The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 1991

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2015, 02:20
by oldiaf
To American public the first Air to Air victory achieved in Operation Desert Storm was either that of Cap. Steve Tate F-15C from 71TFS/1TFW on a Mirage F.1EQ ( pilot Lt.col. Sabah Mutlag 89 Squadron - ejected safely ). Or Lt.Col.Jon Kilk F-15C from 58TFS/33TFW on MiG-29 ( Iraqis never admitted this loss ) .

In fact the first Air to Air Victory in that war was achieved by Iraqi Air Force Lt. Zuhair Dawood MiG-25PD from 96 Squadron on USN F/A-18C ( Pilot LCDR Scott Speicher VFA-81from USS Saratoga CV-60 ).

While the story has been covered very well by American media ( with the details of the loss and confusion to what cause the loss or the fate of the pilot )... No one had ever get the story from the Iraqi perspective ... The perspective of the Pilot him self .... The following is the story of the engagement as the Pilot at that time Lt. Zuhair Dawood reported it to his command :

Jan 17 1991
On the night of Jan 16/17 , I was on standby alert along with other 3 pilots of 96 squadron in the main aircraft shelter of Alqadisiya base ( Ain Alasad base ) and other 4 pilots in the other shelter ( Note 1 ) ... In fact I was wearing my flight suit.
On 0238 hr the Air Defence telephone ring and I answered the call and there was a guy screaming at the other end of the line : MiG-25 IMMEDIATE TAKE OFF !! ( Note 2 ) ... So I hurried to the aircraft MiG-25PD ( Note 3 ) ... In Fact the technicians were ready for this moment and the aircraft was ready ... So the take off was exceptionally fast ( 3 minutes since I received the call ) ...

After take off I switched to safe frequency and established contact with GCI of the Air Defence Sector... Sky was clear with very good visibility .... The GCI started to give me directions of group of aircrafts that penetrated the Iraqi air space to the south of the base ...

My radar was still warming and I was 90Km ( 50nm ) from the target formation when an enemy aircraft locked me with Radar ... So I performed a hard maneuver and the lock broke .... I reported what happened to the GCI and he told me to return to the same direction and you have targets at 38Km ( 20nm ) .. Mean while my Radar became ready ... I locked a target 38Km ( 20nm ) from me and at 29Km ( 15nm ) I fired R-40RD missile from my under Rt. wing .... I kept the target locked with my radar till I witnessed I huge explosion in front of me ... I kept looking to the aircraft going down spirally to the ground with fire engulfing it ... This happened at almost 180Km from base ( less than 100nm ) .

At that time as I understood later , Enemy aircrafts were attacking the base as they hit the old runway while others attacked with cluster bombs both the runway and taxiways and as a result my squadron mates took shelter in the underground bunkers and closed the hardened hangers doors .

Meanwhile .... I locked another target from behind ( Note 4 ) at 40Km ( 22nm ) and I asked the GCI for permission to fire but the GCI refused and asked me to confirm the target visually so I approached it and I couldn't believe he still unaware of me till I reached 8Km ( 4.5nm) and prepared R-40TD heat seeking fire and forget missile and asked the GCI again for permission to fire but he denied my request again and I asked him why ? ... He told me there was a MiG-29 ( Note 5 ) took off 10 minutes after me and he lost track with it and he fears I might engaging it ... I told him this slow moving target is impossible to be MiG-29 but he insisted I disengage and return to base .... So I moved passed the target aircraft and I can still remember the cockpit lights of that aircraft .....

I asked the GCI for directions to base because there was a malfunction in the Navigation instruments in my aircraft and he told me that he lost Radar contact with me !! but told me to take 340 barring from my last location ... I asked him where was my last location in relation to base ? .... But the connection was suddenly lost ... I tried to contact him again but to No use .... I feeling of despair as fuel is becoming low and the navigation instruments is down as I mentioned and as It was dark I could see nothing of ground features as electricity is lost all over the place ....the only thing could see is AAA and SAM fire .... But suddenly I noticed that Haditha train station having electrical power and since I know its location 35Km ( 19nm ) north of base ... I turned around toward the base and connection with GCI re-established but with very poor quality and he told me to switch to base frequency and I did it but no one was responding but anyway I started approaching the base and I switched the wing lights of the aircraft so they would know its friendly airplane and the runway lights were switched on for me ( I later knew that they were tracking me visually ) ... But suddenly and with connection is very poor and breaking up voice the landing officer was screaming to me : DO NOT LAND AT THE MAIN RUNWAY !!! ... So I made a turn and landed in the secondary runway ( later I understood that the main runway was crated by bombing in its last 1/3 ) .... No one was there when I landed .. All inside shelters ... So I taxied the aircraft to the gate of one of the shelters and while doing that I noticed the amount of destruction to the base with concrete chunks and metal objects ( bomb fragments ) all over the place ... I increased the thrust so they can hear the sound of the engine inside the shelter and let me in ... And it worked and they let me and the aircraft to go to the shelter..
End of Story

image.jpg
Lt. Zuhair Dawood and a Soviet technician at late 80s or 90 ... Faces were not shown for privacy


Notes :
1- Alqadisiya AB was home base of 2 squadrons : Squadron 96 MiG-25PD and Squadron 39 MiG-29A , He didn't clarify wether the other 4 pilots in the second shelter from his squadron or the MiG-29 squadron.
2- Contrary to what coalition thought that the Iraqis didn't realized the war has started until Baghdad was bombed by the F-117A at 0300 hr ... The news of Nukhaib air defense sector strike by an F-117A tail No. 85-816 Lone Wolf pilot Maj. Greg Best at 0238 reached Baghdad or at least the air defense sector command as the order to MiG-25 to take off came at the same minute.
3- Iraq received MiG-25PD and the export version PDS . The PD was allocated to squadron 96 while the PDS to squadron 97 ... The same with MiG-29. Iraq received the A version (33) and the B version (7) and 4 trainers (UB).
4- This was an A-6E from VA-35 also from CV-60 Saratoga
5- USAF F-15C pilot Jon Kilk reported killing MiG-29 with AIM-7 but Iraqi documents never shown this incident ... Kelk reported an explosion in the horizon ... But since Speicher F/A-18 was infront of him and downed at almost the same time ... This probably what he saw .... In total US claims of 6 MiG-29 shut downed in war later revealed by the Iraqi Air Force archive after the war to be 3 and 1 damaged ... The other 1 being the above and the famous dogfight of Jan 19 in which the Iraqi pilot claimed he through his EFT to the desert floor after performing a split-s maneuver and the F-15C pilot thought he hit the ground and explode while he escaped the Radar using ground clutter .

image.jpg
LCDR Scott Speicher while was a Lt.

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2015, 03:02
by old.iraqi.air.force
For those who lost in that war we will remember their bravery and honor their sacrifice, rest in peace Michael Speicher and all of those lost in that war our pray to your souls.

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2015, 17:42
by mixelflick
Great accounting Old Iraqi AF!

So nice to hear the other side of the story. While I wasn't surprised it was an F-18 that was downed, I was surprised that the pilot almost didn't make it back to base!

He must be one proud/celebrated fighter pilot in your country? And yeah, it's too bad about Speicher. That's what happens in war though, you lost plenty of your own too. Gone, but not forgotten...

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2015, 22:33
by sergei
mixelflick wrote:Great accounting Old Iraqi AF!

So nice to hear the other side of the story. While I wasn't surprised it was an F-18 that was downed, I was surprised that the pilot almost didn't make it back to base!

He must be one proud/celebrated fighter pilot in your country? And yeah, it's too bad about Speicher. That's what happens in war though, you lost plenty of your own too. Gone, but not forgotten...

This story smells bad-from what I hear, they did not even try to find him.

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2015, 22:35
by oldiaf
sergei wrote:
mixelflick wrote:Great accounting Old Iraqi AF!

So nice to hear the other side of the story. While I wasn't surprised it was an F-18 that was downed, I was surprised that the pilot almost didn't make it back to base!

He must be one proud/celebrated fighter pilot in your country? And yeah, it's too bad about Speicher. That's what happens in war though, you lost plenty of your own too. Gone, but not forgotten...

This story smells bad-from what I hear, they did not even try to find him.

Find who ? If you mean Speicher ...then in Dec. 1995 a special investigative team from the Pentagon went to Iraq with the assistance of the Red Cross and examined the crash site .... His remains was discovered in 2009 and brought back to the US.

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2015, 22:36
by oldiaf
mixelflick wrote:Great accounting Old Iraqi AF!

So nice to hear the other side of the story. While I wasn't surprised it was an F-18 that was downed, I was surprised that the pilot almost didn't make it back to base!

He must be one proud/celebrated fighter pilot in your country? And yeah, it's too bad about Speicher. That's what happens in war though, you lost plenty of your own too. Gone, but not forgotten...

Why you didn't suprised it was an F-18 ?

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 31 Aug 2015, 02:57
by oldiaf
I forget to mention that the F/A-18C that locked the MiG-25 in the first place was flown by CMDR. Michael Anderson who was Squadron leader of VFA-81

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 01 Sep 2015, 08:20
by tomcooper
In essence, his account confirms what I've learned from him back in the mid-2000s (via Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik), but is slightly more detailed.

Dawoud was vectored to intercept an incoming strike package from USS Saratoga (CV-60), consisting of five F/A-18s and eight A-6Es, escorted by two pairs of F-14As, and three EA-6Bs. This was to hit H-3 with LGBs a minute before four RAF Tornado GR.Mk.1s were about to plaster the place with JP.233s.

Dawoud was first vectored on F/A-18s and - because he flew perpendicular to the nearest USAF's E-3A Sentry and to escorting F-14s - he remained undetected, and thus was not engaged early enough.

He first attacked Cdr Anderson (CO VFA-83), nearly head-on. Anderson achieved a lock-on on Dawoud's MiG-25, but didn't fire because there was no positive ID from the AWACs. Nevertheless, Anderson's lock-on forced Dawoud to break towards south. He then continued a high-speed counter-clockwise 360-degrees turn. Anderso tried to follow but eventually lost the MiG somewhere behind him, while Dawoud found Speicher's F/A-18 (AA403) and attacked him instead. Because Speicher's ECM-system malfunctioned, he was an easy target: the R-40 hit his Hornet beneath the cockpit, force of impact throwing the F/A-18 out of control and shearing off the external fuel tanks and pylons. Speicher was badly injured by the missile blast: he was conscious enough to eject, but died shortly after.

What I do not understand is why Dawoud is never mentioning his second engagement during that mission? Namely, after shooting down Speicher, he engaged the second wave of the US Navy's strike package, again consisting of F/A-18s. Involved US Navy pilots reported Dawoud making two runs on them, each time from above and their six o'clock. He just couldn't achieve a lock-on because his radar lacked 'look down' capability, and because of heavy ECM.

BTW, the full story - with many additional details - is to be told in the book F-15 Eagle versus MiG-23 and MiG-25, to be published the next year.

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 01 Sep 2015, 08:47
by sergei
oldiaf wrote:
sergei wrote:
mixelflick wrote:Great accounting Old Iraqi AF!

So nice to hear the other side of the story. While I wasn't surprised it was an F-18 that was downed, I was surprised that the pilot almost didn't make it back to base!

He must be one proud/celebrated fighter pilot in your country? And yeah, it's too bad about Speicher. That's what happens in war though, you lost plenty of your own too. Gone, but not forgotten...

This story smells bad-from what I hear, they did not even try to find him.

Find who ? If you mean Speicher ...then in Dec. 1995 a special investigative team from the Pentagon went to Iraq with the assistance of the Red Cross and examined the crash site .... His remains was discovered in 2009 and brought back to the US.

I'm talking about the search in the first days.

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 01 Sep 2015, 11:33
by tomcooper
sergei wrote:I'm talking about the search in the first days.
This issue was 'very complex' (to put it mildly).

Firstly, there was lots of confusion about what happened, and even more uncertainity about Speicher's fate.
Speicher was 'tail end charlie': last aircraft in his formation, and nobody saw him going down.

