South Korea resets Fighter Jet bidding

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sferrin

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Unread post15 Oct 2013, 21:46

lookieloo wrote:If Boeing wanted to remain in the fighter market past 2020, they should have focused on winning non-VLO competitions vs Eurocanards and Flankers after losing the JSF contest, not sad attempts to "me too" LM on "stealth" (no one really buys it). Lacking in signature, they should have been working on up-engined versions of what they already had, but they didn't, leaving them kinematically weak vs foreign competitors in places where the F-35 generates little interest.


An F-15 MANX with a pair of 37,000lb F100-232s, 3D TVC, a big fat AESA, and an IRST. Win.
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Unread post17 Oct 2013, 00:09

gtx wrote:
maus92 wrote:
gtx wrote:
maus92 wrote:
@gtx
@lookieloo


Read "The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard" by Bradley, and get back to me. It's a book, available at many base libraries.


Well duh!!! Have book. Read it many years ago. Have you...or did you only watch the movie of the same name?

Have also served in military and have been involved with OT&E. What's your claim to fame?



Then you should understand.
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smsgtmac

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Unread post17 Oct 2013, 04:13

maus92 wrote:
Read "The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard" by Bradley, and get back to me. It's a book, available at many base libraries.


And what a horrid little tale it is. I wouldn't recommend it to anyone without serious caveats. Such as only if the reader is interested in:
1. Culture clash fallout when AF and Army test philosophies meet. Traditionally, the AF uses testing and modeling results to grade possible designs and solutions. The Army traditionally has used results to merely inform decision makers.
2. Arsenal Bureaucracy Case Studies. This case belongs with the Spencer Repeater and M-16 stories about how slow and closed to new ideas Army arsenals can be. It is hardly representative of all of the Army, Air Force, or pretty much any other DoD sub-culture behaviors. Some of the problematic test aspects Burton describes were identical to a problem an Army researcher pointed out as something that needed changing years (decades?) before on another test program (Anti-armor shape charge).
3. Consequences of not choosing your friends wisely. Burton never should have let himself get sucked into the reform-school gang of reformers. And never let them help you with your book.
4. An example of the norm. It is rare indeed that someone truly is appreciated for his making the tough stand. Honorable people do it thousands of times every day knowing full well there could/will be blowback. Those with big egos for some reason get upset when it happens to them and cry about it. Those who get the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow are the insufferable exceptions. N.N. Taleb (among others) likes to point out that the positive results of the ~.1% are trumpeted and the other ~99.9% who fall away are left unseen. Its called Survivorship Bias.
--The ultimate weapon is the mind of man.
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Unread post17 Oct 2013, 06:21

smsgtmac wrote:
maus92 wrote:
Read "The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard" by Bradley, and get back to me. It's a book, available at many base libraries.


And what a horrid little tale it is. I wouldn't recommend it to anyone without serious caveats. Such as only if the reader is interested in:
1. Culture clash fallout when AF and Army test philosophies meet. Traditionally, the AF uses testing and modeling results to grade possible designs and solutions. The Army traditionally has used results to merely inform decision makers.
2. Arsenal Bureaucracy Case Studies. This case belongs with the Spencer Repeater and M-16 stories about how slow and closed to new ideas Army arsenals can be. It is hardly representative of all of the Army, Air Force, or pretty much any other DoD sub-culture behaviors. Some of the problematic test aspects Burton describes were identical to a problem an Army researcher pointed out as something that needed changing years (decades?) before on another test program (Anti-armor shape charge).
3. Consequences of not choosing your friends wisely. Burton never should have let himself get sucked into the reform-school gang of reformers. And never let them help you with your book.
4. An example of the norm. It is rare indeed that someone truly is appreciated for his making the tough stand. Honorable people do it thousands of times every day knowing full well there could/will be blowback. Those with big egos for some reason get upset when it happens to them and cry about it. Those who get the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow are the insufferable exceptions. N.N. Taleb (among others) likes to point out that the positive results of the ~.1% are trumpeted and the other ~99.9% who fall away are left unseen. Its called Survivorship Bias.



