. Tim Welde, 513th Electronic Warfare Squadron (EWS) commander. “With mission data, the F-35 is pure lethality.”1

Call it the brains behind the brawn.

Now, Eglin is scheduled to get two more of the multimillion-dollar labs beginning this year, both catering to the needs of U.S. allies....

...[The F-35 is] designed with jaw-dropping capabilities requiring more than 8 million lines of coding. For comparison, a million lines of coding is roughly 18,000 pages.

Indeed, computer coding underpins all the F-35 capabilities. It enables flight controls; radar functionality; communications, navigation and identification; electronic attack; sensor fusion; and weapons deployment. As of January 2015, more than 89 percent of the required F-35 software was flying. About 99 percent of required software had been coded, leaving 90,000 lines to be written, according to Lockheed.

What gives the F-35 battle smarts are the mission data files being created by Eglin’s electronic warfare experts.

“The mission data is solely produced by the government,” said Lt. Col. David Perez, commander of the 513th EWS. “Our lab here is entirely a government-owned-and- operated lab producing these files.”

Traditional electronic warfare reprogramming focused on defensive systems. But in the F-35, data is required for offensive capabilities, as well.

The data packages -- the Air Force is working on 12 data files for 12 geographic regions2 -- hold terrain and enemy threat information, including enemy radar, surface-to-air missiles and fighters, along with data on friendly forces, non- belligerents and commercial aircraft -- all that the pilots need for battle space awareness.

The F-35 is “capable of detecting any entity that’s in the airspace it’s operating, whether it be a threat, what we call a red system, a good guy, what we call a blue system, or neutral folks that we sometimes call gray systems, and also all the commercial systems, which we refer to as white,” said Perez.

The F-35s will go into battle packed with more data than other fighters....

...The Pentagon had to do something to relieve the heavy workload of the Eglin lab. But there was another problem to address. It was the issue of access to source codes. The Pentagon has had a policy of never sharing source codes for any U.S. weapons system. But the F-35 is being developed by the United States, the primary funder, and partner nations who have spent millions. They wanted access to source codes to be able to modify data packages to suit their needs.

In October 2014, Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan, executive director of the JSF Program Office, said a compromise was reached that would ease the Eglin lab workload and at the same time provide reprogramming labs for partner nations.3

As a result of that compromise, there are now two mission data reprogramming centers: Reprogramming Center – East (RC-East) at Eglin, and Reprogramming Center – West (RC-West) at Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Calif.

RC-West consists of the F-35 Reprogramming Laboratory (FRL), and its customers are Japan and Israel. Other nations will join that lab in the future.

RC-East, run by the 53rd Electronic Warfare Group (EWG), right now consists of the USRL run by the 513th EWS. In the near future, two more labs will be part of RC- East. In mid-2015, ground will be broken for the Australia, Canada, United Kingdom Reprogramming Lab (ACURL). Then in mid-2016, there will be a groundbreaking for the Norway, Italy Reprogramming Lab (NIRL). The labs will permit them to customize mission data that will be loaded on their planes.

“They will be manned by a combination of foreign nationals from each of those countries, as well as by U.S. government personnel and U.S. contractors,” said Perez.

Source: http://www.gulfcoastaerospacecorridor.c ... MMING.html

[smsgtmac]

“Without mission data, the F-35 is a very pretty, and some would say very loud, aircraft,” said Air Force Lt. Col. Tim Welde, 513th Electronic Warfare Squadron (EWS) commander. “With mission data, the F-35 is pure lethality.”

And as we used to say in MMS, "Without us you'd be just another unscheduled airline" (IYAAYAS!). This kind of chest thumping is reminiscent of the old joke about the brain, heart, and a**hole arguing over who was the most important bodypart .

The data packages -- the Air Force is working on 12 data files for 12 geographic regions -- hold terrain and enemy threat information, including enemy radar, surface-to-air missiles and fighters, along with data on friendly forces, non- belligerents and commercial aircraft -- all that the pilots need for battle space awareness.

But there was another problem to address. It was the issue of access to source codes. The Pentagon has had a policy of never sharing source codes for any U.S. weapons system. But the F-35 is being developed by the United States, the primary funder, and partner nations who have spent millions. They wanted access to source codes to be able to modify data packages to suit their needs.

In October 2014, Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan, executive director of the JSF Program Office, said a compromise was reached that would ease the Eglin lab workload and at the same time provide reprogramming labs for partner nations....

.... The labs will permit them to customize mission data that will be loaded on their planes.

