Australian lawmakers confident in F-35's future

[element1loop]

Back in 2008 Kopp asked Oz to 'harden up': Hardening RAAF Air Base Infrastructure 5th February, 2008
A Monograph by Dr Carlo Kopp, MIEEE, MAIAA http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2008-02.html

hahaha ... get to the chopper!

We don't have money for that? ...soes ... naval air in the pipe, huh?

Epic complacency even Kopp can see. Pity he's so wrong on other matters.

"Oh yaaa!"

[spazsinbad]

I think Intelligence and Satellites can give warning - mentioned earlier. Most naval aircraft would be embarked - few targets ashore. Which is a nice segue into the shell games that can be played (mentioned many time over in the Oz LHDs with Oz F-35B discussions) having F-35Bs embarked on LHDs up north moving around with the aircraft moving on / off to bare bases or temporary FOBs via other helo assets onboard for support but mostly just moving about the north supported by mobile RAAF assets for refuel/rearm if required and mobile maintenance. How does one find these buggas in a hurry?

Anyway now it is time for WHY (an explanation) 'hardening' what exactly is so important and WHY has it been ignored? Is there any online info about the RAAF looking at 'hardening'? Probably ignored for being ineffective and not cost effective?

[element1loop]

Anyway now it is time for WHY (an explanation) 'hardening' what exactly is so important and WHY has it been ignored? Is there any online info about the RAAF looking at 'hardening'? Probably ignored for being ineffective and not cost effective?

Mobility is the element needed. Smaller squadrons can increase presence and mobility, you could even base or rotate assets out of Alice Springs.

But not just platforms, technical people and operational maintenance, deep maintenance and logistics facilities are fixed at main operating bases. So a point defense is required.

As for building shelters, etc., you really only need berms to keep frag limited (already doing that), and enough protection from falling chunks of concrete and steel plus shock protection (no so much at present). I notice Albaross has its engineering underground. Can't complain about that.

The main thing is to focus on detecting and killing cruise missiles before they hit. Tricky in civil Class-C, especially if they go for altitude to get range. So intel must provide guidance of possible attack to cue systems that can intercept including surface fleet, helo, ASW aircraft and Triton.

From 2008:

"More importantly, the data gathered by our surveillance platform must be disseminated in a timely fashion to maintain its tactical/operational relevance. To ensure this happens our future platform must be fully network-enabled through datalinks and satellite communications.

On the maritime front the key challenge will be adapting to evolving submarine technology. The ability to detect and track quiet diesel/AIP submarines in the littoral environment is an ever-increasing problem and the maritime community worldwide has made a concerted effort to reduce the gaps in technology. Multi-static sonobuoy technology may not be the panacea, but it must form the backbone of future ASW sensors. All this technology is currently available but it will continue to evolve.

http://www.australiandefence.com.au/D0D ... 50568C22C9 "

I presume he means dipping as well as fixed and aircraft and ship delivered expendables, plus self-recovering UUV. So hopefully that's well advanced, eight years later.

So they may feel they can find them reliably (in the areas that really matter), and can kill them as fast as you like.

I don't doubt that capacity more or less exists.

If you sometimes find and track two subs from same country moving offshore down or up the east coast at the same time, do you know if they intend to fire? What if they do it off and on randomly for years, sometimes simultaneously? Then one day two subs fire at the same time with one or more salvos, before you can nail them?

Will the surface fleet catch the missiles? Unlikely to be in position to do so if the sub and its intel and sensors are any good. And it's likely they'll be good enough.

Hence a pressing need for dedicated fixed point-defense missiles at main operating bases (including naval).

[spazsinbad]

Well the ADF has listened to the 'find the subs advocates' - we have ROMEO helos equipped with dipping sonar and other good ASW gear along with new P-8s for ASW and Tritons for overwatch. I think ADF will be ASW capable very quickly if there are no hiccups. Friendly subs will be needed to train with and we are getting new ADF subs soonish. I guess the old ones will soldier on for awhile in this training role.

You take some great leaps for the sake of enemy surprise. Foreign subs are tracked hence the recent conniptions in UK for example when a Russian sub was cavorting nearby freely and then the hasty purchase of P-8s for the UK.

