F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 26 Jun 2012, 00:57
by h-bomb
Anyone's 2 cents on this video:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10652020

Claimed a slant range on the display was 49 miles. Excellent resolution. WELL beyond Pave Tack and Lantern systems performance.

RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 26 Jun 2012, 01:45
by count_to_10
That seems to be a view to the side of the aircraft rather than straight forward.

RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 26 Jun 2012, 01:53
by spazsinbad
Some discussion about video here: USAF retiring 5 squadrons of A-10s for F-35s posted by 'munny' Feb 2012

http://www.f-16.net/index.php?name=PNph ... c&p=215819

RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 26 Jun 2012, 02:17
by count_to_10
I never really understood why it is that the Army was prevented from doing it's own CAS. It seems to me it would have been more rational to give the Air Force responsibility for strategic bombing (strike), escort, interception, and long range air superiority, while letting the Army have CAS and short range air superiority.
As it stands, the army makes do with helos and gunships.

RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 26 Jun 2012, 03:35
by archeman
letting the Army have CAS and short range air superiority.


Count210, why would the Army need Air Superiority AND CAS? Wouldn't that require them to go get two different platforms if they wanted specialty equipment separate from the Air Force. It seems that an aircraft that can perform long range air superiority can also do short range air superiority so the Air Force remains in a good position equipment-wise to cover that role.

RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 26 Jun 2012, 13:37
by sprstdlyscottsmn
because when the USAAC became the USAF it was decreed that the Army would have no fixed wing assets with weapons.

RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 26 Jun 2012, 16:36
by archeman
the Army would have no fixed wing assets with weapons

(((I know we're off topic abit here, but the original post was somewhat redundant of an earlier thread))).
I thought that the rule was - No fixed wing assets with FORWARD firing weapons.
That clause in the rule I thought was to prevent the Army from thinking in terms of attacking other aircraft, but not prevent them from taking prudent defensive measures such as mounting door/window gunners on their transports and spotter aircraft if they felt they needed to. Rotary wing aircraft at the time the rule was created were fragile trembling fawns that were not imagined to become the threat they now present.
The current fleet of Army UAVs sure seem to be bypassing that rule however. Perhaps it is now being interpreted as only for manned aircraft and all bets are off for UAVs.

RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 26 Jun 2012, 20:09
by Code3
Anybody who has served in any capacity with the Army where they contol air tasking understands immediately why they don't have air assets...they have no idea how to use them. They view air assets as an extension of the ground commander and tie those assets to his mission. To hell with all the other targets of opportunity with a more strategic affect. If the ground commander is in charge of air assets and has his way, the aircraft will be drilling holes in the sky above his mission doing nothing because they're "his" assets rather releasing them to another unit or tasking where they can have a greater effect. There is a reason the Air Force fought so hard to become a separate service, AND a reason the DoD and congress agreed it needed to happen. The same reasons are still applicable today.

RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 26 Jun 2012, 20:12
by twintwinsingle
Shack, Code 3!

Re: RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 26 Jun 2012, 22:52
by count_to_10
Code3 wrote:Anybody who has served in any capacity with the Army where they contol air tasking understands immediately why they don't have air assets...they have no idea how to use them. They view air assets as an extension of the ground commander and tie those assets to his mission. To hell with all the other targets of opportunity with a more strategic affect. If the ground commander is in charge of air assets and has his way, the aircraft will be drilling holes in the sky above his mission doing nothing because they're "his" assets rather releasing them to another unit or tasking where they can have a greater effect. There is a reason the Air Force fought so hard to become a separate service, AND a reason the DoD and congress agreed it needed to happen. The same reasons are still applicable today.

So, in order to keep generals from hording CAS, we ended up with decades of ignoring CAS with aircraft that were pressed into CAS without being built for it, tasked by people that were more interested in strike missions, and with an extra couple of layers of command structure separating the people needing the CAS from the people doing it.