Ah, memories!
This whole "source code" thing became an issue, first with the UK, because Eurofighter advocates were throwing anything against the wall trying to derail the F-35 for the Brits. You had people who had NO IDEA how the F-35 S/W architecture was structured crying 'source code!', when all along if any partner wanted to do something different they could build their own source code at home and bring their 'app' to the reprogramming laboratory for integration into the software build for their jets. Early in the program everybody gave their head nod to this approach, because the costs involved to set up nine or more individual country labs was HUGE. After all the nationalist 'sovereignty' types started yammerin', this approach became an unacceptable option: the Nationalists actually had their respective publics believing their countries would have NO control over the software. This was about the same time we had the usual suspects claiming that partner jets weren't going to be as 'stealthy' as US jets and demanding proof otherwise.

So yeah, this is a 'compromise': between the rejected unaffordable option on one hand and the politically unacceptable on the other. Just another reason why weapons cost so much.

BTW: This AVIONICS magazine special edition is still one of the better one-stop shops for the nuts and bolts of F-35 S/W structure and security in the public domain. Basic but informative.

MILS-Archiecture.jpg (69.66 KiB) Viewed 39729 times

[blindpilot]

Software Patch Being Tested For F-35 Multiship Attack

Aerospace Daily & Defense Report Mar 16, 2015, p. 4, Amy Butler, Guy Norris

EDWARDS AFB, California – Engineers here at Edwards AFB have begun flying a software patch on two test jets to explore the effectiveness of upgrades designed to improve the “fusion” of the threat picture among multi-aircraft F-35 formations.
....
Data fusion would seem to be simple, as the use of mobile phones with fused data applications is widespread. However, for the F-35, the data must be extremely precise – the system cannot confuse a school bus for a mobile missile erector, for example. The threat data relies on thousands of mission data files that cue the F-35’s software, indicating what objects are (a surface-to-air missile site, enemy radar, enemy vehicle, etc.).
...

<cutesy humor on>

Look this isn't hard. Just program everything to be a "magma displacement", and then change whatever items you can get done before IOC as you pick them off one by one,,, Even Jonesy can tell you that. Piece of cake

"When I asked the computer to identify it, what I got was magma displacement.
"You see, sir, the SAPS software was originally written to look for seismic events.
"I think when it gets confused, it kind of runs home to Mama."
Dallas Sonar Jonesy, Red October

<cutesy off>



BP

[spazsinbad]

MORON the software labs that are country specific - powered by FUD. I seen Canuckians are not mentioned in the UK/Oz lab formerly called the Australia–Canada–United Kingdom Reprogramming Laboratory (ACURL) which was mooted at least a few years ago now with some 'updates' on progress since - all news apparently to BS and no one answers his queries.

First ACURL mention Oct 2012: viewtopic.php?f=22&t=20531&p=233903&hilit=ACURL#p233903
&
viewtopic.php?f=58&t=20532&p=233904&hilit=ACURL#p233904

April 2014 CAN was still in: viewtopic.php?f=58&t=20532&p=270464&hilit=ACURL#p270464

Some USNI FUD Nov 2014 here: viewtopic.php?f=58&t=26576&p=281129&hilit=ACURL#p281129

A UK Mission Sim Facility Nov 2014: viewtopic.php?f=61&t=26676&p=281899&hilit=ACURL#p281899

Contract for ACURL stuff Apr 2015: viewtopic.php?f=58&t=20532&p=289512&hilit=ACURL#p289512

ACURL & Missions Explanations: viewtopic.php?f=62&t=27067&p=289515&hilit=ACURL#p289515

GRAPHIC: http://media.defenceindustrydaily.com/i ... ter_lg.gif

F-35 Customers Funding U.S.-Based Software Update Labs
16 Oct 2015 Bill Sweetman

"Foreign air forces using the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are being compelled [wot a banker - these countries want to do this] to build and fund $150 million software laboratories, based in the U.S. and almost 50% staffed by U.S. personnel, that generate data crucial to the fighter’s ability to identify new radio-frequency threats....

...It’s not clear who, ultimately, would control the use of the foreign-funded laboratories, which will depend on host U.S. bases for power, communications and access. Lockheed Martin referred all questions on this topic to the JSF program office (JSFPO), which did not respond to repeated requests for comment...."

Source: http://aviationweek.com/defense/f-35-cu ... pdate-labs

[bring_it_on]

Foreign air forces using the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are being compelled to build and fund $150 million software laboratories, based in the U.S. and almost 50% staffed by U.S. personnel, that generate data crucial to the fighter’s ability to identify new radio-frequency threats.

This regime is more stringent and far-reaching than earlier U.S. fighter export deals. Those usually withheld key software — known as source code — from the customer, but in most cases allowed local users to manage their own “threat libraries,” data that allowed the electronic warfare (EW) system to identify radio-frequency threats, with in-country, locally staffed facilities.

