Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 10 Jun 2012, 21:18
by count_to_10
It seemed like it would be appropriate to start a thread for this here given the discussion of the Chinese "carrier killer" anti-ship ballistic missiles that is going on in the F-35 section.
So, how about it? What are the likely guidance mechanisms? How can they be defeated? How easy will be be to intercept them? Does this require enough re-thinking of naval air power to change carrier design in the long run (submersible aircraft carriers?)?

RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 10 Jun 2012, 22:34
by jeff929
The discussion so far seems to limit a potential attack to a single ASBM. What about a coordinated barrage of DF-21 missiles directed at a single target.. the carrier? Would this overwhelm the current defense aparatus currently employed by the USN? It seems as though the Chinese are developing the capability to launch multiple missiles from multiple sites from mobile-type launchers. Also, given the somewhat confined area of the South China Sea where a potential conflict may arise, this may make it easier to locate the carrier.

I think this will need to be address in future carrier designs. If China is successful creating an exclusion zone with ASBM, this would encourage other nations unfriendly to the US to invest in the technology or just buy it from the Chinese. The world knows the capability that the US gains from having carrier battle groups sitting right off their coast. I can imagine the Iranians would love to have this option given the proximity of the Abraham Lincoln and the Enterprise to their shoreline.

RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 10 Jun 2012, 23:02
by SpudmanWP
Iran would not need that... put 100 truck-launched CMs in the sky at once and the carrier is a virtual goner.

RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 10 Jun 2012, 23:22
by 1st503rdsgt
Combining the guidance and targeting difficulties to be overcome by such a system, attacking carriers with conventionally-armed IRBMs is like trying to shoot bats on the wing at night with a .22 and a flashlight. I seriously doubt China really has this capability as we've yet to see an actual demonstration of the thing; they're probably just trying to goad us into a panic as we did with the Soviets and Star Wars. Even if China overcomes the technical problems, it's not exactly exportable because none of China's clients have the ISR assets necessary to use it; without extremely advanced targeting, the DF-21 is just an expensive bottle-rocket.

RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 11 Jun 2012, 02:10
by delvo
If you can put a nuclear warhead on the missile, the missile can destroy multiple ships at once without needing to be particularly accurate.

And didn't China have an old submarine surface right in the middle of a group of American surface ships a few years ago?

Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 11 Jun 2012, 02:17
by count_to_10
delvo wrote:And didn't China have an old submarine surface right in the middle of a group of American surface ships a few years ago?

As far as I can tell, that was a "we know where the battle group will pass in the exercise, so we'll just park a diesel sub on battery power and wait for it to pass over" kind of thing.

Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 11 Jun 2012, 02:22
by count_to_10
1st503rdsgt wrote:Combining the guidance and targeting difficulties to be overcome by such a system, attacking carriers with conventionally-armed IRBMs is like trying to shoot bats on the wing at night with a .22 and a flashlight. I seriously doubt China really has this capability as we've yet to see an actual demonstration of the thing; they're probably just trying to goad us into a panic as we did with the Soviets and Star Wars. Even if China overcomes the technical problems, it's not exactly exportable because none of China's clients have the ISR assets necessary to use it; without extremely advanced targeting, the DF-21 is just an expensive bottle-rocket.

What if they use a satellite that can get a visual fix on the target, and update the targeting for the RV second to second? It isn't particularly exportable in that form, but China may not want to sell it to anyone -- they are planning on deploying their own carriers.

Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 11 Jun 2012, 03:07
by 1st503rdsgt
count_to_10 wrote:
1st503rdsgt wrote:Combining the guidance and targeting difficulties to be overcome by such a system, attacking carriers with conventionally-armed IRBMs is like trying to shoot bats on the wing at night with a .22 and a flashlight. I seriously doubt China really has this capability as we've yet to see an actual demonstration of the thing; they're probably just trying to goad us into a panic as we did with the Soviets and Star Wars. Even if China overcomes the technical problems, it's not exactly exportable because none of China's clients have the ISR assets necessary to use it; without extremely advanced targeting, the DF-21 is just an expensive bottle-rocket.

What if they use a satellite that can get a visual fix on the target, and update the targeting for the RV second to second? It isn't particularly exportable in that form, but China may not want to sell it to anyone -- they are planning on deploying their own carriers.


That might work for an atmospheric weapon, but IRBMs are a different animal altogether. With a ballistic weapon, you have to have a very, VERY solid fix on where your missile needs to hit before you even launch, and the capacity for course corrections is extremely limited once it's in transit, which complicates things all the more when your target can change its position by several miles in any direction upon receiving warning of your attack.

As for space-based targeting, satellites aren't the all-seeing eyes of God that conspiracy theorists would have us believe. First, a satellite would have to know exactly where to look; then it would have to collect several minutes worth of data on the target's location, course, speed, and direction before launch even took place; then it would have to provide continuous updates during the missile's entire ~15 minute or so flight. I don't think optical surveillance satellites can observe a target for that long because, well... they're satellites; they have to keep going in their orbits whether you want them to or not. It's also worth mentioning that their satellites are just as vulnerable as ours, and our anti-space technology is somewhat more advanced than theirs.

RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 11 Jun 2012, 16:29
by arkadyrenko
503 - I would like to note that you're one of the very few people poo-pooing the Chinese ballistic missile threat.

The proposed flight path for the ABM is as follows:

1. Ballistic (ish) flight until re-entry
2. Pull up into a hypersonic gliding cruise mode
3. Search for the carrier battle group
4. Terminal attack

Look at the picture in this article: http://www.popularmechanics.com/technol ... ic-missile

In that attack profile, the missile is still constrained by the sensor and flight-path foot print, but it will have time to do a simple surface search before it ditches into the ocean. Now, a single missile may not be able to hit all of the carrier's evasive maneuver zone, but that doesn't mean it is an ineffective weapon. It can be fired in salvos, with several missile's flight path overlapping the entire feasible region for the carrier to maneuver into. Or, the Chinese can add some sort of mid course guidance to the ballistic stage to give the missile better cross-range performance.

About satellites, you're discussing a different question: is the ASBM a practical weapon system. THat depends on the PLA's recon capabilities. According to a story I posted in the previous thread, the PLA is indeed pursuing a concentrated effort to develop a recon-strike complex. In addition to satellites, they're building over the horizon radars and long range UAVs. (It can almost be assumed that the Chinese are working on a stealth recon UAV as well) This doesn't make the anti-ship ballistic missile impossible, instead it just requires that the Chinese get a lock on the battle group before they fire. (Which was always the case). As I've mentioned above, the Chinese probably won't need continuous tracking of the battle group, perhaps a mid-course update, but everyone envisions the terminal stage to have its own homing and maneuvering capability. Terminal attack and perhaps some terminal search will be conducted by the warhead.

