Supply of Future Combat Aircraft

[talkitron]

This talk by a British engineer/academic is called The Supply of Future Combat Aircraft. The speaker advocates producing combat aircraft that are easy to modify in the future on the production line and not upgrading existing airframes with lots of wear and tear on them. He likes the American Phantom and Viper and the British Hawker Hunter and the Harriet for programs that have long legs. He is not a fan of the F-22, Tornado and Typhoon, finding them hard to modify.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9L_e15_YDgU

[marauder2048]

This talk by a British engineer/academic is called The Supply of Future Combat Aircraft. The speaker advocates producing combat aircraft that are easy to modify in the future on the production line and not upgrading existing airframes with lots of wear and tear on them. He likes the American Phantom and Viper and the British Hawker Hunter and the Harriet for programs that have long legs. He is not a fan of the F-22, Tornado and Typhoon, finding them hard to modify.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9L_e15_YDgU

He's factually, historically and analytically wrong on just about everything he covers.
I've been addressing this in gory detail over on Secret Projects were the speaker disengaged
after about the k-th misrepresentation I pointed out claiming that my naughty language upset him.

(I said: "No $hit" to his claims hat the end of the Cold War impacted ATF).

[weasel1962]

Y'know the funny thing about the webinar is that if one didn't actually mention names/country, one could have actually thought this was a sales pitch for the F-35 (as opposed to the "too expensive" programs a la Tempest).

Thought I highlight that the build for use strategy as advocated is exactly what the Russkies used to do/does with their own flankers. No "upgradation" as the Indians like to say. Its lower cost upfront but as history shows, lifetime costs aren't exactly low and that as rightly pointed out is the result of maintenance/support costs.

Notwithstanding any factual errors, its a good discussion to have. Its relevant especially for countries that don't have the defense budget of the US but have to face a growing low-cost juggernaut.

[mixelflick]

I wonder what he'd like to be flying into combat tomorrow... an F-4, F-16, Harrier or F-22?

[marauder2048]

Thought I highlight that the build for use strategy as advocated is exactly what the Russkies used to do/does with their own flankers. No "upgradation" as the Indians like to say. Its lower cost upfront but as history shows, lifetime costs aren't exactly low and that as rightly pointed out is the result of maintenance/support costs

Maintenance is not the major driver for O&S for fighters: it's unit personnel, operations, upgrades and sustaining support.
The West has an all volunteer force that makes personnel cost growth very difficult to restrain.
That does spillover into maintenance and the labor rates seen there.

Furthermore, if you look at the ratio of Non-O&S costs:O&S costs actual fighter lifetime actuals it's more like 50:50:
there was an RAF prediction of this for Typhoon back and 1992 that was corroborated for fighters in general by a comprehensive study of actuals in 2014.

[talkitron]

[
I've been addressing this in gory detail over on Secret Projects were the speaker disengaged
after about the k-th misrepresentation I pointed out claiming that my naughty language upset him.

What subforum / topic is the discussion under on Secret Projects?

[marauder2048]

[
I've been addressing this in gory detail over on Secret Projects were the speaker disengaged
after about the k-th misrepresentation I pointed out claiming that my naughty language upset him.

What subforum / topic is the discussion under on Secret Projects?

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/thread ... 020.34733/

[talkitron]

Hi Marauder, You make some good points. Sorry you scared off the speaker!

[weasel1962]

Thought I highlight that the build for use strategy as advocated is exactly what the Russkies used to do/does with their own flankers. No "upgradation" as the Indians like to say. Its lower cost upfront but as history shows, lifetime costs aren't exactly low and that as rightly pointed out is the result of maintenance/support costs

Maintenance is not the major driver for O&S for fighters: it's unit personnel, operations, upgrades and sustaining support.
The West has an all volunteer force that makes personnel cost growth very difficult to restrain.
That does spillover into maintenance and the labor rates seen there.

Furthermore, if you look at the ratio of Non-O&S costs:O&S costs actual fighter lifetime actuals it's more like 50:50:
there was an RAF prediction of this for Typhoon back and 1992 that was corroborated for fighters in general by a comprehensive study of actuals in 2014.