Then, CO VFA-81 and CAG CVW-17 were initially 'in denial' about any kind of loss at all. They wanted to make sure that he didn't divert to some place in Saudi Arabia - or even Jordan.

Then the USN's establishment took over and handled the entire affair in - sorry to say it - most sorrid fashion. For example, while subsequent investigation revealed that the USAF E-3 actually picked up an 'unknown radar contact heading south, that the controller obtained 'IrAF IFF transmission' and issued a warning 'bandit, bandit' and 'heads up' before the plots merged, he used 'bullseye format' - which was completely meaningless to Hornet pilots (even more so as they were heads down, programming the launch of their HARMs).

Meanwhile, the DIA 'fusion cell' (in Riyadh) reported that one of KH satellites recorded a 'missile', 'impact', and subsequent 'fireball', but did not record any Fox Fire emissions. That prompted somebody within the chain of command to start 'loudly guessing' about a possible 'blue on blue'. This erroneous report diverted plenty of attention from the CSAR effort for Speicher (indeed, ADM Mixon even launched an investigation board into relevant claims, although everybody knew that all the F-14s came home without firing a single missile).

All of this was kind of 'stuff' nobody could talk about openly in the public (it was eventually published, but only about 10 years later).

And then the time passed by and things only got worse. Cheney and few others began claiming that 'no US or Coalition aircraft was shot down by IrAF interceptors during the whole war', which everybody knew was a lie, but nobody was curious to correct them. This meant that this affair became a 'political' rather than 'military' affair, and further degraded efforts to find out what actually happened... On the top of that, although Speicher's fate was quite certain at least by 1992 (when Iraqis learned that Speicher is still considered 'MIA', and their case-officer discussed this issue with UN-inspectors in Iraq), at latest by 1995 (US investigation inside Iraq), various circles at the Capitol Hill and elsewhere around the DC found it more suitable to bullshit about this affair than do something serious (was 'useful to keep Iraq under pressure')... the rest of the story (foremost the part including entirely pointless - actually: idiotically counterproductive - US invasion of Iraq), should be more than 'well-known'...

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 01 Sep 2015, 11:56
by oldiaf
Please correct me if I wrong but from what I know the formation consisted of 6 Hornets : 4 from VFA-81 and 2 from VFA-83 :
CMDR - Mike Anderson squadron leader VFA-81
LCDR - Scott Speicher - VFA-81
LCDR - Tony Albani - VFA-81
LCDR - Barry Hull - VFA-81
CMDR - Bob Stumpf squadron leader of VFA-83
LCDR - Dave Renaud - VFA-83

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 01 Sep 2015, 17:24
by tomcooper
There was a total of 10 F/A-18Cs: 5 from VFA-81 'Sunliners' and five from VFA-83 'Rampagers'.

Rampagers formed a 'wall' to the 'left' (or north-west) of A-6Es, which followed about 75 miles behind (and south), Sunliners to the 'right' (or north-east) of them, and they were gradually fanning (spreading their formations) after entering Iraq.

Dawoud was initially vectored against Rampager formation (i.e. 'almost directly west'), but after his near-engagement with Anderson and that turn he ended to the left of Speicher and... well: fired.

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 01 Sep 2015, 17:28
by oldiaf
tomcooper wrote:There was a total of 10 F/A-18Cs: 5 from VFA-81 'Sunliners' and five from VFA-83 'Rampagers'.

Rampagers formed a 'wall' to the 'left' (or north-west) of A-6Es, which followed about 75 miles behind (and south), Sunliners to the 'right' (or north-east) of them, and they were gradually fanning (spreading their formations) after entering Iraq.

Dawoud was initially vectored against Rampager formation (i.e. 'almost directly west'), but after his near-engagement with Anderson and that turn he ended to the left of Speicher and... well: fired.

Thats will make the Formation consisting of 10 F/A-18C + 8 A-6E + 4 F-14A+ + 3 EA-6B = 25

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 01 Sep 2015, 21:01
by tomcooper
oldiaf wrote:Thats will make the Formation consisting of 10 F/A-18C + 8 A-6E + 4 F-14A+ + 3 EA-6B = 25

Yes, but Rampages didn't get involved - just like F-14As from VF-32, that were further north (i.e. between Dawoud and Taqqaddum AB). They were far too far away to the west, and Tomcats were far too far away to the north. So, only 5 Sunliners and A-6Es were around.

BTW...
To American public the first Air to Air victory achieved in Operation Desert Storm was either that of Cap. Steve Tate F-15C from 71TFS/1TFW on a Mirage F.1EQ ( pilot Lt.col. Sabah Mutlag 89 Squadron - ejected safely ).

One more thing: Mutlag flew a F.1BQ (two-seater). His single-seater had a malfunction on scramble, and he had to quickly change to 'spare' aircraft.

He was well-experienced from the war with Iran and knew what it looked like when a Sparrow was fired at him. He evaded at least one AIM-7, before another hit his aircraft.

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 01 Sep 2015, 23:32
by ruderamronbo
tomcooper wrote:
sergei wrote:I'm talking about the search in the first days.
This issue was 'very complex' (to put it mildly).

he used 'bullseye format' - which was completely meaningless to Hornet pilots (even more so as they were heads down, programming the launch of their HARMs).



Use of "bullseye" reference calls is standard and has been for decades. If the Hornet drivers found it meaningless they have no one to blame but themselves. Radio traffic stepping on the calls is more likely.

One other note on why there was no CSAR effort. No survivor radio calls were heard. The Navy switched to the PRC-90 the night of the first strikes and it turned out the survival vest pocket for the new radio wasn't big enough. Many are convinced the radio wouldn't stay in the pocket during ejection. It would be interesting for participants to report whether survival seat beacons were set to auto (standard during peace time to accelerate recovery efforts) or manual (often used during combat so as not to highlight aircrews on the chute to the enemy.)

Re: the downing of Speicher F/A-18 : Iraqi perspective Jan 1

Unread postPosted: 02 Sep 2015, 04:20
by oldiaf
tomcooper wrote:
oldiaf wrote:Thats will make the Formation consisting of 10 F/A-18C + 8 A-6E + 4 F-14A+ + 3 EA-6B = 25

Yes, but Rampages didn't get involved - just like F-14As from VF-32, that were further north (i.e. between Dawoud and Taqqaddum AB). They were far too far away to the west, and Tomcats were far too far away to the north. So, only 5 Sunliners and A-6Es were around.

BTW...
To American public the first Air to Air victory achieved in Operation Desert Storm was either that of Cap. Steve Tate F-15C from 71TFS/1TFW on a Mirage F.1EQ ( pilot Lt.col. Sabah Mutlag 89 Squadron - ejected safely ).

One more thing: Mutlag flew a F.1BQ (two-seater). His single-seater had a malfunction on scramble, and he had to quickly change to 'spare' aircraft.

He was well-experienced from the war with Iran and knew what it looked like when a Sparrow was fired at him. He evaded at least one AIM-7, before another hit his aircraft.

He was hit by Steve Tate I think

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 02 Sep 2015, 11:42
by hornetfinn
For the Iraqis the environment was an extremely target rich and it shows in these descriptions. Of course for the same reason it was pretty difficult situation for Coalition pilots and AWACS crews. With so many friendly aircraft flying around, it must've been very difficult to keep an eye for everyone. MiG-25 was definitely the best chance for Iraqis as it had crude but large and powerful radar and equally crude, large but powerful missiles. This shows in this shoot down in that it was able to engage from quite far away compared to what was possible to smaller MiGs or Mirages and of course Iraqis knew the aircraft well.

I really wonder what was the tactical thinking behind sending only token aircraft against Coalition forces even during the first couple of days before being effectively decimated? Were Iraqis incapable of sending more fighter aircraft into air or were they trying to preserve their precious fighter force?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 02 Sep 2015, 12:37
by old.iraqi.air.force
As I confirmed before there is no pilot name Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik in old Iraq AF (this is fictional character).
And what oldaif told here came directly from Capt.Zuhair Dawood,other comment gives guesses and assumptions attributed to the incident is incorrect..

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 02 Sep 2015, 13:14
by markjp
old.iraqi.air.force wrote:As i confirmed before there is no pilot name Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik in old Iraq AF (this is fictional character).
And what oldaif tolled here came directly from Capt.Zuhair Dawood,other comment gives guesses and assumptions attributed to the incident is incorrect..

You're right here's some key stuff published 10 years ago.
http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/1991-lt-cdr-michael-speicher-t14808.html

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 02 Sep 2015, 17:43
by tomcooper
Ok, I'm wrong and Mr. Miserable Liar quasi-Mirage-pilot is 'right'.

Now let's talk frankly, and ask you two experts (the Mr. Miserable Liar quasi-Mirage-pilot, and you, Mark) to explain me the following: if this narrative 'by Dawoud' is 'right', then why is it full of 'guesses and assumptions'?

Indeed, guesses and assumptions that do not fit even the official IrAF documentation (such like '1991 Dossier on Role of IrAF in the Gulf War', table of 'Immediate Sorties' [meaning 'scrambles'] from 17 January 1991, p23)?

Reasons:

- Kelk engaged 'his' MiG-29 already around 03.15, about half an hour before Dawoud got airborne.

Hey! This was widely published, and should be well-known. Why then quess Kelk has seen Speicher's F/A-18 going down around 03.50? And who is guesing about this: Dawoud or the 'producer' of this narative?

- Above-mentioned document (available since some 3-4 years, compared to Sadik's interview with Dawoud from 2006*) cites Dawoud and Hamadan scrambling around the same time, i.e. 03.30.

- But, 'this Dawoud' says he was alerted only around 03.38, and got airborne 'three minutes later' (i.e. 03.41).

Isn't that interesting...?

- Problem: either the author of that narrative, or the official IrAF documentation is lying about the timing of Hamadan's scramble (too), then according to official IrAF documentation, Hamadan was scrambled around 03.30, and not '6 - 10 minutes after Dawoud' (i.e. between 03.47 and 03.51).

Perhaps one of you would be so kind to explain us this 'mystery' and tell us who is lying...?

- As next: all the F-15Cs of the initial wave were back over Saudi Arabia by 03.40.

- Speicher was shot down around 03.50.

- Means: Kelk couldn't see Speicher going down.

- Means: Kelk couldn't engage Hamadan's MiG-29.

- Means: whoever put that Sparrow into Hamadan's aircraft, it wasn't any of USAF F-15s.

Overall, it's either so that

- a) the provider of this narative is Dawoud, but with some extremely bad memory (indeed, a memory that's not even recollecting what he wrote into his post-mission report, provided to Sadik back in 2006); or

- b) the provider of this 'narrative' is a liar; an overenthisastic dumbass thinking he can fool everybody.

Now, please, don't get upset. I admit I'm a liar, producing guesses and assumptions. I do so not only in the case of Iran-Iraq War, but also about two dozens of other conflicts about which I've published so far. Since I have no clue why, and you know better, you'll be so kind to explain me why do I do that.

But then, be so kind and explain me all of this nonsense in that 'narrative'?

I learned to expect nothing but nonsense and absurdities from Mr Miserable Liar, but perhaps you, Mark, can explain me where is he 'right'...? Or, perhaps you could explain if the person that manufactured this narrative is just too clueless about what exactly was going on...?

*************

*Published in 2006 in German magazine Fliegerrevue Extra (Vol. 16), and in 2009, in the International Air Power Review, (Vol. 26)

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 02 Sep 2015, 19:08
by oldiaf
The whole matter is related to Baghdad winter-summer time difference...

Dawood engaged Speicher 25 min. after he took off ... That will make it 0306 .... And he took off 0238 not 0338 ( as I said Baghdad winter time which is not one hour late as summer time ) .... Hamdan took off approximately 0250 ... And if he was the one engaged by Kelk ( and that is my assumption ) not from Dawood narrative it would have been happened 0315 ... No conflict in time as I see !! But If Kelk reported the explosion in the horizon slightly earlier ( let's say less than min. Then it would be definitly Speicher ) ... But it was fog of war and confusion about exact time of reporting things that might happened

And regarding guesses and assumptions it was added by me not from Dawood narrative or official Iraqi AF documents to link other events at that night.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 02 Sep 2015, 22:58
by tomcooper
sigh...

