F-16 versus Mirage 2000

Agreed, it will never be a fair fight but how would the F-16 match up against the ... ?
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by Pumpkin » 29 Jan 2005, 10:09

Wildcat wrote:Actually, only the Mirage 2000N and the Mirage 2000D possess a terrain-following-capable radar, but these are two-seat mud-moving versions, with little AA ability (they can only fire Magic II infrared missiles). They are supposed to protect themselves by speed, very low flying and ECM.
On the contrary, the multirole versions, i.e. Mirage 2000C, Mirage 2000E (same for export) Mirage 2000-5 and 2000-9 have no TFR (or something comparable to the LANTIRN system), so that I cannot figure out why a AA-capable Mirage 2000 would be at advantage over a Viper in a high threat scenario.


hi Wildcat, the Mirage TF capable is new to me. Do the mentioned Thales(Thomson-CSF) Antilope 5 and 50, have both FCR + TFR features in one radar?

Thanks,
Desmond


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by Wildcat » 29 Jan 2005, 13:51

Absolutely :D , the Antilope 5 and Antilope 50 possess six different modes (I translate from French):
Terrain Following (suivi de terrain), the radar sees up to 7 nm in front of the plane, allowing a 600kt speed at 200ft
Ground Mapping (cartographie), enables two submodes: VISUSOL gives a 160° (+/- 80°) map with 1/250,000 or 1/1,000,000 scales, while RESOL enables to magnify a part of the map from 2 to 50 times
Terrain Following + Ground Mapping (mode entrelacé)
Ground Target Ranging (télémétrie), effective range 8nm
Air-to-air (air-air), range 16nm, 160° wide sweeping, BoreSight and Slew submodes possible
Air-to-sea (air-surface), comparable to Ground Mapping

The ranges and resolutions I gave are the offical ones for the Antilope 5 released by the Armée de l'Air in a 1992 book. Notice that the avionics of the Mirage 2000D and 2000N are constantly improved, so that the actual figures may be better now.


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by Pumpkin » 29 Jan 2005, 18:06

Thanks Wildcat! The info is not very readily available on the net. :?

out,
Desmond


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by Pat1 » 31 Jan 2005, 06:49

ACSheva wrote:Hey what about me bro?

:oops:

Shev

¡¡THANKS Shev!!, sorry I missed you :oops:.


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by Wildcat » 31 Jan 2005, 13:12

Here are two picture to help understand what I wrote about the Mirage 2000 loading. See: the Mirage 2000 has only three hardpoints under which to carry heavy stores (whereas the Viper has four), i.e. two under the wings and one central. The two wing hardpoints usually carrying tanks for air-to-ground missions, that only leaves the central hardpoint to carry a heavy armament. The other four belly hardpoints can only carry one MICA each (2000-5 and 2000-9 only) or one Mk-82 class bomb, and the two outer wing pylons usually carry IR missiles. Actually, the Mirage 2000D and 2000N are most commonly fitted with the two 2000l wing tanks and two IR missile pylons, whatever the mission.
Attachments
Chargé de PGMs.jpg
Mirage 2000-5 carrying GBUs
Flares.jpg
basic 2000N and 2000D load


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by Pumpkin » 31 Jan 2005, 23:37

Wildcat cool pic! Care to ID the white, TGP looking pod on the starboard pylon?

Thanks,

PS: I have a same question about French's TGP in this thread. Appreciate if you can shed some light.
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by Fantasma337 » 01 Feb 2005, 01:41

Wildcat wrote:Greece, but when they ordered Mirage 2000s they had just been accepted in the European Union. I think buying Mirage 2000s was a way to get closer to France at the time. (Exocet missiles may have been part of the explanation too, though).


The reasons that Greece bought the Mirage 2000 were many, mainly political but also operational...

HAF (PA) was very impressed with the Mirage F.1CG, (as were the THK pilots that were intercepted by it), the Reagan administration was not very warm towards the socialist goverment of Greece and amidst the cold war there were fears of an unofficial embargo that would ground the HAF main assets, especially in a crisis with Turkey... And also intercepting THK F-16s with an unknown to them fighter was a big factor... Certainly it was an expensive but worth while choice... All in all the M2K has proven its value and with the MICA armed M2K-5 Mk.IIs entering service by the end of the year the mistake of not ordering more M2ks will be set right...
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by Wildcat » 01 Feb 2005, 11:31

Nice information, Fantasma337! :D If you know more about Greek Mirage 2000, fell free to post it.
Pumpkin, the pod carried by the Mirage 2000 is a PDLCT (or a PDLCT-S, I can't be sure). PDLCT means pod de désignation à Contrôle Thermique, that-is-to-say Thermal Targeting Pod. As far as I know, this pod, which was the successor of the ATLIS II, wass only fitted on Mirage 2000. It is on sale for export but it seems that it is only used by the Armée de l'air on Mirage 2000D and Mirage 2000N. Anyway, Thales now rather tries to sell the more modern Damoclès pod.