Re: RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missile

Unread postPosted: 11 Jun 2012, 23:01
by count_to_10
arkadyrenko wrote:503 - I would like to note that you're one of the very few people poo-pooing the Chinese ballistic missile threat.

The proposed flight path for the ABM is as follows:

1. Ballistic (ish) flight until re-entry
2. Pull up into a hypersonic gliding cruise mode
3. Search for the carrier battle group
4. Terminal attack

Look at the picture in this article: http://www.popularmechanics.com/technol ... ic-missile

Thats odd. That sounds too advanced. I think the US has been having problems getting experiments like that to work.

RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 11 Jun 2012, 23:34
by 1st503rdsgt
Ark,

What you're describing is a force of mini-space-shuttles with sensor capabilities far beyond anything fielded on a guided weapon before, all completely dependent on a vast, vulnerable ISR infrastructure. The reason I poo-poo the carrier-killer's threat is because two years of research have given me some insight into the technical difficulties associated with such a system. I'm not saying it can't be done, it's just not cost effective compared to other means of area-denial. Besides, what's the point of building a conventional weapon, the only purpose of which is to do something that's likely to trigger a war with nuclear arms? Frankly, I don't think the Chinese are dumb enough to waste money on such a thing, though it wouldn't surprise me if they were building something to hit ships in port (a useful capability to have against their neighbors).

RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic mis

Unread postPosted: 12 Jun 2012, 00:10
by Orangeburst
Let me ask..is it possible for an ABM stike on a carrier to be implemented using Initial GPS coordinates loaded into a BM (I would think yes) with only additinal terminal guidance? Everyone and everything can be GPS tracked even via a simple personal cellphone. You think with 5,000 sailors on board with personal electronic items, that the GPS signals could be intercepted or hacked? My understanding is even when your phone is turned off, there is still a signal unless you remove the SIM chip.

Now before you correct me, yes I always thought GPS was a passive multi-angular determination of location. But how does a phone company know where to have a cell phone call come to your proximate cell tower when you are say in Montana, but live in Georgia? You don't believe that every tower in America sends a query?

But back to carrier BMD, if the GPS coordinates are known, then attacking a CBG will only be dependent on the area coverage of terminal guidance. Figuring a CBG at 30 knots, then within 10-15 minutes, the terminal phase only needs to "see" less than 200 square miles of ocean. This is not 86 Libya anymore and I am sure the Chinese did not ever forget the bugging of Boeing VIP aircraft many years ago.

I hope I am wrong in this layman assesment. Maybe just a nut, I dunno.

RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic mis

Unread postPosted: 12 Jun 2012, 01:07
by count_to_10
Cell phones can be tracked because they stay in constant communication with cell phone towers. They actively report their position to the network. GPS alone is purely passive.

RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic mis

Unread postPosted: 13 Jun 2012, 05:50
by arkadyrenko
503 - I don't get your, and many other commentators, insistence on ballistic missile launch(!) --> nuclear war. That linkage had no serious basis. If the country is salvo-ing ballistic missiles towards a target, and that target isn't a US missile field, than the US has NO REASON to launch nuclear weapons in response. Especially if that country has a well developed and publicized arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles. I do not understand how that can be otherwise. Why assume a launch on warning posture, when the nuclear missiles are not threatened?

Second, the Chinese have done it, very few public military commentators seriously doubts the existence of this weapon system, nor have I seen many doubts about the technological feasibility of the warhead. And if you're wondering about that system's flight profile, its already been done, ableit in a different form. There's a picture online of an alleged US test of such a re-entry vehicle flight path. Heck, the US army tested a similar weapon quite recently.

http://www.parabolicarc.com/2011/11/18/ ... e-vehicle/

As for the homing methods, people have questioned the systems radar foot-print, but I don't recall reading many questions about the ability to mount such a radar on the re-entry vehicle itself. Just because the US hasn't had a need to do it doesn't mean that it isn't possible. And, I may add, the USN is acting as if it is very much possible. It could be the case that the ASBM is a boutique weapon, one which works only in the most narrowly defined circumstances, but that is hardly a new circumstance in military history.

Finally, I agree with you in that the vulnerability of the system will probably lie in its attached recon component. Given that such a network is already needed for the Chinese military, we can assume that they're pursuing that technology quite aggressively. Also, recon technology has advanced dramatically since the end of the cold war. Microsats and long range UAVs give a different form of ocean recon, forms which can supplement the traditional RORSAT constellation. But, all those nodes are vulnerable to attack and will be a target in wartime. The vulnerability of those nodes does not mean that an ASBM is impossible. It only suggests that it is vulnerable.

RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic mis

Unread postPosted: 13 Jun 2012, 06:40
by madrat
Pershing II used radar for homing in on the target. Radar in the nose of a ballistic missile (the bus at least) is nothing new.

RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic mis

Unread postPosted: 13 Jun 2012, 07:02
by 1st503rdsgt
Ark,

I never said that IRBM launches=nuclear war (though it could mean that in a tense situation). I'm saying that sinking a carrier=all-out war, which between nuclear powers, means nuclear war.

Second, when have the Chinese ever demonstrated this weapon? They seem quite eager to disseminate pictures and videos of their J-20 prototype as exposition of their technical prowess. As for that US demonstration: not ballistic and no target (moving or otherwise), a very poor comparison.

Third, radar doesn't run on magic. With an IRBM's flight profile, your costly Chinese mini-shuttles would need transceivers an order of magnitude more powerful and larger than anything a MARV could carry. Pershing II's MARV carried radar, but that was only for fine tuning it's trajectory at the very end of its flight to a stationary target; one still had to tell the inertial guidance system where the target was because there simply isn't time for an IRBM warhead to dick around looking for it.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 03 Nov 2015, 19:35
by lamoey
LM-Built Systems Successfully Destroy Multiple Targets in Test of BMDS

Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT), U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and the Missile Defense Agency successfully conducted a multifaceted operational test of the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) that resulted in the successful intercepts of multiple air and missile targets launched within moments of one another.

