Marines F-35 reset

[XanderCrews]

F=MA

[ricnunes]

a.k.a. Newton's second law of motion

[weasel1962]

Easy to forget the SM is also 1500+ lbs.

While I used "CEP" accuracy, in today's world it is actually more of a "Kill Chain" issue. Break the kill chain and the AA missile, Ballistic missile, Anti Ship missile etc. will simply "splash in the empty ocean."Break the Command and Control before the first shot and the chain is missing it's first link. Jam or confuse the terminal mechanism, (GPS spoof, decoys etc.) and the weapon will miss exactly to the inch, ever how many miles away it was confused.

Difficulty is that the newer missiles are smarter. They don't depend on 3rd party sensors and its smart enough not to be spoofed (AGR, SAASM etc). Today, hardkill is probably the only solution. However, not going to be easy to hardkill an hypersonic and it can be too far to take out the launcher.

[blindpilot]

F=MA

Absolutely true, but understand the force the impacting projectile is "de-accelerating" nearly instantly which is a measured function of the starting (at impact) "velocity." The acceleration from Mach 10 to zero in a fraction of a second is a big number, no matter how big the mass is. The acceleration from 20 knots(or even 400 kts) to zero, not so much, hence the need for an "explosive" aid.

As to hypersonic defense problems, using hypersonics has its own problems not yet fully worked out by anyone (Russian, Chinese claims to the contrary). High speeds typically wrap the airframe in a plasma that messes with radiation (IR, Radar, GPS Radio etc.) targeting, offboard or onboard. Passive systems like INS don't like getting jerked at super High G's either. Targeting is a non trivial problem.
And from my SR-71 days, I am made mindful, that even at extreme G's, the turn radius of a hypersonic craft is like Geographical not a circle of a few hundred yards, ... as in a circle the size of west Australia etc. The track may not be ballistic, but it can't move far from a straight line. It took the SR a couple western states to make a 180 turn at Mach 3. These missiles are not "juking" like bumble bees. They change heading "a few degrees over many miles"

Just Sayin,
BP

[ricnunes]

Hi BP,

what you said about the hypersonic weapon/missile problems kinda reminds me of the Shkval supercavitating torpedo despite being using a different 'medium' (water instead of air).
While the Shkval is much, much faster than the other underwater weapons - Torpedoes - this gives it several disadvantages such as being largely or almost unguided and much easier to be detected by the enemy (due to supercavitation) and as a result basically no-one uses such weapons (even the Russians seem to hardly and rarely use it), this despite its principles being generally well known.

Perhaps it's quite possible that due to known limitations that hypersonic weapons will only be used in niche roles similarly to what happens with the Shkval torpedo, no?

[weasel1962]

If one looks at the DF-17 which the Chinese declared operational last year, tests were conducted between 2014 to 2017 which suggests it works. Tests of the delivery system (then identified as WU-14) was tested at 9 times between 2016 to 2017 and concluded by US to be successful.

This is basically utilising ICBM/MRBM launch vehicles to achieve the same speeds with similar ingress (mach 10 at reentry). Add GPS targeting to achieve low CEPs. The difficulty of targeting moving targets appears to have been resolved, taking into account ships don't go that fast either (up to 30 knots). How they do that appears to be by depressing the glide path after reentry thereby slowing down the delivery close to terminal stage allowing the delivery to employ its sensors. This makes the missile relatively more vulnerable at this time (still fast) but taking into account that this is close to terminal stage which means lower detection/reaction times. The glide also enables more maneuver capability.

Whilst there may still be some doubt as to whether the DF-17 or DF-21D can actually successfully target a moving target, a static target capability should be minimally assumed. That includes CVNs/ships at port, air bases and SAM sites.

As CVNs will be at port some of the time, I'd recommend moving the Japan-based CVBG back to Pearl or Guam to avoid tempting a first strike on static targets.

[blindpilot]

.... I'd recommend moving the Japan-based CVBG back to Pearl or Guam to avoid tempting a first strike on static targets.

You recommend? What makes you think (or more importantly Chinese leadership would not dare think) that a surprise missile attack on Japan would not be met by a couple hundred SLBM nuclear missile warheads annihilating 1 billion Chinese? There would be no one in Beijing to take the damage reports.

If your asymetrical response leads to oblivion, it's not a strategy. It's a bluff. And escalation can get very ugly very fast. I recommend you go play a video game in the basement .... the CVBG and 1 or two of it's friends are going to be in Japan, and East/South China Sea for as long as this discussion matters. Learn to live with it. Recommend BS.

MHO,
BP

[weasel1962]

There goes 300 million Americans as well. Escalating to a nuclear war is mutually assured destruction.

I seriously doubt if US leadership will regard an attack on a static CVBG, a military target, as something that would trigger a nuclear response. Thousands of tac-toms maybe but that's already something that is factored into for any Taiwan conflagration. It will go both ways. If there is 1 situation where a China military strike could happen, that's over Taiwan. Consider that attacking a CVN at port side may also attract less casualties...

Even at the height of hysteria during the cold war, I doubt if US would have triggered a nuclear response from potential Russki conventional attacks on a CVBG.

A redeployment is not as crazy as it sounds. In the past few years, US has been pushing back other assets from potential front-lines in places like Korea and Japan precisely to increase survivability. Sinking a CVBG is probably the one that can trigger the biggest hit to morale...

I think this discussion should be confined to hypersonics, rather than nuclear. As to it being a bluff, I don't think one can bluff multiple detectable tests.

[ricnunes]

There goes 300 million Americans as well. Escalating to a nuclear war is mutually assured destruction.