For the U.K. in particular, the reliance on U.S.-located laboratories looks like a pullback from its earlier position. In 2006, concern over access to JSF technology reached the national leadership level, and prompted a declaration, by U.S. President George W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, that “both governments agree that the U.K. will have the ability to successfully operate, upgrade, employ, and maintain the JSF such that the U.K. retains operational sovereignty over the aircraft.”

That promise seemingly contrasts with the severe limits now being imposed on non-U.S. access to the system.

Concerns about the lack of sovereignty and access to the core system — since customer laboratory personnel will not be co-located with operating units — are being voiced. A retired senior officer with the Royal Air Force comments that “the non-U.S. operators are going to have to take a very great deal on trust. Further, ‘rubbish in – rubbish out’ is still going to hold sway and I doubt that the non-U.S. customers will be able to check what is going in.” Security arrangements “seem to go a lot further and deeper” than on earlier platforms, he says.

Another source close to the U.K. user community notes that Lockheed Martin has advertised the capability of the “fusion engine” — the software that combines inputs from different sensors and datalinks — to identify targets and implement rules of engagement automatically. But if the logic of the fusion engine itself is not understood at the U.K.’s operational level, he says, “You can imagine that this slaughters our legal stance on a clear, unambiguous and sovereign kill chain.”

The restrictions are also likely to be cumbersome. By contrast, “Swedish air force Gripens are often updated between sorties,” a Saab spokesman says. Signals intercepted and recorded by the fighter’s EW system on one sortie can be analyzed and the system updated in hours.

It’s not clear who, ultimately, would control the use of the foreign-funded laboratories, which will depend on host U.S. bases for power, communications and access. Lockheed Martin referred all questions on this topic to the JSF program office (JSFPO), which did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

But even the current security regime is the result of a compromise by the U.S. In September 2014, JSFPO director Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan indicated that the foreign-owned laboratories would allow the operators more access to the system than they would otherwise have enjoyed. This suggests that the initial U.S. position was that foreign nationals would not be involved with reprogramming at all.

The JSFPO will not be the final U.S. authority on security measures. That is the Low Observables/Counter Low Observables Executive Committee (LO/CLO ExCom), the third and highest level of a special process of reviewing stealth technology transfers, managed by the Defense Technology Security Administration. Of about 700 requests for the export of stealth-related technology each year, only around 30 require the attention of the ExCom, with the rest approved or rejected at lower levels.

The mission data files (MDFs) generated in the U.S. labs are sensitive because they are essential to the aircraft’s stealth characteristics. They include information that allows onboard software to build a so-called “blue line” flightpath that avoids exposing its less-stealthy viewing angles to hostile radar. This process is based on a highly detailed model of the aircraft’s radar cross-section against all known threats and at all aspect angles, so any compromise of that data would be potentially catastrophic.

The MDFs also include target models that the sensor system uses to fuse radar, passive electronic and electro-optical signals into a single set of target tracks. “Reprogramming used to be about survivability,” says RAF Air Commodore Linc Taylor, assistant Chief of Staff of Capability Delivery for Combat Air and Air ISTAR, “Now it’s about survivability and effectiveness.”

The MDFs are twice as large as the equivalent data load in the F-22, the Air Force has said. There are 12 packages covering different regions.

The Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation, Michael Gilmore, has stressed the importance of the MDF process to the F-35’s capability and warned of delays. “Mission data load development and testing is a critical path to combat capability for Block 2B and Block 3F,” Gilmore said in his fiscal 2014 report. “Accuracy of threat identification and location depend on how well the mission data loads are optimized to perform in ambiguous operational environments.” Software and hardware used to create the MDFs was held by Lockheed Martin at Fort Worth for three years after its planned delivery to the first government reprogramming laboratory, delaying its delivery, DOT&E says.

The JSF program is standing up two centers to produce and update MDFs, at Eglin AFB, Florida, and NAS Point Mugu, California. The western center will host a lab to support Japanese and Israeli F-35s. An Australia/U.K. facility and a laboratory to support Norway and Italy will be established at Eglin. Lockheed Martin was awarded a contract to build the Australia/U.K. facility in April. According to an Australian government document, the lab will have a staff of about 110 people, of whom 50 will be U.S. nationals, and the international partners will cover all its operating costs.

Until now, even the most advanced EW systems exported by the U.S. have included provisions for local updating. The United Arab Emirates uses a system of “object codes,” a form of middleware that allows its operators to program threats into the Northrop Grumman EW system on the F-16 Block 60. South Korea has an in-country reprogramming tool for the F-15K’s ALQ-135M that allows its air force to create, modify and maintain mission data and to produce mission data files, according to Northrop Grumman.