Don't like Bradley? - then you definitely won't like Jankowski.
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Unread post17 Oct 2013, 06:47

I think Boeing may have just shot themselves in the foot with this talk of a split buy of F-35's and F-15SE's. Because if the ROKAF really wanted a Stop Gap until the arrival of the F-35's. Why not just incorporate the F-15SE Stealth features into South Korea existing fleet of F-15K's!!!! :bang:
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Unread post17 Oct 2013, 06:55

gtx wrote:
maus92 wrote:@gtx
@lookieloo

Read "The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard" by Bradley, and get back to me. It's a book, available at many base libraries.
Well duh!!! Have book. Read it many years ago. Have you...or did you only watch the movie of the same name?

Have also served in military and have been involved with OT&E. What's your claim to fame?
He wants a pat on the head for reading a book (that fits his preconceptions of the military) and applying it to a poorly related situation. Here it is.vvv That's a good boy; now come back with some context and we'll give you some bacon.

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lookieloo

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Unread post17 Oct 2013, 07:26

Corsair1963 wrote:I think Boeing may have just shot themselves in the foot with this talk of a split buy of F-35's and F-15SE's. Because if the ROKAF really wanted a Stop Gap until the arrival of the F-35's. Why not just incorporate the F-15SE Stealth features into South Korea existing fleet of F-15K's!!!! :bang:
Doesn't keep the factory doors open. As I already mentioned, there's really no excuse for not having significantly up-rated F-15s and Superhornets already set to go. It's been 12 years since Boeing lost JSF, 12 years during which they twiddled their thumbs and fell behind foreign offerings for customers less concerned with VLO and worried about F-35 delays.
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Unread post17 Oct 2013, 07:30

lookieloo wrote:
Corsair1963 wrote:I think Boeing may have just shot themselves in the foot with this talk of a split buy of F-35's and F-15SE's. Because if the ROKAF really wanted a Stop Gap until the arrival of the F-35's. Why not just incorporate the F-15SE Stealth features into South Korea existing fleet of F-15K's!!!! :bang:
Doesn't keep the factory doors open. As I already mentioned, there's really no excuse for not having significantly up-rated F-15s and Superhornets already set to go. It's been 12 years since Boeing lost JSF, 12 years during which they twiddled their thumbs and fell behind foreign offerings for customers less concerned with VLO and worried about F-35 delays.



So, Boeing should have paid for the development of further upgraded Strike Eagles and Super Hornets??? :?:
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Unread post17 Oct 2013, 08:21

Corsair1963 wrote:
lookieloo wrote:
Corsair1963 wrote:I think Boeing may have just shot themselves in the foot with this talk of a split buy of F-35's and F-15SE's. Because if the ROKAF really wanted a Stop Gap until the arrival of the F-35's. Why not just incorporate the F-15SE Stealth features into South Korea existing fleet of F-15K's!!!! :bang:
Doesn't keep the factory doors open. As I already mentioned, there's really no excuse for not having significantly up-rated F-15s and Superhornets already set to go. It's been 12 years since Boeing lost JSF, 12 years during which they twiddled their thumbs and fell behind foreign offerings for customers less concerned with VLO and worried about F-35 delays.
So, Boeing should have paid for the development of further upgraded Strike Eagles and Super Hornets??? :?:
Hard to say. There's been plenty of government-funded subsystems and research out there to work with, even before JSF; so it's not as if they would have been required to develop everything from scratch. Deliberate, incremental integration of upgrades has defrayed costs for other manufacturers with fewer resources and less government-support than Boeing.
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Unread post17 Oct 2013, 09:58

lookieloo wrote:
Corsair1963 wrote:
lookieloo wrote:
Corsair1963 wrote:I think Boeing may have just shot themselves in the foot with this talk of a split buy of F-35's and F-15SE's. Because if the ROKAF really wanted a Stop Gap until the arrival of the F-35's. Why not just incorporate the F-15SE Stealth features into South Korea existing fleet of F-15K's!!!! :bang:
Doesn't keep the factory doors open. As I already mentioned, there's really no excuse for not having significantly up-rated F-15s and Superhornets already set to go. It's been 12 years since Boeing lost JSF, 12 years during which they twiddled their thumbs and fell behind foreign offerings for customers less concerned with VLO and worried about F-35 delays.
So, Boeing should have paid for the development of further upgraded Strike Eagles and Super Hornets??? :?:
Hard to say. There's been plenty of government-funded subsystems and research out there to work with, even before JSF; so it's not as if they would have been required to develop everything from scratch. Deliberate, incremental integration of upgrades has defrayed costs for other manufacturers with fewer resources and less government-support than Boeing.