I seriously doubt if US leadership will regard an attack on a static CVBG, a military target, as something that would trigger a nuclear response. Thousands of tac-toms maybe but that's already something that is factored into for any Taiwan conflagration. It will go both ways. If there is 1 situation where a China military strike could happen, that's over Taiwan. Consider that attacking a CVN at port side may also attract less casualties...

If I read BP post correctly, even during Cold War Ballistic Missiles (such as ICBMs or IRBMs) would be detected during the very early launch stages.
This means that dozens of such Chinese Ballistic Missiles being launched and thus detected during the early launch stage would or could be interpreted by the Americans as a Nuclear Strike which would immediately result in a (Nuclear) counter-strike by the US, this instead of interpreting as being an attack on a CVBG.
The US would probably never wait until such 'conventional' Ballistic Missiles hit (or miss) the target in order to see/check/confirm that they indeed carry conventional warheads instead of nukes.

Besides, I would say that during the very early stages of such Ballistic missiles flight path (i.e. during launch) it will be very hard to figure (if possible at all) if their target is a CVBG near Japan or targets on actual Japan (such as cities or military bases) or even cities or targets on continental USA (or Hawaii).

Well, my 2 cents anyway...

[blindpilot]

...
Even at the height of hysteria during the cold war, I doubt if US would have triggered a nuclear response from potential Russki conventional attacks on a CVBG.
....

That's your opinion. I was there during the 'Hysteria during the Cold War." "There" being in the missile warning center in Cheyenne Mountain. I know first hand how close things came more often than folks would like. I designed systems that provided the algorithms projecting orbital elements, and predicted impact points and variation of those over the flight path. I sat in the pentagon discussing the accuracy or lack there-of for various sensor systems and such. actually calculating the PI CEP etc. for informing command decisions. I actually participated in the "NCA elements of decision" designs for system reports. I was on the phone conferences discussing actual ICBM launch reports as they happened, and what they meant for those decisions real time.

But hey, it's just my opinion (I signed it MHO ). And shucks - You doubt it so ...

The calculation of such provocations as multiple missile launches at real targets gets into very bad places very fast.
The Chinese know this, ... and actually their attitude is one of the long road with constant pressure. They don't do "surprise mass launches," strategically. They poke tactically to test status. They think in terms of decades and centuries of evolving advantages. They like "fait accompli" results following decades of maneuver without starting WW III. They have no desire to use a handful of DF-17s/DF-ZF HGVs against a single Carrier.

FWIW MHO,

Rock Piece from Cheyenne Mtn Complex

Chey Mtn Rock.jpg (38.28 KiB) Viewed 8568 times

I'm gonna go play with my Great Grandson ...
BP

[zhangmdev]

The anti-ship-ballistic-missile has been hyped since ... there was internet. Now it has evolved into the undetectable and invincible boost-glider. It is pointless to talk about technological side of the issue, which is basically impossible to prove or disprove until the chips are down.

I'd like to say what happened in this January is the indication of what is the shape of things to come. Just like Iran, China is not seeking nuclear annihilation, which it definitely cannot win. It will simply declare "we will conduct a limited non-nuclear strike against your assets within a certain area tomorrow, and you can do nothing about it". That is specifically designed to prevent any nuclear response and exchange. So it can keep doing whatever it is doing. If the strike results in the destruction of some important asset on the other side, that will be a big propaganda coup. Any loss on its own side can be easily glossed over. I am pretty sure nobody can win a propaganda war against China.

It is a far more sinister opponent. It is pursuing empire building through commerce. Its military might is backed by Western money, technology, and consumerism. The Soviets never got this kind of treatment. The problem is how to deal with this threat. Improved technology? Economic standoff? Retreat and regroup? Accept defeat? I don't know.

[weasel1962]

BP, due respect given. Younger folks question everything but would do well to heed lessons learnt from real experience. Points well taken

[blindpilot]

BP, due respect given. Younger folks question everything but would do well to heed lessons learnt from real experience. Points well taken

Okay one war story.

In 1979 we were testing new systems. One evening (ie 0 dark thirty AM) a test was running and went hay wire. I literally jumped over the row of consoles, to punch an old manual cutoff to the outside world before they could see the pretty lights and bells. I advised senior leadership we needed to move testing off site, and in November I left the assignment. Early in 1980, my replacement didn't make it to the cutoff switch and things got exciting. ( https://books.google.com/books?id=AIBRd ... &q&f=false ) For years we relied on a small trusted Univac back up system, that I set up in the chaos before leaving. They moved testing off site, cleaned up the mess and life went on. BUT in 1980 we almost accidentally went to nuclear war because a guy couldn't jump over the consoles. And you think it couldn't happen when there is a real launch of many ballistic missiles? Something to ponder. Thankfully tensions are less today, and the Chinese take the long view, but whether it's 1980 or the Cuban missile crisis, sometimes it's just a sub commander's instincts away(see Cuban Missile Crisis), from really bad stuff.

Relying on long range ballistic missiles for conventional tactical strikes is a really bad plan, and a Halloween haunted house I wouldn't want to go into. Nor is the US going to "stand down" tactical presence during peace time chess games, nor surrender ground when it heats up. Whether that's good or bad, I don't know. With the Chinese you just have to do a lot of chest bumping. They understand that. And both countries prosper along the way.

Just saying,
BP

[ricnunes]

Interesting example indeed BP and thanks for sharing your experiences!

There were indeed plenty of situations that brought the world to the brink of (nuclear) war.
Just to complement, another and well known example/situation of this happened after the end of the Cold War (in 1995) due to a scientific rocket launch in Norway.
Here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norwegian_rocket_incident

So and echoing BP's words, if a single scientific rocket launch almost resulted in a nuclear war then imagine launching several long range Ballistic Missiles (even if they don't carry nukes).

[XanderCrews]

Escalating to a nuclear war is mutually assured destruction.

No its not.