Sale of 32 F-35's to Poland

[mixelflick]

This is fantastic news, and a shining example of how other NATO countries should follow suit (cough, Turkey, cough).

Going from SU-22's and Mig-29's to..... F-35A's. Wow. Talk about culture shock, those poor pilots that are going to transition LOL. In all candor, the Poles deserve it. They have been a model NATO member since joining, going above and beyond in a number of cases. They're hard working people, and have a natural dislike for Russia (which IMO, only makes them work harder at being a good NATO member).

And what a day for LM, as the dominoes continue to fall their way. The F-35 is winning fans worldwide, and as the price drops that's only going to accelerate. Given its sensors, weapons and stealth it should also punch above its weight when the time comes to drop the hammer.

Good for Poland...

[hornetfinn]

SkyCeptor sounds like it is pretty range restricted without a booster. So is it an AMRAAM derived interceptor?

No, it's unique missile AFAIK. Here is the brochure:
https://www.rafael.co.il/wp-content/upl ... Ceptor.pdf

SkyCeptor seems to have option to either have a booster or not and missile itself without booster seems to be close to AMRAAM size.

http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/2019-09-0 ... nse-system.

KIELCE, Poland, Sept. 4, 2019 /PRNewswire/ -- Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) is offering a boosterless version of its SkyCeptor® interceptor to Poland to fulfill the country's Narew short-range and Wisla medium-range air defense requirements.

SkyCeptor defeats short- to medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles and other advanced air defense threats. Raytheon is also offering SkyCeptor with a booster for the second phase of Poland's Wisla air and missile defense program.

Of course it has shorter range than Patriot PAC-2 or similar much larger missiles. It likely has better maneuverability and ability to engage certain targets like UAVs and low altitude targets. It's also likely a lot cheaper than PAC-2 missiles.

[laos]

Going from SU-22's and Mig-29's to..... F-35A's. Wow. Talk about culture shock, those poor pilots that are going to transition LOL.

I don’t expect pilots from Su-22 and MiG-29 to be send to F-35 training.
Pilots from F-16 will go to the USA to train on F-35.

[Corsair1963]

Going from SU-22's and Mig-29's to..... F-35A's. Wow. Talk about culture shock, those poor pilots that are going to transition LOL.

I don’t expect pilots from Su-22 and MiG-29 to be send to F-35 training.
Pilots from F-16 will go to the USA to train on F-35.

Brand new pilots convert right out of flight school. So, why not Su-22 and/or Mig-29 pilots????

[squirrelshoes]

I know a guy who went from A-10 pilot to F-16 pilot in USAF.

I can't imagine why someone can't go from MIG/SU to F-35.

[doge]

This is Arms Sales Notification to Poland.
Is there anything worth noting? It's... almost the SECRET!!!
https://www.federalregister.gov/documen ... tification

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
1. The F-35 Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) Block 4 aircraft is classified SECRET, except as noted below. It contains current technology representing the F-35 low observable airframe/outer mold line, Pratt & Whitney engine, radar, integrated core processor central computer, mission systems/electronic warfare suite, a multiple sensor suite, operational flight and maintenance trainers, technical data/documentation, and associated software. As the aircraft and its subsystems are under development, many specific identifying equipment/system nomenclatures have not been assigned to date. Sensitive and classified elements of the F-35 CTOL Block 4 aircraft include hardware, accessories, components, and associated software for the following major subsystems:

a. The Propulsion system is classified SECRET and contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET. The single 40,000-lb thrust class engine is designed for low observability and has been integrated into the aircraft system. Pratt & Whitney, with the F-135, is developing and producing engine turbo machinery compatible with the F-35 and assures highly reliable, affordable performance. The engine is designed to be utilized in all F-35 variants, providing unmatched commonality and supportability throughout the worldwide base of F-35 users. The CTOL propulsion configuration consists of a main engine, diverterless supersonic inlet, and a Low Observable Axisymmetric Nozzle (LOAN).