In the test, the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Weapon System and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System aboard the USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) received support from a sensor command-and-control architecture that included an AN/TPY-2 radar, and the Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications ( C2BMC ) suite.

The event, called Flight Test Operational-02 Event 2 (FTO-02 E2), was conducted at Wake Island and surrounding areas. The event stressed the ability of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and THAAD Weapon Systems to defeat a raid of three near-simultaneous air and missile targets, consisting of one medium range ballistic missile, one short range ballistic missile and one cruise missile target.

As the test began, the AN/TPY-2 radar detected the target and relayed track information to the C2BMC system to cue defending ballistic missile defense system assets. The THAAD system destroyed both the medium range and short range ballistic missiles, and the Aegis system defeated the air-breathing target. Preliminary data indicate all Lockheed Martin systems were successful.

The live-fire operational test demonstrated the integrated, layered, regional missile defense capabilities that have become the hallmark of the system. Soldiers, sailors and airmen from multiple Combatant Commands operated the systems and were provided a unique opportunity to refine operational doctrine and tactics while increasing confidence in the execution of integrated air and missile defense plans.

“Today’s successful intercepts proved once again that the capability and maturity of the Lockheed Martin missile defense systems are unequaled,” said Richard McDaniel, vice president and program manager for THAAD at Lockheed Martin. “This realistic and complex operational test demonstrated that a multi-tier layered defense is essential in the protection of nations from current and emerging air and missile threats.”

“In this test, we see BMDS as it would operate in a real-world scenario, where layers of sensor data and BMD assets work seamlessly to recognize and eliminate threats,” said Paul Klammer, director for Aegis BMD Programs at Lockheed Martin. “This interoperability of these systems is a testament to the engineering that has built these programs and our partnership with the U.S. Navy and MDA.”

The THAAD system, using a second AN/TPY-2 radar, tracked the target. THAAD developed a fire-control solution, launched a THAAD interceptor missile and successfully intercepted the short-range ballistic missile and the medium-range ballistic missile. THAAD was operated by soldiers from the Alpha Battery, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment.

Meanwhile, USS John Paul Jones, utilizing Aegis Baseline 9’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capability, successfully engaged the “air breather” cruise-missile target.


More at the link:
http://www.asdnews.com/news-64483/LM-Built_Systems_Successfully_Destroy_Multiple_Targets__in_Test_of_BMDS.htm

Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 06 Nov 2015, 10:15
by tincansailor
SpudmanWP wrote:Iran would not need that... put 100 truck-launched CMs in the sky at once and the carrier is a virtual goner.


You have no idea how difficult it would be to do what your talking about. Coordinating so many launches would be almost impossible. Iran most likely doesn't have 100 CMs. Also all these scenarios assume the U.S. has no warning, all their ships just sail into a trap, with no escorts, or CAP, and just line up for target practice. Dream on.

Back in the 80s a U.S. Battleship passing through the Straights of Hormuz was painted by the FC radar from Iranian CM Batteries. The Battleship sent a radio message that if they didn't shut off their radar they would be destroyed. They shut their radar off. Our forces are allowed to defend themselves, and they can dish out more then Iran can put out.

Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 06 Nov 2015, 10:42
by tincansailor
delvo wrote:If you can put a nuclear warhead on the missile, the missile can destroy multiple ships at once without needing to be particularly accurate.

And didn't China have an old submarine surface right in the middle of a group of American surface ships a few years ago?


When deployed ships operate several miles apart. One nuke would take out only one ship. Each ship is equipped with NBC warfare gear, and the crew is trained to deal with that kind of attack. Any country dumb enough to use nukes against us better know they would be subjected to a massive nuclear retaliator attack. Every base they have that we think has nukes stationed on them would be destroyed. In effect they would be committing suicide.

Yes we do get subs getting dangerously close to our carriers. What you don't see is that at least 2 SSNs are operating with each carrier sanitizing the area. In a time of real tension any hostile subs that were trying to maneuver into a position for a torpedo attack would disappear. "Why no mister ambassador, we have no information about any missing submarine in area X."

Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 06 Nov 2015, 11:13
by tincansailor
count_to_10 wrote:
1st503rdsgt wrote:Combining the guidance and targeting difficulties to be overcome by such a system, attacking carriers with conventionally-armed IRBMs is like trying to shoot bats on the wing at night with a .22 and a flashlight. I seriously doubt China really has this capability as we've yet to see an actual demonstration of the thing; they're probably just trying to goad us into a panic as we did with the Soviets and Star Wars. Even if China overcomes the technical problems, it's not exactly exportable because none of China's clients have the ISR assets necessary to use it; without extremely advanced targeting, the DF-21 is just an expensive bottle-rocket.

What if they use a satellite that can get a visual fix on the target, and update the targeting for the RV second to second? It isn't particularly exportable in that form, but China may not want to sell it to anyone -- they are planning on deploying their own carriers.


Recon Satellites don't work quite the way most people think. Rather then a birds eye view it's more like looking down through a straw. They work best at finding fixed targets on land. Ships at sea are actually hard to find. In parts of the world with major shipping lanes there are thousands of ships passing though the large areas that a Battle Group can operate in. The same is true for both sides.

It's not like WWI & II were after the first few weeks all merchant ships were funneled into narrow shipping lanes and battle fleets mostly operated in voids. At the start of any major conflict today separating merchant shipping from naval forces would be a tough job. That's why the USN puts so much effort, and resources into it. China better be careful they don't end up hitting a Supertanker, possible one of their own. Things are never as easy as they may seem.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 06 Nov 2015, 11:27
by popcorn
The Navy is confident that it's investment in the SEWIP Blocks 1,2 and 3 will allow it to detect, identify and jam incoming hostiles.
By next decade, Lasers and railguns should help the Navy win the battle of salvoes.
http://breakingdefense.com/2015/03/navy ... are-sewip/
What does this all mean militarily?

“In layman’s terms,” said Capt. Small, who overseas the program for Naval Sea Systems Command, “with SEWIP Block II and the SEWIP Block I [upgrades], I don’t think there’s anything out there we can’t detect any more, and detect at ranges where they need to be detected. With SEWIP Block III, there will not be anything that we know of that we can’t jam and jam effectively."

Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic

Unread postPosted: 07 Nov 2015, 07:34
by tincansailor
arkadyrenko wrote:503 - I don't get your, and many other commentators, insistence on ballistic missile launch(!) --> nuclear war. That linkage had no serious basis. If the country is salvo-ing ballistic missiles towards a target, and that target isn't a US missile field, than the US has NO REASON to launch nuclear weapons in response. Especially if that country has a well developed and publicized arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles. I do not understand how that can be otherwise. Why assume a launch on warning posture, when the nuclear missiles are not threatened?

Second, the Chinese have done it, very few public military commentators seriously doubts the existence of this weapon system, nor have I seen many doubts about the technological feasibility of the warhead. And if you're wondering about that system's flight profile, its already been done, ableit in a different form. There's a picture online of an alleged US test of such a re-entry vehicle flight path. Heck, the US army tested a similar weapon quite recently.

http://www.parabolicarc.com/2011/11/18/ ... e-vehicle/

As for the homing methods, people have questioned the systems radar foot-print, but I don't recall reading many questions about the ability to mount such a radar on the re-entry vehicle itself. Just because the US hasn't had a need to do it doesn't mean that it isn't possible. And, I may add, the USN is acting as if it is very much possible. It could be the case that the ASBM is a boutique weapon, one which works only in the most narrowly defined circumstances, but that is hardly a new circumstance in military history.

Finally, I agree with you in that the vulnerability of the system will probably lie in its attached recon component. Given that such a network is already needed for the Chinese military, we can assume that they're pursuing that technology quite aggressively. Also, recon technology has advanced dramatically since the end of the cold war. Microsats and long range UAVs give a different form of ocean recon, forms which can supplement the traditional RORSAT constellation. But, all those nodes are vulnerable to attack and will be a target in wartime. The vulnerability of those nodes does not mean that an ASBM is impossible. It only suggests that it is vulnerable.


The Chinese have never tested the system against a moving ship. All I've ever seen is tests against the out lines of ships in a desert. That's a far cry from a maneuvering ship, using active jamming, defended by THAAD, and Aegis systems.

Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic

Unread postPosted: 07 Nov 2015, 20:00
by count_to_10
tincansailor wrote:
The Chinese have never tested the system against a moving ship. All I've ever seen is tests against the out lines of ships in a desert. That's a far cry from a maneuvering ship, using active jamming, defended by THAAD, and Aegis systems.

I'm pretty sure the THAAD is a land only system. Are you sure you don't mean the Standard Missile that is rated for ballistic missile defense?

Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic

Unread postPosted: 07 Nov 2015, 20:15
by sferrin
count_to_10 wrote:
tincansailor wrote:
The Chinese have never tested the system against a moving ship. All I've ever seen is tests against the out lines of ships in a desert. That's a far cry from a maneuvering ship, using active jamming, defended by THAAD, and Aegis systems.

I'm pretty sure the THAAD is a land only system. Are you sure you don't mean the Standard Missile that is rated for ballistic missile defense?



He probably meant SM-3, though to be fair LM (the makers of the Mk41 VLS and THAAD) have looked at the idea of installing THAAD in those cells. PAC-3 as well.

Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic

Unread postPosted: 08 Nov 2015, 13:40
by tincansailor
sferrin wrote:
count_to_10 wrote:
tincansailor wrote:
The Chinese have never tested the system against a moving ship. All I've ever seen is tests against the out lines of ships in a desert. That's a far cry from a maneuvering ship, using active jamming, defended by THAAD, and Aegis systems.

I'm pretty sure the THAAD is a land only system. Are you sure you don't mean the Standard Missile that is rated for ballistic missile defense?



He probably meant SM-3, though to be fair LM (the makers of the Mk41 VLS and THAAD) have looked at the idea of installing THAAD in those cells. PAC-3 as well.


I mentioned THAAD because attacking missiles my well pass in range of land based THAAD Batteries. The navy has been doing tests with the army integrating land and sea based systems. Yes when I said Aegis Systems I meant SM-3 Missiles. No I've never heard about a proposal for putting THAAD in MK-41 VLS Launchers. I don't see why you'd want to put PAC-3 in to replace SM-3. Do you think they would be more effective? SM-3 can intercept targets in space, which I admit makes THAAD the second line of defense, and PAC-3 third.

I've read about the Israeli Stunner Missile possible becoming the Patriot PAC-4. It provides improved performance, at 20% the cost of the PAC-3, and can be used against aircraft and cruise missiles as well. No more need for Patriot Batteries to deploy with two types of missiles and launchers. I'd also like to see the U.S. look into using the jointly developed Israeli Arrow-3 System. It may have some advantages over our THAAD System.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 08 Nov 2015, 15:23
by popcorn
THAAD nicely fills the middle gap between the endoathmosphere-capable PAC-3 and exoatmosphere-capable SM-3. This would make it the missile of choice to counter threats like Iskander or even DF-21D. It's versatility allows it to intercept targets outside of and within the earth's athmosphere. You lose that versatility with Arrow-3, which seems to duplicate what you already get with SM-3.

Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Defending against anti-ship balistic

Unread postPosted: 08 Nov 2015, 19:19
by sferrin
tincansailor wrote:I mentioned THAAD because attacking missiles my well pass in range of land based THAAD Batteries. The navy has been doing tests with the army integrating land and sea based systems. Yes when I said Aegis Systems I meant SM-3 Missiles. No I've never heard about a proposal for putting THAAD in MK-41 VLS Launchers. I don't see why you'd want to put PAC-3 in to replace SM-3. Do you think they would be more effective? SM-3 can intercept targets in space, which I admit makes THAAD the second line of defense, and PAC-3 third.


You wouldn't replace SM-3 with PAC-3 as they have completely different missions. PAC-3 (which can fit four to a cell) would supplement SM-3, much like ESSM supplements SM-2.

tincansailor wrote:I've read about the Israeli Stunner Missile possible becoming the Patriot PAC-4.


No, Raytheon is pimping it as "PAC-4". It's a marketing gimmick.


tincansailor wrote:It provides improved performance, at 20% the cost of the PAC-3, and can be used against aircraft and cruise missiles as well.


"Improved performance" over what? PAC-3? PAC-3 MSE? "Improved" in what way? PAC-3 (even the original) has shot down maneuvering Pershing II RVs. Stunner has never been tested against anything nearly that difficult. PAC-3 can also be used against cruise missiles and aircraft. As for 20% the cost, I'll believe it when I see it.


tincansailor wrote:No more need for Patriot Batteries to deploy with two types of missiles and launchers.