On long range vs. short range air superiority, one of the reasons that US fighters had a problem with Migs in Vietnam was that the long range US fighters were going up against short range Migs that had less baggage. We may well have lucked out there, because (to my knowledge) the US hasn't really defended against an air attack since WWII.

Re: RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 27 Jun 2012, 02:51
by bigjku
count_to_10 wrote:
Code3 wrote:Anybody who has served in any capacity with the Army where they contol air tasking understands immediately why they don't have air assets...they have no idea how to use them. They view air assets as an extension of the ground commander and tie those assets to his mission. To hell with all the other targets of opportunity with a more strategic affect. If the ground commander is in charge of air assets and has his way, the aircraft will be drilling holes in the sky above his mission doing nothing because they're "his" assets rather releasing them to another unit or tasking where they can have a greater effect. There is a reason the Air Force fought so hard to become a separate service, AND a reason the DoD and congress agreed it needed to happen. The same reasons are still applicable today.

So, in order to keep generals from hording CAS, we ended up with decades of ignoring CAS with aircraft that were pressed into CAS without being built for it, tasked by people that were more interested in strike missions, and with an extra couple of layers of command structure separating the people needing the CAS from the people doing it.

On long range vs. short range air superiority, one of the reasons that US fighters had a problem with Migs in Vietnam was that the long range US fighters were going up against short range Migs that had less baggage. We may well have lucked out there, because (to my knowledge) the US hasn't really defended against an air attack since WWII.


I think that is a pretty narrow view of things. Having the Air Force apart from the Army encourages a healthy discussion about the most effective way to utilize air power in a given environment. The army is always going to think it needs CAS when sometimes that may not be the most effective way to manage the battle space.

And lets be 100% honest, having the Air Force to blame lets the Army commanders off the hook in many regards. If the Army had its own aircraft and was responsible for using air in the battle space to a given depth from the front then they would run into the same issue as the Air Force can which is that there are more CAS request than one could hope to service. Given the chance most ground force commanders will call for air support all the time to help protect their force. Someone has to be the ******* that decides what priorities are.

I also think it is very unfair to say that CAS has been ignored. You can cite the Vietnam War about fighters and CAS but to be honest all US services were mostly preparing to fight a nuclear WW III and much of the equipment was designed to fight that war.

When a conventional posture was called for the USAF clearly took the steps necessary to provide CAS and by almost all reports I have heard has supplied the necessary CAS in both of our current conflicts. I mean in what instances can someone say the USAF has not provided the necessary CAS when called upon in recent history?

I honestly think the system has led to fairly good outcomes for both sides. The USAF brings a branch to planning that thinks about the battlefield in a deeper sense which is immensely valuable. The Army has, because of their restrictions, focused on systems such as Apache and UAV's that really provide what they want better anyway which is persistent fire support at the point of engagement and relatively deep within the division or corps area of responsibility.

Having two chains of command responsible for high speed jets in one battle space is a recipe for disaster as well. Under the current joint operations model all the army fixed-wing planes you want to give them would be under the command of the air-component commander to begin with. You are basically talking about undoing Goldwater-Nichols.

RE: Re: RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 27 Jun 2012, 14:00
by neptune
http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/page ... l?d=260297

Northrop Grumman's F-35 DAS and Radar Demonstrate Ability to Detect, Track, Target Ballistic Missiles

LINTHICUM, Md., June 26, 2012 .. -- Northrop Grumman Corporation .. recently demonstrated the ballistic missile detection, tracking and targeting capabilities of the company's AN/AAQ-37 distributed aperture system (DAS) and AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, both of which are featured on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft.

A video accompanying this release is available on YouTube at http://youtu.be/qF29GBSpRF4.

