F-22 and the FAA ADS-B 2018

[neptune]

https://www.c4isrnet.com/air/2018/01/25 ... ck-a-f-22/

GAO: Fix security flaws or anyone will be able to track a F-22


By: Daniel Cebul
25Jan18

WASHINGTON ―
Some of the military’s most advanced aircraft could be tracked by adversaries with greater precision than radar if security flaws in the latest signal technology aren’t addressed. The risk is associated with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out transponder technology. According to a Government Accountability Office report released this month, a 2010 Federal Aviation Administration rule requires all military aircraft to be equipped with ADS-B Out transponders by Jan. 1, 2020 as part of its program to modernize the air transportation system, but neither the Department of Defense nor the FAA has taken significant steps to mitigate security risks. Whereas older transponders like the Mode S broadcast an aircraft-specific International Civil Aviation Organization code, squawk code and altitude, ADS-B Out technology provides much more detailed information. An aircraft’s registration number, longitude and latitude, dimensions and velocity are all broadcast by ADS-B Out transponders, allowing anyone with a ADS-B In receiver to track aircraft with more precision than radar. Using a commercially available receiver, the GAO was able to track several types of military aircraft. The watchdog agency pointed to the risk that adversaries could do the same, and may leverage the technology’s inherent vulnerabilities to launch electronic and cyber attacks against aircraft. Adversaries may also attempt to jam ADS-B Out transmissions to obscure air traffic control and surveillance visibility, or spoof transmissions by creating false signals to confuse monitors.

Furthermore, a 2015 RAND assessment concluded broadcasting detailed, unencrypted information about a fighter aircraft’s position like the stealth F-22 ― which is classified secret ― poses significant security risks to DOD personnel and missions. With the 2020 deadline approaching, the GAO warns there is an “urgent need” to address these security risks and plan for ADS-B implementation. The GAO explains that while the risks are known, “DOD and FAA have focused on equipping military aircraft with ADS-B technology and have not focused on solving or mitigating security risks from ADS-B.” Despite knowing of these risks to military missions and security since 2008, DOD and FAA have not approved any of their proposed solutions. Most of the DOD’s proposed fixes, such as masking DOD aircraft identifiers, allowing pilots to turn off ADS-B and exemptions for select aircraft nullify the benefits the technology has to offer. More precise tracking data could allow for increased air transportation system capacity, enhanced airspace safety, a reduced number of cancellations and delays, lower fuel consumption and even lessen the adverse environmental affects associated with flying.

[rheonomic]

Most of the DOD’s proposed fixes, such as masking DOD aircraft identifiers, allowing pilots to turn off ADS-B and exemptions for select aircraft nullify the benefits the technology has to offer. More precise tracking data could allow for increased air transportation system capacity, enhanced airspace safety, a reduced number of cancellations and delays, lower fuel consumption and even lessen the adverse environmental affects associated with flying.

I would be surprised if there wasn't a way for them to disable ADS-B when downrange. They probably keep them on in the NAS and in friendly airspace (wouldn't generally be flying in an LO config anyways) but if it came down to it the FAA can go **** themselves.

[gtg947h]

Most of the DOD’s proposed fixes, such as masking DOD aircraft identifiers, allowing pilots to turn off ADS-B and exemptions for select aircraft nullify the benefits the technology has to offer. More precise tracking data could allow for increased air transportation system capacity, enhanced airspace safety, a reduced number of cancellations and delays, lower fuel consumption and even lessen the adverse environmental affects associated with flying.

I would be surprised if there wasn't a way for them to disable ADS-B when downrange. They probably keep them on in the NAS and in friendly airspace (wouldn't generally be flying in an LO config anyways) but if it came down to it the FAA can go **** themselves.

Civil aircraft can turn it off, too.

Various people have been pointing out the problems with the "in the clear" ADS-B transmissions for several years. But "red team" thinking is beyond the FAA. I think they just liked the proof-of-concept model that was presented to them so much, that they decided to just implement it as-is.

[neptune]

...when in a warzone, it might be of benefit to shutdown the "wonderbox"!...

A Boeing 777 (9M-MRD) with 280 passengers and 15 crew members, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, was reportedly shot down about 50NM to the northwest of Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine. Based on the last transponder signal (with ADS-B mode) recorded by FlightRadar24, the aircraft at 13:21 UTC was at flying at 476 knots, at FL330 at position N48.56 E37.21.

[popcorn]

More prudent to simply avoid routes that pose potential threat to commercial aircraft.