b. The AN/APG-81 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) provides mission systems with air-to-air and air-to-ground tracks, which the mission system uses as a component to sensor fusion. The AESA allows the radar to direct RF energy in a way that does not expose the F-35, allowing it to maintain low observability in high-threat environments. The radar subsystem supports integrated system performance for airto-air missions by providing search, track, identification, and AIM-120 missile data link functionality. The radar also provides synthetic aperture radar mapping for locating surface targets and weather mapping for weather avoidance. The radarfunctions are tightly integrated, interleaved, and managed by an interface to sensor management functions within mission software. The hardware and software are classified SECRET.

c. The Electro Optical Targeting System (EOTS) contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET. The EOTS subsystem to the Start Printed Page 68908sensor suite provides long-range detection and tracking, Infrared Search and Track (IRST) capability, a Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor for precision tracking, and Bomb Damage Indication (BDI) capability. EOTS replaces multiple separate internal or podded systems typically found on legacy aircraft. The functionality of the EOTS employs the following modes: Targeting FLIR; Laser Range-Finding and Target Designation; EO DAS and EOTS Performance.

d. The Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS) is a subsystem to the sensor suite and provides full spherical coverage for air-to-air and air-to-ground detection and Navigation Forward Looking Infrared (NFLIR) imaging. The system contains both SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED elements and contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET. The NFLIR capability provides infrared (IR) imagery directly to the pilot's Helmet-Mounted Display (HMD) for navigation in total darkness, including takeoff and landing, and provides a passive IR input to the F-35's sensor fusion algorithms. The all-aspect missile warning function provides time-critical warnings of incoming missiles and cues other subsystems to provide effective countermeasure employment. EODAS also provides an IRST function that can create and maintain Situational Awareness-quality tracks (SAIRST). EODAS is a midwave Infrared (IR) system consisting of six identical sensors distributed around the F-35 aircraft. Each sensor has a corresponding airframe window panel integrated with the aircraft structure to meet aerodynamic and stealth requirements.

e. The Electronic Warfare (EW) system contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET. Sensitive elements include: apertures; radio frequency (RF) and infrared (IR) countermeasures; and Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) techniques and features. The reprogrammable, integrated system provides radar warning and electronic support measures (ESM) along with a fully integrated countermeasures (CM) system. The EW system is the primary subsystem used to enhance situational awareness, targeting support and self-defense through the search, intercept, location and identification of in-band emitters and to automatically counter IR and RF threats. The IR and RF countermeasures are classified SECRET. This system uses low signature-embedded apertures, located in the aircraft control surface edges, to provide direction finding and identification of surface and airborne emitters and the geo location of surface emitters. The system is classified SECRET.

f. The Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence/ communications, Navigation, and Identification (C4I/CNI) system provides the pilot with unmatched connectivity to flight members, coalition forces, and the battlefield. It is an integrated subsystem designed to provide a broad spectrum of secure, antijam, covert voice and data communications, precision radio navigation and landing capability, self-identification, beyond visual range target identification, and connectivity with off-board sources of information. The functionality is tightly integrated within the mission system for enhanced efficiency and effectiveness in the areas of communications, navigation, identification, and sensor fusion. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET. The CNI function includes both SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED elements. Sensitive elements of the CNI subsystems include:

1. The VHF/UHF Voice and Data (Plain and Secure) Communication functionality includes air-to-air UHF/VHF voice and data, both clear and secure, to provide communications with other friendly and coalition aircraft, air-to ground UHF voice to provide communications with ground sites, and intercommunication voice and tone alerts to provide communications between the avionics system and the pilot. UHF/VHF downlink of air vehicle status and maintenance information is provided to notify the ground crews of the amounts and types of stores, fuel, and other supplies or equipment needed to quickly turn the aircraft for the next mission. The system contains both SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED elements and contains technology representing the latest state of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET.

2. The Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) functionality provides operational modes to identify ground station and to provide bearing-to-station, slant range-to ground station, bearing-to-airborne station and slant range to the nearest airborne station or aircraft. TACAN is not unique to the F-35 aircraft but is standard on most U.S. Air Force aircraft. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET.

