65th Aggressor Squadron F-35

[wrightwing]

No mention of the airspeeds was made. If an F-15 has to turn at the part of the envelope where a Flanker excels, then naturally the Flanker has the advantage. That's why a smart F-15 pilot won't try to turn with a Flanker at 300kts or slower. They'll use their superior vertical performance at that point. If the turn starts at 400kts or faster, it's a different story

This is actually the way I defend the F-15 against Flanker fans.
But going back to the Aggressor question.

If the Flanker has a substantial advantage over the Eagle on a big chunk of the Subsonic envelope (up to Mach 0.85 for STR and any speed for ITR) then wouldn't Flanker pilots try to exploit that advantage over everyone.

Just like how Hornet pilots are experts in dragging their victims down to the 300 KCAS region, wouldn't Flanker pilots be the same way.

How does the F-15 accomplish that in the aggressor role?

The Flanker doesn't have an advantage all the way to M.85, though.

[lbk000]

So here I am giving this another go.
This discussion is degenerating because nobody is cutting to the core of why zero is so fundamentally WRONG.

Zero, your mental picture of air combat training reeks of watching too much Hollywood so you think people go up there to just dick around and try pulling wild gimmick tricks like "hit the brakes and they'll fly right past".
And to do that, you need an airplane that can correctly punish Maverick, because otherwise how do you know what tricks work and what don't?
Right???

The air forces already know what techniques work, and it's not the trainee's business to reinvent the killing technique.

The F-15 is there to provide a point of reference while the trainee is drilling The Winning Thing To Do, so the whole point is that he's not going to see the part of the envelope where the Flanker does The Flanker Thing. The aggressor F-15 will in fact have the option of flying in a regime that the F-15 outperforms the Flanker in, but that's why a key aspect of Aggressor piloting is strict discipline in not exceeding the performance characteristics of their mimicked aircraft. You'll hear in documentaries Aggressor pilots commenting that they must fly under performance limitations and that's because training exercises are taking place in a regime where the Aggressor must be weak. Teaching how to kill means teaching what weakness and vulnerability look like.

Let me put it this way, if you are drilling marksmanship, you're there to drill shooting the target. You're not there to experience how it feels to get shot because you missed.

Rate debates ought to be a straight up banned topic. They are worse than worthless because they are a distraction and a refuge for ignorance.

[spazsinbad]

'lbk000' I'm an old 'out of state' guy but have experience in ACM from the olden daze. I rage against every post turning into a 1v1 talkfest from armchair pilots. We all have our place however we need to know it and not fantasize from movies or some computer flight simulations that do not mimic the crushing G physicality of ACM when BVR kills are fine & go home.

Meanwhile I do some reading in an attempt to keep up so this is one story that explains the mindset of USAF RED AIR.

http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArch ... essors.pdf (1Mb)

Probably there is reference to this 11 page PDF in this forum somewhere but anyways I'll attach it here - if even again....

PREVIOUS POST of same PDF here: viewtopic.php?f=57&t=52723&p=363610&hilit=aggressor+Tirpak#p363610

[lbk000]

I'm only really addressing ZO here. There's more to Aggressor training than the BFM aspect, but that's where we started this whole thing at so that's what I want to resolve.
He needs to overturn his idea of what the goal is and understand that being "rigged to win" makes for good training.

Beyond WVR the F-15's larger radar is also more suitable for simulate Bars/Irbis capabilities.

Edit: Sorry I guess I didn't comprehend your remark too well at first spaz.

[spazsinbad]

Yep thanks I get that however I just wanted to RAVE AGAIN! Meanwhile here are some quotes from the above PDF....

USAF’s AGGRESSORS [lot more to read than just these scruffy excerpts]
April 2017 John A. Tirpak

"...the Air Force launched its own Aggressor squadron in 1972. The first of these was the 64th Aggressor Squadron (AGRS), based at Nellis AFB, Nev....

...In 1975, a second squadron was added—the 65th Aggressor Squadron, also based at Nellis—and in 1976, two more units were stood up. These were at Clark AB, Philippines (the 26th AGRS), and at RAF Alconbury, UK (the 527th AS). The latter two units did “road shows,” traveling around their respective theaters to tangle with frontline units.

Aggressors adopted Soviet-style tactics and procedures, becoming experts in how the Soviet Union and its client states (such as Iraq) used their fighters in collaboration with ground control units. They carried this impersonation to the point of adopting Soviet-style name badges and helmets, their squadron ready rooms festooned with Russian propaganda posters labeled with Cyrillic lettering.