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by Wildcat » 01 Feb 2005, 11:43

Here are other pictures of Mirage 2000N with PDLCT pods:
Attachments
Mrage 2000N au sol.jpg
Mirage 2000N en vol.jpg


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by CheckSix » 01 Feb 2005, 12:44

M2k loadout has been broadly discussed, but what is a combat payload of F-16. Mostly their A2G weapons are 2 small bombs or 2 harms.

If these numbers are correct:
http://www.mirage-jet.com/COMPAR_1/compar_1.htm

Dassault has done their job extremely well. Look at the acceleration tables!
Despite its weaker engine, M2k accelerates significantly faster than F-16.


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by Pumpkin » 01 Feb 2005, 18:47

Thanks for the responses, Wildcat.

sorry Fantasma337, if I may ask, why the purchase of 52+ but not more Mirage then?

CheckSix wrote:M2k loadout has been broadly discussed, but what is a combat payload of F-16. Mostly their A2G weapons are 2 small bombs or 2 harms.


2 small bombs... :shock: ? {EDIT} GBU-15, Spice..etc


IDFAF F-16A/B with 2x GBU-15 EO guided bombs, and an AXQ-14 Data Link pod [USAF photo]
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by Fantasma337 » 02 Feb 2005, 10:27

The reason is mainly political but that does not mean the B 52+ is not an exceptional system... The main drawback of teh Greek defence procurement is that there is lack of long term planning and that means the fighter purchases are random and subject to financial (FMS) and political factors... There were plans for more M2Ks that never materialised until 1999-2000 when the -5MkIIs were ordered...

HAF photos, including F-16s and M2Ks can be seen here:

http://hafcphotos.cs.net/
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by bull » 02 Feb 2005, 20:41

The mild winter in Jammu and Kashmir during 1998 enabled Pakistani Army Regulars and Mercenaries to infiltrate, and set up camps on the Indian Side of the Line of Control (L-O-C). The build of forces, unknown to Indian Authorities at the time was to have a major impact on the Indian Air Force (IAF) the following year as it fought to dislodge the enemy.

The battle was to take place over some of the highest terrain in the world, where aircraft and weapons were limited in their effectiveness. Conventional targets like airfields, command and control centre and convoys did not exist. Instead the IAF were to be confronted with tents and fortified bunkers, the single biggest structure being a hangar capable of taking a helicopter. The advance along the LOC was eventually to penetrate up to 10 kms in some areas along a line 200 kms long. All the ridges in the area were off shoots of K2 (8611 metres); the world’s second tallest mountain or Nanga Parbat (8126 metres); both located on the Pakistan side. Because of the climatic conditions and wind directions, a large number of features are shear cliffs on the Indian Side with gradual gradients on the other. Heights varied along the line, with a low of 2700 metres at Kargil, going up to 3400 metres in Dras and Tiger Hill being at 5000 metres. The area had no habitation and was covered in snow for most of the year. Strategically the area could not be used as a launch pad for a major offensive, its sole importance being the heights and the threat to National Highway 1A.

The IAF were limited in what they could use at such a demanding altitude. Attack helicopters were initially preferred with Mil-17’s being employed. However due to the abundance of man portable SAM’s, such as the Stingers, their effective operation was not possible due to the hostile flying environment. Therefore the IAF decided after experience that high altitude bombing by fighter aircraft and in particular the Mirage 2000, was the best option
To fully understand the role played by the Mirage 2000 during ‘Operation Vijay’ and the sterling work performed by pilots and support staff; we need to go back in time. The IAF ordered 42 single seat and 7 dual seat Mirage 2000 aircraft, that were delivered starting in 1985. Two squadrons, numbers 1 ‘Tigers’ and 7 ‘Battleaxes’, at Gwalior, operate the fleet. For 14 years they have been highly regarded in the IAF, being a stable weapons platform and having a good safety record. The Kargil Conflict was to push that high esteem to even greater heights
The Mirage 2000 were supplied with Thomson-CSF Laser Designator Pod, known as ‘ATLIS’ which was capable of delivery of Matra 1000 kg LGBs, which were purpose built for destruction of reinforced targets. These weapons were highly capable but were very expensive. It was decided to augment their capability by adding the 1000 lb bomb coupled with Paveway II laser-guided bomb kit. The IAF had ordered a number of these, but they had been supplied with an incorrect part. Because of the nuclear test performed by India, they were on the embargo list and were unable to get the correct parts sent as replacements. Consequently IAF technicians had to remanufacture this part in order to make the Paveway serviceable for use on the Mirage.