They'd still have to. PAC-2 out ranges both Stunner and PAC-3. Why would you want to give that up? Also, PAC-2 and PAC-3 use the same launcher. A PAC-3 cell simply has 4 smaller missiles in it instead of one big one.


tincansailor wrote:I'd also like to see the U.S. look into using the jointly developed Israeli Arrow-3 System.


Why? It's basically SM-3 lite.

tincansailor wrote:It may have some advantages over our THAAD System.


None that I can think of. THAAD Block II now. . .

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 16 Dec 2015, 12:42
by popcorn
The Navy is enhancing it's multi-layer defensive scheme via Pandarra Fog which will screw with threat radar seekers.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/20 ... ing-ducks/

The capabilities of China’s Wrecker and DF-21 missiles, for example, are far from being ignored. On June 21st the navy carried out sea trials of a new countermeasure to anti-ship missiles called Pandarra Fog. Slated to be deployed as part of a warship’s defensive armament, the Pandarra Fog system creates radar-absorbing carbon-fiber clouds that prevent a missile’s seeker from finding its target. It is a simple but effective means of blinding the radar target acquisition system of anti-ship supersonic cruise missiles and ballistic missiles like the Wrecker and the DF-21.

“This isn’t just smoke or chaff, this is a high tech obscurant, which can be effective against an array of missile homing systems,
” said Antonio Siordia, U.S. Seventh Fleet’s science adviser.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 16 Dec 2015, 16:28
by hornetfinn
I wonder if towed decoys might be usable for ships against such a threat? Naturally the mechanisms would be different than for aircraft, something like towed blimp or very slow UAV. It would need to have very long endurance while moving slowly for flying object if used for ship self defense. If such a system could be created, it could bring the countermeasures higher and further away the ship but closer the flight path of the missile.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 17 Dec 2015, 01:17
by popcorn
hornetfinn wrote:I wonder if towed decoys might be usable for ships against such a threat? Naturally the mechanisms would be different than for aircraft, something like towed blimp or very slow UAV. It would need to have very long endurance while moving slowly for flying object if used for ship self defense. If such a system could be created, it could bring the countermeasures higher and further away the ship but closer the flight path of the missile.

Nulka already serves that function and IIRC can even be quad-packed into a VLS tube.
Re Pandarra Fog, aside from inferfering with RF, I wonder how feasible it would be to add oher ingredienfs to the soup to spoil IR sensors as well? It already would interfere with optical targeting systems by blocking visual acquisition.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 17 Dec 2015, 14:41
by hornetfinn
Thanks popcorn! I was thinking that the idea is so simple that somebody has to have already thought about that... :D

I think it should be easy to add IR blocking ingredients. AFAIK, Pandarra fog works also against infrared and other optical systems.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 17 Dec 2015, 16:10
by popcorn
hornetfinn wrote:Thanks popcorn! I was thinking that the idea is so simple that somebody has to have already thought about that... :D

I think it should be easy to add IR blocking ingredients. AFAIK, Pandarra fog works also against infrared and other optical systems.

Presumably Pandarra Fog would also screw with the sensors aboard Navy ships ie. would it render AEGIS ineffective? Maybe not if they have à E-2D circling above and it's datalink is somehow able to penetrate the obscurant..

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 19 Dec 2015, 01:18
by popcorn
The Navy wants a smarter Nulka.

http://www.seapowermagazine.org/stories ... arris.html
U.S. Navy Awards Harris $54 Million Electronic Warfare Contract

MELBOURNE, Fla. — Harris Corp. has received a three-year, $54 million ceiling, single-award contract from the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory to provide electronic warfare (EW) technology and engineering services for the Advanced Decoy Architecture Project (ADAP). The indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract was awarded during the first quarter of Harris' fiscal 2016, the company announced in a Dec. 17 release.

Harris will provide ADAP payloads designed to lure missiles away from their intended targets with advanced electronic techniques. The ADAP payloads are an upgrade to the existing Nulka decoy, currently in service with the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, Royal Australian Navy and Royal Canadian Navy. Harris also will provide research engineering services to help advance the Navy's capabilities to meet current and future EW mission requirements.

“Programs like ADAP help ensure that the Navy’s tactical EW capabilities remain at the cutting edge as the threat landscape continues to evolve,” Rich Sorelle, president of the Harris Electronic Warfare Systems business unit, said in the release. “By supporting the rapid deployment of this new capability, Harris continues to demonstrate its commitment to Navy EW and mission success in the electromagnetic spectrum.”

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 19 Dec 2015, 03:39
by count_to_10
popcorn wrote:
hornetfinn wrote:Thanks popcorn! I was thinking that the idea is so simple that somebody has to have already thought about that... :D

I think it should be easy to add IR blocking ingredients. AFAIK, Pandarra fog works also against infrared and other optical systems.

Presumably Pandarra Fog would also screw with the sensors aboard Navy ships ie. would it render AEGIS ineffective? Maybe not if they have à E-2D circling above and it's datalink is somehow able to penetrate the obscurant..

If you have AEGIS ships out in front of it, they won't have a problem.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 19 Dec 2015, 04:32
by popcorn
count_to_10 wrote:
popcorn wrote:
hornetfinn wrote:Thanks popcorn! I was thinking that the idea is so simple that somebody has to have already thought about that... :D

I think it should be easy to add IR blocking ingredients. AFAIK, Pandarra fog works also against infrared and other optical systems.

Presumably Pandarra Fog would also screw with the sensors aboard Navy ships ie. would it render AEGIS ineffective? Maybe not if they have à E-2D circling above and it's datalink is somehow able to penetrate the obscurant..

If you have AEGIS ships out in front of it, they won't have a problem.

Yeah but then they become tàrgets ala pickets off Okinawa in 1945. Pesumably PF could protect a CSG or solo combatants providing distributed lethality. Anyway, Navy will work out apropriate CONOPs.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 19 Aug 2019, 09:28
by zero-one

Interesting video on ASuW. I think the channel is one of the better researched military channels out there compared to it's contemporaries.

But I'm not sure why most people consider the AGM-158C inferior to the latest anti ship missiles.
My argument is, no matter how fast, if you're missile relies on data links pre terminal stage then that data link can be jammed, If its not stealthy then its easier to target and hit.

There is a notion that fast missiles are impossible to hit. Is this true? the US navy has the GQM-163 which is said to be capable of replicating the Brahmos, Klub and even DF-21 ballistic missiles.