The jets themselves were painted to mimic Soviet aircraft and those of Soviet Bloc countries, wearing schemes known as “Flogger” and, later, “Flanker.” Some schemes were generic and went by names such as “Lizard,” “Pumpkin,” and “Grape,” but others were clearly meant to suggest specific aircraft of the air arms of dozens of adversary and nonaligned countries.

Three years after the Aggressors first stood up, the Air Force—again relying on Red Baron [an old study] and subsequent studies—launched the Red Flag series of exercises, aimed at giving combat pilots experience participating in a large-scale air operation with many elements. Red Baron had concluded that once a pilot had survived 10 combat missions, his life expectancy increased sharply. Red Flag simulated those first 10 missions in a controlled environment before the pilots flew their first real-world combat mission. So effective were the Aggressors, even against vastly superior aircraft like the F-15, that for a time in the 1970s Congress dallied with the idea of buying vast numbers of inexpensive F-5Es rather than pricey F-15s. Air Force leaders patiently explained that the F-15s lost early engagements with the Aggressors because Eagle pilots were not yet proficient in DACT.

After training with the Aggressors and in Red Flag, the F-15 pilots became unbeatable, however. The F-15, in fact, was designed around lessons learned from the Red Baron study: It was a machine designed exclusively to achieve air superiority, with excellent maneuverability, speed, acceleration, radar range, and visibility for the pilot. In US and foreign service, the F-15 has racked up more than 100 dogfight victories over nearly 40 years, without any losses.

USAF’s heavily one-sided victory during the first Gulf War in 1991 validated the success of the Aggressors and Red Flag. Many pilots even reported that the reality of combat did not quite match the stress and challenge they had faced during training in Red Flag.

The 18th Aggressor Squadron and its F-16s became the resident Red Air at Eielson AFB, Alaska, while the 64th AGRS flew F-16s at Nellis.

In recent years, budget cuts and the evolution of Red Flag brought more churn to the Aggressor community. In the wake of the 2013 budgetary debacle of sequester that grounded many USAF fighter squadrons, the 65th inactivated on Sept. 26, 2015, giving up its F-15s to Air National Guard units.

At the same time, Air Combat Command was beginning to envision a new kind of Red Flag—one still having a substantial live-fly element, but heavily supplemented with virtual elements and simulation. Though F-22s and (as of January) F-35s participate in Red Flags, the true scope of what they can do must be hidden from potential opponents closely monitoring the wargames. As a result, Red Flag will move increasingly into the virtual realm.

For the moment, however, no one has forecast a time when the live-fly Aggressors will disappear, completely replaced by phantom digital aircraft on a virtual battlefield. Exposing fighter pilots to the physical experience of skilled “bad guys” in real aircraft will likely remain an Air Force priority."

Source: http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArch ... essors.pdf (1Mb)

[garrya]

My thoughts on the Flanker mysticism...
The Flanker design I would characterize as a very traditional STR-centric design focused on energy retention with high lift features tacked on afterwards to expand the lower end of its maneuvering band. F-16 is somewhat in the same vein. This is in contrast to the "new" school of EM-centric design which is less preoccupied about STR and energy retention and instead pursues angle generation through energy conversion (great I'm starting to retread my earlier post).
So the Flanker's "visibly modern" aerodynamic features do not actually offer it commensurately modern capabilities (i.e., high speed nosepointing threat). The Flanker's excellent energy retention actually plays against it at high speeds because it essentially puts a clamp on its maximum rate; try to pull a power slide and you'll ditch the wings. Flankers must bleed their energy down first to the low speed end before all their gimmick capabilities get unlocked.

In other words, the Flanker is either an F-15 or a Hornet, but never both at once. The predictability of its "mode switching" makes it less scary than it sounds.