3. The Identification Friend or Foe Interrogator and Transponder Identification functionality consists of integrated Mark XII Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder capability to provide identification of other friendly forces. The CNI system supports sensor fusion by supplying data from IFF interrogations and offboard sources through the intra-flight data link. The system contains both SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED elements and contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET.

4. The Global Positioning System Navigation functionality includes the Global Positioning System (OPS) aided inertial navigation to provide high-quality positional navigation, and the Instrument Landing System (ILS)/Tactical Air Control and Navigation (TACAN) to provide navigation and landing cues within controlled airspace. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET.

5. The Multi-Function Advanced Data Link (MADL) is used specifically for communications between F-35 aircraft and has a very low probability of intercept, contributing to covert operations. The system contains both SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED elements and contains technology representing the latest stateof-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET.

6. The Inertial Navigation System is an all-attitude, Ring Laser Gyro-based navigation system providing outputs of linear and angular acceleration, velocity, body angular rates, position, altitude (roll, pitch, and platform azimuth), magnetic and true heading, altitude, and time tags. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET.

7. The Radar Altimeter functionality is a module provided in the CNI system rack 3A and uses separate transmit and receive antennae. It measures and reports altitude, and altitude rate of change. Control data is transferred over Start Printed Page 68909to a configurable avionics interface card, which translates the information to the F-35 aircraft computers. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET.

8. The Instrument Landing System (ILS) measures, and reports azimuth course and alignment, elevation course alignment, and distance to the runway. Data from the ILS is used to drive visual flight instrumentation. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET.

9. The Tactical Data Link is a secure broadcast Tactical Digital Information Link (TADIL) used for real-time voice/data exchange for command and control, relative navigation, and Precise Position Location Identification (PPLI), providing Link-16 type capabilities. The system contains both SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED elements and contains technology representing the latest state of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET.

g. The F-35 Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment (ALGS) includes both SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED elements. It provides a fully integrated logistics management solution. ALGS integrates a number of functional areas, including supply chain management, repair, support equipment, engine support, and training. The ALGS infrastructure employs a state-of-the-art information system that provides real-time, decision-worthy information for sustainment decisions by flight line personnel. Prognostic health monitoring technology is integrated with the air system and is crucial to the predictive maintenance of vital components.

h. The F-35 Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) includes both SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED elements. The ALIS provides an intelligent information infrastructure that binds all of the key concepts of ALGS into an effective support system. ALIS establishes the appropriate interfaces among the F-35 Air Vehicle, the warfighter, the training system, government information technology (IT) systems, JSF operations, and supporting commercial enterprise systems. Additionally, ALIS provides a comprehensive tool for data collection and analysis, decision support, and action tracking.

i. The F-35 Training System includes both SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED elements. The Training System includes several types of training devices, to provide for integrated training of both pilots and maintainers. The pilot training device includes a Full Mission Simulator (FMS). The maintainer training devices include an Aircraft Systems Maintenance Trainer (ASMT), Ejection System Maintenance Trainer (ESMT), and Weapons Loading Trainer (WLT). The F-35 Training System can be integrated, where both pilots and maintainers learn in the same Integrated Training Center (ITC). Alternatively, the pilots and maintainers can train in separate facilities (Pilot Training Center and Maintenance Training Center).

j. Weapons employment capability is SECRET and contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET. Sensitive elements include co-operative targeting.

k. Other Subsystems, Features, and Capabilities:

1. The Low Observable Air Frame is SECRET and contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified SECRET. Software (object code) is SECRET. Sensitive elements include: the Radar Cross Section and its corresponding plots, construction materials and fabrication.

2. The Integrated Core Processor (ICP) Central Computer is SECRET and contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is SECRET. Software (object code) is classified SECRET. Sensitive elements include: F-35 Integrated Core Processor utilizing Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Hardware and Module Design to maximize growth and allow for efficient management of DMS and Technology Insertion, if additional processing is needed, a second ICP will be installed in the space reserved for that purpose, more than doubling the current throughput and memory capacity.

