Major General Alwan al-Abousi Iraqi AF during the cold war
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Interview: Major General ‘Alwan Hassoun ‘Alwan al-Abousi
Conducted by Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, and Elizabeth A. Nathan.
Major General Alwan al-Abousi joined the Iraqi Air Force in 1963 and rose through the ranks. He graduated with a BA in science aviation from the Egyptian Air Force Academy in 1966. Subsequently, he received an MA in military science from the Iraqi Staff College at Bakr University. His foreign military training includes training in Egypt, India, Russia, France, and Greece. During the Iran-Iraq War, he served as commander of multiple squadrons, groups, and air bases. Late in the war, he became the director and deputy commander of air force training. In the early 1990s, General Abousi became the dean of the national defense for higher political and military studies, and later the commander of air force administration.
Personal Background State of Iraqi Air Force Readiness Initial Air Strikes (Fall 1980) Planning and Training Foreign Technology Saddam’s Personality Intelligence and the Bombing of Osirak Reactor Woods: Could you give a brief description of your position within the Iraqi military during the war?
Abousi: Let me start with my time as a squadron commander. I flew a ground attack aircraft between 1975 and 1978; I was a wing commander of Sukhoi-22s in Kirkuk between 1978 and 1981; I was a base commander in Kirkuk between 1981 and 1982 and 1983, I was a student at the staff college on al-Sha’iba Air Base in Basra.173 Between 1983 and 1984, I remained in Basra. Between 1985 and 1988, I was base commander in Habaniya Then, I became Air Training Director until six months after the war ended, at which point I was replaced by someone from Tikrit and reassigned to Bakr University.
I have flown 22 different aircraft as a fighter pilot. As a base commander, I was told not to fly, because they did not want to lose a senior officer. I stopped flying in 1984. However, I started flying again in secret. One time I lost five pilots in the 109th squadron. I was sad for their loss and told the surviving pilots, ‘I will fly with you.’ I did not tell the air force’s high command. Instead of honoring me and giving me a medal, when they found out, the air force leaders punished me.
Murray: What airplane did you fly?
Abousi: I flew everything as a fighter: MiG-15s, MiG-17s, MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-29s, Sukhoi-7s, Sukhoi-22s, Sukhoi-25s, Tu-16s, Tu-22s, Mirages, and Jaguars.175
Murray: Which was your favorite?
Abousi: The Mirage was my favorite aircraft to fly because it was so responsive. I still suffer from flying the Soviet aircraft: my body and my bones still hurt. The seats were hard, so we all had hemorrhoids. Moreover, it was so hot in the cockpit that we had to take salt capsules to prevent dehydration.
Murray: Were you able to continue flying?
Abousi: Yes, I continued until I became a major general. I was exceeding the age limit; I should have stopped flying at the age of 40 because of medical issues.
Murray: How many hours of flying time did you have?
Abousi: Approximately 3,000 hours as a fighter pilot.
Murray: Was the Iraqi military running a full staff college course during the war?
Abousi: Yes, they ran courses continuously.
Woods: How long were you at the National Defense College [at Bakr University]?
Abousi: I was at the National Defense College for three years between 1989 and1993. I was a student while I finished a course during the first year and then became the dean.
Murray: So you watched the 1991 war from the sidelines?
Abousi: No. The army, the minister of defense, Shanshal, and al-Khazraji do not know this. Only General Ra’ad Hamdani knows what I am about to tell you. The air force was only given 24 hours notice before the start of the invasion of Kuwait. The pilots were asleep on the ground. At 0400, they were ordered, ‘This is the route; fly to Kuwait.’ There were a lot of accidents. We lost approximately 20 aircraft, as a result of pilots flying into high- tension wires because they had not taken the QFE.176 Altimeters were not set for Kuwait. It was tragic, but no one could say anything.
Woods: You were at the university until 1993, and then you became the administrative commander for the air force?
Abousi: Yes, I was administrative commander for air force management from 1993 to 1994. I transferred, because Uday had asked to be a student at the national defense college. Once he joined the college, he wanted to be the dean of faculty and eventually the president of the university. Because I was dean, I could not talk to him. I received the air force appointment through a connection. So I re-joined the air force and worked as an administrative assistant.
Woods: Did Uday ever finish the course?
Abousi: Uday finished three courses in one year—defense, staff, and national defense— without attending a seminar or class. He kept giving orders and changing curriculum, which I could not stand.
Woods: Then, you went back to training?
Abousi: I returned to the same place as the assistant to the director of training for the air force. I noticed that air force training efficiency was low in 1991. Moreover, aircraft were no longer well maintained.
Murray: Aircraft were not operationally ready?
Abousi: I wrote a report detailing the air force’s below-average performance. As a result, Iraqi aircraft were not used for combat operations. The best aircraft had been flown to Iran during the Gulf War.177
Woods: Could you describe for us what you thought the conditions of the air force were before the Iran-Iraq War; its role in the Iraqi military; and Saddam’s attitude towards the air force? We learned from talking to army officers that their focus was on Israel, not on Iran. Was the situation the same for the air force?
Abousi: The air force was not at all prepared for the war with Iran. We did not even think we were going to fight the Iranians. In the period just prior to the war, immediately after Khomeini came to power, the Iranians started provoking Iraq. If we look at the air force in general, its capabilities were at least half those of the Iranian Air Force. We evaluated our air force in comparison to the Iranian Air Force: a correlation of forces. There were some mistakes in the original study, but I have corrected them in the new one.
Murray: What was your impression in 1980 of US technology versus Russian technology in terms of aircraft?
Abousi: US aircraft were better than the Russian Sukhois and other Russian aircraft. When a direct comparison was done between the Mirage and the Sukhoi, we found that flying a Sukhoi for one sortie was equivalent to flying three Mirage sorties because the Sukhoi was so hard on your body. We trained our pilots to be strong and fit, like athletes. If you were weak, you would not last long because the stick hurts.178
Murray: This explains why Israelis flying Mirages and other French aircraft in 1967 were able to fly four or five sorties in a day. Western critics of the September 1980 Iraqi strike cite a lack of training and maintenance that limited the Iraqi air force to one sortie per day. In fact, what you’re saying is that it was the difficulty of flying the Sukhoi that limited you to one sortie per day.
Abousi: The equipment was hard on the pilot, like other World War II aircraft. When we flew against the Iranians at the beginning of the war, we suffered from these problems. For example, the maps we used for our sorties were necessarily large. But the cockpits of Soviet fighters were small and space was limited, which made flying and navigating at 10-to-15 meters above the ground extremely difficult. Before the war, we needed to establish a balance between the Iraqi and Iranian air forces, so we increased the tactical training our pilots received. We did this in extreme secrecy. Mohammed Jissam al- Jibouri was named the commander of the air force just before the start of the hostilities; he was an excellent commander. Within the air force there were jokes made about the fact that they were bringing a new commander who would train the air force in a new way. None of pilots or the staff realized that this was in preparation for war with Iran.
Woods: When did al-Jibouri become the air force chief? What was he specifically working on to change and why? What was motivating him?
Abousi: Al-Jibouri became air force chief in 1979. He was a British Hunter pilot and trained in America. In addition, he was aggressive, courageous, and dedicated to the air force. He attended training exercises regularly. On one occasion, he attended a training exercise brief at Hurriya Air Base and got personally involved.179 He had lots of sessions with the pilots. He had a good relationship with the airmen.
Murray: In 1980, Saddam brought in a series of incompetent Ba’athist officers to lead the army. Did Saddam do the same thing with the air force?
Abousi: Not at all. The air force was mainly led by competent officers. Incompetent officers were not allowed to join the air force. Besides, General Adnan Khairallah was in control of the air force. We used to say that if Adnan had still been alive, Iraq would never have invaded Kuwait. Saddam listened to Adnan, but not to anyone else. When Adnan was killed, the army died too.
Woods: In 1979, what was Saddam’s attitude toward the air force? Did he view it as a strong element of the Iraqi military?
Abousi: Saddam had no knowledge of or experience with air matters. It was Adnan Khairallah who came to the air force, flew our aircraft, and had a great relationship with everyone.
Woods: Was General Khairallah your patron?
Abousi: He was a good person and a friend. When I was commander of air force training, he told me, ‘We want to do such and such a thing. Can you please help me?’ I would execute his request because of the relationship. He wanted to build up the air force. Our loss was enormous when he died. The army was also killed. The people who led the army, like Ali Hassan al-Majid and Hussein Kamel, knew nothing about the military, because they were just politicians. They interfered in the army. Then Saddam Hussein started to interfere.
Murray: Is it true that in 1980 Saddam said that any good Ba’athist could be a good soldier, but he understood that a good Ba’athist could not necessarily become a good pilot?
Abousi: I have never heard of this. He used to say that good soldiers were good Ba’athists, even if they were not Ba’athists.
Murray: Saddam’s attitude in 1980 was that people like Tala al-Duri could be good division commanders, because they were good Ba’athists.
Abousi: Tala al-Duri just talked; he never had any impact or influence on the army the way Nizar al-Khazraji did.
Woods: Could you tell us the story of the initial air strikes in 1980? We have your write-up, but I am fascinated by the planning. As you describe it, the initial mission was planned and then delivered to the pilots as a training mission, but in fact turned out to be the plans for war.
Abousi: Like I said, we intensified training in order to enhance the capabilities of the air force to counter-balance the Iranian Air Force. As a wing commander, I could not tell whether it was possible or not to carry out the strike and achieve success. Therefore, maybe 48 hours before the operation, I told my pilots that what turned out to be an attack on Iran was a training mission that this was a part of an intense training program that we had been on for months.
Woods: Forty-eight hours before the start of the war did you know this was a combat mission or did you still think it was a training mission?
Abousi: As a formation commander, I actually did not know. I thought to myself this might be real. But when nobody told us to stop, I knew it was the beginning of war. I was on the runway with some other pilots. We usually ran taxi exercises—turn on power, roll to a speed of 150, shut off engine, reduce RPMs, taxi back, and park. Nobody told us to stop and return to our parking spot, and the aircraft were soon airborne. We were at war.
Murray: Most Western accounts say that Iranian aircraft were parked in the open. Your earlier written account indicates that they were under shelters.
Abousi: I flew several sorties on 22 and 23 September. When we arrived over the Iranian bases, I was looking for aircraft on the ground but could not find anything. Shahrokhi Air Base is large with three runways and many shelters, but there were no aircraft!180
Woods: Who did the detailed planning—flight plans, location of refueling, communication plan—for the mission?
Abousi: Headquarters planned everything, but we suggested changes to parts of it, because their plan would expose our aircraft to Iranian defenses. The original flight plan took the planes over a large town with a lot of people and army personnel who could report our air raid. We recommended a change that diverted the flight path.
Murray: Were any changes made between the time you received the plan on 21 September and the morning of the mission on 22 September?
Abousi: We learned of the plan on the 20 September. An officer named Haldoun was the base commander.
Woods: As a wing commander, were you made aware of the training plan on 20 September?
Abousi: The plan for the air force was sent to us on 20 September. They told us to choose the pilots, but not tell them anything because the mission only involved training.
Woods: But you recommended changes to the plan not to fly over Iranian cities? Did they implement your changes to the plan?
Abousi: I made my suggestion to a base commander. He sent someone to Baghdad to notify the command of the changes. They approved it. The major difficulty we encountered was that the bomb load of the aircraft was small—only 1,000 kilograms (approximately 2,500 pounds). This limited amount could not cover the entire target, so our results were not sufficient to prevent the Iranians from striking back. On the first afternoon after our strike, the Iranians attacked al-Sha’iba Air Base and al-Kut. However, they could not fly missions after our second strike. Their engineering efforts were excellent. For instance, they were already repairing the runway by the time our second strike began. The Iranians
had completed repairing the runway by the time we launched our second strike on the second day. They had a lot of aircraft prepped and ready for missions. I even hit one aircraft myself on the runway.
Murray: Did Iran attack with F-4s?
Abousi: Iran attacked with F-4s and F-5s. The F-4s carried a two-and-a-half-ton payload. Even the F-5s could carry more [ordnance] than the Sukhois. Iran has plans to develop its own version of the F-5. They say they can build this aircraft, but it is an Iranian- modified American-developed aircraft. We do not believe anything Iran says.
Woods: Did the tactical training that General al-Jibouri began in 1979 include precision strikes against enemy airfields as a specific target? Did your crews practice hitting airfields?
Abousi: Yes, we were trained in striking runways, because our aircraft did not have electronic equipment that could detect or deal with missiles. Our mission success relied on visually identifying the target: a shelter, a runway, a taxiway, a tarmac. On the other hand, the Mirages had an electronic targeting system, but we did not yet have them in the squadrons. In the Sukhoi, the pilot flies the aircraft; in the Mirage, it is the other way around. The pilot has nothing to do; it is all programmed and easy. We believed even the Americans could not have executed the strikes the Mirages carried out.
Murray: One of our sources suggests that part of the Iraqi difficulties in the early days was that Saddam was afraid of the air force participating in a coup, so he limited the low- level training of Iraqi aircraft. You seem to be suggesting the opposite.
Abousi: At the beginning of 1979, when Saddam came to power, General Khairallah was Saddam’s advisor, and Saddam was not afraid of the air force. By the end of the war in 1989, Adnan Khairallah was dead and Saddam feared the air force. For example, when Saddam attended an air force show, he was very careful about the pilots who carried out the demonstration flying. The drop tanks were removed from the aircraft to prevent the pilots from dropping them as a bomb.
Woods: By 1988, the Mirages were carrying heavy drop tanks on them. In September 1980, did you have any special munitions for cratering runways, or were they just heavy iron bombs?
Abousi: We used drag bombing, especially for runways. They were not rocket bombs. They were regular bombs—called the Shah 500. However, the Iranians were good at repairing runways. It was harder for us to repair runway damage greater than 30 meters across.
The American-made M84 could create craters greater than 50 meters wide by 10 meters deep.181 We had difficulty repairing the runways quickly enough for aircraft to take off the next morning. The cement would not have set by that time.
Woods: Can you describe the morning of 23 September, when the Iranians struck your bases?
Abousi: The Iranians struck Baghdad and many other targets on 23 September. I was at Hurriya Air Base in Kirkuk, but it was not struck that morning. Most bases were not struck on 23 September; Iran targeted industrial installations. We expected the air force headquarters in Baghdad to be struck, but by mistake the Iranian bombs hit another location—a grain silo or a non-vital target.
Woods: Did their target selection seem random or did the Iranians have a plan?
Abousi: They had a plan. When we captured prisoners on the 23 September, they had plans to strike all the Iraqi bases, but our strikes had surprised them and prevented their attack. If it had not been for this surprise, they would have destroyed Iraq’s air force.
Murray: It strikes me that the Iranian strikes focused on Iraqi’s command and control system?
Abousi: If you mean the headquarters, then yes.
Murray: Were any of the squadron and wing headquarters struck as well?
Abousi: They intended to strike the command, but missed their targets and accidentally hit other areas—mostly the Muthana Zayuna [district in Baghdad], where the officers lived.182
Murray: In 1991, the United States struck the same targets as the Iranians with precision weapons. Do you think the Iranians were following American doctrine in their target selection?
Abousi: The American strikes in 1991 were accurate and had a major effect on us. We were surprised that Saddam Hussein had not learned any lessons from the Iranian strikes [of the 1980s] by 2003. He refused to accept our warnings; he called us cowards.
Murray: Our sense is that the Saddam in 1980 was different from the Saddam of 2000.
Abousi: In 1980, he was more reasonable; he listened to us when we met with him. Later he acted on his own. In 1996, we did a study assessing approaches to counter the US Air Force. General Ra’ad Hamdani was present when we presented our arguments. We indicated that that the Iraqi Air Force could not face the US Air Force and win. The ratio [of combat power] between the Americans and Iraqis was approximately 1:50. Traditionally, you should not fight an adversary with a ratio of more than one or two times greater than your own strength.183 Saddam said, ‘No. Change the study results. Do not rely on these numbers; rely on courage,’ and he drew an X on every page. Saddam would often say, ‘One Iraqi soldier is equal to ten Americans.’
Woods: Could you describe the air-to-air operations during the initial Iraqi airstrikes on 22 September? Not so much the maneuvers, but rather compare the level of pilot training and technology between the two air forces.
Abousi: Many air clashes happened in the war’s opening days. The skill level between the Iraqi and Iranian pilots was almost equal. The Iranians downed a small number of our aircraft over our territory; however, most of our downed aircraft resulted from their air defense operations and Hawk missiles. The Iranians are weak when it came to air-to-air combat.
Woods: Why do you think that was?
Abousi: The Iranian F-4 and F-5 aircraft clashed with our aircraft over our territory. They would intercept our aircraft; we tried to evade them. On 23 September, some F-5 aircraft were chasing several of our fighters. We dropped down to 10 meters above the ground; we flew close to the hills, climbed the hills, and then came down on the other side. They would just ignore our strike formations, because they could not hit us. However, they were able to down some of our bombers, the Tu-22s, so we stopped flying them into Iran after 23 September.