I know very well about local time zones and what you've added and what not.

What I do not know - or I'm not sure any more - is if your original source is really 'that' Dawoud.

...and thus I pointed out exactly at one of crucial problems with recording IrAF history - and then one that is making me really furious: fabrications.

Yes, you all get an original narrative, from your fathers, uncles, uncles' uncles, half-brother's uncle of wife-in-law, neighbour's uncle's brother-in-law of second degree etc...

But, then you start adding your assumptions - and thus create fabrications.

And what then? By the time such fabrications reach people like me, nobody knows what was original text any more, and then a CLOWN like this wannabe-'Mirage-pilot' (really a miserable liar that can't answer a single question addressed to him) is bullshitting around about my reliability and how I'm 'fabricating' maps and whatever else.... :roll:

And when some of you face something they don't like - then it's 'others' that are creating fabrications...?!?

I 'love' such people a lot. So much so, I'm sick and tired of them all. None of them has even a trace of clue about the nature of investigative journalistm (especially in regards of current or recent military affairs), no ideas about what 'cross-examination' means, even less about nature and practices of publishing etc. Not one of them has ever read anything of what I've published so far (or if, then they are misusing my publications, like this CLOWN is using my artwork of an Iraqi Mirage F.1EQ as his 'avatar', or presenting my articles as 'his').... but all of them know so much, and since they 'posess' internet too, they are 'right' and can offend and bullshit as much as they like.

And they are sole owners of the truth, of course! :x

Get your stuff together finally, all of you. If there is somebody providing his recollections: leave his narrative as it. And leave your assumptions for yourself.

If you don't know why: that is the best way to 'record' history. 'Say what the source said', cross-examine it as much as you like, but stick to that rule, no matter you like it or not. Nothing more, nothing less.

That's how we've done with hundreds of interviews that can be read in (between others) this book-series (which certain characters here have certainly never heard about, and even less so could ever imagine preparing):
- Arab MiGs, Volume 1: MiG-15s & MiG-17s in Service with Air Forces of Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco and Syria
- Arab MiGs, Volume 2: Supersonic Fighters, 1958-1967
- Arab MiGs, Volume 3: The June 1967 War
- Arab MiGs, Volume 4: Attrition War, 1967-1973
- Arab MiGs, Volume 5: October 1973 War, Part 1
- Arab MiGs, Volume 6: October 1973 War, Part 2.

If anybody thinks we (the team of authors that prepared these books) have got all the hundreds of generals and other ranks - from Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen etc - interviewed for that series because we're something like 'renowned' for fabricating their narratives, changing their content, twisting and turning official documentation or what people say as we like it or find it suitable... well, he/she is simply dumb and there's no help.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 02 Sep 2015, 23:24
by oldiaf
The narrative is authentic and original ... The only assumption I made is that about Kelk kill which is not in the Narrative ... And here is other thing ... The kill that Graeter claimed against a Mirage F.1 was infact of a MiG-23ML from squadron 73 and this come from cross examining of Iraqi AF record and Graeter account ..

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 00:04
by old.iraqi.air.force
tomcooper wrote:Ok, I'm wrong

Nothing new..

tomcooper wrote:Mr. Miserable Liar quasi-Mirage-pilot is 'right'.

You are the only miserable liar here and on internet community, don't forgot your last joke map this was one of hundreds lies of you.

On Mirage F.1EQ Service with Iraqi AF Episode 4 you wort this:-

tomcooper wrote:You really excell in stupidity, that's all that's left to say.

let me prove to you as i always did before who is really excell in stupidity.
tomcooper wrote:Anderson achieved a lock-on on Dawoud's MiG-25, but didn't fire because there was no positive ID from the AWACs. Nevertheless, Anderson's lock-on forced Dawoud to break towards south. He then continued a high-speed counter-clockwise 360-degrees turn.

-Do we need to shift our planet upside down to make this work for you! as you shift Saddam air base to the east and beyond the Tigris River on that map!
Capt. Zuhair Dawood took-off from Alqadisiya air base and towards to the south which is mean he is north to Capt.Mike Anderson formation, and Capt.Mike lock him on where Capt. Zuhair to the north from him, now Capt. Zuhair should turn to the right-west or to the south!! How is that even possible Capt. Zuhair heading to south and turn to the south!!! this one it's looks like when you draw route on 1/1000000 map..
tomcooper wrote:He then continued a high-speed counter-clockwise 360-degrees turn.

-Now look at this disaster MIG-25 in combat speed (counter-clockwise 360-degrees)!! even the 15 years old batter know than you in this issue, this mean the MIG-25 back over the base to complete his 360-degrees turn.
------
Do you want to know exactly what happened ? ok i will tell you in the language of numbers:-
Give copy to your friend in Tehran first to test their abilities and second to interpretation for you (they will need age to understand this calculations) and then back to tell me if they understand anything..
I do not boast myself or even compliment my fellow Americans pilots here, but this kind of calculations we and Americans do it in part of seconds under any condition during combat mission.

2000nm x 1.8=3600Km
F-18 0.9.5
3600 ÷ 3= 1200
F-18 speed + MIG-25 speed + take-off= 1200km ÷ 3.6= 333 meter per second
333 x 60 second= 19980 each aircraft a cross 20km approximately per minute
from 90km ÷ 20= 4.30 mint+ 1 minute take-off= 5.30 minute reach 90Km
3600 ÷ 2=1800 ÷ 3.6=500 meter per second
500x 60 second = 30000 meter 30km per minute
V secouer / GGR =R
500 M/per second x 500= 250000
250000 ÷ 9.81 x 1 = 25 km
90 Degree R.O.T = G x GGR ÷ V= total x 57.3
9.81 X 1= 0.01962 X 57.3= 1.12 Degree
His turn at every one second = 1.12 Degree to complete 90 Degree
90 ÷ 1.12 =80.35 second
5.30 + 1.20 minute = 6.50 minute till the break
call-delay time 30 second =7.20 minute till now.
This 30 second about 10 km head on to the right.
Again 90 Degree 80 = 1.20 = 8.4
Again 90 Degree to the left = 1.20 minute = 8.40
38km Distance from target
30 second (search and luck on) + 8.4= 9.10 fire (from take-off)
Time duration to the missile 3.5 + 1.8= 5.3 Mach
5.3 x 1320= approximately 7000km
7000 ÷ 5 3.6 = 1944 M/ per second
29000 ÷ 1944 = 14.9
9.10+ 15 =9.25 the impact
_____

One more thing, we have discussed this issue before on subject called (the first kill of the Gulf War) and we reach point (we and Americans) respect for each other's point of view, now what is your problem? and why do you bother your self here on this subject? If the Americans said this kill was at 0600 no problem, we and they are understand each other (what do you want here?)

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 04:03
by markjp
The one who always thinks he’s right and he has an answer for everything and seems to have an air of superiority about everything he needs to find himself!

For Old Iraqi air force, some people always thinks they are right and you try to correct them you became their enemy instead you have to get them to feel like you are on their side and that your ideas and their ideas are the same, So don't wear yourself out.
Salute.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 10:21
by tomcooper
oldiaf wrote:The narrative is authentic and original ...

Then leave it as such.

The only assumption I made is that about Kelk kill which is not in the Narrative ... And here is other thing ... The kill that Graeter claimed against a Mirage F.1 was infact of a MiG-23ML from squadron 73 and this come from cross examining of Iraqi AF record and Graeter account ..

What 'Iraqi AF record'? What's the designation of the document in question, and when was it issued? Who and from what squadron was flying that MiG-23ML, and from what base?

...and finally: if that MiG-23ML flew into the area of responsibility of the 2nd SOC IrAF, then why isn't it mentioned as such in the document I've mentioned above...?

old.iraqi.air.force wrote:-Do we need to shift our planet upside down to make this work for you!

Not necessary: it's just you who is too stupid to admit that you have no trace of clue about military flying - although claiming to be a 'former Mirage pilot'.

Plus, you're simply too clueless about this engagement (Anderson vs Dawoud) but to understand what happened. That's why you're not going to get any additional food for your fabrications in response.

On the contrary: you remind me of that 'serious historian' from Libya. Last year he's got an interview with Belkacem al-Zintani. For you and your 'Americans' here al-Zintani is not going to ring any bells. For Libyans, he's a hero who 'shot down' a USN's F-14 on 19 August 1981.

Problem was: that clown had to find some USN F-14 pilot al-Zintani 'must have killed'. So, he picked Henry Kleeman (leader of the USN's section that shot down the two Libyan Sukhois, indeed, the gent that shot down the Libyan wingman) - because Kleeman was killed in a landing accident with an F/A-18, in 1986.

Why should he care about F-14 being a two-seater or Dave Venlet (Kleeman's RIO) reaching the rank of Admiral...?

...and now he's argumenting that the USN has fabricated Kleeman's death certificate... :roll:

Ah yes, and regarding this:
One more thing, we have discussed this issue before on subject called (the first kill of the Gulf War) and we reach point (we and Americans) respect for each other's point of view, now what is your problem? and why do you bother your self here on this subject? If the Americans said this kill was at 0600 no problem, we and they are understand each other (what do you want here?)
Am I disturbing you, Mr. Miserable Liar?

You have no clue what are you talking about: you have some data which you do not even understand, even less so do you know how to use what you've got. And the 'Americans' you're talking with here have no clue what are you talking about - because they never studied anything of this closely enough.

Please, be my guests and remain in agreement :D

Give copy to your friend in Tehran first...
Hey clown: is 'Tehran' paying me to write a history of Arab air forces at wars with Israel, 1955-1973, too...?

And if so, who is then paying me to write a history of Ethiopian-Somali air war of 1977-1978? Or a complete ORBAT of the Chinese air force and naval aviation?

Or are you just too stupid to understand even this?

Finally, regarding your question about what am I doing here?

That's your own fault.

Namely, if you wouldn't have started bullshitting lies about my person, my integrity and my work, I would've never posted a single word here - nor care to reveal you for what you are: a clown with illusion of grandeur.

So, don't complain about my utter disrespect for a miserable liar like YOU, and don't you dare misinterpreting this as some sort of 'disrespect for the IrAF': I respect the IrAF more than you ever can imagine - that's why CONTRARY TO YOU I'm NOT publishing fabrications about it.

@Mark:
if I'm wrong, then SHOW ME I'm wrong instead of phylosophing about things you obviously have no clue about.

Where's your evidence?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 10:29
by oldiaf
tomcooper wrote:
oldiaf wrote:The narrative is authentic and original ...

Then leave it as such.

The only assumption I made is that about Kelk kill which is not in the Narrative ... And here is other thing ... The kill that Graeter claimed against a Mirage F.1 was infact of a MiG-23ML from squadron 73 and this come from cross examining of Iraqi AF record and Graeter account ..

What 'Iraqi AF record'? What's the designation of the document in question, and when was it issued? Who and from what squadron was flying that MiG-23ML, and from what base?

...and finally: if that MiG-23ML flew into the area of responsibility of the 2nd SOC IrAF, then why isn't it mentioned as such in the document I've mentioned above...?

old.iraqi.air.force wrote:-Do we need to shift our planet upside down to make this work for you!

Not necessary: it's just you who is too stupid to admit that you have no trace of clue about military flying - although claiming to be a 'former Mirage pilot'.

Plus, you're simply too clueless about this engagement (Anderson vs Dawoud) but to understand what happened. That's why you're not going to get any additional food for your fabrications in response.

On the contrary: you remind me of that 'serious historian' from Libya. Last year he's got an interview with Belkacem al-Zintani. For you and your 'Americans' here al-Zintani is not going to ring any bells. For Libyans, he's a hero who 'shot down' a USN's F-14 on 19 August 1981.

Problem was: that clown had to find some USN F-14 pilot al-Zintani 'must have killed'. So, he picked Henry Kleeman (leader of the USN's section that shot down the two Libyan Sukhois, indeed, the gent that shot down the Libyan wingman) - because Kleeman was killed in a landing accident with an F/A-18, in 1986.

Why should he care about F-14 being a two-seater or Dave Venlet (Kleeman's RIO) reaching the rank of Admiral...?