Leveraging NASA's Science Mission Directorate-sponsored Anomalous Transport Rocket Experiment launch operation, the demonstration was coordinated with NASA and the U.S. Air Force to ensure that it did not impact NASA's primary science mission goals. The systems were demonstrated in flight onboard the company's BAC1-11 testbed aircraft.
Northrop Grumman's DAS and APG-81 autonomously detected, tracked and targeted multiple, simultaneous ballistic rockets. The DAS autonomously detected all five rockets, launched in rapid succession, and tracked them from initial launch well past the second stage burnout.

"Northrop Grumman demonstrated these ballistic missile tracking modes with only minor modifications to the baseline F-35 JSF radar and DAS software," said Jeff Leavitt, vice president of Northrop Grumman's combat avionic systems business unit. "Since DAS is always staring simultaneously in every direction, an operator does not have to point the sensor in the direction of a target to gain a track. The F-35 pilot could continue the primary mission while the sensors automatically observe ballistic missile threats."
The APG-81 AESA radar demonstrated the ability to provide acquisition and weapons quality tracks independently, and also via pointing cues from DAS for expedited and extended range target acquisition. The radar maintained each track from initial acquisition until the rocket exited the radar's field of view.

Leavitt added that Northrop Grumman is currently exploring how the existing DAS technology could assist in several additional mission areas, including irregular warfare operations.

The multifunction AN/APG-81 AESA radar is capable of the full range of air-to-air and air-to-surface capabilities complemented by significant electronic warfare and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance functions. The AN/AAQ-37 DAS provides passive spherical awareness for the F-35, simultaneously detecting and tracking aircraft and missiles in every direction, and providing visual imagery for day/night navigation and targeting purposes.....

Re: RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 27 Jun 2012, 23:16
by count_to_10
bigjku wrote:Having two chains of command responsible for high speed jets in one battle space is a recipe for disaster as well. Under the current joint operations model all the army fixed-wing planes you want to give them would be under the command of the air-component commander to begin with. You are basically talking about undoing Goldwater-Nichols.

Actually, looking at Goldwater-Nichols, it operationally breaks CAS off from the strategic air power and puts it directly under the command of the "Joint" commander. The different services end up only running preparation and logistics for their assets, which are then turned over the the general in charge of the local front. That's actually closer to what I was suggesting.

Also, given that Goldwater-Nicols wasn't passed until the 80's, it obviously wasn't the thing keeping the Army from building CAS aircraft in the 70's.

Re: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 28 Jun 2012, 01:13
by geogen
h-bomb wrote:Anyone's 2 cents on this video:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10652020

Claimed a slant range on the display was 49 miles. Excellent resolution. WELL beyond Pave Tack and Lantern systems performance.


Now just imagine the high fidelity from the next-gen, enhanced 1k FLIR Litening SE pod and Sniper SE pod will enable for the warfighter. Hope Northrop and LM will reveal those clips to the public too ;)

Re: RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 28 Jun 2012, 02:44
by bigjku
count_to_10 wrote:
bigjku wrote:Having two chains of command responsible for high speed jets in one battle space is a recipe for disaster as well. Under the current joint operations model all the army fixed-wing planes you want to give them would be under the command of the air-component commander to begin with. You are basically talking about undoing Goldwater-Nichols.

Actually, looking at Goldwater-Nichols, it operationally breaks CAS off from the strategic air power and puts it directly under the command of the "Joint" commander. The different services end up only running preparation and logistics for their assets, which are then turned over the the general in charge of the local front. That's actually closer to what I was suggesting.

Also, given that Goldwater-Nicols wasn't passed until the 80's, it obviously wasn't the thing keeping the Army from building CAS aircraft in the 70's.


Goldwater-Nichols operations breaks off all aircraft in a theater and puts them under the joint commander. That is why CENTAF was commanding F-117's and F-111's and F-15E's in deep strikes against Iraq in 1991. In fact during that conflict the Marines fought the same battle you are suggesting the army fight, that their aircraft be under their control and were flat told no by the overall commander. Just like everyone else their fixed wing craft reported to and were tasked by CENTAF.