Woods: In American doctrine, before you do low-level strikes on an enemy airfield, you need to establish some degree of control over the airspace. In the initial plans of 22 September, did the strikes include air superiority aircraft to hold off Iranian fighters?
Abousi: We had to achieve an element of surprise to guarantee the success of our strikes. We did not have any intelligence. We did not know anything about the Iranian air bases. We merely identified the location of Iranian air bases on a map. Fortunately, they were where we expected. Moreover, we did not know anything about the Iranian air defense system. If it were not for the courage of the pilots and the training they had received, the strikes would not have been successful. Formation commanders who had experience led the wings. We had experience from the northern war with the Peshmerga in 1974–75 and with Israel in 1967 and 1973.185 On the morning of the strikes, one of my pilots, Sa’ad Khamas, was crying. When I asked him why, he said, ‘Because you will not let me fly.’ I told him he was a novice and to wait.
Murray: In the fall of 1980, Saddam supposedly dispersed the air force to the airfields of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates.
Abousi: No, that is not correct. Bandar-e Abbas Airport in Iran was far away. The 36th Squadron was supposed to fly Tu-22s out of Oman, but the runway there was too short. Because the Tu-22 requires a runway at least three kilometers long, we flew from Habaniya. We struck the Tehran Airport and nearby oil installations. This was two or three days before the start of the war. It was not supposed to be war, but a cooperation and partnership building exercise between the Iraqi Air Force and Omani Air Force.
Woods: In a book published in the United States, there was a discussion that after the Iranian counterstrikes in the fall of 1980, some Iraqi aircraft were dispersed to Jordan and Saudi Arabia in order to preserve the Iraqi Air Force.
Abousi: Not at all.
Woods: They all stayed in Iraq?
Abousi: A MiG-25 did make an emergency landing in the Emirates, a Mirage landed in Saudi Arabia, and Super-Frelon helicopters landed many times in Kuwait, but our aircraft were never dispersed to other countries.
Woods: After the initial strike, the air force knew Iraq was at war. Was there mobilization planning?
Abousi: The air force started to improve its level of performance throughout the first half of 1980. The close-air-support (CAS) was the main mission for the air force. Close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, air defense also became missions of the air force. At the beginning, the army had many requests for CAS and as a result, we lost a number of our aircraft, because the level of training in the Iraqi air defenses was bad. They shot down 16 of our own aircraft. More often than not, they failed to recognize our aircraft.
Murray: Clearly Saddam must have been upset by the relative ease with which the Iranians were able to slip F-5s and F-4s into Iraq and attack targets, but the Israeli raid at Osirak in 1981 must have pointed out to him the inadequacies of the air defense system.186 We have recordings in which Saddam is furious at the Israeli success.
Abousi: The air defense fighters were not very good, but it was also good timing on the part of the Israelis. The Iraqi pilots were tired late in the afternoon, so they were allowed to sleep in the evenings. The Israelis took advantage of this. The strike took place at approximately 1900, just as our fighters were coming back from patrol missions. They had no threat, and the Israeli aircraft carried out their strike on the reactor. Saddam was extremely upset with the air force; the air defense commanders were blamed for their negligence. After that, Saddam asked for security measures to be increased around the reactor. For instance, the defenders of the reactor attached balloons on 300 meter long cables around the reactor. High tension wires were placed around the balloons to knock any attacking aircraft down. However, it was not an effective security measure. An aircraft with a long range weapon could still target the reactor.
Woods: Who took the blame?
Abousi: The air defense deputy director of operations, Shakir Mahmoud, was the officer who took the blame for this failure.
Murray: We understand that the other weakness in the defense of the Osirak Reactor was that the ground air defense missile commander and his crew were on a supper break. This suggests outstanding intelligence by the Israelis.
Abousi: The Israelis are known for their good intelligence. All of these weaknesses were taken into account in their plan. Woods: It represents the kind of intelligence you needed on the 22 September.
Abousi: The intelligence we had on Iran was extremely weak. That is why we relied on the courage of our pilots. The Iranian air defenses were strong. Each air base was like a ball of fire. We would lose one or two of our aircraft on every mission.
Woods: Can you describe the air support the Iraqi Air Force provided to the army? How did it coordinate that support? How effective was it? You have said already that the coordination for air defense was weak, but how did you receive your missions and coordinate the targets?
Abousi: The air force command comprised of officers from the air bases who used to be wing commanders or base commanders. We thought the close support missions were not that important. Artillery could be used, for instance. We assigned these missions to army aviation (helicopters).The requests or orders came from corps or division commanders, who were not well-informed regarding the problems and the limitations of the air force. One day in early 1981, Saddam realized that our air losses were disproportionately higher than those of the Iranians. He stopped flights for approximately a month so the air force could reorganize. From then on, all requests for air cover went through air force command directly to the armed forces general command. The general command and the air force commander then made the final decision on targets. Moreover, between late 1980 to mid-1981, the Soviets stopped supplying us. Beginning in July 1981, the French started supplying Iraq with French aircraft.
Murray: So, from September 1980 to July 1981 the Soviets provided no supplies for your aircraft?
Abousi: They provided no support. But after that, the Soviets supplied us with MiG-25s, and we had the Mirage. I believe the first MiG-25 squadron was formed in August. The Mirage squadron was formed in late 1981. The latter were Western aircraft, while our doctrine was Eastern. The Western aircraft required equipment that we did not have.
Murray: They also required more training for pilots and more maintenance.
Abousi: Western aircraft require more sophisticated maintenance and a cleaner storage space without dust, which we did not have. Soviet aircraft could survive the conditions inherent on our bases. Therefore, it took time to prepare the Mirage squadrons. The pilots attended three-to-four–month training courses in France starting in early 1981.
Murray: Did the pilots have a difficult time adjusting to the new aircraft?
Abousi: Western aircraft are easier to fly. We flew the Mirage in 1975. We climbed into them and could fly immediately. Compared to Soviet aircraft, they were easy to fly. On the other hand, the equipment was more difficult: the targeting and navigation systems took time to master.
Murray: During the 1980 strikes, were all of the Iranian bases targeted in that first strike?
Abousi: Approximately. We hit most of the bases within range, which were the air bases, which would provide air support to Iranian troops.
Murray: Was more attention given to air bases housing particular Iranian aircraft, such as the F-14 bases?
Abousi: We did not target the base with F-14s, because they were too far south and beyond the range of our aircraft.
Woods: How did intelligence support to the change over the war’s course?
Abousi: We used the MiG-25 and the Mirage for photoreconnaissance missions over Iran.
Woods: So the air force generated its own intelligence by doing the reconnaissance operations to support strikes?
Abousi: Of course—we’re talking about imagery intelligence and not signals intelligence.
Woods: I would like to know about both.
Abousi: Signals is more related to political issues. Imagery intelligence focuses more on the information that will affect one’s job within the military.
Woods: Were you able to monitor Iranian air defense traffic or flights en route by radar and signals after 1980?
Abousi: Of course. After 1982, the air force was transformed by the introduction of Mirages, MiG-25s, Sukhoi-25s, Chinese B-6Ds aircraft, and Silkworm anti-ship missiles
Section 18: Long-range Strikes Military Cooperation Foreign Technology Chemical Weapons Intelligence
Murray: In terms of the aggressive campaign of long-range raids carried out against Iranian tanker and transport traffic around Kharg Island and in the north of the Gulf, how much cooperation was there between the air force and the navy?
Abousi: Iraq wanted to put an end to the war as early as 28 September 1980. Saddam gave a speech that night. We were ordered to stop all combat flights for three days. Iran took advantage of this period and bombed all our bases. Saddam waited approximately 24 hours; then we resumed military operations. When Saddam realized that Iran had refused to end the war, we focused on paralyzing the Iranian economy. Our most important targets were the oil reserves and refineries. We controlled the air and sea. We targeted aircraft carrying supplies and ammunition from Israel to Iran. We defined a zone in the Persian Gulf area, where we targeted every Iranian ship. The navy’s capabilities were limited, so it made a lot of demands on the air force. When we could not keep up with their demands, they accused us of refusing fulfill the mission. General al-Kabi, when he was navy force commander, he and I had a feud, because he continued the same demands as the navy forces.
Woods: This is a little like the story you told us about cooperation with the Iraqi Army.
Abousi: We stopped filling the requests, because they were always telling the high command they had such great capabilities. They always said they had the same capability as the air force as far as aircraft and could meet the demand. After that, we started planning for the navy. The navy would alert us when an Iranian ship was approaching the range of our aircraft. Iraqi intelligence intercepted the message traffic of international companies and knew ship movements as tankers approached. Gulf countries also helped us regarding ships along the Iranian coast. In the latter half of the war, the Americans also started helping us. We used to inform them when we were launching strikes in the Gulf, especially after the Stark was hit.188 They started being more careful and reporting their position and coordinating with us to prevent a repeat of that incident.
Woods: Prior to this, had the Iraqi Air Force ever considered anti-shipping missions? Had it practiced, or thought about attacking ships in the Gulf?
Abousi: No, we had no training for this, so we began with significant losses.
Woods: What did your pilots think when you gave them their first missions?
Abousi: The missions were difficult because we were flying Soviet aircraft. The C5K Rocket was not effective against ships.189 After we acquired the Exocet missile, the situation improved. We used to provide the pilots briefings in the middle of the night; they would fly to operate out of Kuwait and return to base in the morning. Then, the Iranians started using reflectors that countered the Exocet guidance system. They could not shoot the Exocets down directly, but did direct a few missiles off their targets by chaff. In the end, I do not think the Iranian economy was affected by the air force’s targeting of their shipping. The ships were not really targeted by the Exocet, although those handling the Exocet missiles had good, detailed preparations. The Iranians had anti-Exocet reflectors. They would not shoot the missiles down directly.
Murray: They were using chaff dispensers like the British did in the Falklands.
Woods: And they put reflectors on boats to give the Exocets mixed signals.
Abousi: Those near the ports and along the Iranian coast. The Mirage could go much farther. We would locate and intercept ships at great distances. The only air defense the ships had were F-14s. This affected air force operations.
Woods: Especially in the Strait of Hormuz.
Abousi: Exactly. F-14s were there in the Bushehr area [in Iran] because of the reactor. At the beginning of war, there were no F-14s in the Bushehr area; they were protecting Tehran. The anti-ship issue was such a complicated issue. We lost a lot of pilots, as I recall approximately ten, in the Gulf.
Woods: Did you ever lose any Mirages?
Abousi: We lost one Super Etendard. The pilot turned back when visibility got bad and crashed into the water; he died. We also lost one Mirage at sea, but the American fleet saved the pilot and returned him to his Iraqi base.
Woods: I am intrigued by the long-range strike missions down to the Strait of Hormuz with the B-6D and the Silkworms. Could you describe these missions?
Abousi: These missions started at the end of 1986; the strike aircraft flew out of Habaniya Air Base. Each plane left Habaniya with a Silkworm under each wing. The pilot would head towards the Gulf near the Kuwaiti-Arab coast line. American ships would occasionally give us the location of Iranian ships. When planning missions, we took into account how slow our planes were. It would often take one-and-a-half or two hours to reach the attack area and strike the ship. After reaching the Gulf, the pilot would fly to Lavan, Sirri, or Larak Islands, by way of Bubiyan Island and Qatar. The Silkworm was bigger and less accurate than the Exocet. After they reached the area, the pilots would climb to 1,000 meters when they reached their target. At 100 kilometers, the pilots locked onto the target and began their attack run. A strong wind could shift the rocket off course, so the pilot waited until he was within 70 kilometers before firing his missile. We also attacked Larak Island with Mirages. These missions required two difficult midair refuelings.
Woods: Had the Iraq Air Force ever practiced air-to-air refueling before the war?
Abousi: No, not at all. There are two types of Mirage. The Mirage AQ5 carried the Exocet.192 The targeting system in the cockpit is designed specifically for the Exocet. The cockpit for the ground attack and refueling version is the Mirage AQ6; it is general purpose aircraft.193 But we eventually developed and deployed the Sukhoi-22 to conduct air-refueling, though we did not use it after the war. We also learned to modify the Ilyushin- 76 transport aircraft as a refueling aircraft for the Sukhoi-22.194
Murray: When did you begin doing air-to-air refueling of Mirage aircraft?
Abousi: From 1985–86 onwards.
Woods: During the missions to attack Larak Island, were the Mirages refueled off Saudi Arabia and then Qatar, before the strike?
Abousi: They were refueled twice. Fourteen aircraft were involved in the operation: two were electronic aircraft; six were the second-leg aircraft; the remaining six were the refueling aircraft, and they returned to al-Sha’iba Airport afterwards. Somewhere off the coast of Qatar, three of the attacking aircraft were then refueled; the refueling aircraft returned to Saudi Arabia, while the other three aircraft attacked their targets.
Woods: How often did Iraq use air-to-air refueling during the course of operations?
Abousi: There were a hundred missions. There were many missions like this one. All of the difficult refueling missions occurred near the end of the war.
Murray: How often were these kind of long-distance raids with Mirages done?
Abousi: Only once, approximately one month before the end of the war. It required numerous aircraft and complex planning. All of these strikes required training over Lake Habaniya. We rehearsed out in the western desert.
Murray: These kinds of raids were obviously designed to increase the pressure on the Iranians.
Abousi: Of course. They were intended to pressure Iran to end the war. Iran occupied much of our territory late in the war. If we had not pressured them, they would have occupied Kirkuk.
Woods: Can you tell us about chemical weapons and the Iraqi air force?
Abousi: No one in the air force ever used chemical weapons. Some people have said so, but that is not correct.
Woods: Well, in fact there is quite a lot of evidence that says the charge that Iraq used chemical weapons was true. I can accept that you may have had no knowledge of it, but we know the Iraqi Air Force had the capability.
Abousi: The artillery may have used chemical weapons, but I was in charge of the three main bases, and we never used chemical weapons. We did use napalm. We dropped it from Ilyushin aircraft making low-speed passes over a target. For an occupied country such as Iraq, you have to take extreme measures. Iran used to push hundreds of thousands of people to the front. They used human wave attacks. They did not care if their soldiers got killed or not.
Woods: The Ilyushin-76 napalm mission is an interesting use of transport aircraft.
Abousi: We used napalm in Khorramshahr and Penjwin. The entire strip between Penjwin to Halabjah was occupied by Iranians and Peshmerga.
Woods: How big were the napalm containers?
Abousi: The barrels held about 200L. We mixed the napalm material and attached a fuse to the capsule. When the barrels were dropped, the fuse would go off spreading napalm everywhere.
Woods: What did the Ilyushin pilots think about becoming bomber pilots?
Abousi: They were like many other soldiers; they followed their orders.
Woods: What altitude did they drop the napalm from?
Abousi: Approximately 6,000 meters.
Murray: I want to get back to the intelligence, particularly in 1982 and 1983. General Kabi suggested that long-range naval radars from Fao were crucial to providing information for air and naval strikes. I am interested particularly in cooperation between the navy and air force. Was this naval radar information from Fao passed to you when convoys were moving north to Bandar-e Abbas? According to the naval commander, the radars at Fao could reach all the way to Kharg Island.
Abousi: Kharg is between 280 and 300 kilometers from Fao. Are you talking about the ground radar?
Murray: Yes, long-range ground radar.
Abousi: I do not know exactly. We had no cooperation in this regard. The navy asked the air force to run constant sea patrols in order to provide them with information on shipping in the Gulf. If they had such radar, why would they need aircraft to carry out reconnaissance missions?
Section 19: Attitudes toward the Air Force Air Defense Systems Bombing of USS Stark
Woods: Can you describe events as they unfolded after 1982? What was the opinion of Iraqi senior leadership, including Saddam and the general command, with regard to the air force? How did it change?
Abousi: Saddam and the command realized that the air force was achieving major successes. Unlike the ground forces and the naval forces, we did not get any rest; we flew constantly. Saddam changed his perception of the air force to be in line with the opinion of the minister of defense, Adnan Khairallah. Adnan interacted with us directly. He occasionally flew reconnaissance missions with us in the Sukhoi. Aadil Suleman was a pilot who worked with General Khairallah at the headquarters. He was the best pilot in the world. One day on our way to France, he asked the French to let him dogfight with their best fighter pilots. He shot him down three times in simulated dogfights. The French then removed their pilot from squadron operations, because he was unfit. Suleman was always with General Khairallah. He always trusted him when they went out. Three of Khairallah’s sons were Mirage pilots. The oldest was killed in a plane crash.
Woods: How about the Iraqi air defenses? What was their reputation over time, after 1982?
Abousi: Air defense depends on three things: fighter aircraft, ground-to-air rockets, and anti- aircraft artillery, in that order. Air defenses improved in a number of ways during the war. The only thing we lacked was a long-range detection capability. We were forced to maintain and man observation posts. These posts possessed early warning equipment, such as radar.
Woods: How many layers of observation did the air defense maintain?