...and now he's argumenting that the USN has fabricated Kleeman's death certificate... :roll:

Ah yes, and regarding this:
One more thing, we have discussed this issue before on subject called (the first kill of the Gulf War) and we reach point (we and Americans) respect for each other's point of view, now what is your problem? and why do you bother your self here on this subject? If the Americans said this kill was at 0600 no problem, we and they are understand each other (what do you want here?)
Am I disturbing you, Mr. Miserable Liar?

You have no clue what are you talking about: you have some data which you do not even understand, even less so do you know how to use what you've got. And the 'Americans' you're talking with here have no clue what are you talking about - because they never studied anything of this closely enough.

Please, be my guests and remain in agreement :D

And what am I doing here?

That's your own fault.

Namely, if you wouldn't have started bullshitting lies about my person, my integrity and my work, I would've never posted a single word here - nor care to reveal you for what you are: a clown with illusion of grandeur.

So, don't complain about my utter disrespect for a miserable liar like YOU, and don't you dare misinterpreting this as some sort of 'disrespect for the IrAF': I respect the IrAF more than you ever can imagine - that's why CONTRARY TO YOU I'm NOT publishing fabrications about it.

Finaly, @Mark:
if I'm wrong, then SHOW ME I'm wrong instead of phylosophing about things you obviously have no clue about.

Where's your evidence?

The MiG-23ML was from Squadron 73 based at Saad AB ( H2 ) pilot name Hasan ... The base had also contigent from 79 Mirage squadron ..

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 10:31
by tomcooper
oldiaf wrote:The MiG-23ML was from Squadron 73 based at Saad AB ( H2 ) pilot name Hasan ... The base had also contigent from 79 Mirage squadron ..

OK. And the rest? Who was the pilot ('Hassan' - who?) and what happened to him?

And why wasn't his mission into the 2nd SOC IrAF mentioned in the list of scrambles in an official IrAF document about scrambles of 2nd SOC IrAF?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 10:34
by oldiaf
tomcooper wrote:
oldiaf wrote:The MiG-23ML was from Squadron 73 based at Saad AB ( H2 ) pilot name Hasan ... The base had also contigent from 79 Mirage squadron ..

OK. And the rest? Who was the pilot and what happened to him?

And why wasn't his mission into the 2nd SOC IrAF mentioned in the list of scrambles in an official IrAF document about scrambles of 2nd SOC IrAF?

As I said pilot Name was Hasan and he was KIA .... he was not mentioned because the Iraqi AF didn't know who shoot him down and there was a fear that this was a fratricide kill by the Air defenses

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 10:46
by tomcooper
oldiaf wrote:As I said pilot Name was Hasan and he was KIA .... he was not mentioned because the Iraqi AF didn't know who shoot him down and there was a fear that this was a fratricide kill by the Air defenses

OK, 'Hassan and I'll get no more'... as so often. :roll:

But, sorry, the rest of explanation is not really useful: if the 2nd SOC IrAF lists its scrambles from the night of 17 January 1991, and this contains only scrambles by Mirages, MiG-29s and MiG-25s... then why this MiG-23ML is not listed?

Fates of the aircraft in question are no reason: several of Mirages and MiG-29s were shot down too, but are listed. Why not that MiG-23ML?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 11:04
by oldiaf
tomcooper wrote:
oldiaf wrote:As I said pilot Name was Hasan and he was KIA .... he was not mentioned because the Iraqi AF didn't know who shoot him down and there was a fear that this was a fratricide kill by the Air defenses

OK, 'Hassan and I'll get no more'... as so often. :roll:

But, sorry, the rest of explanation is not really useful: if the 2nd SOC IrAF lists its scrambles from the night of 17 January 1991, and this contains only scrambles by Mirages, MiG-29s and MiG-25s... then why this MiG-23ML is not listed?

Fates of the aircraft in question are no reason: several of Mirages and MiG-29s were shot down too, but are listed. Why not that MiG-23ML?

There was a fear the Air defense would be blamed for downing it since no mention for the cause who shoot it down .. So they reported it to be destroyed on the ground before scrambling and the pilot killed inside it ..

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 11:20
by oldiaf
tomcooper wrote:
oldiaf wrote:As I said pilot Name was Hasan and he was KIA .... he was not mentioned because the Iraqi AF didn't know who shoot him down and there was a fear that this was a fratricide kill by the Air defenses

OK, 'Hassan and I'll get no more'... as so often. :roll:

But, sorry, the rest of explanation is not really useful: if the 2nd SOC IrAF lists its scrambles from the night of 17 January 1991, and this contains only scrambles by Mirages, MiG-29s and MiG-25s... then why this MiG-23ML is not listed?

Fates of the aircraft in question are no reason: several of Mirages and MiG-29s were shot down too, but are listed. Why not that MiG-23ML?

The only Mirage I know about that was downed was that of Lt. Col. Mutlag Squadron 89 ... Plus 2 MiG-29s from 39 squadron both Pilots KIA ... There were also 2 MiG-21 from 47 squadron but this happened in the afternoon and both pilots also KIA.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 16:45
by old.iraqi.air.force
tomcooper wrote:Not necessary: it's just you who is too stupid to admit that you have no trace of clue about military flying - although claiming to be a 'former Mirage pilot'.

Keep going with your stupidity here this all what we need to prove to the people who is the Clown TomCooper and his ignorance of Aviation (your nonsense such Capt. Zuhair turn to the south) while he was heading to south shows your low level of your intelligence, second your industry of fabrication without any knowledge.
tomcooper wrote:Plus, you're simply too clueless about this engagement (Anderson vs Dawoud) but to understand what happened. That's why you're not going to get any additional food for your fabrications in response.

This is totally apply on you and the reasons above prove my words.

tomcooper wrote:On the contrary: you remind me of that 'serious historian' from Libya. Last year he's got an interview with Belkacem al-Zintani. For you and your 'Americans' here al-Zintani is not going to ring any bells. For Libyans, he's a hero who 'shot down' a USN's F-14 on 19 August 1981.

Problem was: that clown had to find some USN F-14 pilot al-Zintani 'must have killed'. So, he picked Henry Kleeman (leader of the USN's section that shot down the two Libyan Sukhois, indeed, the gent that shot down the Libyan wingman) - because Kleeman was killed in a landing accident with an F/A-18, in 1986.

Why should he care about F-14 being a two-seater or Dave Venlet (Kleeman's RIO) reaching the rank of Admiral...?

...and now he's argumenting that the USN has fabricated Kleeman's death certificate...

Be man and go wort this on Libyan forums don't talk behind their back, no need to read your nonsense, if there is something worthy to remember, first remind yourself of your reliability and correct your behaviors and then back to wrote.

tomcooper wrote:Ah yes, and regarding this:
One more thing, we have discussed this issue before on subject called (the first kill of the Gulf War) and we reach point (we and Americans) respect for each other's point of view, now what is your problem? and why do you bother your self here on this subject? If the Americans said this kill was at 0600 no problem, we and they are understand each other (what do you want here?)
Am I disturbing you, Mr. Miserable Liar?

I meant the subject related between us and U.S so why put your nose here?
Otherwise you make me favor by joying this valuable forum and i love to keep you here to show up your fabrication and low knowledge.

tomcooper wrote:You have no clue what are you talking about: you have some data which you do not even understand, even less so do you know how to use what you've got. And the 'Americans' you're talking with here have no clue what are you talking about - because they never studied anything of this closely enough.

Oh you just told me..
My fellow Americans here have no clue what I am talking about because they never studied anything of this closely enough!
The best answer of this part this video below:


tomcooper wrote:Please, be my guests and remain in agreement :D

No.. on my pocket please you're my guests here :cheers:
So.. where we were? keep telling me more about your nonsense.. you have drawing route on 1/1000000 map and F-5 shot down MIG-25, and F-14 down a three MIGs in one missile.. It's look likes heavy weed !

tomcooper wrote:Hey clown: is 'Tehran' paying me to write a history of Arab air forces at wars with Israel, 1955-1973, too...?

Naah.. you didn't appear on Iranian Islamic revolutionary guards television channel glorifies their fake heroism, and fighting for their empty claims.

tomcooper wrote:Finally, regarding your question about what am I doing here?

That's your own fault.

Namely, if you wouldn't have started bullshitting lies about my person, my integrity and my work, I would've never posted a single word here - nor care to reveal you for what you are: a clown with illusion of grandeur.

And if you wouldn't have started bullshitting lies about our air force history i would've never posted a single word here about you ok?
Since the discussion between you and me on Interview: Major General ‘Alwan Hassoun ‘Alwan al-Abousi i said to you Tom let me start a new page with you and correct all that information you have (it was a great chance to you) but you totally messed up that chance and you write what you wrote, believe or not and accept this from me or disagree with me, back with your bad words such liar or Clown..etc it's all up to you and at the end will represent your behavior only not me. but you know or didn't know most the history of Iraqi air force since 1931 till April 9-2003 in my hands and in particular to the Mirage and Su-22 and MIG-25s. Say whatever you want, you are free, but you have to remember you lost your best source hayder and some others on iraqimilitary.org because you did not accept criticism or trying in various formats to impose your point of view and the other are wrongs. At the end people fed up of you..
There is no one make no mistake, but the real mistake if you didn't correct it back and insists it's right, i did some mistake here in particular to the Mirage while it's my part my squadrons my plane, but no one know everything and when i did a mistake i come back to say (gentleman's it was my fault in that subject and you are right and I'm wrong..etc).
We have losses during Iraq-Iran war but not the way you show it up, and you relied on the one side in your publishing and that's why you are facing great discontent from people.

tomcooper wrote:I respect the IrAF more than you ever can imagine - that's why CONTRARY TO YOU I'm NOT publishing fabrications about it.

If you have a great respect to us then how can i interpret your harsh words to me?
And your comment on this subject Mirage F.1EQ Service with Iraqi AF episode 5

tomcooper wrote:Yup, and what you - exactly like majority of Iraqi fighter-bomber pilots, plus their superiors that were planning these missions - do not understand is: hitting all the piping and jetties etc. was all for nothing.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 17:11
by tomcooper
oldiaf wrote:The only Mirage I know about that was downed was that of Lt. Col. Mutlag Squadron 89 ... Plus 2 MiG-29s from 39 squadron both Pilots KIA ... There were also 2 MiG-21 from 47 squadron but this happened in the afternoon and both pilots also KIA.

Yes, that part is clear. What I'm wondering about is how a MiG-23ML can get scrambled, operate within the area of responsbility of the 2nd SOC, and then is not mentioned with a single word in a report supposed to cite precisely ALL operations launched by the aircraft under the control of the 2nd SOC?

(Not to talk about the issue of that report citing entirely different timings of scrambles in question, than timings mentioned by different of pilots that flew actual sorties...)

Look, in the military there are strict rules. There is a chain of command and a chain of responsibilities (some call this 'discipline'). People who lie are breaking rules, compromising this chain, and (usually) get punished for that.

This is especially the case when one is writing a report about such things like combat operations. Why? Because if some commander there is responsible for (for example) 12 aircraft and 12 pilots, and authorized to get funding to support these 12 aircraft and 12 pilots, but loses one aircraft and one pilot (just another example), but does not report about such a loss, he's unprofessional, he's compromising his command and the chain of command. He's stealing from the service too. All of that is punishable.

Reason: people who lie cannot be depended upon.

Means: when some officer with such a responsibility like the CO 2nd SOC writes a report, this oughts to be 100% correct, or he's _lying_ and is going to get punished for that.

Means: if there was a 2nd SOC IrAF, and its CO is submitting a report about his operations, and then there is a section of that report containing the number of aircraft SCRAMBLED by squadrons under its control, then his report has to include a list of 100% of aircraft SCRAMBLED by those units. Period.

Reason: these aircraft have spent fuel, weapons, spares etc. - plenty of stuff that costs money. The CO 2nd SOC is paid to do his job ('command'), his offices, pilots and other ranks are paid for to do their jobs ('fight'). And, after all, purpose of the very existence of the entire 2nd SOC IrAF was to 'fight wars', 'provide air defence of homeland'. So, if this homeland is hit and heavily bombed, but the 2nd SOC IrAF is doing nothing to prevent that, its CO must explain why not (i.e. why are his aircraft not flying).