The break is not at the CAS/Strategic level. It is at the theater level. The theater air commander decides what should be used for CAS and what should be used for other strikes in the area.

Re: RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 28 Jun 2012, 19:52
by hb_pencil
bigjku wrote:
count_to_10 wrote:
Code3 wrote:Anybody who has served in any capacity with the Army where they contol air tasking understands immediately why they don't have air assets...they have no idea how to use them. They view air assets as an extension of the ground commander and tie those assets to his mission. To hell with all the other targets of opportunity with a more strategic affect. If the ground commander is in charge of air assets and has his way, the aircraft will be drilling holes in the sky above his mission doing nothing because they're "his" assets rather releasing them to another unit or tasking where they can have a greater effect. There is a reason the Air Force fought so hard to become a separate service, AND a reason the DoD and congress agreed it needed to happen. The same reasons are still applicable today.

So, in order to keep generals from hording CAS, we ended up with decades of ignoring CAS with aircraft that were pressed into CAS without being built for it, tasked by people that were more interested in strike missions, and with an extra couple of layers of command structure separating the people needing the CAS from the people doing it.

On long range vs. short range air superiority, one of the reasons that US fighters had a problem with Migs in Vietnam was that the long range US fighters were going up against short range Migs that had less baggage. We may well have lucked out there, because (to my knowledge) the US hasn't really defended against an air attack since WWII.


I think that is a pretty narrow view of things. Having the Air Force apart from the Army encourages a healthy discussion about the most effective way to utilize air power in a given environment. The army is always going to think it needs CAS when sometimes that may not be the most effective way to manage the battle space.

And lets be 100% honest, having the Air Force to blame lets the Army commanders off the hook in many regards. If the Army had its own aircraft and was responsible for using air in the battle space to a given depth from the front then they would run into the same issue as the Air Force can which is that there are more CAS request than one could hope to service. Given the chance most ground force commanders will call for air support all the time to help protect their force. Someone has to be the ******* that decides what priorities are.

I also think it is very unfair to say that CAS has been ignored. You can cite the Vietnam War about fighters and CAS but to be honest all US services were mostly preparing to fight a nuclear WW III and much of the equipment was designed to fight that war.

When a conventional posture was called for the USAF clearly took the steps necessary to provide CAS and by almost all reports I have heard has supplied the necessary CAS in both of our current conflicts. I mean in what instances can someone say the USAF has not provided the necessary CAS when called upon in recent history?

I honestly think the system has led to fairly good outcomes for both sides. The USAF brings a branch to planning that thinks about the battlefield in a deeper sense which is immensely valuable. The Army has, because of their restrictions, focused on systems such as Apache and UAV's that really provide what they want better anyway which is persistent fire support at the point of engagement and relatively deep within the division or corps area of responsibility.

Having two chains of command responsible for high speed jets in one battle space is a recipe for disaster as well. Under the current joint operations model all the army fixed-wing planes you want to give them would be under the command of the air-component commander to begin with. You are basically talking about undoing Goldwater-Nichols.


Wow, that's an excellent post. I think you're on the mark that Vietnam that the AF was not so much CAS-adverse as it was more conventional warfare-adverse. Alot of this was based on the flawed assumptions of the New Look strategy. I can't remember the figures but less than 20% of the USAF budget prior to 1962 was devoted to conventional fighting capabilities. You had the secretary of the Air Force stand up in front of congress and suggesting to defund the Army because they were preparing to fight using outdated concepts of war.

Vietnam certainly brought a new realization of the need to develop effective conventional warfare capabilities. The A-7 and A-10 were the first generation of that. However Airland battle gave the organizational structure to really make this conceptual shift. Now all aircraft needed to be flexible, able to either undertake CAS as well as deep interdiction. This was aided by the advent of precision guided munitions, which opened up new operational roles for aircraft. Vietnam was an important lesson, but arguable it was the failings of the Granada invasion the spurred better joint use of assets rather than single service domination.

