F-35 Live Fire Info

F-35 Armament, fuel tanks, internal and external hardpoints, loadouts, and other stores.
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SpudmanWP

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Unread post23 Jun 2010, 16:59

I found a newsletter (Spring 2010) about aircraft survivability and extracted the relevant F-35 Live Fire information.

They cover topics like which F-35s are involved (more than just AA-1), pilot in-the-loop simulation while the tests are going on, etc.

Enjoy.
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JSF Live Fire Update.pdf
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Unread post23 Jun 2010, 17:55

Wow, I didn't realize the extent that the testing was going to go for the live fire tests. It adds a lot of confidence . . . assuming the jet does well.
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Unread post23 Jun 2010, 19:50

SpudmanWP, same PDF (with all the pages so twice as large at 3.3Mb) can be found on this page: (27 May 2010)

http://www.f-16.net/f-16_forum_viewtopi ... rt-75.html

F-35 Live Fire Test: Full-Up Systems Level Testing

http://www.bahdayton.com/surviac/asnews ... ring10.pdf (3.3Mb)

"The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (F-35, Lightning II) Vulnerability and Live Fire Test Team will be
conducting Full-Up System Level (FUSL) testing on the 1st JSF System Design and Development
(SDD) aircraft (2AA:0001). The F-35 live fire test and evaluation (LFT&E) strategy is to conduct a
comprehensive test and evaluation of the system-level vulnerability and lethality of all three F-35
variants against ballistic and advanced threats. The original LFT&E strategy for determining the
system-level vulnerability for the F-35 family of aircraft was founded on the FUSL testing of an
F-35 short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) variant. The approach for the remaining two
variants was to leverage the high degree of commonality between the F-35 family of aircraft by
conducting Full-Up testing of the variant unique features and component/system level tests. The
waiver approving this live fire (LF) strategy was approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) on 25 October 2001."
RAN FAA A4G Skyhawk 1970s: https://www.faaaa.asn.au/spazsinbad-a4g/ AND https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwqC_s6gcCVvG7NOge3qfAQ/
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Unread post24 Jun 2010, 02:08

My bad on the duplicate post..
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Unread post24 Jun 2010, 05:54

SpWP, no worries - regularly I try to duplicate an already found/published PDF on this forum. Difficult to keep track of all the good info on this forum - a good thing. :D
RAN FAA A4G Skyhawk 1970s: https://www.faaaa.asn.au/spazsinbad-a4g/ AND https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwqC_s6gcCVvG7NOge3qfAQ/
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Unread post10 Apr 2012, 06:38

Updated Info and Results:

I'll apologize ahead of time as I do not know if is my computer, DSL line, or the report is offline, but I found info regarding the FUSL testing but can only post the Google cached info. In case the report comes back online, here is the link and the Google cache:

www.bahdayton.com/surviac/asnews/ASJ_Sp ... V9_web.pdf

Aircraft Survivability Journal - Spring 2012 Issue
Published by the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Office

JSF FULL UP SYSTEM LEVEL TESTING
F35 Flight Critical Systems Test
By Chuck Frankenberger

To fulfill the congressionally mandated Live Fire Test (LFT) activity, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is conducting Full Up System Level (FUSL) testing on one JSF variant, and will conduct variant unique testing on production representative structural test articles. Aircraft 2AA:0001, (AA-1), a Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) Air Force variant, was selected as the FUSL test article and was used in conjunction with pilot in the loop simulator testing to obtain an overall assessment of the pilot/aircraft’s ability to maintain safe flight after ballistic damage. The test program was designed to evaluate the aircraft systems for synergistic effects.

As engineers, we do our best to incorporate lessons learned from past projects into design of the next program. However, there remain many unknowns even when leveraging this knowledge base. As the trend continues toward highly integrated aircraft systems compared to the aircraft they are replacing, the unknown reaction of these integrated systems to ballistic damage is not well understood. What are the interactions between systems given ballistic damage? Does damage to one system affect the performance of other systems? The primary benefit of FUSL testing is the ability to monitor each of the aircraft systems simultaneously to capture transient behaviors and interactions across systems. During aircraft development, components are tested individually, then as individual systems, then as integrated systems. The JSF LFT program has followed this developmental test approach, testing components early on in the program and system level testing on AA-1. Live Fire testing is required at the system level to take into consideration the non graceful degradation of components/systems as a result of ballistic damage. Damage to one system should not adversely affect other systems. For systems with redundant or backup capabilities, damage should remain isolated and should not affect the ability to transition into backup configurations.