Correspondingly, he has to cite what were his units doing that night, and then it's only of his advantage to cite ALL the aircraft that were scrambled, 100%.

In such case, he's surely not the least curious to start omitting aircraft that were lost - no matter to what reason - from a list citing aircraft that were SCRAMBLED: his report has to include 100% of aircraft SCRAMBLED. Period.

What happened to the aircraft in question (perhaps also explanations why) is then discussed in a separate section of that report.

That's how a professional military report is filled. Of course, there are military services around the world that have officers who are not as professional; where the entire system is corrupt to a degree that the official documentation is doctored, losses omitted (or added) as necessary etc.

For example, last year several divisions of the Iraqi Army disintegrated precisely because their top commanders were pocketing money they were authorized to use for feeding and paying their troops. With other words: commanders in question were lying - to their superiors and to their troops. The chain of command was corrupted from within.

Now, would you like to say that the 'old IrAF' was as unprofessional military force, as full of irresponssible and unprofessional commanders that these were doctoring data in their reports? That the CO 2nd SOC IrAF was as unprofessional as to omit an entire aircraft (it's not like a MiG-23ML is 'peanuts') SCRAMBLED and then LOST (no matter the reason) from his report?

Namely, your answer indicates this was the case. I.e. the CO 2nd SOC was affraid he might get punished because there was a chance of one of his fighters being shot down by own ground defences...

Sorry if I'm not really buying this...

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 17:12
by old.iraqi.air.force
markjp wrote:For Old Iraqi air force, some people always thinks they are right and you try to correct them you became their enemy instead you have to get them to feel like you are on their side and that your ideas and their ideas are the same, So don't wear yourself out.
Salute.

Much appreciate your participation.
Salute

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 17:14
by tomcooper
And for the Clown:
old.iraqi.air.force wrote:Since the discussion between you and me on Interview: Major General ‘Alwan Hassoun ‘Alwan al-Abousi ...

Should you ever happen to manage activating more than 1 brain cell, go and read Arab MiGs Volume 5 & 6: perhaps you might find out why such clowns like you are surplus. :D

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 17:24
by oldiaf
If the one who made the report just changed a single event ( the aircraft was destroyed on the ground fully loaded instead of immediately downed after take off ... Then he would have been protecting his own ground crews ) .. Remember Iraqi sociery is tribal one and the tribe of the fallen Pilot would had seeked retribution from the ground crews ( of the air defense ) if a simple rumor spread out that their son was killed ( mistakenly ) by his fellow mates ... You need to understand the society of Iraq to know this ....

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Sep 2015, 20:58
by tomcooper
I know how the society is organized, and also that Saddam's idiocies (and those of his crownies) have repeatedly compromised... indeed corrupted the chain of command.

But - and while I've suspected since long that much of IrAF documentation is doctored (take documents about MiG-25 losses from war with Iran as example) - this is still shocking for me.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 04 Sep 2015, 15:14
by piston
May I ask for something like a drawing or diagram of this AA encounter as reading the pilot's explanations an all I cannot figure it out how it happened at all... Thanks in advance if someone would do it...

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 04 Sep 2015, 21:08
by tomcooper
piston wrote:May I ask for something like a drawing or diagram of this AA encounter as reading the pilot's explanations an all I cannot figure it out how it happened at all... Thanks in advance if someone would do it...

I have a diagram that would make everything crystal clear - based not only on Dawoud's, but also official documentation, maps used during that mission, plus recollections from about a dozen of USN pilots/crewmembers.

But sorry: in no way am I going to post it here - and feed a miserable liar (or characters 'believing' him).

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Sep 2015, 06:30
by piston
tomcooper wrote:But sorry: in no way am I going to post it here - and feed a miserable liar (or characters 'believing' him).


????
Do you believe that this forum is visited only by "a miserable liar (or characters 'believing' him)"??

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Sep 2015, 06:41
by tomcooper
Not much to see except the two...

Anyway: take some map of Iraq west/south-west of Baghdad.

Draw a line along a course 260° from Tammuz to 42° E - and you've got Dawoud's initial course.

Then draw a line along a course of 15° in direction of Ayn Zazu (a town west of Ramadi) - and you've got initial course of F/A-18s.

Keep in mind aircraft separation in standard USN formations, that Anderson was on the left (western) side of Sunliners' wall, and Speicher on its right (eastern) end, while the first four A-6Es were further south/south-west, in a trail with 4-5 miles separation between single aircraft.

...and everything should be 'crystal clear'.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Sep 2015, 08:07
by tomcooper
That said, when I'm cross-checking my diagram with Dawoud's account posted above, there are further discrepancies between Dawoud's account and other known data:

- 1.) In this account he says he was assigned to No. 96 Squadron and based at al-Qaddisya AB ('al-Assad' for Westerners). So far, all the other accounts - foremost: ALL of available IrAF documentation - were placing No. 96 Sqn at Tammuz AB and No. 97 at al-Qaddisya AB.

So, at the first look, this is 'not making sense'.

- 2.) If timings in this account would be correct, they are giving him only 9 minutes from take-off at Tammuz to climb to 7,000m, fly 180km, engage Anderson, do a complete circle with him, then roll out east and shoot down Speicher. IMHO, not nearly enough - even in MiG-25 going supersonic all the time.

But... if he scrambled from al-Qaddisya, then 'everything fits', because of a) the 'warm up time' his Sherch radar needed (in turn making a scramble at 03.38-03.41 more believeable), b) his engagement with Anderson (which took place only about 90km south of Qadissya AB), and c) his description of finding his base by using Haditha train station.

Though, in such case he didn't follow the course of 260° after taking off...

- 3.) His citing of the MiG-29 that took off '6-10 minutes after' remains under a big question mark. If this was Qudair Hijab from No. 6 Squadron (MiG-29 that engaged the B-52 over Talha FOL), he must've taken-off at least 10 minutes earlier than Dawoud, and the reason why the GCI didn't permit Dawoud to open fire at the lead A-6E was that Hijab was returning from Talha towards north.

So, was Dawoud really based at al-Qaddisya, or at Tammouz AB - as everybody else says he was? Or did he scramble from Tammouz but landed at al-Qaddisya (because Tammouz was under attack by the USN strike package he intercepted, for example)?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Sep 2015, 11:40
by piston
OK, as more and more questions appeared, I lost the track completely....

Let's say I knew that F-18 was shot head on, 'till now.... :doh:

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Sep 2015, 12:57
by oldiaf
He scrambled from Al-Qadisiya ....thats for certain ..... And with respect check your info regarding home base of 96 & 97 squadrons :
96 was in Al-Qadisiya and 97 was in Tammuz... Squadron 96 was equipped with the more capable MiG-25PD while Squadron 97 was equipped with MiG-25PDS. ....... Even with earlier sources that put Dawood with fictional squadron 84 !!! They said he scrambled from Al-Qadisiya.
And one other thing - if the MiG-29 that was crossing path with Dawood was that of khidr Ahjeb then why the GCI warned him about a single MiG-29 while in fact Khidr Ahjed was not alone and had a wingman in another MiG-29 Pilot name Haitham Mizher.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Sep 2015, 17:07
by oldiaf
So You acknowledge the B-52 was engaged by MiG-29 of Khdir Ahjeb not by HARM fired from F-4G

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Sep 2015, 19:12
by tomcooper
piston wrote:OK, as more and more questions appeared, I lost the track completely....

Let's say I knew that F-18 was shot head on, 'till now.... :doh:

:wink:

It wasn't head-on: he was on a course 015 and hit from the left - because Dawoud detected him while coming out of engagement with Anderson, who was to the left (west) from Speicher.

Crucial quesiton is now if - before engaging Anderson - Dawoud approached directly from the north (if scrambling from al-Qaddisya AB) or if he approached from Tammuz along course 260 and then turned south...

oldiaf wrote:He scrambled from Al-Qadisiya ....thats for certain ..... And with respect check your info regarding home base of 96 & 97 squadrons :
96 was in Al-Qadisiya and 97 was in Tammuz... Squadron 96 was equipped with the more capable MiG-25PD while Squadron 97 was equipped with MiG-25PDS. ....... Even with earlier sources that put Dawood with fictional squadron 84 !!! They said he scrambled from Al-Qadisiya.
Nope, sorry. The story was always 'from Tammuz'. As the IrAF's case officer for that affair, Sadik was fully in picture, had all the official documentation, including Dawoud's post-mission report etc. (he's even published a number of articles in the Iraqi press, back in late 1990s - all of which were entirely missed by all possible authorities in the USA).

Drop me an e-mail and I can send you the original manuscript (in English) Sadik and me have put together back in 2006 (which was then published in the IAPR, back in 2008, and which contains not only 'pilot-stories' but plenty of stuff from AAA- and SAM-gunners, Intel Department IrAF etc.): nobody - really: NOBODY - ever mentioned al-Qaddisiyah AB so far.

And one other thing - if the MiG-29 that was crossing path with Dawood was that of khidr Ahjeb then why the GCI warned him about a single MiG-29 while in fact Khidr Ahjed was not alone and had a wingman in another MiG-29 Pilot name Haitham Mizher.
Aha. See there: that's really 'news'.

Firstly: this is another scramble (Mizher) not mentioned in official documentation... (indeed, when I think of it: this was not mentioned even by Hijab in interview to Sadik, back in... erm, I'll keep that date for myself, for specific reason.)

Secondly: ...well, see the bottom of this post...

So You acknowledge the B-52 was engaged by MiG-29 of Khdir Ahjeb not by HARM fired from F-4G.
I never said anything else. Why should I?

But then, I'm no American curious to deny some 'filthy' MiG-driver put his R-27 into one of 'holy' B-52s - but a (strictly neutral, as always) 'Namsawi'. :wink:

Seriously now: Hijab said so to Sadik, Sadik wrote it down, I've cross-checked with somebody in the USA, and there was never any kind of a probelm with this case (published in English for the first time in same article mentioned above). The only thing unknown - until now - was that Hijab had a wingman.

This is especially 'news' because even the ONI (and that's one of coolest US intel services, if I'm to ask) was all the time reporting that the IrAF was capable of single-ship nocturnal intercept ops only (for example in SPEARTIP 014/90).

Indeed, that's going to be a big surprise for quite a few people I happen to know...

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Sep 2015, 20:06
by oldiaf
That was not the only mission of night intercept involving 2 aircrafts and as example the 2 MiG-29s from squadron 39 that were shut downed by USAF F-15Cs Draeger and Magill over Talha Air field ... were together ... Both Pilots killed : Major Tariq Saeed and Captain Emad Mohammed ... This happened at night right ?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 06 Sep 2015, 12:53
by oldiaf
tomcooper wrote:Not much to see except the two...

Anyway: take some map of Iraq west/south-west of Baghdad.

Draw a line along a course 260° from Tammuz to 42° E - and you've got Dawoud's initial course.

Then draw a line along a course of 15° in direction of Ayn Zazu (a town west of Ramadi) - and you've got initial course of F/A-18s.

Keep in mind aircraft separation in standard USN formations, that Anderson was on the left (western) side of Sunliners' wall, and Speicher on its right (eastern) end, while the first four A-6Es were further south/south-west, in a trail with 4-5 miles separation between single aircraft.

...and everything should be 'crystal clear'.

That will be correct if he scrambled from Tammuz AB ... But he didn't , he flow from Al-Qadisiya AB and as you said it will only fit the description of events

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 06 Sep 2015, 14:55
by piston
Guys, post some schemes, please!

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 07 Sep 2015, 07:55
by tomcooper
Sry, too busy for that (too): since two days, we've got about 20,000 Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan and other refugees coming in via Hungary and longing to reach Germany, and I'm trying to help there.

Most are in need of some sort of care, whether food, clothes (it got quite chilly here, after the latest heat wave), and especially: safety.

(Perhaps) more when I'm back...