May all be true but Boeing missed the boat sometime ago and the South Korean cancellation of the F-15SE is just the writing on the wall.... :?
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Unread post17 Oct 2013, 10:25

Corsair1963 wrote:
lookieloo wrote:
Corsair1963 wrote:
lookieloo wrote:
Corsair1963 wrote:I think Boeing may have just shot themselves in the foot with this talk of a split buy of F-35's and F-15SE's. Because if the ROKAF really wanted a Stop Gap until the arrival of the F-35's. Why not just incorporate the F-15SE Stealth features into South Korea existing fleet of F-15K's!!!! :bang:
Doesn't keep the factory doors open. As I already mentioned, there's really no excuse for not having significantly up-rated F-15s and Superhornets already set to go. It's been 12 years since Boeing lost JSF, 12 years during which they twiddled their thumbs and fell behind foreign offerings for customers less concerned with VLO and worried about F-35 delays.
So, Boeing should have paid for the development of further upgraded Strike Eagles and Super Hornets??? :?:
Hard to say. There's been plenty of government-funded subsystems and research out there to work with, even before JSF; so it's not as if they would have been required to develop everything from scratch. Deliberate, incremental integration of upgrades has defrayed costs for other manufacturers with fewer resources and less government-support than Boeing.
May all be true but Boeing missed the boat sometime ago and the South Korean cancellation of the F-15SE is just the writing on the wall.... :?
Hard to argue with that.
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Unread post17 Oct 2013, 13:32

maus92 wrote:
smsgtmac wrote:
maus92 wrote:
Read "The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard" by Bradley, and get back to me. It's a book, available at many base libraries.


And what a horrid little tale it is. I wouldn't recommend it to anyone without serious caveats. Such as only if the reader is interested in:
1. Culture clash fallout when AF and Army test philosophies meet. Traditionally, the AF uses testing and modeling results to grade possible designs and solutions. The Army traditionally has used results to merely inform decision makers.
2. Arsenal Bureaucracy Case Studies. This case belongs with the Spencer Repeater and M-16 stories about how slow and closed to new ideas Army arsenals can be. It is hardly representative of all of the Army, Air Force, or pretty much any other DoD sub-culture behaviors. Some of the problematic test aspects Burton describes were identical to a problem an Army researcher pointed out as something that needed changing years (decades?) before on another test program (Anti-armor shape charge).
3. Consequences of not choosing your friends wisely. Burton never should have let himself get sucked into the reform-school gang of reformers. And never let them help you with your book.
4. An example of the norm. It is rare indeed that someone truly is appreciated for his making the tough stand. Honorable people do it thousands of times every day knowing full well there could/will be blowback. Those with big egos for some reason get upset when it happens to them and cry about it. Those who get the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow are the insufferable exceptions. N.N. Taleb (among others) likes to point out that the positive results of the ~.1% are trumpeted and the other ~99.9% who fall away are left unseen. Its called Survivorship Bias.



Don't like Bradley? - then you definitely won't like Jankowski.


I assume you mean Thaddeus Jankowski? Yep. His (and far too many others) problem is he thinks civilian 'management' theory is directly applicable to the military world. He possesses inconsequential knowledge that he tries to apply consequentially. He's like a am USMC version of the AFs Dan Ward. :)

BTW: I know you meant 'Burton' not 'Bradley' so I didn't say anything the first time. But others may read this and want to look up who we're talking about, so they need to know it is Col Burton. If you want to read the sine qua non of organizational insurgency read Bergerson's "The Army Gets an Air Force". Rationalization like you've never read before, but no where does it adequately defend such insurgency as 'right'. (One reason why I loathe Social 'Scientists'.)
--The ultimate weapon is the mind of man.
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Unread post18 Oct 2013, 12:48