3. The F-35 Helmet Mounted Display System (HMDS) is SECRET and contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is SECRET. Software (object code) is SECRET. Sensitive elements include: HMDS consists of the Display Management Computer-Helmet, a helmet shell/display module, a quick disconnect integrated as part of the ejection seat, helmet trackers and tracker processing, day- and night-vision camera functions, and dedicated system/graphics processing. The HMDS provides a fully sunlight readable, bi ocular display presentation of aircraft information projected onto the pilot's helmet visor. The use of a night vision camera integrated into the helmet eliminates the need for separate Night Vision Goggles (NVG). The camera video is integrated with EO and IR imaging inputs and displayed on the pilot's visor to provide a comprehensive night operational capability.

4. The Pilot Life Support System is SECRET and contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is SECRET. Software (object code) is SECRET. Sensitive elements include: a measure of Pilot Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Protection through use of an On-Board Oxygen Generating System (OBOGS); and an escape system that provide additional protection to the pilot. OBOGS takes the Power and Thermal Management System (PTMS) air and enriches it by removing gases (mainly nitrogen) by adsorption, thereby increasing the concentration of oxygen in the product gas and supplying breathable air to the pilot.

5. The Off-Board Mission Support System is SECRET and contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is SECRET. Software (object code) is SECRET. Sensitive elements include: mission planning, mission briefing, maintenance/intelligence/ tactical debriefing, sensor/algorithm planning, EW system reprogramming, data debrief, etc.

l. Publications: Manuals are considered SECRET as they contain information on aircraft/system performance and inherent vulnerabilities.
2. The JSF Reprogramming Center is classified SECRET and contains technology representing the latest state-of-the-art in several areas. This hardware/software facility is located in the United States and provides F-35 customers a means to update JSF electronic warfare databases. Sensitive elements include: EW software databases and tools to modify these databases.
3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.Start Printed Page 68910
4. A determination has been made that Poland can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.
5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of Poland.

[laos]

Brand new pilots convert right out of flight school. So, why not Su-22 and/or Mig-29 pilots????

Basically in Poland we have two groups of MiG-29 pilots.
Experience pilots with 15+ years in Air Force that have acquired the right to retire. It will take circa 4 years to acquire combat ready status in F-35 and right away most will retire. It would be wast of money to send them to USA if handful will transfer to staff duties and most go to fly airlines.
The second group is young pilots who did not qualify for F-16 training due to their talents (or lack thereof) and less then required command of English. Due to technical issues Poland have in recent years to keep MiG-29 in flying conditions and number of accidents due to technical issues greenhorns were flying on average 10-20h/year on MiG-29 and in last 18 months 0 -5 hours.
It is expected that there will be problem with number of training slots in the US. Rumours are that only perspective pilots and perspective commanders will go to then. Those with experience of the F-16.

[Corsair1963]

Poland to Resign from the F-35 Offset to Save USD 1 Billion [EXCLUSIVE]
20 grudnia 2019, 09:16


Polish Ministry of Defence recommended it to the Offset Committee to resign from concluding the offset agreement pertaining to F-35 acquisition within the framework of the Harpia programme - Defence24.pl found out. The proposals submitted by the US partners did not match the Polish requirements and they would entail too high cost - Col. Jacek Najs claims - acting as the Director at the Offset Agreements Bureau of the Polish Ministry of Defence.


The MoD recommends that Poland shall resign from concluding the offset agreement related to the F-35. The final opinion on the matter is to be released after a vote, during the upcoming meeting of the Offset Committee expected in January. Stance adopted by the MoD remains unchanged though. “This will be a new global system of spare parts supply and keeping this aircraft in operations”, explains Major General, Pilot Jacek Pszczoła, the Air Force Inspector and plenipotentiary for acquisition of the new generation fighter aircraft.

“We have presented our recommendation, that is suggesting we should resign from concluding the offset agreement. We want to focus on industry-industry memorandums that shall be signed in the future, similarly as it happened in case of the agreements signed with regards to the Belgian aircraft”, the representatives of Ministry of Defence, told us. “Preliminary talks on that matter have already begun, but at the moment we cannot release any further details for now. Potential conclusion of agreements as such will not be correlated with procurement of the F-35, however, it would happen sooner than later.”