ASW is a heck of a topic and I know little - however western navies/AFs are getting serious about it again after a hiatus.

Anyway this topic should be somewhere else - it has little to do with the thread title so thanks for the hijack. I'll just excerpt the old words from KOPP from 2008 re Oz - details above:

""...Hardening RAAF Bases
The very limited hardening and passive defensive measures applied to RAAF bases in the north are a product of the regional capability environment of more than a decade ago, when PGMs were scarce or absent in regional inventories, and standoff or cruise missiles operated only by the US and Soviets. The region is now a very different place, and the RAAF's northern basing can be considered, for all intents and purposes, naked if subjected to a pre-emptive attack using cruise missiles or other PGMs.

In strategic terms, given the small size of the RAAF combat fleet, attrition in combat is not an option to be seriously considered. Hardening the basing infrastructure with lots of concrete is much cheaper than replacing billions of dollars of slow to replace hardware.

In terms of priorities, RAAF Tindal, Darwin and Learmonth are the highest priorities, as they are in the strategically most important locations, and have the best runways making them more useful in a contingency than the gapfiller bases at Curtin and Scherger.

With advent of cruise missile capabilities across the Asia-Pacific-Indian region, early interception becomes a key priority, and this drives up the strategic importance of the Cocos Islands runway, and the Christmas Island runway, primarily as diversion sites, but also as additional Forward Operating Bases (FOB).

Over the next decade Australia will thus have to properly develop and harden its northern airbase infrastructure if it intends to use these sites in a real contingency.

Hardening of Australia's northern bases involves a number of specific measures:
1.Runway improvements to provide at least one 10,000 - 12,000 ft length runway for each base. This is required to accommodate the full spectrum of aircraft types, including tankers and heavy airlifters.

2.Runway surfaces will need to be rated to PCN 100 to 150 so as to provide durability with repetitive use by heavy aircraft, and also to provide damage tolerance.

3.Each base requires a 10,000 to 20,000 tonne capacity hardened concrete underground fuel storage farm (for instance multiple cylindrical 2,000 tonne tanks)

4.Bases located at coastal sites will require an offshore fuel loading jetty or seabed pipeline to permit rapid replenishment of aviation fuel supplies. Tindal will require provisions for replenishment by rail from Katherine.

5.Redundant hardened munitions bunkers with redundant access roads will be required.

6.A buried hardened command bunker for C3, ops, and ATC. Underground air raid shelters should be constructed for other areas of each base.

7.Wagon wheel and other redundant taxiway arrangements should be introduced, where not extant.

8.Hardened Aircraft Shelters capable of resisting at least a bunker busting 1,000 lb class supersonic cruise missile warhead in the class of the AUP-3M will be required not only for fighter aircraft, but also for KC-30 tankers, C-17s, Wedgetails, AP-3C/P-8 LRMPs and other large aircraft. This does offer the added benefits of denying satellite recce visibility and protecting the aircraft from the harsh environment.

9.The recent emergence of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and microwave (HPM) weapons requires that all shelters be hardened against this form of attack.

10.Concrete pads for the requisite number of tents or prefab housing modules needed to support an extended deployment.

11.Underground water and electricity distribution to areas to be used to house personnel, redundant desalination plants and electricity generation of necessary capacity. Sewerage facilities of required capacity.

12.A stormwater drainage system to handle monsoonal weather conditions, including runways, taxiways, shelters, carports, concrete housing pads, bunkers etc.

13.Provisions should be made for the deployment of air defence systems, especially search radars and defensive missile batteries.

There exist a large number of well hardened NATO and former Warsaw Pact bases which can be used as templates for the design of a robust base hardening package.

Conclusions
The advent of PGM technology in the region has rendered extant RAAF air base hardening measures ineffective, opening up the strategic option of a pre-emptive attack, especially using submarine or air launched cruise missiles, against forward deployed RAAF assets at northern bases.

It follows that Australia should invest in a robust program to harden all RAAF basing in the north, and apply like hardening measures in the development of the Cocos Islands and Christmas Island.