Iam curious , isn't the new Pak-fa also has loads of high lift feature such as LERX, LeVcon , slat..etc
Even the F-22, F-35 has vortex generation devices

[lbk000]

Iam curious , isn't the new Pak-fa also has loads of high lift feature such as LERX, LeVcon , slat..etc
Even the F-22, F-35 has vortex generation devices

Poor word choice I admit. New designs are by no means "low lift". The contrast that exists in my mind is that new designs are not constrained to conserve their lift; they can dump it at any point to lower their energy state. The Flanker's core design intent is to be an aircraft that wins by being efficient with its energy across a wide range of airspeeds, so you can pick a better airspeed and just let math take care of the rest (in theory). So while Flanker has a bunch of outwardly modern aerodynamic features, they are "squandered" on one thing the designers were really familiar with: "lift gets us better sustained turn performance, so hoard all the lift we can". It's low speed, high AoA performance more or less settles on not falling out of the sky, in contrast to the Hornets nosepointing freedom. Not that having good STR performance is bad, but I wanted to emphasize that they didn't really exploit the possibilities.

I see a major goal of modern US designs as striving for absolute command over every aspect of flight. As Beesley pointed out regarding Flanker maneuvers, they are mostly ballistic, in contrast to the tight control exhibited by F-22 and F-35 maneuvers. I believe it is symptomatic of a core philosophical difference between Russian and US design goals, between "We need X" and "We need to control X".

I'm only talking about the old Su-27 though, the Su-35 could be an entirely new animal, I don't know anything about it.

[spazsinbad]

RED AIR FOR HIRE
Apr/May 2018 Amy McCullough

"...Budget cuts in recent years have compelled the Air Force to shrink its aggressor air capability, the in-house adversaries who serve as aerial sparring partners for frontline aircrews. After the 65th Aggressor Squadron (AGRS) — which flew F-15s — shut down in 2014, only the 64th AGRS at Nellis AFB, Nev., and the 18th AGRS at Eielson AFB, Alaska — each flying F-16s — were left.

Within months, the service was forced to pull aircraft from operational units to temporarily fill the gap left by the loss of the 65th’s F-15s, but this wasn’t a sustainable long-term approach: The fighters were needed for real-world missions elsewhere....

...The average 64th aggressor pilot flies two to three times a week. “The schedule can be fairly harrowing on personnel. In general we’ll have a day mission and then have a night mission,” said Manning. For night missions, pilots may show up to work at 4 p.m. but won’t finish debriefing until 4 a.m. or 5 a.m. “Some of the challenges I see as a commander involve making sure I give my people appropriate time off,” he noted....

...WHAT USAF WANTS
The Air Force has said it’s purposely avoiding specifying a specific platform for the job, but ideally it wants an aircraft capable of flying at Mach 1.5, with a service ceiling of 35,000 feet, and a 45 to 60 minute flight endurance. Aircraft must be equipped with fire-control radar capable of detecting, tracking, and simulating “ordnance employment against an opposing aircraft,” and have the ability to “replicate semi-active missiles out to a range of 20 [nautical miles] and active missiles out to a range of 45 [nautical miles],” according to requirements document posted online. Aircraft also must be configured to carry training and electronic attack pods provided by the government....

...USAF works closely with the Intelligence Community to accurately replicate tactics used by foreign air forces. Manning [Lt. Col. Zach Manning, 64th AGRS commander] said when he showed up at Nellis from his previous assignment at Kunsan AB, South Korea, he was a qualified F-16 pilot, yet when he started aggressor training he was “blown away, because I was not prepared for the level of expertise that was needed … in this assignment.”

He said being an aggressor has “made me a better pilot,” and that is something he will take with him to his next assignment. Capt. Justin Bellamy, an aggressor pilot with the 64th AGRS, said he and his fellow USAF pilots are the subject matter experts on how US adversaries operate in the air.

“We’re focused on teaching about our adversaries and then replicating what they do,” he said. “Replication is only one portion of what we do. Thus far, contract Red Air has only been focused on the replication. We don’t really refer to contract Red Air as an aggressor because they don’t have that mission,” meaning the additional duties of teaching adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures....

...Draken’s Baum, a former Viper pilot, said it just makes sense to contract out at least a portion of USAF’s Red Air requirements. He noted the Air Force “literally has to bolt panels on the outside of the F-35 to let it be seen by radar” if the F-35 is to play the role of “bad guy.”

The F-35 pilots also aren’t allowed to turn on all their fifth-generation sensors, keeping them from flying the aircraft the way it was intended and the way they would fight a real battle.

“We’re not trying to come in and say the Air Force shouldn’t do any Red Air. that’s not our message at all,” he said. But, if USAF is going to “burn up hours” for adversary air, the service should “do it on our jets. They’re never going to war. Don’t do it on the brand new jets [the US] just spent billions of dollars … procuring.”