Re: RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 28 Jun 2012, 21:29
by maus92
Code3 wrote:They [the Army] view air assets as an extension of the ground commander and tie those assets to his mission.


Oh, you mean like the Marines....

Re: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 30 Jun 2012, 05:00
by LinkF16SimDude
Let's get back....:ontopic:

h-bomb wrote:Anyone's 2 cents on this video:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10652020

Claimed a slant range on the display was 49 miles. Excellent resolution. WELL beyond Pave Tack and Lantern systems performance.
The video of Vegas he was showing was actually taken thru one of LockMart's SNIPER pods a year or so back. The kind of EO resolution shown is directly applicable to the F-35's EODAS.

RE: Re: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 30 Jun 2012, 19:56
by SpudmanWP
Sniper = EOTS on the F-35, not EODAS.

Re: RE: F-35 EO system video

Unread postPosted: 30 Jun 2012, 20:19
by stereospace
bigjku wrote:
count_to_10 wrote:
Code3 wrote:Anybody who has served in any capacity with the Army where they contol air tasking understands immediately why they don't have air assets...they have no idea how to use them. They view air assets as an extension of the ground commander and tie those assets to his mission. To hell with all the other targets of opportunity with a more strategic affect. If the ground commander is in charge of air assets and has his way, the aircraft will be drilling holes in the sky above his mission doing nothing because they're "his" assets rather releasing them to another unit or tasking where they can have a greater effect. There is a reason the Air Force fought so hard to become a separate service, AND a reason the DoD and congress agreed it needed to happen. The same reasons are still applicable today.

So, in order to keep generals from hording CAS, we ended up with decades of ignoring CAS with aircraft that were pressed into CAS without being built for it, tasked by people that were more interested in strike missions, and with an extra couple of layers of command structure separating the people needing the CAS from the people doing it.

On long range vs. short range air superiority, one of the reasons that US fighters had a problem with Migs in Vietnam was that the long range US fighters were going up against short range Migs that had less baggage. We may well have lucked out there, because (to my knowledge) the US hasn't really defended against an air attack since WWII.


I think that is a pretty narrow view of things. Having the Air Force apart from the Army encourages a healthy discussion about the most effective way to utilize air power in a given environment. The army is always going to think it needs CAS when sometimes that may not be the most effective way to manage the battle space.

And lets be 100% honest, having the Air Force to blame lets the Army commanders off the hook in many regards. If the Army had its own aircraft and was responsible for using air in the battle space to a given depth from the front then they would run into the same issue as the Air Force can which is that there are more CAS request than one could hope to service. Given the chance most ground force commanders will call for air support all the time to help protect their force. Someone has to be the ******* that decides what priorities are.

I also think it is very unfair to say that CAS has been ignored. You can cite the Vietnam War about fighters and CAS but to be honest all US services were mostly preparing to fight a nuclear WW III and much of the equipment was designed to fight that war.

When a conventional posture was called for the USAF clearly took the steps necessary to provide CAS and by almost all reports I have heard has supplied the necessary CAS in both of our current conflicts. I mean in what instances can someone say the USAF has not provided the necessary CAS when called upon in recent history?

I honestly think the system has led to fairly good outcomes for both sides. The USAF brings a branch to planning that thinks about the battlefield in a deeper sense which is immensely valuable. The Army has, because of their restrictions, focused on systems such as Apache and UAV's that really provide what they want better anyway which is persistent fire support at the point of engagement and relatively deep within the division or corps area of responsibility.

Having two chains of command responsible for high speed jets in one battle space is a recipe for disaster as well. Under the current joint operations model all the army fixed-wing planes you want to give them would be under the command of the air-component commander to begin with. You are basically talking about undoing Goldwater-Nichols.


I agree with all that. In addition, the re-org that occurred under Goldwater-Nichols allows the theater commander to make the calls that best advance the overall effort. So far, that seems to be working exceptionally well. One of those (rare) instances when congress seems to have gotten the solution just right.