Australian Industry and Research Organisations (e.g. CSIRO, Universities) are at the leading edge of construction technologies globally, and Australian research and industry innovations are held in very high regard internationally.

It follows that Australian industry and researchers can make valuable contributions to the development of new air base hardening capabilities, which in turn could directly benefit coalition partners and other allies of Australia."

[element1loop]

... it has little to do with the thread title so thanks for the hijack.

Not intended Spaz, just responding to a discussion relevant to F-35's future, and operation, and to a comment within the thread. You did keep it going as well, I was done with it two comments back.

[spazsinbad]

So we have finished - with a reminder that the RAN specialised in ASW back in the carrier days with S2E/Gs and Wessex 31Bs/SeaKings. The ADF ASW school AJASS of old USED TO BE at NAS Nowra - I wonder where it has gone? bollocks: http://www.defence.gov.au/ADFWC/about.asp

[element1loop]

So we have finished - with a reminder that the RAN specialised in ASW back in the carrier days with S2E/Gs and Wessex 31Bs/SeaKings. The ADF ASW school AJASS of old USED TO BE at NAS Nowra - I wonder where it has gone? bollocks: http://www.defence.gov.au/ADFWC/about.asp

Spaz, please mate. To be be clear, I knew of prior capabilities (cold war). Did you not read the last longish reply above? I wrote:

So they may feel they can find them reliably (in the areas that really matter), and can kill them as fast as you like.

I don't doubt that capacity more or less exists.

Couldn't have been much clearer. You focused on 'hardening' buildings, but I largely ignored that aspect, and focused on point-defense to prevent the damage in the first place. Why? (you asked above, so I replied) Because you don't know if the sub or subs you do detect and track intend to fire. If they fire, and there is no SLCM defense to target, damage is done. I'm focused on how for there to be no, or very low damage if that occurred and then to kill the sub(s) already known to be present (see the initial comments, I said that at the beginning). I am not "advocating" to find subs, but to make them fail. Again, I thought I was being specific and clear. Thanks for the misrepresentation.

We're good here - cheers.

[spazsinbad]

No problem - although you assume the surprise will be one-sided. What stops the ADF from taking out the unknown sub as our form of surprise. What the ADF will likely do is at least let the unknown sub know that they know where it is and perhaps in dire straits force it to surface OR sink it. Subs know when the game is up and will act appropriately or not.

[element1loop]

No problem - although you assume the surprise will be one-sided. What stops the ADF from taking out the unknown sub as our form of surprise. What the ADF will likely do is at least let the unknown sub know that they know where it is and perhaps in dire straits force it to surface OR sink it. Subs know when the game is up and will act appropriately or not.

Covered that. From 4:17 PM comment on previous page:

But just having more and smaller squadrons in more places means the attractiveness of that sort of knock out attack drops off. Plus it becomes much easier to notice an opponent's sub force setting up for such an attack, and to do something, hmm, passive-aggressive about it, earlier.

Sorry for pooping all over your thread with this, it seemed related at the time, with respect to the potential of smaller squadrons that the Abbott quote triggered me with. I goofed.

[spazsinbad]

Speak of AJASS and the old sinkers start blowing spume through their snorkels: [Sea Venom behind Neptune 'J' Hangar]

The Role of AJASS at RANAS Nowra
Jan 2016 Story and Photographs courtesy of Kim Dunstan

"...To build cooperation between the RAN and RAAF the Australian Joint Anti-Submarine School (AJASS) was established in December 1951, at RANAS Nowra....

...From the start AJASS played a leading role in developing Australia’s ASW capability. Besides conducting regular joint anti-submarine ‘war games’ with RAAF, these exercises were often run in conjunction with allied navy and air forces – in particular the British, US, NZ and French services – who would deploy ASW aircraft to Nowra. In addition to the AJASS anti-submarine work, each year major fleet exercises were conducted with SEATO nation partners in the South-East Asia region.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the easing of tensions AJASS was moved to the RAAF base at Williamtown, in December 1990, to be reorganised and renamed the Australian Joint Maritime Warfare Centre, later to be amalgamated with The Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre...."