It was successfully intercepted by the French Aster 30
(https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gq ... ses-03155/)
missiles which is roughly an analogue of the SM-2

and was again intercepted by SM-6 missiles
(http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.ph ... le&id=2073)

So to me Stealth missiles which do not rely on data links is really the way to go.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 19 Aug 2019, 18:26
by sferrin
zero-one wrote:There is a notion that fast missiles are impossible to hit. Is this true? the US navy has the GQM-163 which is said to be capable of replicating the Brahmos, Klub and even DF-21 ballistic missiles.


No. Coyote simulates Brahmos and Klub. Ballistic missile targets simulate DF-21. And AQM-37C (which have also been shot down) are WAY faster than Coyote.

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-37.html

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 20 Aug 2019, 04:18
by fidgetspinner
"the US navy has the GQM-163 which is said to be capable of replicating the Brahmos, Klub and even DF-21 ballistic missiles."

"No. Coyote simulates Brahmos and Klub."

Since the Brahmos is based off the onyx I believe there is a slight problem I need to address before something is called comparable. But below is the export yakhont.

Image

Here is an example of the coyote missile.

https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gq ... ses-03155/

Rail-launched from Navy test and training ranges, the highly maneuverable Coyote achieves cruise speeds of over Mach 2.5, with a range of approximately 60 nautical miles at altitudes of less than 20 feet above the sea surface

Aug 13/10: High Diver. The first flight test of the Coyote SSST High Diver variant was successful. During the naval test at San Nicolas Island, CA, the Coyote High Diver vehicle was rail-launched from the ground, then boosted by its Variable Flow Ducted Rocket (VFDR) solid rocket motor to ramjet-takeover speed. It ascended to 35,000 feet and Mach 3.3 cruise under ramjet power, and executed the planned 40-degree unpowered dive to its objective point near the ocean’s surface at the end of its 110 mile journey.
Aerojet’s VFDR is also used in the original SSST configuration, but the CQM-163 needed guidance software modifications that let it operate at altitudes up to 50,000 feet.

http://members.home.nl/7seas/radcalc.htm

I am assuming for H2 the ship radar would be 30 meters and I put 5 meters for H1 got a radar horizon of 31.81kms. The coyotes 60 nautical mile below 20 ft altitude journey is 111.2kms. So- 79.39kms it will definitely not be seen but at a 35,000ft altitude with H2 remaining as 30 meters the radar horizon is 448kms. The next problem is the 40 degree dive.

https://m.blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?b ... gle.com%2F
"Range is at 300 km in a hi-lo profile or at 120 km at altitudes of 5-15 metres, in a lo-lo profile. A regular mid-course phase of the flight occurs at 15 km."

The problem is yakhont as a longer low altitude range than coyote as well as overall range assuming the 110 mile journey is max 177kms. The bigger problem is that the onyx comes with twice the range and this is what the brahmos is based off of. If the max flight attitude is 10-14kms so putting 14kms for h1 the radar horizon is 500kms. So lets assume the low-low profile for the onyx is twice that of yakhont than the low altitude profile would be 220kms. which would mean ships can still track the target but at a way lesser time before re-appearing again. Also there is a bigger problem than this is that they made the dive more steep so there is no telling what range the long low altitude range would be. Wiki is showing me that even the speeds have changed on brahmos.

I am assuming that the coyote based of its range was meant to replicate the brahmos missile variant that came before india signing to be a part of the MTCR. and regarding the klub missile I assuming that they are referring to export version because the domestic version goes by the name kalibr. And boy the supersonic version of the kalibr missile has a max range of 440-660kms with a max flight ceiling being 1km put that on h1 than it is very safe to assume that a ship out at sea will not know the presence of a incoming kalibr missile and if its 15ft low profile altitude is correct as well than 31.4km is the max range and if the speed is mach 2.9 in which its basically 1km/s than 31.4 seconds is the only time the kalibr missile will show itself to any ship so it makes sense why the Navy only referenced klub instead of kalibr. klubs and brahmos variants(before MTCR) have around 300km ranges although it would be nice to try out against supersonic targets that have longer ranges instead of ones below 300kms.

We have hit ballistic missiles before as well be it IRBMs or MRBMs the problem regarding the future is that scramjet flight ceilings are much lower along with other certain factors that make it a more difficult target if anyone is interested in hearing that as well?

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 20 Aug 2019, 04:31
by zero-one
sferrin wrote:No. Coyote simulates Brahmos and Klub. Ballistic missile targets simulate DF-21. And AQM-37C (which have also been shot down) are WAY faster than Coyote.

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-37.html

Aug 1 3/1 0: High Diver. The first flight test of the Coyote
SSST High Diver variant was successful. During the naval
test at San Nicolas Island, CA, the Coyote High Diver
vehicle was rail-launched from the ground, then boosted
by its Variable Flow Ducted Rocket (VFDR) solid rocket
motor to ramjet-takeover speed. It ascended to 35,000
feet and Mach 3.3 cruise under ramjet power, and
executed the planned 40-degree unpowered dive to its
objective point near the ocean's surface at the end of its
1 1 0 mile journey.

Aerojet's VFDR is also used in the original SSST
configuration, but the CQM-163 needed guidance
software modifications that let it operate at altitudes up
to 50.000 feet.

There are cruise missiles that execute supersonic pop up and dive attacks at the end of their flight, but not from 50,000 feet and not usually at shallow trajectories. Anti-ship ballistic missile like China’s Dong Feng 21D on the other hand, may have just found their target analogue.

https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gq ... s-03155/0p

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 20 Aug 2019, 06:19
by Corsair1963
zero-one wrote:Interesting video on ASuW. I think the channel is one of the better researched military channels out there compared to it's contemporaries.

But I'm not sure why most people consider the AGM-158C inferior to the latest anti ship missiles.
My argument is, no matter how fast, if you're missile relies on data links pre terminal stage then that data link can be jammed, If its not stealthy then its easier to target and hit.

There is a notion that fast missiles are impossible to hit. Is this true? the US navy has the GQM-163 which is said to be capable of replicating the Brahmos, Klub and even DF-21 ballistic missiles.

It was successfully intercepted by the French Aster 30
(https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gq ... ses-03155/)
missiles which is roughly an analogue of the SM-2

and was again intercepted by SM-6 missiles
(http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.ph ... le&id=2073)

So to me Stealth missiles which do not rely on data links is really the way to go.