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 07 Sep 2015, 08:17
by 35_aoa
tomcooper wrote:Sry, too busy for that (too): since two days, we've got about 20,000 Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan and other refugees coming in via Hungary and longing to reach Germany, and I'm trying to help there.

Most are in need of some sort of care, whether food, clothes (it got quite chilly here, after the latest heat wave), and especially: safety.

(Perhaps) more when I'm back...


Good on you sir. I had the unfortunate task of watching many of them (through a monochrome ATFLIR feed) either being gunned down by ISIS firing squads, or running for their lives through northern Iraq/north-eastern Syria. My only wish during that period of time was that I could have done something for those kids and families. I'm glad there are some folks out there like yourself who are.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 07 Sep 2015, 10:00
by oldiaf
35_aoa wrote:
tomcooper wrote:Sry, too busy for that (too): since two days, we've got about 20,000 Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan and other refugees coming in via Hungary and longing to reach Germany, and I'm trying to help there.

Most are in need of some sort of care, whether food, clothes (it got quite chilly here, after the latest heat wave), and especially: safety.

(Perhaps) more when I'm back...


Good on you sir. I had the unfortunate task of watching many of them (through a monochrome ATFLIR feed) either being gunned down by ISIS firing squads, or running for their lives through northern Iraq/north-eastern Syria. My only wish during that period of time was that I could have done something for those kids and families. I'm glad there are some folks out there like yourself who are.

Apart from Syrians .... Why the Iraqis remember to go for Europe now ?!!! Al-Qaida before was brutal just like ISIS now but the fact it was the European countries closed their doors for them back then and re-open it now .... Simply the Iraqis ( most of them ) are migrating for economic reasons rather than safety.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 07 Sep 2015, 19:31
by 35_aoa
oldiaf wrote:
35_aoa wrote:
tomcooper wrote:Sry, too busy for that (too): since two days, we've got about 20,000 Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan and other refugees coming in via Hungary and longing to reach Germany, and I'm trying to help there.

Most are in need of some sort of care, whether food, clothes (it got quite chilly here, after the latest heat wave), and especially: safety.

(Perhaps) more when I'm back...


Good on you sir. I had the unfortunate task of watching many of them (through a monochrome ATFLIR feed) either being gunned down by ISIS firing squads, or running for their lives through northern Iraq/north-eastern Syria. My only wish during that period of time was that I could have done something for those kids and families. I'm glad there are some folks out there like yourself who are.

Apart from Syrians .... Why the Iraqis remember to go for Europe now ?!!! Al-Qaida before was brutal just like ISIS now but the fact it was the European countries closed their doors for them back then and re-open it now .... Simply the Iraqis ( most of them ) are migrating for economic reasons rather than safety.


You'd know better than I, but either way, it was a depressing spectacle to watch

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 07 Sep 2015, 19:58
by oldiaf
I met some of the refugees in Belgium few weeks ago and got that picture from them.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 10 Sep 2015, 08:52
by tomcooper
35_aoa wrote:Good on you sir. I had the unfortunate task of watching many of them (through a monochrome ATFLIR feed) either being gunned down by ISIS firing squads, or running for their lives through northern Iraq/north-eastern Syria. My only wish during that period of time was that I could have done something for those kids and families. I'm glad there are some folks out there like yourself who are.
...what shall I answer to that...?!?

For me, the situation in the Middle East is well beyond infuriating.

If I start bragging about all the ones guilty/responsible for it, there is going to be no end...

oldiaf wrote:Apart from Syrians .... Why the Iraqis remember to go for Europe now ?!!!

There is a mix of primary reasons: unbearable conditions at home, unbearable conditions in refugee camps of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey... and then it's simply summer. Weather is good and traffickers have no problem with loading them into anything that swimms, then send them over the Med for Greece or Italy.

The weather is 'responsible' (so to say) why as many of them are arriving ('now'): most of those trying to do that trip in winter disappear somewhere in the Med, without a trace (at best, their bodies appear then on beaches of southern Italy). Traffickers don't care about them: they cash per head, bunch 200 people on a boat that could barely carry 20, and then send the boat in northern direction. Most of the times engine malfunctions much too soon. If not, they issue calls on international emergency frequencies and then run away... (these ***** know much too well EU coastal guards are going to do their best to save people in emergency...).

And regarding 'economic reasons'... well, most of those I've got to see were kids, youngsters/teenagers and pregnant women. Lack words to describe it any better, but I've seen very few adult men the last few days. Most have been registered as refugees in Greece (which is in the EU) and Turkey (not in EU) already, but (for reasons I'll discuss below) they are obsessed with getting to Germany. After travelling over Macedonia and Serbia they got stranded in Hungary. Hungarians are treating them really... at least in fashion that for many of refugees is reminiscent of the way Assad's thugs were treating them in Syria....

After these people have spent days (if not weeks) in simmering heat around the major train station in Budapest (or in various camps in Serbia), German Chancelor Merkel came to the idea to simply let them in, last week. Austrian government agreed to let them pass...

Meanwhile, Merkel agreed with Hungarian government to tranship refugees from Budapest and Debrecen to the Austrian border. Hungarians... sigh... they're really.... sigh... they provided busses that brought the first large group - 2000-3000 - about 4-5km close to the Austrian border. Then they simply dropped them there and left them march over... More were brought in per train from Budapest to Vienna. Meanwhile, there are several huge columns literaly marching all the way over 300km from Budapest (or from Debrecen, for example) in direction of Vienna...

Hand at heart: **** the rest of the EU, especially all the a-holes pocketing billions of EU subventions since decades, but are now looking the other way. If it has to be, we'll solve this on our own.

Here in Austria all the possible NGOs are organizing (and providing) plenty of aid for refugees. Even the ÖBB (national railway company) started providing about a dozen of trains a day to carry them from Vienna to Salzburg, where they change to German trains - which are then re-distributing them around Germany.

For people like me, there is meanwhile little to do but help distribute water-bottles, food, clothes, help with translation (primary to English, less so to Arabic, since my Arabic is very poor), perhaps with some 'orientation' too... Various NGOs are doing much more. Yesterday I actually drove quite deep into Hungary and picked up three Syrian families: brought them to one of gathering points in Austria... Some say this should be punishable by Hungarian law, as 'human trafficking', but I would never demand any money for that, and actually... well, after hearing about that thug of a Hungarian neo-nazi reporter beating some of refugess, I couldn't care less any more... I would nearly say, 'good no Hungarian appeared in front of my eyes', during those few hectic hours...

One of particularly shocking things is the number of pregnant women - and kids in general. It's a subjective feeling if you like, but most of people I've got to see were either pregnant women or kids... That said, it's not as if the 'rest' was any much older: most of 'adult's I've got to see were in their 20-somethings.... A kind of 'blow' was a 7-days old girl: born on flight, literally 'somewhere in Hungary', last week... (she's meanwhile in Germany, together with her mother).

Another impression was their incredibly naïve belief in Germany as some sort of 'land of milk and honey'. 'Everything is going to be fine if they get there'.... Especially teenage Syrians, even few Afghans I met yesterday, are kind of obsessed with 'becoming Germans'. Out of thousands that passed through Austria the last few days, less than 100 decided to stay here (in Austria). Didn't have heart to spoil anybody's expectations, nor really time to explain them something about reality (especially those with apparent beliefs similar to those of neo-Nazis here), but it's sure so that there is going to be plenty of rude awakening once they're there (in Germany)...

Overall feeling: majority of Syrians (and Iraqis) I met were well-educated, coming from 'higher middle class'. No surprise: poor people lack the money to pay traffickers... Most are speaking English. They make a rather 'progressive' impression: next to nobody religious (in the last six days I saw only a few praying, only one woman wearing chador/burqa; on the contrary, saw plenty of young ladies wearing jeans, some even shorts). Many had relatives living somewhere in Europe too. None of them was really eager to flee their homes, but since it had to be, they did so and then they want 'to Germany' (again: call this 'subjective' - but keep in mind I wasn't running any kind of official polls there, just chatting...).

Now, while - and as usually - all the Syrians I met were (i.e. are) lovely people, very friendly, cheerful and thankful, there was one thing that never stops disturbing me in negative fashion too: men, and especially young men always get all the priviledges. They are always 'first' - no matter what needs. Even young boys are often taken better care of than pregnant women (by refugees themselves)...

Guess, we'll have a lot to do alone in this regards in coming years... just for the start...

Al-Qaida before was brutal just like ISIS now but the fact it was the European countries closed their doors for them back then and re-open it now .... Simply the Iraqis ( most of them ) are migrating for economic reasons rather than safety.
...given it was Ba'thists who transformed the former AQ in Iraq into this beast of Daesh... and a quasi-Ba'ath regime in Syria who left them flourish (with help of money from Tehran)... PLEASE, let's stop here and right now. Like I said: this is all beyond infuriating for me.

Back to 'Speicher Affair'...

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 11 Sep 2015, 03:57
by 35_aoa
Thanks for the writeup Tomcooper. Sorry that you and others are dealing with racist morons. I saw the video of the beating in Hungary and it made me pissed off as well. I'd also agree that average, non-radical, middle easterners are some of the most charitable friendly hosts I have ever encountered. Super friendly, always quick to shower you with dinner or hospitality, and generally cautiously interested and supportive (at least to some extent) of the west/Americans. Many are also highly educated in spite of their meager circumstances, and of course we can't forget the historical hand they played as a culture in modern art, literature, mathematics, science and just about everything else related to humanity. Unfortunately they keep getting bogged down with uneducated, religious thugs and those who are either quietly sympathetic in private (cough Saudi Arabia), or simply turn their heads and let it happen out of fear.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 11 Sep 2015, 12:15
by tomcooper
oldiaf wrote:
tomcooper wrote:Not much to see except the two...

Anyway: take some map of Iraq west/south-west of Baghdad.

Draw a line along a course 260° from Tammuz to 42° E - and you've got Dawoud's initial course.

Then draw a line along a course of 15° in direction of Ayn Zazu (a town west of Ramadi) - and you've got initial course of F/A-18s.

Keep in mind aircraft separation in standard USN formations, that Anderson was on the left (western) side of Sunliners' wall, and Speicher on its right (eastern) end, while the first four A-6Es were further south/south-west, in a trail with 4-5 miles separation between single aircraft.

...and everything should be 'crystal clear'.

That will be correct if he scrambled from Tammuz AB ... But he didn't , he flow from Al-Qadisiya AB and as you said it will only fit the description of events

The map remains the same: just draw the line from al-Qadisiya down the course 175° to see where Dawoud went.

If you pull that line 'too far' south, it's 'colliding' with Anderson's course.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 12 Sep 2015, 22:58
by oldiaf
I have a question :
Why Lt. Zuhair Dawood Squadron reported to be number 84 instead of 96 as soon as details of this incident showed on media ?!
Like in this site and in many others :
http://fly.historicwings.com/2013/01/fi ... ast-found/

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 16 Sep 2015, 02:52
by oldiaf
I have to correct something .... The first attack hit Iraqi targets which occured at 0238 was that of the AH-64 Apaches on EW radars across Arar in KSA not that of F-117A on Nukhaib AD intercept operation center which happened at 0251 ... and since the timing of the scramble call to Zuhair Dawood was at the same time of the Apaches attack so the Iraqis knew about it after all ... Not just what said at time that they debated even after the war if this attack really happened !!

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Oct 2015, 01:13
by old.iraqi.air.force
hornetfinn wrote:I really wonder what was the tactical thinking behind sending only token aircraft against Coalition forces even during the first couple of days before being effectively decimated?

1.Because 96 Squadron deployed only 8 MIG-25PD at Al-Qadisiyah AB and the rest deployed around another bases, therefore it was not wise to launch massive number of interceptors without being covered at lest by the GCI, and as you know the MIG-25PD entirely depends on (RSPN, HOMER, Approach radar, BEKANT i wrote the last one as i pronounce it) to make it's way back, and with out anyone of these the MIG-25PD completely blind and this truly what happened to Capt.Zuhair Dawood, he didn't had any malfunction in the navigation system but because the air base was under attack they shut down the whole radars and RSPN..etc to avoid being targeted by coalition aircraft. So he couldn't make his way back easy and for that you could imagine if they launch two MIG-25PD (with this case) definitely at least one of them will be lost. The MIG-25PDS and MIG-29, Mirage had better navigation system and that's why 97 Squadron at Habbaniyah AB launch two MIG-25PDS at that night.
hornetfinn wrote:Were Iraqis incapable of sending more fighter aircraft into air or were they trying to preserve their precious fighter force?