Abousi: Generally two, but some areas had no detection. An important target would have a small mobile radar that could detect targets up to 50 kilometers away. We only had seven squadron fighters at the war’s beginning; they flew MiG-21s and MiG-23s. The air force had formed the Mirage and MiG-25 squadrons by the end of 1981. This gave our air defense a longer reach. This really helped to improve our air defenses. The organic field air defense inside the divisions and corps had limited weapons and SA- 6s.196 But at all times the main regional air defense system was superior and controlled the field air defense. However, there was chaos at the beginning of the war; the regional air defense was forced outside Iranian territory. When we improved command and control, the air defense situation also improved.
Murray: What were your impressions of Saddam as a leader when you interacted with him during the war?
Abousi: During the war, Saddam really loved and adored the air force. He awarded me three Mercedes for my work as a base commander. I was photographed with Saddam in 1993, right after the American retaliatory air strike on Baghdad; the US Force fired 40 cruise missiles at the Iraqi intelligence headquarters after the assassination attempt on President Bush. So they gathered all the commanders together and took pictures.
Woods: Can you describe your meetings with Saddam during the war?
Abousi: He loved the air force so much. He advocated 50 percent of the defense budget for the air force; the rest was split between the army and the navy.
Murray: How receptive was Saddam to new ideas during this period?
Abousi: Saddam had no military ideas of his own. He learned much of what he knew from Adnan Khairallah. Saddam was interested in how an aircraft flew, but felt as though the air force did not accept him. Saddam would ask sadly, ‘If they can accept Adnan, why can’t they accept me?’
Woods: There is considerable interest in the Stark incident. Describe, in your own words, how that took place and what happened after the Stark was hit. Can you tell us anything about the personalities and reactions of the leaders and the pilot?
Abousi: I was the commander of Habaniya Air Base at the time of the incident. The aircraft that carried out that mission was not from our base; it was originally an Iranian aircraft that had been modified after the pilot had fled in it from Iran. It was a French-built Falcon 50 and could carry two Exocets.197 It was flown out of al-Kut Air Base, where the Mirage squadron was based.198 The Stark was in the wrong place at the wrong time. We defined an exclusion zone where no ships were permitted. We announced to the world media about this exclusion zone; however, the Stark entered this zone. The pilots were monitoring the area; they saw a target and fired. This was before American forces began coordinating with us.
Woods: Was the Falcon 50 flying a normal raid by itself?
Abousi: We only had one of these aircraft. It made many trips. We modified this aircraft, so it could reach Larak Island without requiring refueling by the Mirages.
Woods: When did you first hear that Iraqi forces had hit an American ship?
Abousi: I do not recall the date when I first heard that.
Woods: I am trying to see if there was a major reaction in Iraq to this event, or if it was just an accident of war that happens?
Abousi: It was a mistake. After the incident, the Americans spoke with Saddam and the military command and reviewed our plans regarding the zone and the pilot’s report. Saddam apologized to President Ronald Reagan and honored the families of those who were injured. The Americans understood that it was a mistake. A considerable amount of money was given to the families of sailors who had died, I believe.
Woods: One of the intriguing things about this incident is that the American delegation asked to see the pilot but was never allowed to talk to him.
Abousi: They were afraid for the pilot. Frankly, I do not know the pilot, because he was not a Mirage pilot; he was a transport pilot.
Woods: I am also interested in the long-range strikes against infrastructure targets in Tehran. Tehran is such a large city. How were those planned, and how did you get better targeting information?
Abousi: Every command had a complete map of Iran with the targets. When we learned about a target in a given area, we would first identify it on a map, then brief the pilot and give him a full picture.
Woods: So planning was done at the squadron level?
Abousi: Yes. We used to have an operations room at the base where briefings would take place. Each squadron had an operations room, as well. The tactical issues would be dealt with in the squadron operations room. The result of this planning process was accuracy. After the attack run, the MiG-25 would take post-strike photos of the target. The Mirage also has a camera that turned along with the aircraft, zoomed in, and took detailed, accurate pictures. This was for battle damage assessment.
Murray: After firing Scud missiles, would the MiG-25s do reconnaissance to assess damage?
Abousi: No. We did not do reconnaissance on damage from Scuds because they were not accurate. We did not attack important targets with Scud missiles.
Photo to Major General Alwan al-Abousi preparing for testing a french jaguar aircraft in France:
Conducted by Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, and Elizabeth A. Nathan.
Major General Alwan al-Abousi joined the Iraqi Air Force in 1963 and rose through the ranks. He graduated with a BA in science aviation from the Egyptian Air Force Academy in 1966. Subsequently, he received an MA in military science from the Iraqi Staff College at Bakr University. His foreign military training includes training in Egypt, India, Russia, France, and Greece. During the Iran-Iraq War, he served as commander of multiple squadrons, groups, and air bases. Late in the war, he became the director and deputy commander of air force training. In the early 1990s, General Abousi became the dean of the national defense for higher political and military studies, and later the commander of air force administration.
Personal Background State of Iraqi Air Force Readiness Initial Air Strikes (Fall 1980) Planning and Training Foreign Technology Saddam’s Personality Intelligence and the Bombing of Osirak Reactor Woods: Could you give a brief description of your position within the Iraqi military during the war?
Abousi: Let me start with my time as a squadron commander. I flew a ground attack aircraft between 1975 and 1978; I was a wing commander of Sukhoi-22s in Kirkuk between 1978 and 1981; I was a base commander in Kirkuk between 1981 and 1982 and 1983, I was a student at the staff college on al-Sha’iba Air Base in Basra.173 Between 1983 and 1984, I remained in Basra. Between 1985 and 1988, I was base commander in Habaniya Then, I became Air Training Director until six months after the war ended, at which point I was replaced by someone from Tikrit and reassigned to Bakr University.
I have flown 22 different aircraft as a fighter pilot. As a base commander, I was told not to fly, because they did not want to lose a senior officer. I stopped flying in 1984. However, I started flying again in secret. One time I lost five pilots in the 109th squadron. I was sad for their loss and told the surviving pilots, ‘I will fly with you.’ I did not tell the air force’s high command. Instead of honoring me and giving me a medal, when they found out, the air force leaders punished me.
Murray: What airplane did you fly?
Abousi: I flew everything as a fighter: MiG-15s, MiG-17s, MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-29s, Sukhoi-7s, Sukhoi-22s, Sukhoi-25s, Tu-16s, Tu-22s, Mirages, and Jaguars.175
Murray: Which was your favorite?
Abousi: The Mirage was my favorite aircraft to fly because it was so responsive. I still suffer from flying the Soviet aircraft: my body and my bones still hurt. The seats were hard, so we all had hemorrhoids. Moreover, it was so hot in the cockpit that we had to take salt capsules to prevent dehydration.
Murray: Were you able to continue flying?
Abousi: Yes, I continued until I became a major general. I was exceeding the age limit; I should have stopped flying at the age of 40 because of medical issues.
Murray: How many hours of flying time did you have?
Abousi: Approximately 3,000 hours as a fighter pilot.
Murray: Was the Iraqi military running a full staff college course during the war?
Abousi: Yes, they ran courses continuously.
Woods: How long were you at the National Defense College [at Bakr University]?
Abousi: I was at the National Defense College for three years between 1989 and1993. I was a student while I finished a course during the first year and then became the dean.
Murray: So you watched the 1991 war from the sidelines?
Abousi: No. The army, the minister of defense, Shanshal, and al-Khazraji do not know this. Only General Ra’ad Hamdani knows what I am about to tell you. The air force was only given 24 hours notice before the start of the invasion of Kuwait. The pilots were asleep on the ground. At 0400, they were ordered, ‘This is the route; fly to Kuwait.’ There were a lot of accidents. We lost approximately 20 aircraft, as a result of pilots flying into high- tension wires because they had not taken the QFE.176 Altimeters were not set for Kuwait. It was tragic, but no one could say anything.
Woods: You were at the university until 1993, and then you became the administrative commander for the air force?
Abousi: Yes, I was administrative commander for air force management from 1993 to 1994. I transferred, because Uday had asked to be a student at the national defense college. Once he joined the college, he wanted to be the dean of faculty and eventually the president of the university. Because I was dean, I could not talk to him. I received the air force appointment through a connection. So I re-joined the air force and worked as an administrative assistant.
Woods: Did Uday ever finish the course?
Abousi: Uday finished three courses in one year—defense, staff, and national defense— without attending a seminar or class. He kept giving orders and changing curriculum, which I could not stand.
Woods: Then, you went back to training?
Abousi: I returned to the same place as the assistant to the director of training for the air force. I noticed that air force training efficiency was low in 1991. Moreover, aircraft were no longer well maintained.
Murray: Aircraft were not operationally ready?
Abousi: I wrote a report detailing the air force’s below-average performance. As a result, Iraqi aircraft were not used for combat operations. The best aircraft had been flown to Iran during the Gulf War.177
Woods: Could you describe for us what you thought the conditions of the air force were before the Iran-Iraq War; its role in the Iraqi military; and Saddam’s attitude towards the air force? We learned from talking to army officers that their focus was on Israel, not on Iran. Was the situation the same for the air force?
Abousi: The air force was not at all prepared for the war with Iran. We did not even think we were going to fight the Iranians. In the period just prior to the war, immediately after Khomeini came to power, the Iranians started provoking Iraq. If we look at the air force in general, its capabilities were at least half those of the Iranian Air Force. We evaluated our air force in comparison to the Iranian Air Force: a correlation of forces. There were some mistakes in the original study, but I have corrected them in the new one.
Murray: What was your impression in 1980 of US technology versus Russian technology in terms of aircraft?
Abousi: US aircraft were better than the Russian Sukhois and other Russian aircraft. When a direct comparison was done between the Mirage and the Sukhoi, we found that flying a Sukhoi for one sortie was equivalent to flying three Mirage sorties because the Sukhoi was so hard on your body. We trained our pilots to be strong and fit, like athletes. If you were weak, you would not last long because the stick hurts.178
Murray: This explains why Israelis flying Mirages and other French aircraft in 1967 were able to fly four or five sorties in a day. Western critics of the September 1980 Iraqi strike cite a lack of training and maintenance that limited the Iraqi air force to one sortie per day. In fact, what you’re saying is that it was the difficulty of flying the Sukhoi that limited you to one sortie per day.
Abousi: The equipment was hard on the pilot, like other World War II aircraft. When we flew against the Iranians at the beginning of the war, we suffered from these problems. For example, the maps we used for our sorties were necessarily large. But the cockpits of Soviet fighters were small and space was limited, which made flying and navigating at 10-to-15 meters above the ground extremely difficult. Before the war, we needed to establish a balance between the Iraqi and Iranian air forces, so we increased the tactical training our pilots received. We did this in extreme secrecy. Mohammed Jissam al- Jibouri was named the commander of the air force just before the start of the hostilities; he was an excellent commander. Within the air force there were jokes made about the fact that they were bringing a new commander who would train the air force in a new way. None of pilots or the staff realized that this was in preparation for war with Iran.
Woods: When did al-Jibouri become the air force chief? What was he specifically working on to change and why? What was motivating him?
Abousi: Al-Jibouri became air force chief in 1979. He was a British Hunter pilot and trained in America. In addition, he was aggressive, courageous, and dedicated to the air force. He attended training exercises regularly. On one occasion, he attended a training exercise brief at Hurriya Air Base and got personally involved.179 He had lots of sessions with the pilots. He had a good relationship with the airmen.
Murray: In 1980, Saddam brought in a series of incompetent Ba’athist officers to lead the army. Did Saddam do the same thing with the air force?
Abousi: Not at all. The air force was mainly led by competent officers. Incompetent officers were not allowed to join the air force. Besides, General Adnan Khairallah was in control of the air force. We used to say that if Adnan had still been alive, Iraq would never have invaded Kuwait. Saddam listened to Adnan, but not to anyone else. When Adnan was killed, the army died too.
Woods: In 1979, what was Saddam’s attitude toward the air force? Did he view it as a strong element of the Iraqi military?
Abousi: Saddam had no knowledge of or experience with air matters. It was Adnan Khairallah who came to the air force, flew our aircraft, and had a great relationship with everyone.
Woods: Was General Khairallah your patron?
Abousi: He was a good person and a friend. When I was commander of air force training, he told me, ‘We want to do such and such a thing. Can you please help me?’ I would execute his request because of the relationship. He wanted to build up the air force. Our loss was enormous when he died. The army was also killed. The people who led the army, like Ali Hassan al-Majid and Hussein Kamel, knew nothing about the military, because they were just politicians. They interfered in the army. Then Saddam Hussein started to interfere.
Murray: Is it true that in 1980 Saddam said that any good Ba’athist could be a good soldier, but he understood that a good Ba’athist could not necessarily become a good pilot?
Abousi: I have never heard of this. He used to say that good soldiers were good Ba’athists, even if they were not Ba’athists.
Murray: Saddam’s attitude in 1980 was that people like Tala al-Duri could be good division commanders, because they were good Ba’athists.
Abousi: Tala al-Duri just talked; he never had any impact or influence on the army the way Nizar al-Khazraji did.
Woods: Could you tell us the story of the initial air strikes in 1980? We have your write-up, but I am fascinated by the planning. As you describe it, the initial mission was planned and then delivered to the pilots as a training mission, but in fact turned out to be the plans for war.
Abousi: Like I said, we intensified training in order to enhance the capabilities of the air force to counter-balance the Iranian Air Force. As a wing commander, I could not tell whether it was possible or not to carry out the strike and achieve success. Therefore, maybe 48 hours before the operation, I told my pilots that what turned out to be an attack on Iran was a training mission that this was a part of an intense training program that we had been on for months.
Woods: Forty-eight hours before the start of the war did you know this was a combat mission or did you still think it was a training mission?
Abousi: As a formation commander, I actually did not know. I thought to myself this might be real. But when nobody told us to stop, I knew it was the beginning of war. I was on the runway with some other pilots. We usually ran taxi exercises—turn on power, roll to a speed of 150, shut off engine, reduce RPMs, taxi back, and park. Nobody told us to stop and return to our parking spot, and the aircraft were soon airborne. We were at war.
Murray: Most Western accounts say that Iranian aircraft were parked in the open. Your earlier written account indicates that they were under shelters.
Abousi: I flew several sorties on 22 and 23 September. When we arrived over the Iranian bases, I was looking for aircraft on the ground but could not find anything. Shahrokhi Air Base is large with three runways and many shelters, but there were no aircraft!180
Woods: Who did the detailed planning—flight plans, location of refueling, communication plan—for the mission?
Abousi: Headquarters planned everything, but we suggested changes to parts of it, because their plan would expose our aircraft to Iranian defenses. The original flight plan took the planes over a large town with a lot of people and army personnel who could report our air raid. We recommended a change that diverted the flight path.
Murray: Were any changes made between the time you received the plan on 21 September and the morning of the mission on 22 September?
Abousi: We learned of the plan on the 20 September. An officer named Haldoun was the base commander.
Woods: As a wing commander, were you made aware of the training plan on 20 September?
Abousi: The plan for the air force was sent to us on 20 September. They told us to choose the pilots, but not tell them anything because the mission only involved training.
Woods: But you recommended changes to the plan not to fly over Iranian cities? Did they implement your changes to the plan?
Abousi: I made my suggestion to a base commander. He sent someone to Baghdad to notify the command of the changes. They approved it. The major difficulty we encountered was that the bomb load of the aircraft was small—only 1,000 kilograms (approximately 2,500 pounds). This limited amount could not cover the entire target, so our results were not sufficient to prevent the Iranians from striking back. On the first afternoon after our strike, the Iranians attacked al-Sha’iba Air Base and al-Kut. However, they could not fly missions after our second strike. Their engineering efforts were excellent. For instance, they were already repairing the runway by the time our second strike began. The Iranians
had completed repairing the runway by the time we launched our second strike on the second day. They had a lot of aircraft prepped and ready for missions. I even hit one aircraft myself on the runway.
Murray: Did Iran attack with F-4s?
Abousi: Iran attacked with F-4s and F-5s. The F-4s carried a two-and-a-half-ton payload. Even the F-5s could carry more [ordnance] than the Sukhois. Iran has plans to develop its own version of the F-5. They say they can build this aircraft, but it is an Iranian- modified American-developed aircraft. We do not believe anything Iran says.
Woods: Did the tactical training that General al-Jibouri began in 1979 include precision strikes against enemy airfields as a specific target? Did your crews practice hitting airfields?
Abousi: Yes, we were trained in striking runways, because our aircraft did not have electronic equipment that could detect or deal with missiles. Our mission success relied on visually identifying the target: a shelter, a runway, a taxiway, a tarmac. On the other hand, the Mirages had an electronic targeting system, but we did not yet have them in the squadrons. In the Sukhoi, the pilot flies the aircraft; in the Mirage, it is the other way around. The pilot has nothing to do; it is all programmed and easy. We believed even the Americans could not have executed the strikes the Mirages carried out.
Murray: One of our sources suggests that part of the Iraqi difficulties in the early days was that Saddam was afraid of the air force participating in a coup, so he limited the low- level training of Iraqi aircraft. You seem to be suggesting the opposite.