PHOTO: http://3j8lrq31uyjk1yo9b01c7jub.wpengin ... -Nowra.jpg

Source: http://www.faaaa.asn.au/ajass/

[spazsinbad]

Five more submissions to the enquiry have rocked up here: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus ... ubmissions

Some seem to be inspired/informed by APA - one other seeks to know WHY the F-35 was selected all those years ago - it is the seventh anonymous submission (shades of the Canadian 'throw a spanner in the works' strategy). Otherwise to my skim reading the submission asking for Oz to participate in T&E in USA now (we will do our own once aircraft in Oz also) is a good informed questioning one by a former 'Director General for Test and Evaluation (T&E) from 7 December 2010 until 19 January 2015'. Look to submission PDF no. 5 by Dr Keith F. Joiner, CSC Group Captain (Ret’d): http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ash ... bId=407572 (PDF 78Kb)

A former RAAF Nav in F-111s moans in sub no.4 - at least it is brief. Another wants to start F-22 production but no mention of permission to export to Oz & it has been made clear many times by RAAF we need a multi-role aircraft - but; whatever.

[spazsinbad]

A 1964-65 SECRET document about replacing HMAS Melbourne with a refurbished ESSEX Class carrier and PHANTOM F-4s - I'm gobsmacked - we know MELBOURNE was refurbished in 1967-8 and A4Gs with S2Es with Wessex 31Bs for ASW were acquired/modified (helos). It is here because it shows what goes on behind the scenes that is SECRET then but known some 30 years later. What will we know about the F-35A purchase by Oz in some 15+ years time? Don't hold your breath - breath with me and relax. Australian Pounds COST quoted - don't ask me dollars today. Oz Dollars start early 1966.

RAN proposal for a replacement aircraft carrier and fixed wing aircraft Contents range 1964 - 1966; Series number A1945; Control symbol 244/3/64, Access status Open; Barcode 1565492

http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNR ... ?B=1565492 (242 pages)

Conclusion Page: http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNR ... S=52&N=242

COST: http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNR ... 2&T=P&S=55

Oz Skyhawks were initially A-4Es but with A-4F mods to become A-4Fs but then changed again so designation changed eventually to A-4G but we always at the time 1970s referred to them as A4Gs, without the hyphen - less manual typing.

http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNR ... S=64&N=242 (same doc as above)

From about page 82 in original doc online there is a discussion of British/RN ASW tactics so this document has it all....

Funny HaHaS RN/RAF related start here from page 158 : http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNR ... ?B=1565492

[spazsinbad]

Because there are calls in some submissions to the Oz F-35 inquiry, to have F-22 production started to then somehow get permission to sell to Oz, here is the latest NONstarter.

Reviving F-22 Raptor production a ‘non-starter’
20 Jan 2016 James Drew

"The tooling and equipment needed to produce the twin-engine air-superiority fighter, which was barred from export because of its sophistication, remain in storage along with video instructions for various assembly processes.

This equipment will aid in the remanufacture of spare parts for the aircraft and its two Pratt & Whitney F119 engines, but some Raptor advocates want to see the assembly lines in Marietta, Georgia and Fort Worth, Texas reborn....

...That idea is “pretty much a non-starter,” service secretary Deborah Lee James said when asked about the prospect of resuming serial F-22 production at a recent CSIS event in Washington DC....

...“The very prospect of re-opening that [F-22 line] is pretty much a non-starter,” says James. “We’ve got what we’ve got. We’ve got the F-35 coming, approaching initial operating capability. It’s not the same, but they will complement one another and we’ll have to go forward as is.”"

Source: https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... er-421019/

[maus92]

Aussie Who Led Weapons Tests Knocks F-35
Official urges Australia to take a bigger role in the fighter project or pull out
Joseph Trevithick | WIB

"Australia’s former top weapons tester has warned of serious problems with the country’s $24 billion share of the F-35 stealth fighter program.

The ex-official, Keith Joiner, issued the warnings in a Jan. 4 letter to the Australian Senate’s formal inquiry into the Joint Strike Fighter project. Joiner’s biggest criticisms involve the F-35’s repeated delays, lack of Australian input in the project and the fighter’s powerful computer brain.