Source: http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArch ... 0Issue.pdf (0.9Mb)

[lbk000]

He noted the Air Force “literally has to bolt panels on the outside of the F-35 to let it be seen by radar” if the F-35 is to play the role of “bad guy.”

I probably missed a memo but that's neat. Even Luneburg lens can't blow the signature up enough.

[zero-one]

Zero, your mental picture of air combat training reeks of watching too much Hollywood so you think people go up there to just dick around and try pulling wild gimmick tricks like "hit the brakes and they'll fly right past".

I don't know what your problem is lbk000, but don't pretend like you know me. Tried to be nice but it doesn't work
You assume too much that I think A-A is all about cobras and back flips. Working for McGraw-Hill (aviation week) taught me otherwise. Lots of talks with aggressors including former F-15 aggressors.

And heres what one said. You're right about them honoring the limitations of the aircraft they are trying to replicate,
but they also have limitations of their own, Obviously they cannot replicate a Flanker 100%, the maneuverability below 0.85 mach which is superior in a Flanker is just one example. They actually try to replicate the Flanker in those parts of the envelope where it excels, to the extent of the Eagle's capabilities at least. There are also some electronic and jamming capabilities that he did not go into details.

Anyway, thats where international DACT comes in, the US conducts more joint exercises with friendly forces than any other air force, some of those forces have Flankers (India, Malaysia) but by the time they get there, they already have a good idea of the Flanker's capabilities thanks to aggressor training, DACT with actual Flankers are there to fill in the knowledge gaps.

Lastly, I don't understand why people who talk about ACM here are immediately labeled as watching too much Hollywood. Remember those F-15 guys I talk to, they absolutely love talking about it. Gums loves to talk about it so does Fulcrumflyer, Tailgate also talks about it a lot. I get along with them just fine about that topic, but some people here are so uncomfortable with it. I swear if you didnt know they were actual pilots you'd probably label them as fanboys too.

[spazsinbad]

He may mean the 'red' iron strakes bolted near where LoonyLenz are parked. These are relatively new. Some seen on test F-35s but also others IIRC. F-35Bs doing sloppie VLs had them for example... Why does ALAMY do this shite?

https://c8.alamy.com/comp/MCD0H8/dan-le ... MCD0H8.jpg

[spazsinbad]

'zero-one' I think you have misunderstood a lot when talking with pilots about ACM, but as you say this is difficult to gauge once removed in time and space and keyboard. I'll repeat - you have to have been there to know some of this stuff - just talking about it won't cut it. Pilots often talk in a shorthand way expecting listeners to follow - sometimes they do.....

[hornetfinn]

He noted the Air Force “literally has to bolt panels on the outside of the F-35 to let it be seen by radar” if the F-35 is to play the role of “bad guy.”

I probably missed a memo but that's neat. Even Luneburg lens can't blow the signature up enough.

I bet he meant those Luneburg lenses (4 IIRC in F-35) as they are pretty much panels bolted on the outside of the F-35. Actually the Luneburg lenses themselves are located inside those panels (or whatever they are called) but the shape of the panel is for minimum aerodynamic impact.

I'm more intriqued with this comment:

The F-35 pilots also aren’t allowed to turn on all their fifth-generation sensors, keeping them from flying the aircraft the way it was intended and the way they would fight a real battle

[wrightwing]

Obviously they cannot replicate a Flanker 100%, the maneuverability below 0.85 mach which is superior in a Flanker is just one example. They actually try to replicate the Flanker in those parts of the envelope where it excels, to the extent of the Eagle's capabilities at least. There are also some electronic and jamming capabilities that he did not go into details.

Again with the M.85. A Flanker's corner speed is below 400kts. An Eagle doesn't have to be at above 500 to 550kts to start turning better. It'll reach parity or start turning better between 350 to 400kts.

(If the Flanker is above 60% fuel, the F-15 will have an even broader speed range, where it outmaneuvers the Flanker.)

[marsavian]

In fact here is a sample turn chart that I usually post whenever someone says the Su-27 will make short work of an F-15. As we can clearly see, the Su-27 has the advantage in most of the subsonic envelope in a sustained turn, but there is a spot in the very high subsonic where the F-15 has the advanatge as well as in the supersonic.

That's not really going to be of much use if the Flanker outturns you in the better turning instantaneous phase where according to your graph it has a consistent advantage athough the Russian graph suggests instantaneous performance is better in the high subsonic for the F-15 and only gets worse in the lower subsonic.