Abousi: At the beginning of 1979, when Saddam came to power, General Khairallah was Saddam’s advisor, and Saddam was not afraid of the air force. By the end of the war in 1989, Adnan Khairallah was dead and Saddam feared the air force. For example, when Saddam attended an air force show, he was very careful about the pilots who carried out the demonstration flying. The drop tanks were removed from the aircraft to prevent the pilots from dropping them as a bomb.
Woods: By 1988, the Mirages were carrying heavy drop tanks on them. In September 1980, did you have any special munitions for cratering runways, or were they just heavy iron bombs?
Abousi: We used drag bombing, especially for runways. They were not rocket bombs. They were regular bombs—called the Shah 500. However, the Iranians were good at repairing runways. It was harder for us to repair runway damage greater than 30 meters across.
The American-made M84 could create craters greater than 50 meters wide by 10 meters deep.181 We had difficulty repairing the runways quickly enough for aircraft to take off the next morning. The cement would not have set by that time.
Woods: Can you describe the morning of 23 September, when the Iranians struck your bases?
Abousi: The Iranians struck Baghdad and many other targets on 23 September. I was at Hurriya Air Base in Kirkuk, but it was not struck that morning. Most bases were not struck on 23 September; Iran targeted industrial installations. We expected the air force headquarters in Baghdad to be struck, but by mistake the Iranian bombs hit another location—a grain silo or a non-vital target.
Woods: Did their target selection seem random or did the Iranians have a plan?
Abousi: They had a plan. When we captured prisoners on the 23 September, they had plans to strike all the Iraqi bases, but our strikes had surprised them and prevented their attack. If it had not been for this surprise, they would have destroyed Iraq’s air force.
Murray: It strikes me that the Iranian strikes focused on Iraqi’s command and control system?
Abousi: If you mean the headquarters, then yes.
Murray: Were any of the squadron and wing headquarters struck as well?
Abousi: They intended to strike the command, but missed their targets and accidentally hit other areas—mostly the Muthana Zayuna [district in Baghdad], where the officers lived.182
Murray: In 1991, the United States struck the same targets as the Iranians with precision weapons. Do you think the Iranians were following American doctrine in their target selection?
Abousi: The American strikes in 1991 were accurate and had a major effect on us. We were surprised that Saddam Hussein had not learned any lessons from the Iranian strikes [of the 1980s] by 2003. He refused to accept our warnings; he called us cowards.
Murray: Our sense is that the Saddam in 1980 was different from the Saddam of 2000.
Abousi: In 1980, he was more reasonable; he listened to us when we met with him. Later he acted on his own. In 1996, we did a study assessing approaches to counter the US Air Force. General Ra’ad Hamdani was present when we presented our arguments. We indicated that that the Iraqi Air Force could not face the US Air Force and win. The ratio [of combat power] between the Americans and Iraqis was approximately 1:50. Traditionally, you should not fight an adversary with a ratio of more than one or two times greater than your own strength.183 Saddam said, ‘No. Change the study results. Do not rely on these numbers; rely on courage,’ and he drew an X on every page. Saddam would often say, ‘One Iraqi soldier is equal to ten Americans.’
Woods: Could you describe the air-to-air operations during the initial Iraqi airstrikes on 22 September? Not so much the maneuvers, but rather compare the level of pilot training and technology between the two air forces.
Abousi: Many air clashes happened in the war’s opening days. The skill level between the Iraqi and Iranian pilots was almost equal. The Iranians downed a small number of our aircraft over our territory; however, most of our downed aircraft resulted from their air defense operations and Hawk missiles. The Iranians are weak when it came to air-to-air combat.
Woods: Why do you think that was?
Abousi: The Iranian F-4 and F-5 aircraft clashed with our aircraft over our territory. They would intercept our aircraft; we tried to evade them. On 23 September, some F-5 aircraft were chasing several of our fighters. We dropped down to 10 meters above the ground; we flew close to the hills, climbed the hills, and then came down on the other side. They would just ignore our strike formations, because they could not hit us. However, they were able to down some of our bombers, the Tu-22s, so we stopped flying them into Iran after 23 September.
Woods: In American doctrine, before you do low-level strikes on an enemy airfield, you need to establish some degree of control over the airspace. In the initial plans of 22 September, did the strikes include air superiority aircraft to hold off Iranian fighters?
Abousi: We had to achieve an element of surprise to guarantee the success of our strikes. We did not have any intelligence. We did not know anything about the Iranian air bases. We merely identified the location of Iranian air bases on a map. Fortunately, they were where we expected. Moreover, we did not know anything about the Iranian air defense system. If it were not for the courage of the pilots and the training they had received, the strikes would not have been successful. Formation commanders who had experience led the wings. We had experience from the northern war with the Peshmerga in 1974–75 and with Israel in 1967 and 1973.185 On the morning of the strikes, one of my pilots, Sa’ad Khamas, was crying. When I asked him why, he said, ‘Because you will not let me fly.’ I told him he was a novice and to wait.
Murray: In the fall of 1980, Saddam supposedly dispersed the air force to the airfields of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates.
Abousi: No, that is not correct. Bandar-e Abbas Airport in Iran was far away. The 36th Squadron was supposed to fly Tu-22s out of Oman, but the runway there was too short. Because the Tu-22 requires a runway at least three kilometers long, we flew from Habaniya. We struck the Tehran Airport and nearby oil installations. This was two or three days before the start of the war. It was not supposed to be war, but a cooperation and partnership building exercise between the Iraqi Air Force and Omani Air Force.
Woods: In a book published in the United States, there was a discussion that after the Iranian counterstrikes in the fall of 1980, some Iraqi aircraft were dispersed to Jordan and Saudi Arabia in order to preserve the Iraqi Air Force.
Abousi: Not at all.
Woods: They all stayed in Iraq?
Abousi: A MiG-25 did make an emergency landing in the Emirates, a Mirage landed in Saudi Arabia, and Super-Frelon helicopters landed many times in Kuwait, but our aircraft were never dispersed to other countries.
Woods: After the initial strike, the air force knew Iraq was at war. Was there mobilization planning?
Abousi: The air force started to improve its level of performance throughout the first half of 1980. The close-air-support (CAS) was the main mission for the air force. Close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, air defense also became missions of the air force. At the beginning, the army had many requests for CAS and as a result, we lost a number of our aircraft, because the level of training in the Iraqi air defenses was bad. They shot down 16 of our own aircraft. More often than not, they failed to recognize our aircraft.
Murray: Clearly Saddam must have been upset by the relative ease with which the Iranians were able to slip F-5s and F-4s into Iraq and attack targets, but the Israeli raid at Osirak in 1981 must have pointed out to him the inadequacies of the air defense system.186 We have recordings in which Saddam is furious at the Israeli success.
Abousi: The air defense fighters were not very good, but it was also good timing on the part of the Israelis. The Iraqi pilots were tired late in the afternoon, so they were allowed to sleep in the evenings. The Israelis took advantage of this. The strike took place at approximately 1900, just as our fighters were coming back from patrol missions. They had no threat, and the Israeli aircraft carried out their strike on the reactor. Saddam was extremely upset with the air force; the air defense commanders were blamed for their negligence. After that, Saddam asked for security measures to be increased around the reactor. For instance, the defenders of the reactor attached balloons on 300 meter long cables around the reactor. High tension wires were placed around the balloons to knock any attacking aircraft down. However, it was not an effective security measure. An aircraft with a long range weapon could still target the reactor.
Woods: Who took the blame?
Abousi: The air defense deputy director of operations, Shakir Mahmoud, was the officer who took the blame for this failure.
Murray: We understand that the other weakness in the defense of the Osirak Reactor was that the ground air defense missile commander and his crew were on a supper break. This suggests outstanding intelligence by the Israelis.
Abousi: The Israelis are known for their good intelligence. All of these weaknesses were taken into account in their plan. Woods: It represents the kind of intelligence you needed on the 22 September.
Abousi: The intelligence we had on Iran was extremely weak. That is why we relied on the courage of our pilots. The Iranian air defenses were strong. Each air base was like a ball of fire. We would lose one or two of our aircraft on every mission.
Woods: Can you describe the air support the Iraqi Air Force provided to the army? How did it coordinate that support? How effective was it? You have said already that the coordination for air defense was weak, but how did you receive your missions and coordinate the targets?
Abousi: The air force command comprised of officers from the air bases who used to be wing commanders or base commanders. We thought the close support missions were not that important. Artillery could be used, for instance. We assigned these missions to army aviation (helicopters).The requests or orders came from corps or division commanders, who were not well-informed regarding the problems and the limitations of the air force. One day in early 1981, Saddam realized that our air losses were disproportionately higher than those of the Iranians. He stopped flights for approximately a month so the air force could reorganize. From then on, all requests for air cover went through air force command directly to the armed forces general command. The general command and the air force commander then made the final decision on targets. Moreover, between late 1980 to mid-1981, the Soviets stopped supplying us. Beginning in July 1981, the French started supplying Iraq with French aircraft.
Murray: So, from September 1980 to July 1981 the Soviets provided no supplies for your aircraft?
Abousi: They provided no support. But after that, the Soviets supplied us with MiG-25s, and we had the Mirage. I believe the first MiG-25 squadron was formed in August. The Mirage squadron was formed in late 1981. The latter were Western aircraft, while our doctrine was Eastern. The Western aircraft required equipment that we did not have.
Murray: They also required more training for pilots and more maintenance.
Abousi: Western aircraft require more sophisticated maintenance and a cleaner storage space without dust, which we did not have. Soviet aircraft could survive the conditions inherent on our bases. Therefore, it took time to prepare the Mirage squadrons. The pilots attended three-to-four–month training courses in France starting in early 1981.
Murray: Did the pilots have a difficult time adjusting to the new aircraft?
Abousi: Western aircraft are easier to fly. We flew the Mirage in 1975. We climbed into them and could fly immediately. Compared to Soviet aircraft, they were easy to fly. On the other hand, the equipment was more difficult: the targeting and navigation systems took time to master.
Murray: During the 1980 strikes, were all of the Iranian bases targeted in that first strike?
Abousi: Approximately. We hit most of the bases within range, which were the air bases, which would provide air support to Iranian troops.
Murray: Was more attention given to air bases housing particular Iranian aircraft, such as the F-14 bases?
Abousi: We did not target the base with F-14s, because they were too far south and beyond the range of our aircraft.
Woods: How did intelligence support to the change over the war’s course?
Abousi: We used the MiG-25 and the Mirage for photoreconnaissance missions over Iran.
Woods: So the air force generated its own intelligence by doing the reconnaissance operations to support strikes?
Abousi: Of course—we’re talking about imagery intelligence and not signals intelligence.
Woods: I would like to know about both.
Abousi: Signals is more related to political issues. Imagery intelligence focuses more on the information that will affect one’s job within the military.
Woods: Were you able to monitor Iranian air defense traffic or flights en route by radar and signals after 1980?
Abousi: Of course. After 1982, the air force was transformed by the introduction of Mirages, MiG-25s, Sukhoi-25s, Chinese B-6Ds aircraft, and Silkworm anti-ship missiles
Section 18: Long-range Strikes Military Cooperation Foreign Technology Chemical Weapons Intelligence
Murray: In terms of the aggressive campaign of long-range raids carried out against Iranian tanker and transport traffic around Kharg Island and in the north of the Gulf, how much cooperation was there between the air force and the navy?
Abousi: Iraq wanted to put an end to the war as early as 28 September 1980. Saddam gave a speech that night. We were ordered to stop all combat flights for three days. Iran took advantage of this period and bombed all our bases. Saddam waited approximately 24 hours; then we resumed military operations. When Saddam realized that Iran had refused to end the war, we focused on paralyzing the Iranian economy. Our most important targets were the oil reserves and refineries. We controlled the air and sea. We targeted aircraft carrying supplies and ammunition from Israel to Iran. We defined a zone in the Persian Gulf area, where we targeted every Iranian ship. The navy’s capabilities were limited, so it made a lot of demands on the air force. When we could not keep up with their demands, they accused us of refusing fulfill the mission. General al-Kabi, when he was navy force commander, he and I had a feud, because he continued the same demands as the navy forces.
Woods: This is a little like the story you told us about cooperation with the Iraqi Army.
Abousi: We stopped filling the requests, because they were always telling the high command they had such great capabilities. They always said they had the same capability as the air force as far as aircraft and could meet the demand. After that, we started planning for the navy. The navy would alert us when an Iranian ship was approaching the range of our aircraft. Iraqi intelligence intercepted the message traffic of international companies and knew ship movements as tankers approached. Gulf countries also helped us regarding ships along the Iranian coast. In the latter half of the war, the Americans also started helping us. We used to inform them when we were launching strikes in the Gulf, especially after the Stark was hit.188 They started being more careful and reporting their position and coordinating with us to prevent a repeat of that incident.
Woods: Prior to this, had the Iraqi Air Force ever considered anti-shipping missions? Had it practiced, or thought about attacking ships in the Gulf?
Abousi: No, we had no training for this, so we began with significant losses.
Woods: What did your pilots think when you gave them their first missions?
Abousi: The missions were difficult because we were flying Soviet aircraft. The C5K Rocket was not effective against ships.189 After we acquired the Exocet missile, the situation improved. We used to provide the pilots briefings in the middle of the night; they would fly to operate out of Kuwait and return to base in the morning. Then, the Iranians started using reflectors that countered the Exocet guidance system. They could not shoot the Exocets down directly, but did direct a few missiles off their targets by chaff. In the end, I do not think the Iranian economy was affected by the air force’s targeting of their shipping. The ships were not really targeted by the Exocet, although those handling the Exocet missiles had good, detailed preparations. The Iranians had anti-Exocet reflectors. They would not shoot the missiles down directly.
Murray: They were using chaff dispensers like the British did in the Falklands.
Woods: And they put reflectors on boats to give the Exocets mixed signals.
Abousi: Those near the ports and along the Iranian coast. The Mirage could go much farther. We would locate and intercept ships at great distances. The only air defense the ships had were F-14s. This affected air force operations.
Woods: Especially in the Strait of Hormuz.
Abousi: Exactly. F-14s were there in the Bushehr area [in Iran] because of the reactor. At the beginning of war, there were no F-14s in the Bushehr area; they were protecting Tehran. The anti-ship issue was such a complicated issue. We lost a lot of pilots, as I recall approximately ten, in the Gulf.
Woods: Did you ever lose any Mirages?
Abousi: We lost one Super Etendard. The pilot turned back when visibility got bad and crashed into the water; he died. We also lost one Mirage at sea, but the American fleet saved the pilot and returned him to his Iraqi base.
Woods: I am intrigued by the long-range strike missions down to the Strait of Hormuz with the B-6D and the Silkworms. Could you describe these missions?
Abousi: These missions started at the end of 1986; the strike aircraft flew out of Habaniya Air Base. Each plane left Habaniya with a Silkworm under each wing. The pilot would head towards the Gulf near the Kuwaiti-Arab coast line. American ships would occasionally give us the location of Iranian ships. When planning missions, we took into account how slow our planes were. It would often take one-and-a-half or two hours to reach the attack area and strike the ship. After reaching the Gulf, the pilot would fly to Lavan, Sirri, or Larak Islands, by way of Bubiyan Island and Qatar. The Silkworm was bigger and less accurate than the Exocet. After they reached the area, the pilots would climb to 1,000 meters when they reached their target. At 100 kilometers, the pilots locked onto the target and began their attack run. A strong wind could shift the rocket off course, so the pilot waited until he was within 70 kilometers before firing his missile. We also attacked Larak Island with Mirages. These missions required two difficult midair refuelings.
Woods: Had the Iraq Air Force ever practiced air-to-air refueling before the war?
Abousi: No, not at all. There are two types of Mirage. The Mirage AQ5 carried the Exocet.192 The targeting system in the cockpit is designed specifically for the Exocet. The cockpit for the ground attack and refueling version is the Mirage AQ6; it is general purpose aircraft.193 But we eventually developed and deployed the Sukhoi-22 to conduct air-refueling, though we did not use it after the war. We also learned to modify the Ilyushin- 76 transport aircraft as a refueling aircraft for the Sukhoi-22.194
Murray: When did you begin doing air-to-air refueling of Mirage aircraft?
Abousi: From 1985–86 onwards.
Woods: During the missions to attack Larak Island, were the Mirages refueled off Saudi Arabia and then Qatar, before the strike?
Abousi: They were refueled twice. Fourteen aircraft were involved in the operation: two were electronic aircraft; six were the second-leg aircraft; the remaining six were the refueling aircraft, and they returned to al-Sha’iba Airport afterwards. Somewhere off the coast of Qatar, three of the attacking aircraft were then refueled; the refueling aircraft returned to Saudi Arabia, while the other three aircraft attacked their targets.
Woods: How often did Iraq use air-to-air refueling during the course of operations?
Abousi: There were a hundred missions. There were many missions like this one. All of the difficult refueling missions occurred near the end of the war.