The AGM-158C (LRASM) is hardly inferior to the latest Anti-Ship Missiles. As a matter of fact I would say the opposite.... :twisted:

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 20 Aug 2019, 12:56
by sferrin
fidgetspinner wrote:"the US navy has the GQM-163 which is said to be capable of replicating the Brahmos, Klub and even DF-21 ballistic missiles."

"No. Coyote simulates Brahmos and Klub."

Since the Brahmos is based off the onyx I believe there is a slight problem I need to address before something is called comparable. But below is the export yakhont.

Image

Here is an example of the coyote missile.

https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gq ... ses-03155/

Rail-launched from Navy test and training ranges, the highly maneuverable Coyote achieves cruise speeds of over Mach 2.5, with a range of approximately 60 nautical miles at altitudes of less than 20 feet above the sea surface

Aug 13/10: High Diver. The first flight test of the Coyote SSST High Diver variant was successful. During the naval test at San Nicolas Island, CA, the Coyote High Diver vehicle was rail-launched from the ground, then boosted by its Variable Flow Ducted Rocket (VFDR) solid rocket motor to ramjet-takeover speed. It ascended to 35,000 feet and Mach 3.3 cruise under ramjet power, and executed the planned 40-degree unpowered dive to its objective point near the ocean’s surface at the end of its 110 mile journey.
Aerojet’s VFDR is also used in the original SSST configuration, but the CQM-163 needed guidance software modifications that let it operate at altitudes up to 50,000 feet.

http://members.home.nl/7seas/radcalc.htm

I am assuming for H2 the ship radar would be 30 meters and I put 5 meters for H1 got a radar horizon of 31.81kms. The coyotes 60 nautical mile below 20 ft altitude journey is 111.2kms. So- 79.39kms it will definitely not be seen but at a 35,000ft altitude with H2 remaining as 30 meters the radar horizon is 448kms. The next problem is the 40 degree dive.

https://m.blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?b ... gle.com%2F
"Range is at 300 km in a hi-lo profile or at 120 km at altitudes of 5-15 metres, in a lo-lo profile. A regular mid-course phase of the flight occurs at 15 km."

The problem is yakhont as a longer low altitude range than coyote as well as overall range assuming the 110 mile journey is max 177kms. The bigger problem is that the onyx comes with twice the range and this is what the brahmos is based off of. If the max flight attitude is 10-14kms so putting 14kms for h1 the radar horizon is 500kms. So lets assume the low-low profile for the onyx is twice that of yakhont than the low altitude profile would be 220kms. which would mean ships can still track the target but at a way lesser time before re-appearing again. Also there is a bigger problem than this is that they made the dive more steep so there is no telling what range the long low altitude range would be. Wiki is showing me that even the speeds have changed on brahmos.

I am assuming that the coyote based of its range was meant to replicate the brahmos missile variant that came before india signing to be a part of the MTCR. and regarding the klub missile I assuming that they are referring to export version because the domestic version goes by the name kalibr. And boy the supersonic version of the kalibr missile has a max range of 440-660kms with a max flight ceiling being 1km put that on h1 than it is very safe to assume that a ship out at sea will not know the presence of a incoming kalibr missile and if its 15ft low profile altitude is correct as well than 31.4km is the max range and if the speed is mach 2.9 in which its basically 1km/s than 31.4 seconds is the only time the kalibr missile will show itself to any ship so it makes sense why the Navy only referenced klub instead of kalibr. klubs and brahmos variants(before MTCR) have around 300km ranges although it would be nice to try out against supersonic targets that have longer ranges instead of ones below 300kms.

We have hit ballistic missiles before as well be it IRBMs or MRBMs the problem regarding the future is that scramjet flight ceilings are much lower along with other certain factors that make it a more difficult target if anyone is interested in hearing that as well?


For a target it doesn't matter if the range is shorter. All that matters is it replicates the amount of difficulty. And Coyote is probably faster than Brahmos/Onyx (they don't do Mach 2.8 on the deck). Coyote would have difficulty replicating Sizzler's dart.

As for the D-21, what we don't know is how fast it's RV is coming in. If it's as slow as Mach 3 (which would astonish me) then yeah, Coyote could replicate it. I'd still think you'd want to go with an AQM-37C as it can fly higher, faster, further, and is cheaper than Coyote. In fact they used AQM-37C on a (relatively) recent SM-6 test.

"Some of the latest AQM-37Cs have further improved heat insulation, and can also be used to simulate ballistic missile threats, being able to fly ballistic trajectories to an altitude of 100 km (330000 ft) and a range of 425 km (265 miles), with terminal speeds of Mach 5."

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 20 Aug 2019, 12:59
by sferrin
zero-one wrote:
sferrin wrote:No. Coyote simulates Brahmos and Klub. Ballistic missile targets simulate DF-21. And AQM-37C (which have also been shot down) are WAY faster than Coyote.

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-37.html

Aug 1 3/1 0: High Diver. The first flight test of the Coyote
SSST High Diver variant was successful. During the naval
test at San Nicolas Island, CA, the Coyote High Diver
vehicle was rail-launched from the ground, then boosted
by its Variable Flow Ducted Rocket (VFDR) solid rocket
motor to ramjet-takeover speed. It ascended to 35,000
feet and Mach 3.3 cruise under ramjet power, and
executed the planned 40-degree unpowered dive to its
objective point near the ocean's surface at the end of its
1 1 0 mile journey.

Aerojet's VFDR is also used in the original SSST
configuration, but the CQM-163 needed guidance
software modifications that let it operate at altitudes up
to 50.000 feet.

There are cruise missiles that execute supersonic pop up and dive attacks at the end of their flight, but not from 50,000 feet and not usually at shallow trajectories. Anti-ship ballistic missile like China’s Dong Feng 21D on the other hand, may have just found their target analogue.

https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gq ... s-03155/0p


That's some journalist's opinion. Until we know how fast DF-21s RV is traveling once it's in the atmosphere you can't really make that judgement. Personally, I'd think it would be coming in a HELL of a lot faster than Coyote (which is why they used the faster AQM-37 in recent SM-6 testing).

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 21 Aug 2019, 03:08
by fidgetspinner
@sferrin

"All that matters is it replicates the amount of difficulty."

Do not worry this will be my last post and its apologies on my part for not offering you a demonstration earlier to what I mean.