2.For the same reason above, most the radars and communication unit has been destroyed from the first night of the war, even if we were able to insure the return to air base we can't insure the communication with ground control to locate the targets and follow the rest of orders, so any interception duty will be completely pointless.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Oct 2015, 01:18
by oldiaf
old.iraqi.air.force wrote:
hornetfinn wrote:I really wonder what was the tactical thinking behind sending only token aircraft against Coalition forces even during the first couple of days before being effectively decimated?

1.Because 96 Squadron deployed only 8 MIG-25PD at Al-Qadisiyah AB and the rest deployed around another bases, therefore it was not wise to launch massive number of interceptors without being covered at lest by the GCI, and as you know the MIG-25PD entirely depends on (RSPN, HOMER, Approach radar, BEKANT i wrote the last one as i pronounce it) to make it's way back, and with out anyone of these the MIG-25PD completely blind and this truly what happened to Capt.Zuhair Dawood, he didn't had any malfunction in the navigation system but because the air base was under attack they shut down the whole radars and RSPN..etc to avoid being targeted by coalition aircraft. So he couldn't make his way back easy and for that you could imagine if they launch two MIG-25PD (with this case) definitely at least one of them will be lost. The MIG-25PDS and MIG-29, Mirage had better navigation system and that's why 97 Squadron at Habbaniyah AB launch two MIG-25PDS at that night.
hornetfinn wrote:Were Iraqis incapable of sending more fighter aircraft into air or were they trying to preserve their precious fighter force?

2.For the same reason above, most the radars and communication unit has been destroyed from the first night of the war, even if we were able to insure the return to air base we can't insure the communication with ground control to locate the targets and follow the rest of orders, so any interception duty will be completely pointless.

How many MiG-25PD and PDS squadron 96 and 97 had in total ? 19 in total as I recall ? .... I don't understand : was the PD version supposed to be more advanced than the PDS version ?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Oct 2015, 17:59
by tomcooper
oldiaf wrote:How many MiG-25PD and PDS squadron 96 and 97 had in total ? 19 in total as I recall ? .... I don't understand : was the PD version supposed to be more advanced than the PDS version ?

Yup, 19.

And yes:
- MiG-25PD: advanced variant with R-15 engines (much better than erlier examples), N-005 Saphir-25 radar (limited look-down/shoot-down capability), IRST and R-60-compatibility, originally built for the V-VS to replace MiG-25Ps (because these were compromised by Viktor Belenko's defection)
- MiG-25PDS: overhauled MiG-25Ps, brought to MiG-25PD-similar standard, but retaining Smerch 2A radar, built for export.

Means: it would be very interesting to learn what kind of 'more advanced navigational system' was installed into the PDS... :roll:

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Oct 2015, 18:12
by oldiaf
tomcooper wrote:
oldiaf wrote:How many MiG-25PD and PDS squadron 96 and 97 had in total ? 19 in total as I recall ? .... I don't understand : was the PD version supposed to be more advanced than the PDS version ?

Yup, 19.

And yes:
- MiG-25PD: advanced variant with R-15 engines (much better than erlier examples), N-005 Saphir-25 radar (limited look-down/shoot-down capability), IRST and R-60-compatibility, originally built for the V-VS to replace MiG-25Ps (because these were compromised by Viktor Belenko's defection)
- MiG-25PDS: overhauled MiG-25Ps, brought to MiG-25PD-similar standard, but retaining Smerch 2A radar, built for export.

Means: it would be very interesting to learn what kind of 'more advanced navigational system' was installed into the PDS... :roll:

How many in each squadrons ?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Oct 2015, 21:12
by tomcooper
That's unclear. But, obviously, there couldn't have been more than 9-10 per squadron.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 04 Oct 2015, 22:45
by oldiaf
tomcooper wrote:That's unclear. But, obviously, there couldn't have been more than 9-10 per squadron.

Ok ... How many were PD ? and how many were PDS ? and all PD were in Squadron 96 and PDS in 97 ?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Oct 2015, 06:09
by nikolaos
Did the Soviets modernised all PDs to PDSs after strong Iraqi demands ?
Incidentally, were they any MiG-25 RBs left in 1991?
If yes what was their participation in DS?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Oct 2015, 07:42
by oldiaf
nikolaos wrote:Did the Soviets modernised all PDs to PDSs after strong Iraqi demands ?
Incidentally, were they any MiG-25 RBs left in 1991?
If yes what was their participation in DS?

No ... The PDS is the modernization of the P model ... RB still present and used only 1 time were 2 RBs used to drag F-15s to SAM sites on Jan 19 .. Both were shut downed ... and frankly I don't know why they choose the F-15C to drag ?!!

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Oct 2015, 08:39
by nikolaos
So, 19 Mig 25 PD and PDS and how many RBs? what was the RBs squadron?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 05 Oct 2015, 09:23
by oldiaf
nikolaos wrote:So, 19 Mig 25 PD and PDS and how many RBs? what was the RBs squadron?

Squadron 87 but the number of RBs I don't remember ... Some of them I think were also with squadron 97

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 06 Oct 2015, 15:00
by tomcooper
oldiaf wrote:...and frankly I don't know why they choose the F-15C to drag ?!!

For several reasons.

Primary is that because although supported by digital computers, the KARI was still providing only 'analog' radar picture (that's why it was susceptible to bogus radar contacts caused by weather, too).

Other was that the IrAF considered it critical to bag some of F-15s, to make their crews less bold.

And finally: some of controllers were making mistakes by vectoring interceptors at the first target they could detect. Protected by less powerful ECM, F-15s were 'more visible' than better-protected fighter-bombers.

BTW, are you 100% sure these were MiG-25RBs on 19 January?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 06 Oct 2015, 15:08
by oldiaf
tomcooper wrote:
oldiaf wrote:...and frankly I don't know why they choose the F-15C to drag ?!!

For several reasons.

Primary is that because although supported by digital computers, the KARI was still providing only 'analog' radar picture (that's why it was susceptible to bogus radar contacts caused by weather, too).

Other was that the IrAF considered it critical to bag some of F-15s, to make their crews less bold.

And finally: some of controllers were making mistakes by vectoring interceptors at the first target they could detect. Protected by less powerful ECM, F-15s were 'more visible' than better-protected fighter-bombers.

BTW, are you 100% sure these were MiG-25RBs on 19 January?

Yes .... They should be and they were not armed ... The only things go against this that they were from squadron 97 which operate PDS version ... It is possible the planes were borrowed from squadron 87 but the pilots were from 97 because they were more experienced in AA combat .. This happenend before with Mirage pilots during Iraq-Iran war and later in DS on Jan 24 raid ... Ultimately both MiG-25s were downed 1 Pilot Captain Saad Naema ejected but injured while Lt. Hussain Abdulsattar was killed

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 24 Jun 2017, 04:56
by brcampbe01
Hello,

i know this is an old post. I served on an STT team at Al Asad in 2010-2011 and this individual, Dawood, had become a Brigade Commander in the 7th Iraqi Army Division. Many of the old pilots became Army officers once the air force disbanded in 2003, He still wore his brown flight jacket and spoke English. My counterpart, COL Foaad who was the Division G5 introduced me to him and told me he had shot down Speicher. Dawood told me he launched in a 2 seat trainer MiG-25 armed with 2 R40s. This is the aircraft that shot down Speicher, it was not a single seat interceptor. This particular aircraft is held for preserve by the Iraqi Army at Camp Mejid on Al Asad because of its significance, it is held in a fenced field. I have a picture with it. There are also several MiG-21s there which are ace aircraft from the Iran/Iraq war. Al Asad (Al Qadisiyah) had squadrons of MiG-25 and MiG-21, nothing else. TQ in Fallujah had the MiG-29s. There they still sit. Those aircraft never flew again after 2003.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 24 Jun 2017, 19:57
by basher54321
Dawoud told you himself he took off in a MiG-25PU (Foxbat C) with 2 x R-40T or TDs ? - which if genuine that version had no radar so one reason why an RWR would never pick anything up.

Don't suppose you took his email address :)

How many Dawouds are there in Iraq claiming this kill btw?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 30 Sep 2017, 07:11
by tomcooper
brcampbe01 wrote:Hello,

... Dawood told me he launched in a 2 seat trainer MiG-25 armed with 2 R40s. This is the aircraft that shot down Speicher, it was not a single seat interceptor. ...


Here a link to loads of photos of MiG-25PU (two-seat conversion trainer): https://www.airplane-pictures.net/type.php?p=4571

Mind showing me what radar should it have that could support deployment of R-40 missiles?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 18 Nov 2017, 20:16
by AfterburnerDecalsScott
I've been to both Al Assad and TQ...never saw a fenced off 2-seat 25...I would have taken all sorts of pictures of it.

Image

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 18 Nov 2017, 20:28
by AfterburnerDecalsScott
piston wrote:Guys, post some schemes, please!


These are all the F-18s...

Image


Line up for VFA-81 strike on Al Taqqadam 1/17

AA401 - "Spock" Anderson
AA402 - "Chauncey" Gardner
AA403 - "Spike" Speicher
AA404 - "Bano" Albano
AA406 - "Skull" Hull
AA410 - "Banker" Caldwell

401 and 410 also participated in the later 1/17 strike that resulted in the 2 MiG-21 kills, flown by "MRT" Fox and "Mongo" Mongillo respectively.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 03 Feb 2019, 18:46
by piston
AfterburnerDecalsScott wrote:
piston wrote:Guys, post some schemes, please!


These are all the F-18s....


I am sorry, I have something like this in mind...

Image

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 04 Feb 2019, 15:44
by mixelflick
tomcooper wrote:
brcampbe01 wrote:Hello,

... Dawood told me he launched in a 2 seat trainer MiG-25 armed with 2 R40s. This is the aircraft that shot down Speicher, it was not a single seat interceptor. ...


Here a link to loads of photos of MiG-25PU (two-seat conversion trainer): https://www.airplane-pictures.net/type.php?p=4571

Mind showing me what radar should it have that could support deployment of R-40 missiles?


This sure is a curious claim. Never heard of a Mig 25PU even being armed with missiles, nevermind capable of downing another aircraft. The R-40 was ginormous, but came in at least 2 flavors (radar guided and infa-red). Maybe it was a heat seeker that got Spike?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 06 Feb 2019, 03:58
by knowan
mixelflick wrote:Maybe it was a heat seeker that got Spike?


Given it was a head-on shot, that would require the R-40T to be all-aspect, which is unlikely given when the missile was developed.

EDIT: On further look, there were more modern R-40T variants with all-aspect seekers, so it is possible, if Iraq had those improved missiles available.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 21 Feb 2019, 20:33
by piston
The incredible story of denial, deceit, and deception that ultimately cost Navy pilot Captain Michael Scott Speicher his life is exposed in this military tell-all. Asserting that years of information has been intentionally kept from an American public, the book reveals that, contrary to reports, Speicher survived after he ejected from his stricken F/A-18 Hornet on the first night of the Persian Gulf War. Protected by a Bedouin tribal group, he evaded Saddam’s capture for nearly four years. In that time he was repeatedly promised by an American intelligence asset that a deal for his repatriation would be worked out but it never was. Speicher was left behind. After Saddam Hussein captured him, Speicher spent the next eight years in a secret Baghdad prison and being moved around in secret to avoid an American task force looking for him, and before he was killed after the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003. Author Amy Waters Yarsinske, a former naval intelligence officer and a veteran investigator and author, presents her fascinating case after years of research.


Image

:shock: :shock: :shock:

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 21 Feb 2019, 21:46
by popcorn
Seriously? :bang:

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 22 Feb 2019, 02:13
by basher54321
This CIA doc from 2001 unsurprisingly suggests they didn't have clue where he was.