AA-1 was the first produced JSF CTOL aircraft. AA-1 flew to China Lake on 17 December 2009, its 91st flight, and had accumulated 125.9 flight hours. AA-1 had started production prior to the program going through a significant weight reduction effort in 2004 – 2005. This weight reduction activity resulted in major changes in the airframe structure, which made most of the AA-1 structure non-production representative. The flight critical systems tested in AA-1 are functionally representative of F35 production aircraft. In some cases, there are slight variations in component location and configuration. These variations were taken into consideration during the test program to provide production representative testing. The objective of this test series was to evaluate flight critical systems response to ballistic damage. Flight critical systems include the Flight Control System (FCS), Vehicle System Network (VSN), Electrical Power System (EPS), and the Power and Thermal Management System (PTMS). A secondary objective was to verify component failure modes used previously in controlled damage test scenarios. In these tests, Lockheed’s pilot-in-the-loop Vehicle Integration Facility (VIF) and Vehicle System Integration Facility were used to evaluate pilot response and aircraft handling qualities after simulated aircraft damage.

Test participants include China Lake Weapons Survivability Lab (WSL) test personnel, Lockheed Martin (LM) LFT team members, LM IPT Subsystem experts, Wright Patterson JSF LFT team members, OSd/LFT&E, and IdA representatives.

TEST APPROACH
This test series was conducted in a way to best represent a combat mission. Test procedures from battery on, engine start, throttle to MIL, gear up…to gear down, engine off, were defined in each run plan. Aircraft systems were in a flight configuration. A critical part of the test program was the ability to move the flight controls and to appropriately load the electrical power system. To do this, surface positions were recorded in the VIF during pilot in the loop testing and used as a flight control script to move the control surfaces at rate during AA-1 ballistic testing. The aircraft was operated remotely using its internal systems. Pilot interfaces were controlled remotely through a Compact Remote Input/Output (RIO) control system developed by China Lake Weapons Survivability engineers. This includes pilot functions such as the battery switch, engine start switch and gear handle. Cockpit displays were provided through a software package developed by Lockheed Martin. This included displaying Integrated Cautions and Warnings (ICAWs). System monitoring was also provided through software packages used in the design and test of the aircraft during initial flight qualifying check outs. This provided test engineers with a very good view of the aircraft system performance during test events.

Systems monitored during test included EPS, PTMS, and FCS. Test sequencing was defined to balance the need to keep the aircraft in a FUSL configuration as long as possible to acquire system level results, and the need to address high priority tests that would take the aircraft out of a FUSL configuration. Early low risk tests were conducted on wire harnesses and cooling ducts that were easily repaired. These early tests verified that the response of the EPS and PTMS systems compared favorably to the response seen in the pilot-in-the-loop simulator tests. Testing progressed to shooting various line replaceable units as part of the FCS and EPS. Spares components were used to reconstitute the test article. High priority tests were conducted after the replaceable component shots were completed. These tests include a Man Portable Air defense System (MANPAD) shot, an HEI shot into a fuel tank, a fragment shot into the integrated power package (IPP) rotating machinery, and a polyalphaolefin (PAO) (avionics cooling fluid) fire test. Close attention was given to the sequence in which the aircraft systems were degraded. Test sequencing was based on system dependencies and facility integration requirements. As an example, to conduct fire detection testing on the aircraft, the three Vehicle Mission Computers (VMC) and all RIO’s needed to be operational to evaluate fire detection capability. The fire detector inputs are spread across the RIOs and the RIOs spread across the VMC bus channels, and the detection software housed in the VMCs. These systems were required to be operational until the fire detection capability was no longer needed.

TEST RESULT
Ballistic testing was conducted on AA-1 from October 2010 to September 2011. A total of 25 ballistic tests were completed. During 16 of these tests the aircraft was in a FUSL configuration: engine on, aircraft operating on internal power. Threats in the test program included surface to air warhead fragments, armor piercing projectiles, high explosive projectiles, and a MANPAD.