[spazsinbad]

12 page PDF attached which shows the references referenced above - just because it is handy - however the PDF is not the only reference to reprogramming lab issues - this PDF is about ACURL mostly from 2009 until today.

[tritonprime]

Bill's at it again...

"U.S. Will Keep Locks On JSF Software Updates"
F-35 export buyers must pay for U.S.-controlled software labs
Oct 23, 2015 Bill Sweetman | Aviation Week & Space Technology

Source:
http://aviationweek.com/defense/us-will ... re-updates

Foreign air forces using the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are being compelled to fund $150 million software laboratories, based in the U.S. and almost 50% staffed by U.S. personnel, that generate data crucial to the fighter’s ability to identify new radio-frequency threats. This regime is more stringent and far-reaching than earlier U.S. fighter export deals. Those usually withheld the software’s source code from the customer, but in most cases allowed local users ...

[spazsinbad]

Did you look at the posts immediately above? What are they about? What is your post about? An almost identical first paragraph one week later and that is it? Puhleez. I object to the use of the word 'compelled'. Some partners wanted their own labs so they are allowed them. No one has compelled them. Read my PDF attached above. Puhleez.

[tritonprime]

Did you look at the posts immediately above? What are they about? What is your post about? An almost identical first paragraph one week later and that is it? Puhleez. I object to the use of the word 'compelled'. Some partners wanted their own labs so they are allowed them. No one has compelled them. Read my PDF attached above. Puhleez.

I presume that everyone's favorite journalist added some additional content considering the the new title and new date of the article. Unfortunately, that's all I get with the preview.

[spazsinbad]

Yep - that is unfortunate - trolling for someone to post the full artickle? Probably BBSP (BillyBobSweetyPie) will UNlock the artickle soon - because he is such a clever chap - full o' repeats.

[spazsinbad]

F-35 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Reprogramming Laboratory
08 Apr 2015 NavAir

"Mission.
Provides mission data to foreign customers and a data production capacity for FMS F-35 aircraft.

Unique Features.
The F-35 FMS Reprogramming Laboratory (FRL) will be part of the F-35 Reprogramming Enterprise that supports mission data production needs for all countries. The current construct of F-35 reprogramming includes two major reprogramming centers, one at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and the other at Point Mugu, California. Each reprogramming center consists of independent laboratories supporting dedicated customers with shared support services. When fully operational, these centers will be configured with mission data production, testing, and validation capabilities. These centers will use the latest available intelligence data to build and test mission data products and verify and validate these products prior to deployment.

RDT&E.
NAWCWD provides hardware and software engineering, mission planning, sensor integration, pilot vehicle interface, software architecture, and systems design integration and test. The Division provides expertise in weapons integration such as stores management, fire control and stores, suspension equipment, loading supportability, and gun systems. Lethality assessment is provided for the entire kill chain from target detection and identification to weapon delivery and battle damage assessment.

Survivability and vulnerability efforts include live-fire testing and analysis, effectiveness of countermeasure systems, electronic defense systems, and signature expertise. NAWCWD provides engineering expertise in system security engineering, crew escape systems, and M&S support. F-35 subsystems development ground and flight testing are currently being conducted at various test facilities including the Radar Reflectivity Laboratory (RRL) and Sea Range at Point Mugu, as well as the Land Range at China Lake. Engineers also participate in verification and test planning. With the addition of the FRL to NAWCWD, mission data development, testing, and deployment will also fall into this list of capabilities provided to the F-35 program.

Size / Description / Location / Scope.
48,000 SF facility at Point Mugu with the ability to support multiple customers simultaneously and will include 15,000 SF of raised floor, RF shielded, secure laboratory space. In addition, the FRL will house a workforce of over 100 engineers, technicians, and other government professionals that work on FMS mission data products.

Year Opened: groundbreaking winter 2014. Plant Value: $200M+.

Sub-Facilities
- Mission Data Development Tools. Capability to design, build, and unit test mission data
- Mission Environment Development System. Capability to build emitter simulations and scenarios
- Verification and Validation System. Capability to test mission data files in a real-time scenario driven environment
- T&E Analysis Laboratory. Capability to analyze data produced during verification and validation testing

Equipment / Instrumentation
- F-35 prime mission equipment (PME)
- Emulations of F-35 mission systems: distributed aperture system, electro-optic targeting system, weapons, and communication, navigation, and identification system
- Mission data development databases and unit testing capabilities
- Verification and validation system: instrumentation, scenario & test control system, data collection, & storage
- Spectrum simulation system: RF signal generation and scenario creation in real time"

Source: http://www.navair.navy.mil/nawcwd/comma ... kFacts.pdf (121Kb)