My previous source gave that the range of the coyote missiles journey is 177kms and having a 111km low altitude flight. Although I disagree with the 110mile/177km range I believe it is somewhere around 300km in range in order for it to effectively simulate a brahmos or a klub missile. 177-111= 66kms of no low altitude flight. So if Coyote is launched and covers a range of 66kms or is about to enter the low altitude flight profile at the 111km range mark. The SM-6 with mach 3.5/ 1.2km/s would cover 79.2kms. Now there is a very important feature on the SM-6 and that it the fact it has a host radar system. http://eng.ktrv.ru/production/military_ ... -35ue.html if the Russians can acquire a 50km autonomous lock on to targets and their companies KRET and RTI say they are 5-10 years behind in MMIC technology along with the fact that the SM-6 is much newer than this anti-ship missile. Than I definitely believe the SM-6 will have no problem acquiring a 42km lock on the coyote missile that has already currently entered the low altitude flight profile.

Again I honestly don't believe the Coyotes max range to be 177kms I believe it to be rather 300kms which would mean 189kms before it enters its final low altitude flight profile. I honestly believe that the ships radar does not even have to use the host radar on the SM-6 to intercept the coyote before it begins its dive or it is during its dive. For example when SM-6 111 divide by 1.2 would mean the missile is already at 111kms at 92.5 seconds and since coyote is spot on 1km/s assuming its range is 300kms the distance covered by coyote would mean it is 207.5km/s away from the ship. I am guessing the coyote missile is 1.about to ascend to 35,000 ft. 2. is at 35,000ft. 3. is currently descending with its 40 degree dive but not low enough to reach 111kms meaning the ships radar is still tracking the coyote missile. So in the next 44-45 seconds the interception occurs between the 160-162km range mark and even at this range I do not even think the SM-6 has to use its host radar because I believe the radar horizon for the ship would still be able to track it.

I believe it replicates the early brahmos or klub variants. But some newer or better variants would either 1. be tracked partially by the ship but quickly descend in which the ships radar wont track it and the SM-6 host radar is unable to track it because its too faraway. 2. be as good as the kalibr missile and not let the ship even know you are there until you are around 30kms which the ship would have to immediately track you, plan and interception than launch the SM-6 in which reaction time will bring the kalibr closer to the point that CIWS would have to be used. Although I got into a huge argument with someone from another aviation forum about the deployment of radar balloons https://forum.keypublishing.com/forum/m ... sams/page3 and I am not going into too much detail about it here because I will definitely get slapped with a banned sign here if I did.

AQM-37C being faster does not always mean its going to be more difficult to intercept because travelling in an arc allows ship radars to track you way longer and give enough time for a planned interception.

http://www.wsmr-history.org/AQM37CDrone.htm

"The AQM-37C(EP) extended performance target capable of flying at 100,000 ft altitude at a speed of MACH 4 was launched from an F-4 aircraft at 50,000 ft altitude traveling at MACH 1.5. Eight of these targets were specially modified for flight safety purposes to be flown at WSMR as targets for the Standard Missile program SM-2 Block IV in 1993."

Are you referring to this or you have another source about the 100km altitude or you mistaken the measurements for 100,000ft? If this was launched from an F-4 as its testing phase at 50,000ft, ascends to 100,000ft than descends back towards the ship. Than the ship gets the entire 425kms to track this missile without a doubt but I have no idea how long it flies at mach 4 or mach 1.5 when air launched according to this source

Did you happen to use wiki as a quick reference? "These variants were intended to simulate different classes of threats, such as sea-skimming antiship missiles or high-altitude naval attack missiles, or provide better performance. One high-performance variant with improved thermal protection attained a speed of Mach 4.7 and an altitude of over 112,000 feet (34 kilometers) on a ballistic trajectory. The final US Navy variant was designated AQM-37C."

I am assuming you are speaking about the air launched version being ascended? Rather if it is mach +1 or +2 faster it has an added 125km or 248kms(assuming 177kms is the max range for coyote) distance to cover which makes it seem it is still tracked longer than a coyote missile depending if it was air launched. Besides kalibr missiles which if sources are correct offer ships a less tracking time with its 1km flight ceiling and long range low altitude flight profile lets look at another threat for ships in the future.

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news ... cification

According to Russians or Putin specifically they say mach 9 with a 1000km range flight ceiling 30-40kms. Still in testing phase.

Image

Zircon if sources are right is slightly faster and has a little longer range than a SRBM. Comparing 30-40kms flight ceiling to the 200km flight ceiling of a SRBM there is definitely going to be less radar tracking. Says to have either a plasma shield or cloud to further reduce RCS or the ability to get tracked. There have been many people that I have run into that claim its feasible or not feasible to hit its targets with the plasma feature but I am not looking for another argument based on this especially on this forum so don't shoot the messenger. And the next thing to worry about is does it maneuver in every phase of its flight like what was claimed on the kinzhal to throw off planned interceptions of fire control radar guidance or does it only maneuver on the terminal phase like the silver sparrow(again don't shoot the messenger)? People can go add in their suggestions here if they want but remember don't shoot the messenger here I just quote the sources where I find the information.

I hope I was of some help.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 21 Aug 2019, 12:54
by sferrin
fidgetspinner wrote:@sferrin

"All that matters is it replicates the amount of difficulty."

Do not worry this will be my last post and its apologies on my part for not offering you a demonstration earlier to what I mean.

My previous source gave that the range of the coyote missiles journey is 177kms and having a 111km low altitude flight. Although I disagree with the 110mile/177km range I believe it is somewhere around 300km in range in order for it to effectively simulate a brahmos or a klub missile.


It's range isn't that long and it doesn't have to be. If it's a sea-skimmer, 20 miles is no different than a thousand when you're trying to find it from a ship. (Radar horizon.)

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 21 Aug 2019, 13:21
by madrat
The flight time of an IRBM is one of the biggest threats. Six minutes is enough time to cover thousands of miles. Not much room for error.

I can imagine sensor fusion projecting into the future means you can afford to probe with drones and cruise missiles to triangulate attacks with ballistic missiles. You don't need hard kills to drive off fleets, just the ability to threaten them.

Re: Defending against anti-ship balistic missiles

Unread postPosted: 21 Aug 2019, 14:52
by sferrin
madrat wrote:You don't need hard kills to drive off fleets, just the ability to threaten them.


That doesn't always work. Ships have weapons to go places where they're threatened. (You'll note the USN didn't shy away from the North Atlantic just because Russia had regiments of Kh-22/Kh-15 armed Backfires, Bear patrol aircraft, and a slew of SSGNs.)