The retired official wrote that Canberra must either speak out about the stealth warplane’s problems or pull out of the project. He also favors delaying Australia’s commitment until developer Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon prove the F-35 will deliver on its promises.

“Put simply — get in or get out!” Joiner declared. “Stop being naive that just because something should work it will work.”"

"But for Australia, the software may be one of the JSF’s biggest liabilities, according to Joiner. To ma"

ke the most of these features, the stealth jet’s gear will have to be compatible with the RAAF’s existing aircraft, such as the E-7 Wedgetail radar plane. The F-35s will need powerful and reliable linkages to get all this information in near real time and properly “fuze” everything together.

But Australia has cut or scaled back its own work on new data links and improved satellite communications systems. If the E-7 and sites on the ground can’t “talk” with the new planes, the JSF’s biggest advantage is suddenly … moot...."

"...based on his experience, Joiner said he felt Australia’s F-35 project officers were “timid,” “defensive” and unwilling to raise concerns either internally or with their American counterparts. In the letter, he described the officers as having a “‘passenger mentality’ with respect to the U.S. ‘driver.'”"

"“All of Australia’s decisions, including full production approval by our government, have so far been made while the aircraft is still under U.S. development,” Joiner wrote. “The obvious first logic” would be to hold off until the Americans get their act together, he added."

"Instead of just sitting on the sidelines, Joiner stressed that Australian officials should work closely with their American partners. The letter offered up the development and testing of the P-8 maritime patrol plane as a counter example, which involved an Australian team embedded with their American counterparts during the testing phase. The RAAF now expects to get the first of those planes in 2016, a reasonable four years after fully committing to the project.

“This exemplary … strategy stands in stark contrast to what Australia has pursued with the JSF,” Joiner wrote...."

http://warisboring.com/articles/aussie- ... ocks-f-35/

[spazsinbad]

Fixed the TREVITHICK headline "... KNOCKS the lack of RAAF T&E Timely Participation"

Five more submissions to the enquiry have rocked up here: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus ... ubmissions

Some seem to be inspired/informed by APA - one other seeks to know WHY the F-35 was selected all those years ago - it is the seventh anonymous submission (shades of the Canadian 'throw a spanner in the works' strategy). Otherwise to my skim reading the submission asking for Oz to participate in T&E in USA now (we will do our own once aircraft in Oz also) is a good informed questioning one by a former 'Director General for Test and Evaluation (T&E) from 7 December 2010 until 19 January 2015'. Look to submission PDF no. 5 by Dr Keith F. Joiner, CSC Group Captain (Ret’d): http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=42fa2e59-3b51-4816-902c-0f23827d2770&subId=407572 (PDF 78Kb)

A former RAAF Nav in F-111s moans in sub no.4 - at least it is brief. Another wants to start F-22 production but no mention of permission to export to Oz & it has been made clear many times by RAAF we need a multi-role aircraft - but; whatever.

What a good lad is Trevithick - mentioned here earlier. Interested to see proof for this claim by Trevithick:

"...But Australia has cut or scaled back its own work on new data links and improved satellite communications systems. If the E-7 and sites on the ground can’t “talk” with the new planes, the JSF’s biggest advantage is suddenly … moot...."..."

Below is JOINER text: Does someone in the RAAF know about how the F-35 will interface with RAAF assets? SHIRLEY....

"...5. Lesser Concern – Early De-Risk T&E Opportunities.
The Australian JSF T&E strategy was shaped by the promissory MOTS approach to avoid any T&E until Australia conducts its own operational T&E (circa 2019). Further, for an unknown reason, the 14 early aircraft were purchased for aircrew training and not destined (permitted) to do T&E. My T&E reviews of the risks in the JSF introduction clearly showed that interfaces with other Australian aircraft would be key, such as the interface between Australia’s developed Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft and its Air-to-Air Refuelling aircraft. There was, and remains, opportunity to do some early developmental T&E checks and indeed operational checks on these key interfaces well before Australia commences operational T&E in Australia. Suggestions to do these checks early were met with a kind of timidity and caution suggesting that there was no overarching operational and technical risk management within the Australian JSF office, no contingency funding, and a ‘passenger mentality’ with respect to the U.S. ‘driver’...."