Another event was to take place during May that was to have a major impact on the work going on at Gwalior. On the 9th May, Pakistani Shelling along the Line of Control intensified and appeared to be more accurate in it’s spread. This began to threaten the strategically important National Highway 1A, which ran from Srinagar to Leh, and which was only open from May until October because of the weather. It became apparent that artillery spotters were entrenched along the peaks on the Indian Side of the L-O-C. Initially the Indian Army suffered badly due to the terrain and having to attack well dug in defenders up the high peaks. The Army Chief on the 26th formally requested IAF Support after losses had started racking up to un-acceptable levels.

The IAF had up until that time only flown photo-recon missions. This had resulted in a Canberra from 106 squadron being hit by a Stinger Missile on the 21st whilst over Batalik. Luckily the aircraft was able to make a safe recovery to Srinagar and PR missions were subsequently flown at higher altitude by Mig25RBT’s from 102 squadron.

Following the commitment of combat resources by the IAF, initial operations involved low level air strikes in the Tololing Sector using Mil-17’s and fighters, such as the MiG-21, 23 and 27. Strikes using these jet fighters were to continue throughout the duration of the war. During these operations two fighters were lost on the 27th May and one Mil 17 was lost on the 28th. The loss of the Mil 17 and its four crew proved to be a turning point in IAF thinking. The aircraft was on standby for an attack mission to Tololing and did not have adequate self-protection in the form of chaff and flares. However a helicopter with protection aborted its mission and as a result 4 crew were killed when the Mil-17 was attacked by 3 Stingers. Immediately the IAF decided to re-assess the situation. Of the attack helicopters only the Mil-17 could operate at this altitude, the Mil-35 could not. However the environment was awash with man portable SAM’s and deemed too hostile to commit further helicopter resources. Planners at IAF HQ began to re-think their offensive strategy. They thought about committing the Mirage 2000 to the conflict to augment the other jet fighters. This aircraft could operate at this altitude with no problem, but it had no high altitude attack capability.

On the 30th May, IAF HQ decided to commit the aircraft, which had already moved to forward operating location in their air defence role, to the offensive. Now the work of the back room staff and pilots was to intensify greatly. The status as of early June was that aircraft, pilots and technicians were spread around at Western Air Command bases and Gwalior. The Mirage 2000 aircraft itself had always been regarded as an air defence fighter with a limited ground attack capability. Consequently it lacked certain resources such as bombs, hardpoint pylons, tooling, testers and ground crew experience in such matters. A big push was instigated at Gwalior to get the platform prepared. By the 12th June, the IAF Personnel had ironed out most of the faults.

Enough equipment was found to make twelve aircraft at any given time, capable of delivering bombs. However bombs were not readily available to suit, so a search was made of the IAF Inventory. Vintage 250kg bombs from the 1970’s that were made in Spain for the HAL Ajeet aircraft and had been in storage were found and made available. A one off trial was carried out from Jaisalmer over the Porkoran Range on the 1st June and was deemed to be successful. They were immediately rushed into service with the Mirages of 7 Squadron. Initial missions were flown using dumb bombs only. Each aircraft would be configured with 12 bombs, 1 ventral fuel tank and 2 ‘MAGIC-2’ Air to Air Missiles. The mission would depart and meet up with fighter escorts from 1 Squadron, and then fly into the Indian Side of Jammu and Kashmir, with Mig29’s operating as top cover. The attacks took place initially on Point 5140 near Tololing in the Dras Sector and 4 strikes took place over 3 days. The Indian Army re-took this position on the 20th June after fighting in tandem with continuous IAF Strikes.

Notable amongst 7 Squadrons approximate 200 plus attack missions were the airstrikes on Muntho Dhalo, Tiger Hill and Point 4388 in the Drass Sector. On the 16th June, the major enemy supply depot at Muntho Dhalo in the Batalik Sector was sighted by a Mirage on the LDP. The following day this was hit and destroyed by aircraft from 7 Squadron using dumb bombs. This camp was the major re-supply base in the Batalik Sector and this devastating attack left over 100 dead and 50 structures destroyed.