Murray: How often were these kind of long-distance raids with Mirages done?
Abousi: Only once, approximately one month before the end of the war. It required numerous aircraft and complex planning. All of these strikes required training over Lake Habaniya. We rehearsed out in the western desert.
Murray: These kinds of raids were obviously designed to increase the pressure on the Iranians.
Abousi: Of course. They were intended to pressure Iran to end the war. Iran occupied much of our territory late in the war. If we had not pressured them, they would have occupied Kirkuk.
Woods: Can you tell us about chemical weapons and the Iraqi air force?
Abousi: No one in the air force ever used chemical weapons. Some people have said so, but that is not correct.
Woods: Well, in fact there is quite a lot of evidence that says the charge that Iraq used chemical weapons was true. I can accept that you may have had no knowledge of it, but we know the Iraqi Air Force had the capability.
Abousi: The artillery may have used chemical weapons, but I was in charge of the three main bases, and we never used chemical weapons. We did use napalm. We dropped it from Ilyushin aircraft making low-speed passes over a target. For an occupied country such as Iraq, you have to take extreme measures. Iran used to push hundreds of thousands of people to the front. They used human wave attacks. They did not care if their soldiers got killed or not.
Woods: The Ilyushin-76 napalm mission is an interesting use of transport aircraft.
Abousi: We used napalm in Khorramshahr and Penjwin. The entire strip between Penjwin to Halabjah was occupied by Iranians and Peshmerga.
Woods: How big were the napalm containers?
Abousi: The barrels held about 200L. We mixed the napalm material and attached a fuse to the capsule. When the barrels were dropped, the fuse would go off spreading napalm everywhere.
Woods: What did the Ilyushin pilots think about becoming bomber pilots?
Abousi: They were like many other soldiers; they followed their orders.
Woods: What altitude did they drop the napalm from?
Abousi: Approximately 6,000 meters.
Murray: I want to get back to the intelligence, particularly in 1982 and 1983. General Kabi suggested that long-range naval radars from Fao were crucial to providing information for air and naval strikes. I am interested particularly in cooperation between the navy and air force. Was this naval radar information from Fao passed to you when convoys were moving north to Bandar-e Abbas? According to the naval commander, the radars at Fao could reach all the way to Kharg Island.
Abousi: Kharg is between 280 and 300 kilometers from Fao. Are you talking about the ground radar?
Murray: Yes, long-range ground radar.
Abousi: I do not know exactly. We had no cooperation in this regard. The navy asked the air force to run constant sea patrols in order to provide them with information on shipping in the Gulf. If they had such radar, why would they need aircraft to carry out reconnaissance missions?
Section 19: Attitudes toward the Air Force Air Defense Systems Bombing of USS Stark
Woods: Can you describe events as they unfolded after 1982? What was the opinion of Iraqi senior leadership, including Saddam and the general command, with regard to the air force? How did it change?
Abousi: Saddam and the command realized that the air force was achieving major successes. Unlike the ground forces and the naval forces, we did not get any rest; we flew constantly. Saddam changed his perception of the air force to be in line with the opinion of the minister of defense, Adnan Khairallah. Adnan interacted with us directly. He occasionally flew reconnaissance missions with us in the Sukhoi. Aadil Suleman was a pilot who worked with General Khairallah at the headquarters. He was the best pilot in the world. One day on our way to France, he asked the French to let him dogfight with their best fighter pilots. He shot him down three times in simulated dogfights. The French then removed their pilot from squadron operations, because he was unfit. Suleman was always with General Khairallah. He always trusted him when they went out. Three of Khairallah’s sons were Mirage pilots. The oldest was killed in a plane crash.
Woods: How about the Iraqi air defenses? What was their reputation over time, after 1982?
Abousi: Air defense depends on three things: fighter aircraft, ground-to-air rockets, and anti- aircraft artillery, in that order. Air defenses improved in a number of ways during the war. The only thing we lacked was a long-range detection capability. We were forced to maintain and man observation posts. These posts possessed early warning equipment, such as radar.
Woods: How many layers of observation did the air defense maintain?
Abousi: Generally two, but some areas had no detection. An important target would have a small mobile radar that could detect targets up to 50 kilometers away. We only had seven squadron fighters at the war’s beginning; they flew MiG-21s and MiG-23s. The air force had formed the Mirage and MiG-25 squadrons by the end of 1981. This gave our air defense a longer reach. This really helped to improve our air defenses. The organic field air defense inside the divisions and corps had limited weapons and SA- 6s.196 But at all times the main regional air defense system was superior and controlled the field air defense. However, there was chaos at the beginning of the war; the regional air defense was forced outside Iranian territory. When we improved command and control, the air defense situation also improved.
Murray: What were your impressions of Saddam as a leader when you interacted with him during the war?
Abousi: During the war, Saddam really loved and adored the air force. He awarded me three Mercedes for my work as a base commander. I was photographed with Saddam in 1993, right after the American retaliatory air strike on Baghdad; the US Force fired 40 cruise missiles at the Iraqi intelligence headquarters after the assassination attempt on President Bush. So they gathered all the commanders together and took pictures.
Woods: Can you describe your meetings with Saddam during the war?
Abousi: He loved the air force so much. He advocated 50 percent of the defense budget for the air force; the rest was split between the army and the navy.
Murray: How receptive was Saddam to new ideas during this period?
Abousi: Saddam had no military ideas of his own. He learned much of what he knew from Adnan Khairallah. Saddam was interested in how an aircraft flew, but felt as though the air force did not accept him. Saddam would ask sadly, ‘If they can accept Adnan, why can’t they accept me?’
Woods: There is considerable interest in the Stark incident. Describe, in your own words, how that took place and what happened after the Stark was hit. Can you tell us anything about the personalities and reactions of the leaders and the pilot?
Abousi: I was the commander of Habaniya Air Base at the time of the incident. The aircraft that carried out that mission was not from our base; it was originally an Iranian aircraft that had been modified after the pilot had fled in it from Iran. It was a French-built Falcon 50 and could carry two Exocets.197 It was flown out of al-Kut Air Base, where the Mirage squadron was based.198 The Stark was in the wrong place at the wrong time. We defined an exclusion zone where no ships were permitted. We announced to the world media about this exclusion zone; however, the Stark entered this zone. The pilots were monitoring the area; they saw a target and fired. This was before American forces began coordinating with us.
Woods: Was the Falcon 50 flying a normal raid by itself?
Abousi: We only had one of these aircraft. It made many trips. We modified this aircraft, so it could reach Larak Island without requiring refueling by the Mirages.
Woods: When did you first hear that Iraqi forces had hit an American ship?
Abousi: I do not recall the date when I first heard that.
Woods: I am trying to see if there was a major reaction in Iraq to this event, or if it was just an accident of war that happens?
Abousi: It was a mistake. After the incident, the Americans spoke with Saddam and the military command and reviewed our plans regarding the zone and the pilot’s report. Saddam apologized to President Ronald Reagan and honored the families of those who were injured. The Americans understood that it was a mistake. A considerable amount of money was given to the families of sailors who had died, I believe.
Woods: One of the intriguing things about this incident is that the American delegation asked to see the pilot but was never allowed to talk to him.
Abousi: They were afraid for the pilot. Frankly, I do not know the pilot, because he was not a Mirage pilot; he was a transport pilot.
Woods: I am also interested in the long-range strikes against infrastructure targets in Tehran. Tehran is such a large city. How were those planned, and how did you get better targeting information?
Abousi: Every command had a complete map of Iran with the targets. When we learned about a target in a given area, we would first identify it on a map, then brief the pilot and give him a full picture.
Woods: So planning was done at the squadron level?
Abousi: Yes. We used to have an operations room at the base where briefings would take place. Each squadron had an operations room, as well. The tactical issues would be dealt with in the squadron operations room. The result of this planning process was accuracy. After the attack run, the MiG-25 would take post-strike photos of the target. The Mirage also has a camera that turned along with the aircraft, zoomed in, and took detailed, accurate pictures. This was for battle damage assessment.
Murray: After firing Scud missiles, would the MiG-25s do reconnaissance to assess damage?
Abousi: No. We did not do reconnaissance on damage from Scuds because they were not accurate. We did not attack important targets with Scud missiles.
Photo to Major General Alwan al-Abousi preparing for testing a french jaguar aircraft in France:
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Section 20: Senior Leadership Foreign Assistance Iraqi F- 1s Shot Down by Saudi F-15s during First Gulf War Evacuation of Iraqi Fighters to Iran during First Gulf War War of the Cities
Woods: Could you describe for us the senior Iraqi leadership? You mentioned General Mohammed Jissam al-Jibouri in the beginning. Could you describe him, his personal attri- butes through the war, what happened to him and other senior air force personalities of significance?
Abousi: Our most influential person was Adnan Khairallah, when he was the minister of defense and the secretary of the military office. He and Mohammed Abdullah Shehwani, the director of intelligence, were both pilots. General Khairallah spoke with the formation commander before the first strike and helped the pilots with salaries, housing, etc. He would pay for medical treatment outside the country. We loved Adnan Khairallah.
The other influential person was Mohammed Jissam al-Jibouri. He was a wonderful commander of the air force. He was commander-in-chief of the air force from 1979 through to the beginning of 1984. In 1984, Saddam appointed him to the military industrialization commission (MIC).200 Saddam told him, ‘You need to make military industrializations as good as the air force.’
Woods: Who replaced al-Jibouri as commander-in-chief of the air force?
Abousi: Hamid Shaban Rashid al-Tikriti replaced al-Jibouri. As a pilot, he was pretty weak. Besides, as far as religion, he was a bit of a Sunni extremist. Most Iraqis do not differentiate between Sunni and Shi’a. When al-Tikriti saw a base commander praying, he would love him even more. If he saw a commander drinking, he would hate him. He was not admired in the air force as much as al-Jibouri had been.
Woods: Was al-Tikriti as an effective air force commander? How long did he stay on the job?
Abousi: No, he was not effective. The commanders he had were good. Salim al-Basu, air force operations deputy director, later executed by Saddam, and Hassan Hajj Khudur, the operations director, were both outstanding.
Woods: When and why was al-Basu executed?
Abousi: Al-Basu and Rajji Tikriti were executed after being accused of taking part in an assassination conspiracy against Saddam in 1995.201
Woods: Was Hamid Shaban [Rashid al-Tikriti] the air force commander from 1984 until the end of war?
Abousi: Yes.
Woods: Who were the important leaders in the air force, whether they were good or bad?
Abousi: Mainly, Mohammed Jisam al-Jibouri, because he knew the air force and understood us, unlike Shaban. He was competent, and he encouraged us. He was competent. But the commanders who came after him cared more about being close to Saddam.
Woods: Did al-Jibouri’s move to the military industrial commission have anything to do with the increase in the quality of material supplied to the air force later on?
Abousi: He completely developed military industrialization. According to what he told me, there was equipment and millions of dinars buried in the ground, which he put to work. Hussein Kamel was given control of the commission in 1989. Woods: To what extent did Iraq receive external support in training and technical assistance? You told us about the Mirage pilots sent to France. Did you have other pilots come to Iran to help train, or did foreign technicians help maintain equipment?
Abousi: When we received the Super Entandard aircraft, the French offered to fly with us in order to train our pilots, but we refused. Instead, we sent our pilots for one-month training in France. No foreign pilots participated in our combat missions. Pilots from many countries participated in our training—India, Egypt, Pakistan, and Czechoslovakia. The command of the air force college was a foreigner; the college included many Egyptians. Adnan Khairallah had an excellent relationship with Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and his minister of defense, Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala. This is the Ghazala by the way who wrote a book about the Iran-Iraq War, but most of what he wrote was inaccurate. He wrote a slanted history, which favored Iran.
Murray: Between 1980 and 1988, the Iraqi Air Force underwent a major expansion, both in numbers and technological complexity. What were the processes of training, not just of the pilots, but also of the maintenance crews, electronics crews, electronic counter measures (ECM) crews, radar crews, and ground control? Were they trained in Iraq or foreign countries, or some combination?
Abousi: The air force expanded from 30 squadrons to 50 squadrons. From the tactical side, the methods of usage changed and improved during the war. A flight leader school training was developed. This helped the pilots’ attending this school. At the combat level, we started flying inside Iran and we achieved air superiority after 1985 because our electronics were so advanced. We installed detection and warning equipment and the aircraft carried anti-radar missiles.
Murray: These were French missiles?
Abousi: Yes, the aircraft carried Bazaal and X-28 Radiation missiles.202 They were both expensive, but the X-28 was slightly cheaper, but good. The Bazaal had a range of 100 kilometers; the X-28 had a range of approximately 50 kilometers. The Mirage would mark the target with a beam and the Sukhoi would attack. We flew coordinated attacks with the Mirages and Sukhois. At the beginning of the war, MiG-25s photographed the targets. In 1981, we flew two Sukhoi 22s, one of which had the X-28 rocket for each mission. If both aircraft detected a radar signal that meant it was a false target because the beam should separate; if only one of the aircraft received the radar signal, then it was a real target, and they would attack using the X-28. When the Mirages arrived, we began using the Bazaal.
Murray: Did you have much trouble transitioning pilots from the relatively simple Soviet aircraft to the more complex electronics of the Mirage?
Abousi: All Sukhoi pilots were good pilots. However, the Mirage required more than just a good pilot; the pilot needed to be more intelligent.
Murray: Did some of the pilots fail the transition?
Abousi: When they graduated from the flight school, the best pilots were assigned to fly the Mirage. We reassigned all the Tu pilots to the bombers, because the original bomber pilots were not good. At the beginning of the war, a bomber pilot was executed, refused to fly a mission.
Woods: Did you have occasion to hear either through intelligence or through POW- debriefings what kind of training the Iranian Air Force was receiving?
Abousi: Under the shah, Iranian Air Force training was excellent. The pilots attended training sessions in Pakistan and the United States. We could see how good their air force was in the early days of the war. They downed a reconnaissance aircraft on 13 September, just before the war started.
Murray: What kind of Iraqi aircraft was shot down?
Abousi: They shot down a Sukhoi-22. After the fall of the shah, many of the experienced Iranian pilots fled; only the novice pilots remained. We learned this from Iranian prisoners during their interrogations. The Iranian Air Force was divided into two parts: the main air force and the al-Haras al-Thawri al-Irani.203 The Iranian Air Force had the same basic equipment as the Iraqi Air Force; we had the Sukhoi-24 and the Mirage AQ6, while they had the Adnan-1 and Ilyushin-76.204
Woods: Were you aware of foreign trainers in Iran helping the Iranians during the war?
Abousi: I do not think so. Iran did not have good relations with the rest of the world before or during the war. Only after the war did Soviet and Chinese pilots assist them.
Woods: I read a report that there was some concern that Iranian aircraft were operating from Syrian airfields. Did that ever happen, or was that just a false report?
Abousi: That did not happen. Iraq had a good relationship with Syria. In fact, one time an Iranian Phantom F-4 formation flew through Syrian airspace to strike al-Walid Air Base.205 This was not Syria’s fault. When we asked Syria for clarification, there was no indication that they had anything to do with this Iranian mission. On one occasion an Iranian bomber aircraft entered our air space by flying under a civilian aircraft. It flew with the civilian aircraft, refueled in the air, entered our border that way, bombed, and then flew back via the same route. This was what was wrong with our air defense in 1982. Saddam blamed the air force and executed the commander of the 2nd Air Defense Sector.
Murray: You mentioned that the Iraqi Air Force was intercepting and attempting to shoot down transport aircraft from Israel to Iran. Did the air force actually shoot any such aircraft down?
Abousi: Yes, we shot one Iranian C-130 down using a MiG-25.206 We destroyed four transport aircraft flying to Turkey from Argentina. I do not know the type of the aircraft though.
Woods: Were the Iraqi air force pilots captured by Iran repatriated?
Abousi: They were returned in batches, in 1989, 1990, and 1991. Not all of the pilots returned. For example, Talal Jamil, who flew Sukhoi-22 aircraft, defected to Iran in 1982. He was a coward and a poor pilot. He would get nervous and sweat when briefed on a mission.
Woods: The questions we have ask come from our limited understanding. Our questions may not do service to the nature of your story. Could you tell us anything you think is important that we have not asked about yet?
Abousi: The most important thing to note is that the air force developed in a way that was not expected at the time. Western nations, especially Israel, started looking at us differently
than they had in the past. They started taking Saddam’s threats towards Israel seriously. The Iraqi Air Force was on par with the Israeli Air Force. For that reason, when Israel threatened to bomb Iraqi oil installations, there were fears that Iraq might attack Israel because Iraq immediately mobilized its air force. Israel did not honor the threat and carry out the attack. In return, Iraq cancelled its plans to bomb Israel.
Woods: When was that?
Abousi: April or May 1990. The air force looked strong when it threatened. The Gulf countries gained a respect for Iraqi power and became more cautious in their relations with Iraq. Delegations came to learn how the Iraqi Air Force was able to achieve its objectives and goals. If you have the chance in Egypt to go to Syria, I will introduce you to the Iraqi pilots there. We also have many former pilots.