Read a Korean article. [Strategy site I think.]
He said the Airforce in Korea did want the F15SE which they considered good enough to penetrate NK and handle the NK air force fro a long time. Under there procurement system though a Civilian panel has the last say and often Economics is the main consideration. They expect technology exchange and offsets. Boeing was offering very little in this area.
This he said does not mean the F35 now has a better chance since they can't offer much in the way of offsets and definitely will not offer any technology exchange. His contention is that overall Military Strategy in SK is turning more and more to home Produced SAM's for defense and Missiles to take out NK artillery etc. They are still developing better versions with Russian technical help. They don't really take the NK Air-force seriously. What really worries them is the enormous amount of artillery and number of troops NK has. Ranges being short small cheap missiles are now considered an ideal way of taking out that artillery etc. The fact they have developed there own SAM's and Missiles with Russian help is a big selling point with the Civilian panel. He said the SK - Army and Navy are getting all the money they want to buy these home made SAM's and Missiles. The Civilian panel is in favor of this since all the $'s stay in SK.
He predicts they will in the end probably build there own aircraft. All they need is one good enough to handle the NK airforce and provide good ground support should ever 1-2 million troops come swarming over the border but not too good to worry China or Japan. [SK still does not trust Japan] He said at present the only company after all the messing about they have done that may help them in the technology area is Saab. It will be interesting to see what happens. Possibly he is correct.
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Unread post18 Oct 2013, 20:55

Link to said article?
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Unread post18 Oct 2013, 22:36

smsgtmac wrote:
maus92 wrote:
smsgtmac wrote:
maus92 wrote:
Read "The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard" by Bradley, and get back to me. It's a book, available at many base libraries.


And what a horrid little tale it is. I wouldn't recommend it to anyone without serious caveats. Such as only if the reader is interested in:
1. Culture clash fallout when AF and Army test philosophies meet. Traditionally, the AF uses testing and modeling results to grade possible designs and solutions. The Army traditionally has used results to merely inform decision makers.
2. Arsenal Bureaucracy Case Studies. This case belongs with the Spencer Repeater and M-16 stories about how slow and closed to new ideas Army arsenals can be. It is hardly representative of all of the Army, Air Force, or pretty much any other DoD sub-culture behaviors. Some of the problematic test aspects Burton describes were identical to a problem an Army researcher pointed out as something that needed changing years (decades?) before on another test program (Anti-armor shape charge).
3. Consequences of not choosing your friends wisely. Burton never should have let himself get sucked into the reform-school gang of reformers. And never let them help you with your book.
4. An example of the norm. It is rare indeed that someone truly is appreciated for his making the tough stand. Honorable people do it thousands of times every day knowing full well there could/will be blowback. Those with big egos for some reason get upset when it happens to them and cry about it. Those who get the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow are the insufferable exceptions. N.N. Taleb (among others) likes to point out that the positive results of the ~.1% are trumpeted and the other ~99.9% who fall away are left unseen. Its called Survivorship Bias.



Don't like Bradley? - then you definitely won't like Jankowski.


I assume you mean Thaddeus Jankowski? Yep. His (and far too many others) problem is he thinks civilian 'management' theory is directly applicable to the military world. He possesses inconsequential knowledge that he tries to apply consequentially. He's like a am USMC version of the AFs Dan Ward. :)

BTW: I know you meant 'Burton' not 'Bradley' so I didn't say anything the first time. But others may read this and want to look up who we're talking about, so they need to know it is Col Burton. If you want to read the sine qua non of organizational insurgency read Bergerson's "The Army Gets an Air Force". Rationalization like you've never read before, but no where does it adequately defend such insurgency as 'right'. (One reason why I loathe Social 'Scientists'.)


Thanks for the catch re: Burton. Probably had the APC on my brain when I wrote it - unfortunately I'd given his book away a move or two ago, and was relying on memory and just repeated the error. Anyway, the point behind the references is to *encourage* people to search out the material and get more familiar with structural and cultural issues within the Pentagon, and how they affect acquisition decisions and policy. Some clearly have seen the material and discounted it, while others may come to a different conclusion.
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