On June 24th, the Enemy Battalion HQ on Tiger Hill top was hit by two Mirage 2000 employing the ‘PAVEWAY’ Laser Guided Bomb (LGB). This was the first operational use on an LGB by the IAF. In another mission on the same day Mirages stuck the same target using dumb bombs. This strike proved to be particularly effective causing severe damage to the enemy. It also gave Indian Army Troops watching from nearby a tremendous morale boost. This mission was witnessed by ACM Tipnis, then officer commanding IAF, who was flying backseat in a another Mirage 2000TH. An IAF spokesperson said at a press conference on the 25th that, ‘ New weapons delivery techniques had been developed by Western Air Command, that had proved very accurate and had caused considerable damage to the enemy positions. They had been effective in achieving the desired results.’ Attacks continued on Tiger Hill, which was heavily defended with man portable Stinger Missiles for several days, during the day and night. After continuous air attacks, the Indian Army recaptured Tiger Hill on the 4th July after an 11-hour night battle.

On the 4th July a strike with dumb bombs was made for the first time on gun positions and a supply camp at Point 4388 in the Dras Sector. These attacks proved to be highly successful and culminated in a serious degradation of the enemy supply chain. The series of attacks on Point 4388 was an excellent example of how lethal airstrikes combined with good recon detected the enemy plans to shift to alternative supply routes, which were then attacked strangling their supply arteries. Follow up attacks were made by Mirages on the 6th July, four aircraft dropping twenty four dumb bombs and on the 10th July, three aircraft dropping fifteen dumb bombs. These attacks broke the enemy resistance and because of the high casualty rate amongst officers, seriously degraded their command and control leading to the overrunning of their position by the Indian Army. In fact by the 9th July the Indian Army had recaptured 99% of the Batalik Sector and 90% of the Dras Sector.

A typical bombing mission would involve 4 Mirages from 7 Squadron loaded with dumb bombs leaving a base in Punjab together with a two seat Mirage loaded with a LGB and Laser Designating pod. This 5 ship would rendezvous with 3 aircraft of 1 Squadron carrying Beyond Visual Range Weapons (Super 530D), operating out of another base. This rendezvous point would change on a mission to mission basis and once joined up, one escort aircraft would return. Once over Jammu and Kashmir they would be joined by Mig29’s giving top cover. These only had 20-minute duration in the area and would usually be supplemented by another pair. Over the target the Mirages with the dumb bombs would visually acquire the target and drop their bombs. The two seater, which would be filming the whole affair from behind, would only use the LGB if required to do so. Only 9 LGB’s were dropped during the whole war, 8 by the Mirage fleet and one by a Jaguar. Normal procedure employed during the dumb bomb attacks was for the aircraft to commence a dive at about 30,000 feet and designate the target at 15 kms distance. At 8 kms distance anything from 6 to 12 bombs would be despatched towards the target. Procedure for a LGB attack would differ in that the target would be acquired at 20 kms distance, designation would occur at 15 kms with release of the weapon at 8.5 kms. The LGB would travel towards the target and the Mirage would turn away still illuminating the target and at point of impact it would be 6 kms away.
Attachments
mirage2000H&Su30.jpg
mirage2000H.jpg
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by Pumpkin » 02 Feb 2005, 22:03

Fantasma337 wrote:The reason is mainly political but that does not mean the B 52+ is not an exceptional system... The main drawback of teh Greek defence procurement is that there is lack of long term planning and that means the fighter purchases are random and subject to financial (FMS) and political factors... There were plans for more M2Ks that never materialised until 1999-2000 when the -5MkIIs were ordered...

HAF photos, including F-16s and M2Ks can be seen here:

http://hafcphotos.cs.net/



Thanks again Fantasma337, the photos are cool.!

It is truly a pity if desired platform was shot down by political ground.

I guess it is not a just statement to make, (again due to politcial factors), but among the Viper operators who also operate the Mirage (UAEAF, ROCAF, HAF), I'm seeing the Viper as their main fighting force and Mirage as the complement. Please correct me if the statement is wrong.

cheers,
Desmond


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by ACSheva » 03 Feb 2005, 00:59

One thing I dont get is why the rear view on the Mirages is so poor. Does any body know the reason for that type of design?

Shev


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