Woods: What can you tell me about the decision, planning, and preparation for flying 139 aircraft to Iran in 1991 during the Gulf War? How and why?
Abousi: Before the [Iran-Iraq] war, Saddam agreed with Iran and sent Izzat al-Duri, who was the deputy general commander of the Iraqi embassy in Iran. Al-Duri made an agreement with Iran that if the Americans attacked Iraqi forces in Kuwait, Iraq would send aircraft to Iran for protection purposes. In the early days of the 1991 Gulf War, we sent 18 Ilyushin-76 aircraft, K-76 (Adnan-1 early warning radars), Boeing-727 aircraft, and civilian aircraft from Iraqi Airlines.207 A few days later, on 21or 23 January, approximately 50 aircraft were precision-bombed all in one day at al-Qadisiyah Air Base.208 There was no need for this; the Americans had excellent detection equipment. Within the air force, we pushed back against the decision to send our aircraft to Iran. We concealed some aircraft in orchards. We relocated non-operable aircraft outside the base with their wings opened. The American forces shot the aircraft down as soon as they took off. They had full command of the area.
Murray: In late January 1991, two Iraqi Mirages flew down into the Gulf and almost fired on some US ships. Why was it only two and not six or eight Mirages?
Abousi: This was 25 January. Saddam had ordered the air force to attack the Saudi oil facility at Ras Tanura. Two Mirages attempted to reach the refinery three times, but could not. Every time they left base, the American aircraft would surround them. It was like God telling us not to fight.
Murray: We discovered after the war that the combat air patrol (CAP) was being flown by F- 14s based in the Pacific. The Pacific carrier air wings (US Navy) did not work with the US Air Force often. They did not have the call-sign and codes for getting the AWACS transmissions.209 AWACS called them regarding the two Iraqi aircraft, but the CAP was not listening to the transmission. The aircraft went right past the CAPs. A Saudi F-15 pilot, who heard the AWACS transmission, shot down the Iraqi aircraft.210
Abousi: We thought the American aircraft were saying, ‘Why are you letting them fly? Shoot them down when they are over the sea.’ The Americans swarmed the airfield on the first two days that we tried to launch. We felt like every time we tried to fly we were swarmed. A successful take off on the third day was very surprising. We did not understand why we were being allowed to do this when the earlier missions were stopped.
Woods: When did al-Duri speak to the Iranians about this?
Abousi: Two days before the war. The pilots did not receive any assistance. The conditions were so poor that many of them landed in the streets.
Woods: Were the pilots returned immediately or held until the end of the war?
Abousi: They were returned one week later, after the Iranians had interrogated them. We lost approximately 10 aircraft in this mission. Some were hit by American aircraft, while others crashed.
Murray: Initially, the American aircraft thought the Iraqi aircraft were heading south to attack. The Americans were not prepared for when they turned east. It surprised them.
Abousi: In the ‘War of the Cities,’ Iraq was patient.211 There was no part of Basra left un-hit; it was badly destroyed. Most people living in Basra Province left the by 1982. Iraq was patient until the Iranians launched missiles at Baghdad in 1987. That is when Saddam threatened them; we bombed all Iranian cities, big and small. The purpose of the air assault was to indicate to the Iranians that war was not what the Iran’s political command would lead them to believe.
The Iranians and the Kurds, led by the traitor Jalal Talabani, occupied Halabja. The battles started in January 1988 and continued until the entire region was occupied on 14 March 1988. We noticed unusual Iranian movements. They moved 70 percent of their troops in the center and 60 percent of the troops in Fao north with the intention of occupying the oil- field region of Kirkuk. The Iraqis and General Khairallah, in particular, devised a smart deception operation; Adnan Khairallah appeared on television mobilizing the troops in Kirkuk [while our troops mobilized around Fao].
Woods: What was the air force doing to assist in this deception operation?
Abousi: We withdrew small units from other sectors. Iran expected an attack on Halabja. Even our own troops expected an attack on Halabja because we deceived them as well. Iraqi command prohibited any movement near Fao. The Republican Guard was already there. After Iraqi troops mobilized in the Halabja area, we attacked Fao on 17 April.
The air force prepared all of our air bases to use in the Fao campaign. The air force did not lose one person in the Fao campaign. It was easy; the Iranian troops fled quickly. It was hard for the Iranians to pull back their troops from Halabja. That was when the second, third, and fourth Tawakal al-Allah operations began. There was excellent cooperation between the air force and the army during these operations. The ground operations were supported by the air force. Thousands of Iranians were killed on the Great Day as they attempted to occupy Basra, thanks to our bombers. Saddam honored the pilots because he was so pleased with their success. The only victory the bombers ever achieved was on the Great Day in December 1987.
Photo to Major General Alwan al-Abousi preparing for testing a french mirage f-1 aircraft in France:
Woods: Could you describe for us the senior Iraqi leadership? You mentioned General Mohammed Jissam al-Jibouri in the beginning. Could you describe him, his personal attri- butes through the war, what happened to him and other senior air force personalities of significance?
Abousi: Our most influential person was Adnan Khairallah, when he was the minister of defense and the secretary of the military office. He and Mohammed Abdullah Shehwani, the director of intelligence, were both pilots. General Khairallah spoke with the formation commander before the first strike and helped the pilots with salaries, housing, etc. He would pay for medical treatment outside the country. We loved Adnan Khairallah.
The other influential person was Mohammed Jissam al-Jibouri. He was a wonderful commander of the air force. He was commander-in-chief of the air force from 1979 through to the beginning of 1984. In 1984, Saddam appointed him to the military industrialization commission (MIC).200 Saddam told him, ‘You need to make military industrializations as good as the air force.’
Woods: Who replaced al-Jibouri as commander-in-chief of the air force?
Abousi: Hamid Shaban Rashid al-Tikriti replaced al-Jibouri. As a pilot, he was pretty weak. Besides, as far as religion, he was a bit of a Sunni extremist. Most Iraqis do not differentiate between Sunni and Shi’a. When al-Tikriti saw a base commander praying, he would love him even more. If he saw a commander drinking, he would hate him. He was not admired in the air force as much as al-Jibouri had been.
Woods: Was al-Tikriti as an effective air force commander? How long did he stay on the job?
Abousi: No, he was not effective. The commanders he had were good. Salim al-Basu, air force operations deputy director, later executed by Saddam, and Hassan Hajj Khudur, the operations director, were both outstanding.
Woods: When and why was al-Basu executed?
Abousi: Al-Basu and Rajji Tikriti were executed after being accused of taking part in an assassination conspiracy against Saddam in 1995.201
Woods: Was Hamid Shaban [Rashid al-Tikriti] the air force commander from 1984 until the end of war?
Abousi: Yes.
Woods: Who were the important leaders in the air force, whether they were good or bad?
Abousi: Mainly, Mohammed Jisam al-Jibouri, because he knew the air force and understood us, unlike Shaban. He was competent, and he encouraged us. He was competent. But the commanders who came after him cared more about being close to Saddam.
Woods: Did al-Jibouri’s move to the military industrial commission have anything to do with the increase in the quality of material supplied to the air force later on?
Abousi: He completely developed military industrialization. According to what he told me, there was equipment and millions of dinars buried in the ground, which he put to work. Hussein Kamel was given control of the commission in 1989. Woods: To what extent did Iraq receive external support in training and technical assistance? You told us about the Mirage pilots sent to France. Did you have other pilots come to Iran to help train, or did foreign technicians help maintain equipment?
Abousi: When we received the Super Entandard aircraft, the French offered to fly with us in order to train our pilots, but we refused. Instead, we sent our pilots for one-month training in France. No foreign pilots participated in our combat missions. Pilots from many countries participated in our training—India, Egypt, Pakistan, and Czechoslovakia. The command of the air force college was a foreigner; the college included many Egyptians. Adnan Khairallah had an excellent relationship with Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and his minister of defense, Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala. This is the Ghazala by the way who wrote a book about the Iran-Iraq War, but most of what he wrote was inaccurate. He wrote a slanted history, which favored Iran.
Murray: Between 1980 and 1988, the Iraqi Air Force underwent a major expansion, both in numbers and technological complexity. What were the processes of training, not just of the pilots, but also of the maintenance crews, electronics crews, electronic counter measures (ECM) crews, radar crews, and ground control? Were they trained in Iraq or foreign countries, or some combination?
Abousi: The air force expanded from 30 squadrons to 50 squadrons. From the tactical side, the methods of usage changed and improved during the war. A flight leader school training was developed. This helped the pilots’ attending this school. At the combat level, we started flying inside Iran and we achieved air superiority after 1985 because our electronics were so advanced. We installed detection and warning equipment and the aircraft carried anti-radar missiles.
Murray: These were French missiles?
Abousi: Yes, the aircraft carried Bazaal and X-28 Radiation missiles.202 They were both expensive, but the X-28 was slightly cheaper, but good. The Bazaal had a range of 100 kilometers; the X-28 had a range of approximately 50 kilometers. The Mirage would mark the target with a beam and the Sukhoi would attack. We flew coordinated attacks with the Mirages and Sukhois. At the beginning of the war, MiG-25s photographed the targets. In 1981, we flew two Sukhoi 22s, one of which had the X-28 rocket for each mission. If both aircraft detected a radar signal that meant it was a false target because the beam should separate; if only one of the aircraft received the radar signal, then it was a real target, and they would attack using the X-28. When the Mirages arrived, we began using the Bazaal.
Murray: Did you have much trouble transitioning pilots from the relatively simple Soviet aircraft to the more complex electronics of the Mirage?
Abousi: All Sukhoi pilots were good pilots. However, the Mirage required more than just a good pilot; the pilot needed to be more intelligent.
Murray: Did some of the pilots fail the transition?
Abousi: When they graduated from the flight school, the best pilots were assigned to fly the Mirage. We reassigned all the Tu pilots to the bombers, because the original bomber pilots were not good. At the beginning of the war, a bomber pilot was executed, refused to fly a mission.
Woods: Did you have occasion to hear either through intelligence or through POW- debriefings what kind of training the Iranian Air Force was receiving?
Abousi: Under the shah, Iranian Air Force training was excellent. The pilots attended training sessions in Pakistan and the United States. We could see how good their air force was in the early days of the war. They downed a reconnaissance aircraft on 13 September, just before the war started.
Murray: What kind of Iraqi aircraft was shot down?
Abousi: They shot down a Sukhoi-22. After the fall of the shah, many of the experienced Iranian pilots fled; only the novice pilots remained. We learned this from Iranian prisoners during their interrogations. The Iranian Air Force was divided into two parts: the main air force and the al-Haras al-Thawri al-Irani.203 The Iranian Air Force had the same basic equipment as the Iraqi Air Force; we had the Sukhoi-24 and the Mirage AQ6, while they had the Adnan-1 and Ilyushin-76.204
Woods: Were you aware of foreign trainers in Iran helping the Iranians during the war?
Abousi: I do not think so. Iran did not have good relations with the rest of the world before or during the war. Only after the war did Soviet and Chinese pilots assist them.
Woods: I read a report that there was some concern that Iranian aircraft were operating from Syrian airfields. Did that ever happen, or was that just a false report?
Abousi: That did not happen. Iraq had a good relationship with Syria. In fact, one time an Iranian Phantom F-4 formation flew through Syrian airspace to strike al-Walid Air Base.205 This was not Syria’s fault. When we asked Syria for clarification, there was no indication that they had anything to do with this Iranian mission. On one occasion an Iranian bomber aircraft entered our air space by flying under a civilian aircraft. It flew with the civilian aircraft, refueled in the air, entered our border that way, bombed, and then flew back via the same route. This was what was wrong with our air defense in 1982. Saddam blamed the air force and executed the commander of the 2nd Air Defense Sector.
Murray: You mentioned that the Iraqi Air Force was intercepting and attempting to shoot down transport aircraft from Israel to Iran. Did the air force actually shoot any such aircraft down?
Abousi: Yes, we shot one Iranian C-130 down using a MiG-25.206 We destroyed four transport aircraft flying to Turkey from Argentina. I do not know the type of the aircraft though.
Woods: Were the Iraqi air force pilots captured by Iran repatriated?
Abousi: They were returned in batches, in 1989, 1990, and 1991. Not all of the pilots returned. For example, Talal Jamil, who flew Sukhoi-22 aircraft, defected to Iran in 1982. He was a coward and a poor pilot. He would get nervous and sweat when briefed on a mission.
Woods: The questions we have ask come from our limited understanding. Our questions may not do service to the nature of your story. Could you tell us anything you think is important that we have not asked about yet?
Abousi: The most important thing to note is that the air force developed in a way that was not expected at the time. Western nations, especially Israel, started looking at us differently
than they had in the past. They started taking Saddam’s threats towards Israel seriously. The Iraqi Air Force was on par with the Israeli Air Force. For that reason, when Israel threatened to bomb Iraqi oil installations, there were fears that Iraq might attack Israel because Iraq immediately mobilized its air force. Israel did not honor the threat and carry out the attack. In return, Iraq cancelled its plans to bomb Israel.
Woods: When was that?
Abousi: April or May 1990. The air force looked strong when it threatened. The Gulf countries gained a respect for Iraqi power and became more cautious in their relations with Iraq. Delegations came to learn how the Iraqi Air Force was able to achieve its objectives and goals. If you have the chance in Egypt to go to Syria, I will introduce you to the Iraqi pilots there. We also have many former pilots.
Woods: What can you tell me about the decision, planning, and preparation for flying 139 aircraft to Iran in 1991 during the Gulf War? How and why?
Abousi: Before the [Iran-Iraq] war, Saddam agreed with Iran and sent Izzat al-Duri, who was the deputy general commander of the Iraqi embassy in Iran. Al-Duri made an agreement with Iran that if the Americans attacked Iraqi forces in Kuwait, Iraq would send aircraft to Iran for protection purposes. In the early days of the 1991 Gulf War, we sent 18 Ilyushin-76 aircraft, K-76 (Adnan-1 early warning radars), Boeing-727 aircraft, and civilian aircraft from Iraqi Airlines.207 A few days later, on 21or 23 January, approximately 50 aircraft were precision-bombed all in one day at al-Qadisiyah Air Base.208 There was no need for this; the Americans had excellent detection equipment. Within the air force, we pushed back against the decision to send our aircraft to Iran. We concealed some aircraft in orchards. We relocated non-operable aircraft outside the base with their wings opened. The American forces shot the aircraft down as soon as they took off. They had full command of the area.
Murray: In late January 1991, two Iraqi Mirages flew down into the Gulf and almost fired on some US ships. Why was it only two and not six or eight Mirages?
Abousi: This was 25 January. Saddam had ordered the air force to attack the Saudi oil facility at Ras Tanura. Two Mirages attempted to reach the refinery three times, but could not. Every time they left base, the American aircraft would surround them. It was like God telling us not to fight.
Murray: We discovered after the war that the combat air patrol (CAP) was being flown by F- 14s based in the Pacific. The Pacific carrier air wings (US Navy) did not work with the US Air Force often. They did not have the call-sign and codes for getting the AWACS transmissions.209 AWACS called them regarding the two Iraqi aircraft, but the CAP was not listening to the transmission. The aircraft went right past the CAPs. A Saudi F-15 pilot, who heard the AWACS transmission, shot down the Iraqi aircraft.210
Abousi: We thought the American aircraft were saying, ‘Why are you letting them fly? Shoot them down when they are over the sea.’ The Americans swarmed the airfield on the first two days that we tried to launch. We felt like every time we tried to fly we were swarmed. A successful take off on the third day was very surprising. We did not understand why we were being allowed to do this when the earlier missions were stopped.
Woods: When did al-Duri speak to the Iranians about this?
Abousi: Two days before the war. The pilots did not receive any assistance. The conditions were so poor that many of them landed in the streets.
Woods: Were the pilots returned immediately or held until the end of the war?
Abousi: They were returned one week later, after the Iranians had interrogated them. We lost approximately 10 aircraft in this mission. Some were hit by American aircraft, while others crashed.
Murray: Initially, the American aircraft thought the Iraqi aircraft were heading south to attack. The Americans were not prepared for when they turned east. It surprised them.
Abousi: In the ‘War of the Cities,’ Iraq was patient.211 There was no part of Basra left un-hit; it was badly destroyed. Most people living in Basra Province left the by 1982. Iraq was patient until the Iranians launched missiles at Baghdad in 1987. That is when Saddam threatened them; we bombed all Iranian cities, big and small. The purpose of the air assault was to indicate to the Iranians that war was not what the Iran’s political command would lead them to believe.
The Iranians and the Kurds, led by the traitor Jalal Talabani, occupied Halabja. The battles started in January 1988 and continued until the entire region was occupied on 14 March 1988. We noticed unusual Iranian movements. They moved 70 percent of their troops in the center and 60 percent of the troops in Fao north with the intention of occupying the oil- field region of Kirkuk. The Iraqis and General Khairallah, in particular, devised a smart deception operation; Adnan Khairallah appeared on television mobilizing the troops in Kirkuk [while our troops mobilized around Fao].