Resigning from the offset is to make it possible to save up more than one billion dollars, however it may also take away the opportunity for the Polish industry to acquire high tech, despite the high level of the fighter-associated expenditure (at least 4 billion dollars).

When asked about the above circumstances, the MoD representatives told us the following: “Proposals that we have received have not been adequately meeting the Polish requirements, furthermore they did not satisfy Poland considering the cost-effect ratio. We should remember the fact that offset does not come without a pricetag. We knew that not being a participant of the F-35 programme it would be much tougher for us to gain capabilities of any sort - be it manufacturing or maintenance - with regards to that aircraft. That chance went away back in 2008 when Poland was offered a chance to join the programme as an observer. However, the proposal in question has been rejected. Should it be otherwise, the position to negotiate would be much stronger today.”

Representatives of the MoD also stress the fact that the recommendation has not been adopted on one side by the Ministry, it has rather been adopted after consultation with the Polish industry, research institutes and the academia.

“It was more or less at the time when the plenipotentiary for the acquisition of the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft was appointed, in March 2019, when the preliminary analysis has begun” – col. Jacek Najs recalls – “We have been working on defining a catalogue of capabilities required from the point of view of the requirements defined by the military within the scope of operating the F-35. The preparatory work, issuing opinions with regards to the potential areas of cooperation or offset took place between May and July, with involvement of the Polish Military, the PGZ Group, military-focused institutes and the academia. And this is how the preliminary scope of commitments has been defined. In the meantime the Americans proposed a scope of maintenance and repair activities. However, as we have noted, their proposals were limited to the level that would be guaranteed anyway, within the framework of the delivery agreement. These were the facilities at the airbase level. Obviously, we came to a conclusion that this does not match our requirements and that we need to look for something else.

Then, we tried to have a look at the offset matter from a broader perspective, perceiving it as a broadly-understood air defence system, reaching beyond the areas related to the jet. At the same time, we could not have left the area directly tied to the F-35 as the offset is not a tool of compensation and, in line with the law, it needs to be directly associated with the subject of acquisition.”

“Having a look at the specifics of the F-35 programme, one needs to say that it is a closed programme. Nine members of the programme have already divided the supplies and manufacturing market. We have a factory in Camari, Italy, where the F-35 is assembled now, with D-level maintenance also expected to be available in the future, up to the factory level. Meanwhile, advanced works on the engine are taking place in the Netherlands. Entering this area would be challenging to say the least. It would not be as cost-effective as expected”, col. Najs said.

The Poles were also considering obtaining capabilities regarding the F-35 logistic support system. However, this is also where modern character of the undertaking has turned out to be an obstacle. “Logistics support system for the F-35 is of specific nature. It very much differs from what we have been experiencing so far. GSS and ALIS systems at the base of the logistics supply chain that have been adopted by the US and by the remaining members of the programme are globally unified - breaking the facade now and establishing maintenance and repair capabilities in Poland, outside the system, would be impossible”, Najs claims.

“This will be a new global system of spare parts supply and keeping this aircraft in operations”, explains Major General, Pilot Jacek Pszczoła, the Air Force Inspector and plenipotentiary for acquisition of the new generation fighter aircraft. “Up until now, when one component broke down in case of the F-16 we were sending it to the US and it was coming back to us, repaired, after some time. And now, with ALIS system in place, monitoring the F-35 system functioning as a whole, it is possible to track any malfunctions in an ongoing manner with the information being sent to the manufacturer in the US. Any malfunctions shall be rectified thus guaranteeing the declared operational availability of the jets. The systems will check which of the warehouses would be best to source the spare. This may be a warehouse in another country - Belgium or the Netherlands. The part will be delivered to us as required. Similarly, our parts would also be sent to other users which would require changes of the Polish legislation. The agreement also guarantees maintenance of the aircraft. The Americans are also obliging themselves to maintain the declared levels of operational availability of those aircraft. This global system for spares is a true novelty”.