33-40% (Table 2.2 pg 28). Granted, that includes transports but its not that far off.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1000756.pdf

P.s. I believe the source of Pryce's 70% OS is actually derived from a year 2000 GAO report
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAO ... 00-165.htm

History indicates that these costs can account for about 70 percent of a system's total life-cycle costs.1

Too lazy to check the citation but its a bit dated. For 2 cents worth, using SAR numbers may not be a good metric because usage outlast acquisitions so SARs only makes estimates. Probably budget docs have sufficient data but its too voluminous to bother. Its not that relevant either.

E.g. let's say OS is 70% (which i'm not saying it is) over 40 years and acquisition is 30%. If one uses a plane for 10 years and replaces every 10 years, acquisition costs will need to fall below 7.5% to render the plane worthwhile which in most cirumstances doesn't. Financially, its not as easy as Pryce suggests.

[marauder2048]

33-40% (Table 2.2 pg 28). Granted, that includes transports but its not that far off.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1000756.pdf

Right so nowhere near 70% of O&S is maintenance; naturally transport aircraft totally distort
that metric; like the C-5s

P.s. I believe the source of Pryce's 70% OS is actually derived from a year 2000 GAO report
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAO ... 00-165.htm

Which is completely invalidated by a 2014 study that used *actuals* for fighters.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a600495.pdf

This what a UK NAO report predicted (based on a actual to date) in 1992.

Too lazy to check the citation but its a bit dated. For 2 cents worth, using SAR numbers may not be a good metric because usage outlast acquisitions so SARs only makes estimates. Probably budget docs have sufficient data but its too voluminous to bother. Its not that relevant either.

It's why I cite studies that cite actuals for fighters.

E.g. let's say OS is 70% (which i'm not saying it is) over 40 years and acquisition is 30%. If one uses a plane for 10 years and replaces every 10 years, acquisition costs will need to fall below 7.5% to render the plane worthwhile which in most cirumstances doesn't. Financially, its not as easy as Pryce suggests.

Unless you are able transition pilots, support and infrastructure seamlessly every ten years this would
tend to exacerbate the already finite but unbounded personnel costs and MILCON.
And it would aggravate disposal costs.

Not clear if aircraft lifetime requirements are strong contributors to acquisition costs.
Example: if you have to tolerate load factors and be ballistically tolerant you might end up with the same structure.
Most mission systems already seem to need a decadal (or more) cadence of refreshes so I'm not sure
there are savings there either.

[madrat]

I guess the dots connecting his arguments just do not click for me. He mixes aircraft with specialized niches in his argument, where some are good examples while others are bad. Then he claims adapted fighters, with no distinction between multi-role and multi-purpose, like Typhoon and Tornado are bad? It's like there is cross pollination in his argument. Tornado adapted for A2A was quite different than the ones built for A2G and SEAD. They never intended for Tornado to be multi-purpose on the same sortie, although it was in some ways done like ECR being equipped with AIM-9 compatible launchers for self defense. Typhoon was not specialized for A2A as people often suggest, it just never had the other purposes fully funded for much of its operational life. But that is a totally different argument altogether.

[marauder2048]

I guess the dots connecting his arguments just do not click for me. He mixes aircraft with specialized niches in his argument, where some are good examples while others are bad. Then he claims adapted fighters, with no distinction between multi-role and multi-purpose, like Typhoon and Tornado are bad? It's like there is cross pollination in his argument. Tornado adapted for A2A was quite different than the ones built for A2G and SEAD. They never intended for Tornado to be multi-purpose on the same sortie, although it was in some ways done like ECR being equipped with AIM-9 compatible launchers for self defense. Typhoon was not specialized for A2A as people often suggest, it just never had the other purposes fully funded for much of its operational life. But that is a totally different argument altogether.

He harps on the Mach 1.4 (IIRC) delivery of an AAM coupled with a tight supersonic turn driving
much of the design and complexity of Typhoon.

As if Mach 1.4 weapons delivery + high speed turning capability isn't useful for A2G?