Woods: What was the air force doing to assist in this deception operation?
Abousi: We withdrew small units from other sectors. Iran expected an attack on Halabja. Even our own troops expected an attack on Halabja because we deceived them as well. Iraqi command prohibited any movement near Fao. The Republican Guard was already there. After Iraqi troops mobilized in the Halabja area, we attacked Fao on 17 April.
The air force prepared all of our air bases to use in the Fao campaign. The air force did not lose one person in the Fao campaign. It was easy; the Iranian troops fled quickly. It was hard for the Iranians to pull back their troops from Halabja. That was when the second, third, and fourth Tawakal al-Allah operations began. There was excellent cooperation between the air force and the army during these operations. The ground operations were supported by the air force. Thousands of Iranians were killed on the Great Day as they attempted to occupy Basra, thanks to our bombers. Saddam honored the pilots because he was so pleased with their success. The only victory the bombers ever achieved was on the Great Day in December 1987.
Photo to Major General Alwan al-Abousi preparing for testing a french mirage f-1 aircraft in France:
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Being a newbie here, perhaps this issue has been discussed before but I would like to know (or shown where else it might be) what were the losses of the Iraqi Air force both in the Iran Iraq War (in aerial combat and by Iranian Air Defense ) and during the Desert Storm.
Although the latter are much more documented I am kind of puzzled having read that Iraqis lost only 23-24 airplanes in aerial fighting and not 37 as claimed by the Allies. The very interesting interview above does not cover this issue.
Thanks in advance
Although the latter are much more documented I am kind of puzzled having read that Iraqis lost only 23-24 airplanes in aerial fighting and not 37 as claimed by the Allies. The very interesting interview above does not cover this issue.
Thanks in advance
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We've had lengthy discussions about the issue of IrAF losses from Iran-Iraq War on ACIG.info forum, several years ago. This involved a number of former Iranian and Iraqi officers (all above the rank of Colonel). Except for that place, I do not know about any other authoritative 'source'.
Anyway, in the course of that discussion, it turned out that:
On the positive side, it stated 'up front' (i.e. already in its Introduction) that (I'm citing, i.e. transliterating from Arabic here), 'During the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi AF lost more than 168 aircraft'.
Note the use of vague terminus 'more than...', indicating the same like 'at least', but also 'certainly more'.
Anyway, going through various break-downs and tables in that study, we've concluded it's missing about 60 different losses 100% confirmed as having taken place.
So, the total was about 220 IrAF tombers, fighter-bombers, and fighters.
Namely, what that study omitted completely were transports (some of which were destroyed by IRIAF aircraft in attacks on Iraqi air bases, others shot down by own air defences etc.), cases of aircraft damaged by Iranians and that made emergency landings in Iraq but were subsequently written off, and then all the losses of the IrAAC (Iraqi Army Air Corps). Obviously, the latter was a separate branch of the military, so it's losses are no matter of concern for the IrAF.
And yes, in regards of reasons for losses, that study drew similar conclusions like al-Aboosi. Indeed, it concluded that no less but 49% of these 168 aircraft were shot down by SA-7s and flak, that 34 were shot down by MIM-23B I-HAWKS and only about two dozens lost in air combats.
With other words: official document or not, it's not really worth much.
Iranians are not much better, though. Ironically, after years of often massive interventions by the IRGC, official Historical Division IRIAF drew similar conclusions, and credited more than half the officially confirmed kills for Iraqi aircraft during that war to its MIM-23B I-HAWKs. At the same time, the IRIAF discredited a number of kills well-known - even confirmed by Iraqis as such - as scored by its F-14-crews (in particular).
Best known case for all of these absurdities by both parties is the MiG-25RB from No. 86 Squadron IrAF shot down over Khark Island by an F-14A, in spring 1982. The Iraqis confirm that it was shot down (and its pilot, CO No. 86 Squadron, KIA), and that it was shot down by an Iranian F-14. The pilot and RIO of that F-14 claim it for them. But...
... this loss is not included in the IrAF study mentioned above...
... and the IRIAF F-14-crew in question was dicredited of it too...
... i.e. official Tehran credited that kill to some supposed IRGCASF (IRGC Air & Space Force) unit, that didn't even exist at that time...
Overall, it's going to take additional years of research before anybody is going to be able to say anything definite about losses during that war.
Anyway, in the course of that discussion, it turned out that:
- IRIAF archives for period 1980-1982 have been destroyed (apparently by the IRGc, jalous over IRIAF's success in those years crucial for survival of Iran), and that
- the IrAF archive was largely destroyed in 2002-2003 period (partially before the US-led invasion, but primarily ever since), and that all that was left is a wild mix of documents and semi-documents of all sort that can be found in posession of different private persons (as far as these are still in Iraq, and in posession of their homes; this is meanwhile next to never the case).
On the positive side, it stated 'up front' (i.e. already in its Introduction) that (I'm citing, i.e. transliterating from Arabic here), 'During the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi AF lost more than 168 aircraft'.
Note the use of vague terminus 'more than...', indicating the same like 'at least', but also 'certainly more'.
Anyway, going through various break-downs and tables in that study, we've concluded it's missing about 60 different losses 100% confirmed as having taken place.
So, the total was about 220 IrAF tombers, fighter-bombers, and fighters.
Namely, what that study omitted completely were transports (some of which were destroyed by IRIAF aircraft in attacks on Iraqi air bases, others shot down by own air defences etc.), cases of aircraft damaged by Iranians and that made emergency landings in Iraq but were subsequently written off, and then all the losses of the IrAAC (Iraqi Army Air Corps). Obviously, the latter was a separate branch of the military, so it's losses are no matter of concern for the IrAF.
And yes, in regards of reasons for losses, that study drew similar conclusions like al-Aboosi. Indeed, it concluded that no less but 49% of these 168 aircraft were shot down by SA-7s and flak, that 34 were shot down by MIM-23B I-HAWKS and only about two dozens lost in air combats.
With other words: official document or not, it's not really worth much.
Iranians are not much better, though. Ironically, after years of often massive interventions by the IRGC, official Historical Division IRIAF drew similar conclusions, and credited more than half the officially confirmed kills for Iraqi aircraft during that war to its MIM-23B I-HAWKs. At the same time, the IRIAF discredited a number of kills well-known - even confirmed by Iraqis as such - as scored by its F-14-crews (in particular).
Best known case for all of these absurdities by both parties is the MiG-25RB from No. 86 Squadron IrAF shot down over Khark Island by an F-14A, in spring 1982. The Iraqis confirm that it was shot down (and its pilot, CO No. 86 Squadron, KIA), and that it was shot down by an Iranian F-14. The pilot and RIO of that F-14 claim it for them. But...
... this loss is not included in the IrAF study mentioned above...
... and the IRIAF F-14-crew in question was dicredited of it too...
... i.e. official Tehran credited that kill to some supposed IRGCASF (IRGC Air & Space Force) unit, that didn't even exist at that time...
Overall, it's going to take additional years of research before anybody is going to be able to say anything definite about losses during that war.
F-Arba-Ashara!! Yalla, yalla!!
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nikolaos wrote: The very interesting interview above does not cover this issue.
Thanks in advance
Mr Nikolaos,
This interview conducted by Mr.Kevin M. Woods, Unfortunately, the interview contains statements attributed to Major General Alwan al-Abousi possible that there was mistake in translation or misunderstand, in regards to Syria and strike H3 air base and Saudi F-15s and bombers pilots and some others, however i did inform Major General Alwan al-Abousi about this and he was very upset and not satisfied for this translation, he promised me he will contact Mr.Kevin through an Iraqi General still in touch with him to correct this statements.
nikolaos wrote: I would like to know (or shown where else it might be) what were the losses of the Iraqi Air force both in the Iran Iraq War (in aerial combat and by Iranian Air Defense)
We made clear on numerous occasions for many people went the same question on different forums in particular iraqimilitary.org, that Iraqi Air force losses during Iran-Iraq war in aerial combat was 37 fixed-wing aircraft, the number of helicopters inaccurate (at least to me so far), the number of fixed-wing aircraft that shot down by Iranian Air Defense almost clear for us, but i needs to make double check before i tell the the exact number, because some of our aircraft down due to the bombs premature detonation or run out of fuel and while the ejaculation process ejection seat won't to release at the end pilots killed and their secret went with them, later Iran claimed shot down the aircraft.
nikolaos wrote: during the Desert Storm
I have the exact number of our aircraft including Pilot names, Squadron, which air base and time and each incident with details..etc, but first of all i need to contact some good people here on this forum and check if i'm not going to cause embarrassment for some involved parties.
later.
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Dear Mr Tomcooper,
Let me start a new page with you, and I hope that you have the desire to re-correct all previous published stories and Iranian air victory allegations about Iran-Iraq War.
However after all, if i manage to get it right perhaps that most information you got is essentially were shaded. And clearly Iranian government doesn't have confidence of their pilots, for many reason i can prove to you, and they wasn't believe what their pilots claims, in addition to the lack of knowledge such they're strongly believe Iraqi MIG-23BNs carried air raids on Mehrabad Airport in 22 of September 1980..!
Late 2010 I've been invited from some people they are active on iraqimilitary.org to join this discussions, I'm not sure if i was wrong or not to accept that invitation, but i thought it was fans aviation discussions no more, later this issue being serious and out of control and multiple websites and books talk about Iranian legendary air victory which is not exist in real life, Anyway to me I'm pretty sure no Iraqi pilot involved in that discussions most of them they were (Pilot navigator or Employees) non of them were fighter pilot.
Even Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik a fictional character does not exist in the old Iraqi Air Force I have read this name many time, and even on Mig-25 vs F-5 subject, but this person not Ahmad Sadik not exist in IrAf at all.
IrAF archive was between four person, the most sensitive section we handed over to the U.S Pentagon department in Baghdad 2003 to maintain it in safe hands.
Will continue later..
Let me start a new page with you, and I hope that you have the desire to re-correct all previous published stories and Iranian air victory allegations about Iran-Iraq War.
However after all, if i manage to get it right perhaps that most information you got is essentially were shaded. And clearly Iranian government doesn't have confidence of their pilots, for many reason i can prove to you, and they wasn't believe what their pilots claims, in addition to the lack of knowledge such they're strongly believe Iraqi MIG-23BNs carried air raids on Mehrabad Airport in 22 of September 1980..!
tomcooper wrote:We've had lengthy discussions about the issue of IrAF losses from Iran-Iraq War on ACIG.info forum, several years ago. This involved a number of former Iranian and Iraqi officers (all above the rank of Colonel). Except for that place, I do not know about any other authoritative 'source'.
Late 2010 I've been invited from some people they are active on iraqimilitary.org to join this discussions, I'm not sure if i was wrong or not to accept that invitation, but i thought it was fans aviation discussions no more, later this issue being serious and out of control and multiple websites and books talk about Iranian legendary air victory which is not exist in real life, Anyway to me I'm pretty sure no Iraqi pilot involved in that discussions most of them they were (Pilot navigator or Employees) non of them were fighter pilot.
Even Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik a fictional character does not exist in the old Iraqi Air Force I have read this name many time, and even on Mig-25 vs F-5 subject, but this person not Ahmad Sadik not exist in IrAf at all.
tomcooper wrote:- the IrAF archive was largely destroyed in 2002-2003 period (partially before the US-led invasion, but primarily ever since), and that all that was left is a wild mix of documents and semi-documents of all sort that can be found in posession of different private persons (as far as these are still in Iraq, and in posession of their homes; this is meanwhile next to never the case).
IrAF archive was between four person, the most sensitive section we handed over to the U.S Pentagon department in Baghdad 2003 to maintain it in safe hands.
Will continue later..
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tomcooper wrote:So, one of papers the Iraqis came out with was titled 'An Analytical Study on the Cases of Iraqi Aircraft Attrition During the Iran-Iraq War', prepared by the IrAF Intelligence Department in 1992. Although sometimes cited as such by various Iraqi sources, it turned out this document cannot be considered as 'definite', for several reasons.
On the positive side, it stated 'up front' (i.e. already in its Introduction) that (I'm citing, i.e. transliterating from Arabic here), 'During the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi AF lost more than 168 aircraft'..
Mr Tom cooper,
I would like to see that An Analytical Study Document prepared by the IrAF Intelligence, to check whether real or otherwise, because i highly doubt the manner of Iraqi military conversational style that came in this document.
tomcooper wrote:Note the use of vague terminus 'more than...', indicating the same like 'at least', but also 'certainly more'.
Anyway, going through various break-downs and tables in that study, we've concluded it's missing about 60 different losses 100% confirmed as having taken place.
So, the total was about 220 IrAF tombers, fighter-bombers, and fighters.
All this information not correct nor has any connection to reality at all, the IrAF Intelligence Department has nothing to do with aircraft losses whether during war or peacetime except intended vandalism incidents to the aircraft caused by pilot or technicians. Statistics losses and crashes of the aircraft and weapons fail or destruction and the end of the age of service all these related to department in Iraqi air force headquarters linked with the secretary commander of the Iraq Air Force and Ministry of Defence (and I unwillingness to mention the name of the office in order not to exploit in the future to to build some allegations on it.
The number of Iraqi aircraft lost during 8 years of war with Iran, whether in combat mission or crashes and training missions i have it, but i want to make sure %100 before i posted anything here. But away less than you mentioned above.
tomcooper wrote:Namely, what that study omitted completely were transports (some of which were destroyed by IRIAF aircraft in attacks on Iraqi air bases, others shot down by own air defences etc.)
Zero Iraqi aircraft destroyed by Iranian AF in attacks on Iraqi air bases, absolutely no one.
Except that confusing air raid on al-Hurriyah AB caused some little damage to couple of MIG-21s, and one MIG-21U damage in H3 airstrike 1981 No more no less Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft damage or even destroyed by Iranian AF during the 8 years of war.
tomcooper wrote:
Iranians are not much better, though. Ironically, after years of often massive interventions by the IRGC, official Historical Division IRIAF drew similar conclusions, and credited more than half the officially confirmed kills for Iraqi aircraft during that war to its MIM-23B I-HAWKs. At the same time, the IRIAF discredited a number of kills well-known - even confirmed by Iraqis as such - as scored by its F-14-crews (in particular).
Best known case for all of these absurdities by both parties is the MiG-25RB from No. 86 Squadron IrAF shot down over Khark Island by an F-14A, in spring 1982. The Iraqis confirm that it was shot down (and its pilot, CO No. 86 Squadron, KIA), and that it was shot down by an Iranian F-14. The pilot and RIO of that F-14 claim it for them. But...
... this loss is not included in the IrAF study mentioned above...
... and the IRIAF F-14-crew in question was dicredited of it too...
... i.e. official Tehran credited that kill to some supposed IRGCASF (IRGC Air & Space Force) unit, that didn't even exist at that time...
No trust me, Iranian AF include F-14-crews none of them have seen or even meet Iraqi MIG-25s in the sky, the luckiest one of them have see it pop up several seconds on his radar and then disappeared.
There was no RB type in Iraqi AF at that time, actually Iraqi AF found and upgrade the MIG-25R to bomber, later became RB and since the MIG-25 recce were operate in reconnaissance missions and photography only this mean they were fly with no less 2+Mach over 20/21km so what Iranian aircraft radar or missile can hit him snap up like that!
With all that i would like to ask you who confirm this claim by Iraqis?
The Squadron number not correct the date as well, So who would confirm this claim with all this wrong information!
tomcooper wrote:
Overall, it's going to take additional years of research before anybody is going to be able to say anything definite about losses during that war.
If we see positive intent by you and you're willing to open a new page with us and correct all the past, then i promise you you will get from me most what are you looking for. (And i said most but not all, because some of that history must be unknown for public under any condition and this part closed and for ever).
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...and you're 1000% right, of course.old.iraqi.air.force wrote:Even Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik a fictional character does not exist in the old Iraqi Air Force I have read this name many time, and even on Mig-25 vs F-5 subject, but this person not Ahmad Sadik not exist in IrAf at all.
Have no doubt, please: the person I met is a Zombie. So, I can claim for myself to have met a _true_ zombie, and this just five times, spending a total of about 30 days, each for between 12 and 15 hours a day of de-briefing him (i.e. more time than Woods & Co have spent de-briefing five Iraqi generals)...
...and this zombie had so much original documentation that he simply must've been zombie. Imagine this: contrary to all of your honourable sources that can't even show their pilot log books, this zombie named Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik had a stash full of official IrAF reports, a CDs full of recce photos shot by MiG-25RBs over Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, those thick CVs of 20 best IrAF pilots prepared for Saddam in the 1990s and so on, to name but a few...
...the fact that Seymour Hersh met him too is only a confrimation that Ahmad is a zombie...
...just like the fact that Kevin (Woods) nearly fainted upon hearing that this zombie helped me prepare an article on Susanna full four years before he intended to 'publish sensation' about attack on USS Stark (that, BTW, happened during a conference on Iran-Iraq War, in London, some four years back)...