Table 1
System Tested.....................Number of Tests
Electrical Power System..........7
Power and Thermal Management System............4
Flight Control System...........8
Vehicle System Network..........6
Propulsion...........................1 (shared with FLCS)

EPS DESIGN: ROBUST
EPS components are well distributed around the aircraft, providing separation, reducing the effect from larger threats. EPS components are electrically protected as well. Seven shots were conducted across various parts of the EPS system. These tests ranged from simple wiring shots to shots into power conversion and distribution components. The EPS testing was conducted to ensure that damage to one part of the system did not propagate to components upstream of the damaged component, or propagate across redundant paths, ensuring backup power modes were sufficient to provide power for continued safe flight. The 270VdC power generation and distribution system successfully demonstrated the ability to quickly detect ground faults and isolate damage. The system automatically transitioned to battery fill power, then reconfigured to backup power modes to allow continued safe flight.

VSN DESIGN: NO CASCADING EFFECTS
VSN architecture successfully detects a damaged component or wire harness and reconfigures to continue communication with other components. Ballistic damage to flight control electronics and wiring was successfully handled by the VSN software error-handling and functional redundancy capability. Due to the nature of the 1394 bus loop, severing a wire or loss of a component resulted in the bus reconfiguring to reestablish communication with the components on either side of the damaged area. Flight control electronic controllers have a further level of redundancy as they pass information on a separate network in the event of bus failures. When components were damaged, the failures seen were benign, with only minor interruption of bus traffic as the bus reconfigured. Ballistic damage to components did not result in the generation of errant signals, the component typically dropped off line. The VMCs flagged the component as failed and reconfigured the bus.

FCS ARCHITECTURE: NO CHEAP KILLS
One of the newer technologies in the F35 is the Electrohydrostatic Actuators. These actuators contain a self-contained hydraulic system. There are two types of actuators on the aircraft: simplex and dual tandem. The dual actuators have redundancies built in, including dual communication and power paths. The dual actuators were ballistically tested and showed good tolerance to damage. The redundant systems are isolated, and damage on one side did not propagate to the other side.

FIRE: SIGNIFICANT THREAT
As with most aircraft, fire is the primary vulnerability to the F35. Fire extinguishing is limited to the IPP bay. This system was installed primarily for ground safety reasons. Fuel, hydraulic, and PAO fluids are the primary sources of fire on the aircraft and are distributed throughout the aircraft. As one would expect, fire is a threat to Flight Critical Systems. Ullage protection is provided by an On board Inert Gas Generating System (ObIGGS). Fuel tank inerting proved successful in this test series preventing fuel tank ullage explosions.

CONCLUSIONS
The FUSL testing conducted on AA-1 was very successful meeting all defined test objectives and success criteria. Addressing synergistic effects, the electrical power and flight control systems successfully isolated failures and protected the redundancies built into these systems, allowing continued safe flight. The VSN architecture is robust, providing multiple paths to transfer data. Testing highlighted that fire is a significant threat to flight critical systems. The test team was able to verify that the actual ballistic damage response correlated very well to previous pilot in the loop simulator testing. Over the course of the test program, the LFT team witnessed firsthand the robustness of the F35 flight critical systems, no cheap system kills.

Visit us online at http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil


--EDIT--

Looks like teh PDF is back up abd I attached it below just in case.

Here is a "shot" (pardon the pun ;) ) of the FUSL testing in action.

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Attachments
ASJ_Spring2012_V9_web.pdf
Spring 2012 Aircraft survival Journal
(1.98 MiB) Downloaded 3674 times
Last edited by SpudmanWP on 11 Apr 2012, 16:41, edited 1 time in total.
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popcorn

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Unread post10 Apr 2012, 11:25

Any one know the comparable results for legacy jets or Raptor? The F-35 is shaping up to be a tough bird.
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Unread post11 Apr 2012, 15:15

Prediction: APA, Eric and Sweetman will all put out articles in the next week only focusing on 3 words: FIRE: SIGNIFICANT THREAT.

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