CIA FOIA DOC_0000588922.pdf
CIA FOIA
(320.59 KiB) Downloaded 344 times

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 22 Feb 2019, 02:17
by basher54321
I005 – Sunliner 403/F-18, USN
LCDR Michael Speicher of VFA-81, deployed aboard the USS Saratoga, launched as part of this strike. Proceeding
through Saudi airspace, his aircraft suffered a series of electrical malfunctions that degraded his ability to employ his
HARMs. His radar warning system also failed, denying him the ability to detect enemy radars. Regardless, he pressed on
with the mission.
En route, Iraqi MiG-25s were reported airborne and active south of the formation near the airfield at Mudaysis. As Speicher’s unit turned toward the MiG-25s, several pilots reported AAA near the airfield. A few minutes later a pilot in the strike package spotted an explosion and reported it as an air-to-air engagement. Two minutes later, the same pilot reported a larger ground explosion. He had not observed an ejection. Subsequently, Speicher was noted as missing when he failed to answer radio calls.

One of the pilots in Speicher’s unit recalled the event. “I remember us all saying at that time, ‘Where’s [Speicher]?’ . . . We checked a couple of times, tried different frequencies and got nothing. We called the AWACS to see if they had him. Nothing. I got on the radio with the JRCC in Riyadh via AWACS and told them we were missing an airplane.”56 The JRCC records do not show that such a call was received.57
Returning to the ship, one of the pilots immediately went to the intelligence Center to report the loss. He stated that the explosion that he had witnessed did not appear to have been “survivable.” Additionally, neither he nor anyone else had heard any calls on the emergency frequencies. But the pilots had been briefed that the Iraqis had the ability to “DF” or home in on survival radios, and it was possible that, if Speicher were down, he might have avoided using his radio for this reason.
As more aircrews recovered from the strike and nobody reported hearing from Speicher, hopes ebbed. Unbelievably, his
loss was not immediately reported to the NRCC. Additionally, the coordinates finally reported were wrong.58
On this first strike, two aircraft were reported down. The second one was logged as incident I006 and was supposedly an A-6. It took several hours of hard work by the SAR control.....


From Combat Search and Rescue (USAF Uni Press)

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 22 Feb 2019, 15:48
by mixelflick
piston wrote:
The incredible story of denial, deceit, and deception that ultimately cost Navy pilot Captain Michael Scott Speicher his life is exposed in this military tell-all. Asserting that years of information has been intentionally kept from an American public, the book reveals that, contrary to reports, Speicher survived after he ejected from his stricken F/A-18 Hornet on the first night of the Persian Gulf War. Protected by a Bedouin tribal group, he evaded Saddam’s capture for nearly four years. In that time he was repeatedly promised by an American intelligence asset that a deal for his repatriation would be worked out but it never was. Speicher was left behind. After Saddam Hussein captured him, Speicher spent the next eight years in a secret Baghdad prison and being moved around in secret to avoid an American task force looking for him, and before he was killed after the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003. Author Amy Waters Yarsinske, a former naval intelligence officer and a veteran investigator and author, presents her fascinating case after years of research.


Image

:shock: :shock: :shock:


WTF?

There is no rest for this man's family. I recall the first night of the war when one of the higher ups said that all aircraft and aircrew were accounted for (after the initial strikes). His family must have sighed a huge sigh of relief. Then he's MIA. Then presumed dead. Then evidence emerges he may have been captured.

Now this.

I sure hope it isn't just a ploy to sell books...

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 23 Feb 2019, 22:38
by piston
AfterburnerDecalsScott wrote:
piston wrote:Guys, post some schemes, please!



Line up for VFA-81 strike on Al Taqqadam 1/17

AA401 - "Spock" Anderson
AA402 - "Chauncey" Gardner
AA403 - "Spike" Speicher
AA404 - "Bano" Albano
AA406 - "Skull" Hull
AA410 - "Banker" Caldwell

401 and 410 also participated in the later 1/17 strike that resulted in the 2 MiG-21 kills, flown by "MRT" Fox and "Mongo" Mongillo respectively.


By the way, why Speicher 's name is on 406?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 24 Feb 2019, 21:15
by milosh
How many coalition fighters and Iraq's fighers were in that area when MiG-25 downed F-18?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 25 Feb 2019, 14:42
by mixelflick
milosh wrote:How many coalition fighters and Iraq's fighers were in that area when MiG-25 downed F-18?


Quite a few, if I remember correctly. There was (as in most combat) a lot of confusion. It was night time, so that added to it. He was a damn brave pilot to press on with the attack, especially given his RWR (and other) failures. I'm not sure we know enough to say he knew he was being painted by the Mig-25's radar. Sounds like he didn't, but its possible he got a radio call telling him they were in the area (and close).

The R-40 is a BIG missile. The biggest AAM of all time, if I recall correctly. Had he known he was painted and had adequate warning of a missile launch, it's likely is hornet could have out-maneuvered the missile. Being as large as it is, the R-40 isn't particularly agile. The hit was lethal though. If memory serves, it severed at least one of his EFT's and other stores from his aircraft.

In all candor, it sounded like from initial and ongoing reports like the Iraqi pilot may not have known he downed Spike. If there were SAM's active in the area (and it's a good bet they were), this would have just added to the confusion. If this book is correct, he survived the ejection. I'm not sure I believe that, but suppose it's possible.

He died a hero, and his family needs to know that..

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 25 Feb 2019, 19:20
by basher54321
Best info so far would suggest there were only maybe a few other MiG-29s up but really clutching at straws.

It seems the MiG-25PD(S) took off alone and was tracked and locked onto by another FA-18 but it managed to escape while the FA-18 pilot (Mike Anderson) was still trying to get AWACs confirmation despite having an EID.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 09 Mar 2019, 12:36
by tomcooper
knowan wrote:
mixelflick wrote:Maybe it was a heat seeker that got Spike?


Given it was a head-on shot, that would require the R-40T to be all-aspect...
Who said it was a head-on shot?

EDIT: On further look, there were more modern R-40T variants with all-aspect seekers, so it is possible, if Iraq had those improved missiles available.

Actually, the reason for existence of IR-homing variants of specific Soviet missiles (like R-40T), and for the existence of SAR-homing variants was a combination of factors like early Russian pulse Doppler radars being foremost able of detecting and tracking only targets approaching them, but not the targets distancing themselves from the radar, or flying perpendicular to it; correspondingly,

- R-40R was to be used for attacks from the forward hemisphere (supported by radar, of course), and

- R-40T was to be used for attacks from the rear hemisphere (supported by the IRST).

The missile that hit Speicher's F/A-18C was an R-40RD - an export-, but still improved variant of the original R-40R. And, it approached and hit from the left rear side (approx 7-8 o'clock as seen from Speicher's position).

The reason Speicher didn't know he was under attack is that his RHAWs failed already before take-off. He decided to continue the mission, though.

...of course, this all was 'supported' by the AWACS failing to provide permission to fire to Speicher's formation leader, who had a firm lock-on on the Foxbat while this was still approaching from the north, and then the failure of the AWACS to track the Foxbat as this passed by, made a turn around the USN's formation and re-attcked.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 10 Mar 2019, 08:45
by knowan
tomcooper wrote:Who said it was a head-on shot?


An old account I read of the shoot down, I can't find it again, but I guess it was wrong. Thanks for the correction.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 10 Mar 2019, 15:02
by mixelflick
I'm curious...

How does US intelligence look at Speicher's shoot down? It was the first time since VIetnam a former Soviet designed platform downed a US jet. A more modern, 4th gen jet that was designed after the Foxbat?

A lucky shot? Simply as the result of faulty RWR?? Or was it a failure of the AWACS to validate the Mig-25 as... a Mig-25? Some combination of the three???

I understand US aircraft aren't invincible. Far from it. But it is an anomaly, and undoubtedly studied by those in the know. Personally, I think the AWACS controller was at fault/too slow and in warfare as in life - he who hesitates, is lost. I don't necessarily think Spike's F-18C was over-matched... but it could have been. The Mig-25 has a powerful radar (although reports of this Mig being a trainer would negate that). It's exceptionally fast, much faster than the F-18. But speed wasn't apparently a factor. The Mig got clearance to fire faster than Spike's squadron mates did, and it unfortunately spelled the difference between who lived and who died that day.

Anyway, I wonder what US intelligence (and the Iraqi's) think about it...

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 11 Mar 2019, 08:17
by Corsair1963
mixelflick wrote:I'm curious...

How does US intelligence look at Speicher's shoot down? It was the first time since VIetnam a former Soviet designed platform downed a US jet. A more modern, 4th gen jet that was designed after the Foxbat?

A lucky shot? Simply as the result of faulty RWR?? Or was it a failure of the AWACS to validate the Mig-25 as... a Mig-25? Some combination of the three???

I understand US aircraft aren't invincible. Far from it. But it is an anomaly, and undoubtedly studied by those in the know. Personally, I think the AWACS controller was at fault/too slow and in warfare as in life - he who hesitates, is lost. I don't necessarily think Spike's F-18C was over-matched... but it could have been. The Mig-25 has a powerful radar (although reports of this Mig being a trainer would negate that). It's exceptionally fast, much faster than the F-18. But speed wasn't apparently a factor. The Mig got clearance to fire faster than Spike's squadron mates did, and it unfortunately spelled the difference between who lived and who died that day.

Anyway, I wonder what US intelligence (and the Iraqi's) think about it...



It's not like it was just one Hornet vs one Mig-25. It was a large strike at night with the fog of war....(and everything that goes with it)

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 11 Mar 2019, 10:41
by tomcooper
knowan wrote:
tomcooper wrote:Who said it was a head-on shot?


An old account I read of the shoot down, I can't find it again, but I guess it was wrong. Thanks for the correction.

At the risk of some 'shameless self-advertising', please check the story as told here: F-15C Eagle vs MiG-23/25: Iraq 1991 (Duel).

It's been cross-examined to the bones, until confirmed by multiple participants.

mixelflick wrote:t was the first time since VIetnam a former Soviet designed platform downed a US jet.
Rather: 'first time since Vietnam a US fighter operated by a US military service was shot down by a Soviet-made fighter'.

US-made fighters operated by diverse military services of OTHER countries have been shot down by Soviet-made fighters in multiple other wars (see Iran-Iraq as the best example).

...(although reports of this Mig being a trainer would negate that)...
Once again: please explain me how is a MiG-25PU supposed to deploy an R-40 in combat.

Please somebody - whether you or anybody else - explain me how do you think is that going to ever work?

Or, wouldn't it be far more logical to conclude that somebody there misunderstood an Iraqi? I mean, it's not like that has happened only once.

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 11 Mar 2019, 15:46
by mixelflick
tomcooper wrote:
knowan wrote:
tomcooper wrote:Who said it was a head-on shot?


An old account I read of the shoot down, I can't find it again, but I guess it was wrong. Thanks for the correction.

At the risk of some 'shameless self-advertising', please check the story as told here: F-15C Eagle vs MiG-23/25: Iraq 1991 (Duel).

It's been cross-examined to the bones, until confirmed by multiple participants.

mixelflick wrote:t was the first time since VIetnam a former Soviet designed platform downed a US jet.
Rather: 'first time since Vietnam a US fighter operated by a US military service was shot down by a Soviet-made fighter'.

US-made fighters operated by diverse military services of OTHER countries have been shot down by Soviet-made fighters in multiple other wars (see Iran-Iraq as the best example).

...(although reports of this Mig being a trainer would negate that)...
Once again: please explain me how is a MiG-25PU supposed to deploy an R-40 in combat.

Please somebody - whether you or anybody else - explain me how do you think is that going to ever work?

Or, wouldn't it be far more logical to conclude that somebody there misunderstood an Iraqi? I mean, it's not like that has happened only once.


Well, that's what I'm saying. Since someone here claimed it's a trainer, it has no radar. Therefore couldn't fire the R-40. Unless.... it was an IR homing version?

Re: The downing of Speicher F/A-18: Iraqi perspective Jan 19

Unread postPosted: 11 Mar 2019, 19:35
by tomcooper
Trainer or no trainer: no way.