Ah wait. Let's make things better: Syrian regime has a zombie sitting in its prison since January 2008, and there's a family of a zombie that was forced to flee Syria and return to Iraq, few years ago...
I think it's about the time to call some producers in Hollywood: they would surely be interested in hearing what zombies look like in real life...
...anything of this would be better - than for any of you to stop living in some distorted variant of memories and wet dreaming, and start working in schoolar fashion.
Yup, that's why they can't show anything of that 'archive' - contrary to so many other Iraqi papers they've got.tomcooper wrote: IrAF archive was between four person, the most sensitive section we handed over to the U.S Pentagon department in Baghdad 2003 to maintain it in safe hands.
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If you want a serious discussion, then do all of the following:old.iraqi.air.force wrote:Mr Tom cooper,
I would like to see that An Analytical Study Document prepared by the IrAF Intelligence, to check whether real or otherwise...
- present yourself with your name, so that I know who am I talking to,
- clearly say where and when did you serve as a pilot with the IrAF (which you said you did),
- verify this through answering 10 questions and providing a scan from your pilot log-book,
- stop plagiarizing publications co-authored by me, and
- stop patronizing me.
I'm sure there's no doubt about this - in your version of reality. After all, why should one have an intelligence service that's not spying on own military in order to ascertain security of Saddam's regime?All this information not correct nor has any connection to reality at all, the IrAF Intelligence Department has nothing to do with aircraft losses whether during war or peacetime except intended vandalism incidents to the aircraft caused by pilot or technicians....
Imagine having a professional intelligence service that's actually doing its job! Or is it a horror for you to find out there was an IrAF Intelligence Department that was spying on Iranians, that was seriously investigating all the wet dreams claimed by various hero-pilots, that was studying recce photos (actually ordering recce flights over specific targets to take these!!) - and similar stuff?!?
Nah, Iraqis just couldn't have such a service, ever, ever, ever... right?
But sure, not a single Iranian bomb dropped during eight years of war has hit anything...Zero Iraqi aircraft destroyed by Iranian AF in attacks on Iraqi air bases, absolutely no one....
Which is why there are recce photos taken by IRIAF RF-4s and RF-5s after specific air strikes on IrAF air bases and CLEARLY showing destroyed An-24s, MiG-21s and such, right?
This fact, combined with fact that Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik is a zombie, is a confirmation that no such photos have been published in this publication (clicky!), at least seven years ago?
- 168_204_img_produit_lela_988_1.jpg (9.33 KiB) Viewed 27378 times
....I've got no clue, but you're certainly going to help me now: why do you remind me of this character?
- Baghdad-Bob.jpg (22.05 KiB) Viewed 27378 times
No trust me, Iranian AF include F-14-crews none of them have seen or even meet Iraqi MIG-25s in the sky, the luckiest one of them have see it pop up several seconds on his radar and then disappeared.
Of course, Baghdad Bob: they have never engaged a single MiG-25 in air combat. All they explain in these three documentaries (particularly in Part 2, which is dedicated to F-14 vs MiG-25 clashes) are wet dreams:
(Part 1)
(Part 2)
(Part 3)
Or, better yet: they're spreading propaganda for the very same Mullah regime that has stripped them of most of credits for kills they have claimed during the war? And this is the case especially with few of them not living in Iran any more, right?
And you are so 100% sure of this because you know so much about Iran too, that you consider it for Iraq under Saddam Hussein and not a place where independent TV-producers can work...?
...ah, now I see: they came out of Transformers movie, and transformed themselves, 'from MiG-25R equipped with Peleng-D nav/attack system' to 'MiG-25RB equipped with Peleng-D nav/attack system'.There was no RB type in Iraqi AF at that time, actually Iraqi AF found and upgrade the MIG-25R to bomber, later became RB...
Wow, man, thanks so much. After so many years of uncertainty, you cleared everything with a single stroke...
...and you forgot to add that Iranian F-14s were non-operational, that Iranians couldn't operate and fly them even if they would've been operational - and that you can walk on the water......and since the MIG-25 recce were operate in reconnaissance missions and photography only this mean they were fly with no less 2+Mach over 20/21km so what Iranian aircraft radar or missile can hit him snap up like that!
Just about every single of some 5-6 ex-IrAF MiG-25-pilots I met. Contrary to you, they knew who was the pilot of the RB shot down by Rostami over Khark, who was the pilot of the RB that run out of fuel over the USSR (after a clash with an F-14), who was the pilot that flew the RB shot up by F-5Es etc., etc., etc..With all that i would like to ask you who confirm this claim by Iraqis?
Yeah, and this forum is full of your 'positive intentions'....If we see positive intent by you...
I have a serious job proposal for you: become a comedian. You'll earn good money that way.
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Mr Tom Cooper,
First of all i was talk to you gently and respectfully so what you have mentioned above not worthy to the morality of a person claiming himself to be a journalist or Author, However, I've been asking you (who is Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik) this person unknown to all Iraqi air force weather Generals or pilots and does not exist at all, prove him from what batch he graduate? what number? was pilot of what air plane? in what airbase served such a Squadron leader, Wing commander or Base commander or anything else? and you get back to me with this answer (the person I met is a Zombie)! how people want to evaluate you after that? And this Alleged personal Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik has no picture, no Wikipedia, no website, no Facebook page..etc? Since he preferred to pop up to the public and share his document and published through books and internet websites!?
1.What plagiarizing publications co-authored by you? just tell me which one? I've never ever copied or quote anything by you or any one else, If you still believe till now that i quote the story of Iraqi TU-22s over Tehran from you, then trust me you're wrong in this point, as i told this story published on Iraqi AF Magazine since 1994, and if you still feel kind of disagree of this point "due to the similarity of the text as good English" then we can ask the administrator to remove it.
Anything else let me know.
2.I am not patronizing you at all, but i refute all what came in your publish because it contradicts the reality.
1.I didn't said they didn't hit anything at all round the land, but my answer was specifically about air bases, with all that even their air strikes during 8 years of war was confusing and were rarely infect their targets.
2.Where is that picture why you didn't show it for us here?
No doubt this Iranian TV propaganda, what should i expect from Iranian regime! isn't the same side showed their president Ahmadinejad with his joke stealth fighter Qaher-313 warns U.S out, and he know for sure it's fake and lie!
Isn't the same - shows that replica of a US aircraft carrier and vows and threat Americans troops in gulf region?
So you're in this TV show on this channel (So I was not wrong in my guess)
See that, when i said you have never ever met any Iraqi fighter pilot before you feel like I am attacking you. But I am not, i just try to show you and show every buddy that you don't really have any accurate and true information about old Iraqi AF,
Now try to find anyone from OIAF and ask him this question: Does that really Iraqi AF engineers discover that the MIG-25R can be a bomber and the Soviet advisers in Baghdad refused to help Iraqis in this project till Soviet advisers knows Iraqis are going to coordinate with East Germany to upgrade the aircraft to be bomber, in that time the Soviet agreed to assist the Iraqi in this project. this happened in Dec 1982 Habbaniyah AB.
See that again! now you prove %100 you have never interview any Iraqi pilot from OIAF,definitely.
You claims that you have met 5 to 6 Iraqi MIG-25 pilots (and no one of these pilot knows the MIG-25s Squadron number!!?)
we don't have this Squadron No 86Sq to the MIG-25s, how is that even possible 5 or 6 pilot no one of them know the right number?!! And what is the name of that alleged victim pilot why you didn't mention his name here? and for other allegations such F-5 and F-14 we have done and we prove this totally false allegation.
This thread will be your daily show and people will be coming here to see your reality.
First of all i was talk to you gently and respectfully so what you have mentioned above not worthy to the morality of a person claiming himself to be a journalist or Author, However, I've been asking you (who is Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik) this person unknown to all Iraqi air force weather Generals or pilots and does not exist at all, prove him from what batch he graduate? what number? was pilot of what air plane? in what airbase served such a Squadron leader, Wing commander or Base commander or anything else? and you get back to me with this answer (the person I met is a Zombie)! how people want to evaluate you after that? And this Alleged personal Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik has no picture, no Wikipedia, no website, no Facebook page..etc? Since he preferred to pop up to the public and share his document and published through books and internet websites!?
tomcooper wrote:- stop plagiarizing publications co-authored by me, and
- stop patronizing me.
1.What plagiarizing publications co-authored by you? just tell me which one? I've never ever copied or quote anything by you or any one else, If you still believe till now that i quote the story of Iraqi TU-22s over Tehran from you, then trust me you're wrong in this point, as i told this story published on Iraqi AF Magazine since 1994, and if you still feel kind of disagree of this point "due to the similarity of the text as good English" then we can ask the administrator to remove it.
Anything else let me know.
2.I am not patronizing you at all, but i refute all what came in your publish because it contradicts the reality.
tomcooper wrote:But sure, not a single Iranian bomb dropped during eight years of war has hit anything...
Which is why there are recce photos taken by IRIAF RF-4s and RF-5s after specific air strikes on IrAF air bases and CLEARLY showing destroyed An-24s, MiG-21s and such, right?
This fact, combined with fact that Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik is a zombie, is a confirmation that no such photos have been published in this publication (clicky!), at least seven years ago?
1.I didn't said they didn't hit anything at all round the land, but my answer was specifically about air bases, with all that even their air strikes during 8 years of war was confusing and were rarely infect their targets.
2.Where is that picture why you didn't show it for us here?
tomcooper wrote:Of course, Baghdad Bob: they have never engaged a single MiG-25 in air combat. All they explain in these three documentaries (particularly in Part 2, which is dedicated to F-14 vs MiG-25 clashes) are wet dreams:
(Part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sya-9XDpfiM
(Part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3BJ1cdMHzKM
(Part 3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dNmgR_zcTNI
Or, better yet: they're spreading propaganda for the very same Mullah regime that has stripped them of most of credits for kills they have claimed during the war? And this is the case especially with few of them not living in Iran any more, right?
No doubt this Iranian TV propaganda, what should i expect from Iranian regime! isn't the same side showed their president Ahmadinejad with his joke stealth fighter Qaher-313 warns U.S out, and he know for sure it's fake and lie!
Isn't the same - shows that replica of a US aircraft carrier and vows and threat Americans troops in gulf region?
So you're in this TV show on this channel (So I was not wrong in my guess)
tomcooper wrote:ah, now I see: they came out of Transformers movie, and transformed themselves, 'from MiG-25R equipped with Peleng-D nav/attack system' to 'MiG-25RB equipped with Peleng-D nav/attack system'.
Wow, man, thanks so much. After so many years of uncertainty, you cleared everything with a single stroke... :roll
See that, when i said you have never ever met any Iraqi fighter pilot before you feel like I am attacking you. But I am not, i just try to show you and show every buddy that you don't really have any accurate and true information about old Iraqi AF,
Now try to find anyone from OIAF and ask him this question: Does that really Iraqi AF engineers discover that the MIG-25R can be a bomber and the Soviet advisers in Baghdad refused to help Iraqis in this project till Soviet advisers knows Iraqis are going to coordinate with East Germany to upgrade the aircraft to be bomber, in that time the Soviet agreed to assist the Iraqi in this project. this happened in Dec 1982 Habbaniyah AB.
tomcooper wrote:Just about every single of some 5-6 ex-IrAF MiG-25-pilots I met. Contrary to you, they knew who was the pilot of the RB shot down by Rostami over Khark, who was the pilot of the RB that run out of fuel over the USSR (after a clash with an F-14), who was the pilot that flew the RB shot up by F-5Es etc., etc., etc..With all that i would like to ask you who confirm this claim by Iraqis?
See that again! now you prove %100 you have never interview any Iraqi pilot from OIAF,definitely.
You claims that you have met 5 to 6 Iraqi MIG-25 pilots (and no one of these pilot knows the MIG-25s Squadron number!!?)
we don't have this Squadron No 86Sq to the MIG-25s, how is that even possible 5 or 6 pilot no one of them know the right number?!! And what is the name of that alleged victim pilot why you didn't mention his name here? and for other allegations such F-5 and F-14 we have done and we prove this totally false allegation.
tomcooper wrote:I have a serious job proposal for you: become a comedian. You'll earn good money that way.
This thread will be your daily show and people will be coming here to see your reality.
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Too late.old.iraqi.air.force wrote:Mr Tom Cooper,
First of all i was talk to you gently and respectfully...
Nothing of what you've posted here would be anything new: all of your 'facts' were 'extracted' from specific publications I've co-authored, and then bunched togther with your own mix of fantasy and half-truths. The rest is useless and you're showing no indications of knowing anything at all.
Indeed, even if I would give it a serious try (for example explain you the actual story about MiG-25RBs): you're so clearly lacking understanding of military flying, and so unable to answer any kind of questions that it's pointless to waste a single second of my time with you.
Bottom line, and as explained above, you're so far the best successor for Baghdad Bob:
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Aviation Weekly used to publish all sorts of interesting short stories during this time period. I remember an editorial where the Iraqis were toting the author around for some political agenda. Iranian F-4's attacked the city he was at and he saw missiles fired in chase. Not much of anything was achieved by the attack.
And that is my impression of Iranian air power. Many appearances. Very little results.
And that is my impression of Iranian air power. Many appearances. Very little results.
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At first I wanted to answer your post with a citate from that report, 'Rat' - and comparisson of it with a copy of corresponding post-mission report. Got distracted by the sheer volume of about 15,000 copies of such reports I've meanwhile got, so gave up...
Conclusion is on hand that depending on snap-shots, prejudice and predilections is always a preferred solution to serious, in-depth research and historical studies.
Imagine the horror or working yourself through tonns of official documentation, searching and interviewing hundreds of participants and eyewitnesses, or finding out about extensions of Iraqi efforts to curb activty of the IRIAF.
Simply disgusting. Why should anybody martyr his brain with such nonsense...
Conclusion is on hand that depending on snap-shots, prejudice and predilections is always a preferred solution to serious, in-depth research and historical studies.
Imagine the horror or working yourself through tonns of official documentation, searching and interviewing hundreds of participants and eyewitnesses, or finding out about extensions of Iraqi efforts to curb activty of the IRIAF.
Simply disgusting. Why should anybody martyr his brain with such nonsense...
F-Arba-Ashara!! Yalla, yalla!!
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Mr Tom Cooper,
1.Till now you couldn't answer my questions about Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik so far, and it is very obviously you don't have anything to prove the truth of this person.
2.You claims that I am (unable to answer any kind of questions) while i did answer all your questions and readers can see and decides.
3.You claims
4.In this comment
5.You always claims that there is tonns of official documentation under your hands, add to that the Iraqi documentation and CDs you got it from the alleged personal Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik, but surprisingly, in spite of all these documents you have no simple idea about the right Squadron number of MIG-25s (as you always mention 86 Squadron) and this squadron absolutely no to the MIG-25s, Is this sensible?
6.You always claims that you're not with the Mullahs regime in Tehran and you are just looking at the history of the Air Forces, but obviously you appeared happy on Iranian regime PressTV Channel, "in my opinion" If you were neutral journalist you should avoid appearing with channels fueling hatred and calls to fight US forces and its allies in the region!
I hope you will return in the logical answers, not circling in speech as always.
1.Till now you couldn't answer my questions about Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik so far, and it is very obviously you don't have anything to prove the truth of this person.
2.You claims that I am (unable to answer any kind of questions) while i did answer all your questions and readers can see and decides.
3.You claims
And till now you still only throw fabrications without any proof in an attempt to confuse and distract the attention of readers from heart of the matter.tomcooper wrote:all of your 'facts' were 'extracted' from specific publications I've co-authored, and then bunched togther with your own mix of fantasy and half-truths.
4.In this comment
you proof as you did many time before that you have no less idea about Iraq AF history except as general information available on multiple forums on internet, specifically iraqimilitary.org/forums, where you were collect your information from Haider and Khalid and Rafat and Hawkeye and some other people, therefore you strongly believe anything you got from that forum is accurate and otherwise is wrong "And this does not apply to a lot of cases". The MIG-25Rs that we received early wasn't even equipped with wiring bombs inside the wing or even the cockpit was mostly empty and blocked by panels.tomcooper wrote:even if I would give it a serious try (for example explain you the actual story about MiG-25RBs): you're so clearly lacking understanding of military flying,
5.You always claims that there is tonns of official documentation under your hands, add to that the Iraqi documentation and CDs you got it from the alleged personal Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik, but surprisingly, in spite of all these documents you have no simple idea about the right Squadron number of MIG-25s (as you always mention 86 Squadron) and this squadron absolutely no to the MIG-25s, Is this sensible?
6.You always claims that you're not with the Mullahs regime in Tehran and you are just looking at the history of the Air Forces, but obviously you appeared happy on Iranian regime PressTV Channel, "in my opinion" If you were neutral journalist you should avoid appearing with channels fueling hatred and calls to fight US forces and its allies in the region!
I hope you will return in the logical answers, not circling in speech as always.
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BTW, don't think I am attacking you but this general people impression of you, weather on internet or public, check out what people says about your reliability since 2008 on tank-net.com and on another websites as well.
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