The situation in which status info pertaining to parts of the Polish jets is sent to the US and the US-based system decides what parts are needed for the Polish aircraft seems to be worrying though. One needs to ask a question: does it not place Poland in a role of an entity that only operates the aircraft, with all servicing and maintenance being left in the hands of the ally? What degree of decisionmaking will still be available to Poland when it comes to those jets, and what would be the level of independence?

Between August and October talks were in progress with the manufacturers of the main elements of the F-35 - Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney above all. “The procedure assumed that initial talks would take in a form of an offset dialogue also involving the Polish defense industry and research facilities. This has been a modern, innovative method as we could have got acquainted with the potential scope offered by the Americans and compare it with our needs, get acquainted with the quotes and the logistics support system”, Col. Najs said. “We were comparing those proposals with involvement of the Polish industry and with particular attention paid to the ability of the industry to absorb new know-how, as the cost is enormous. Paying a lot for the offset agreement is easy. Here it is all about developing an ability to introduce the new expertise, once the technology is adopted. Here is where further investment on our side would also be required”, Najs added.

The dialogue came to an end during the first week of December. As a result the MoD decided to recommend that Poland shall resign from concluding the offset agreement. The MoD representatives list three main causes here: innovative nature of the F-35 technology (that could not be acquired by Poland, for a myriad of reasons), existing supply chain that is fixed and lack of ability to join the F-35 programme, as Poland has not been involved in this initiative earlier on. No details have been disclosed - as this stems from the confidentiality clause applied by the US enterprises.

What can Poland do now?

Initially Lockheed Martin wanted to invest money in the PZL Mielec facility. Nonetheless, using a solution as such is impossible, within the framework of the Polish law. The Americans were also to propose enhancement of maintenance capabilities available domestically, pertaining to enhancement of maintenance-related know-how with regards to C-130 and F-16.

“The scope proposed by the US did not fit well within the areas defined by us, serving the purpose of protecting the basic national security interest. We could look for alternative solutions, but we also took into account the EU, its restrictive approach to offset and its application. Offset, and its scope, must overlap the framework of the master agreement. One cannot acquire abilities pertaining to production or maintenance of warships - like it was suggested by some here in Poland - when signing an agreement concerning aircraft. When it comes to the amount - more than 1 billion dollars - required to cover the offset, this is too little. We wanted, above all, to gain manufacturing capabilities - initially with regards to the F-35, and then, at further stages of the dialogue, with regards to the F-16 and C-130. The proposal we have received concerned, primarily, the maintenance capacity regarding the F-16 and the C-130.

We have come to a conclusion that non-offset industrial cooperation would be a better solution here. These memorandums seem to be a better solution due to a greater flexibility of the relationship in the business domain and a greater scope of possible agreements, conclusion date and the timeline. Meanwhile, we have some areas where the billion saved could be put into use. The Technical Modernization Plan envisages huge necessities.”, Col. Najs said.

It is also too early, as we Defence24.pl has found out, to hope for benefits stemming from the fact that Turkey would no longer be a part of the F-35 program. The Americans are aware that should they keep some competencies away from the Turks, they could be sued. They do not want to burden others with those ramifications, as placing another state within the supply chain could result in a greater fluctuation. Turkey is still manufacturing parts for the aircraft. Theoretically Ankara still has some time to take a step back while the Turkish contracts are to be a subject to work at least until March 2020. However, the Pentagon claims that it has found alternative sources for majority of the “Turkish” parts already. Pushing Turkey out of the programme completely is the move that could result in transfer of some manufacturing know-how to Poland. However, this could not be associated with the offset agreement that would accompany the procurement deal that Poland would sign - this document is to be concluded in early 2020.

Responding to our question whether acquisition of the F-35 should be dependent on prior or parallel establishment of airbase defence capabilities, General Pszczoła placed an emphasis on the huge range of needs needs emerging in the Polish military: “Today we have three fully capable squadrons, plus two MiG-29 squadrons and a single Su-22 squadron. MiG-s are very good in QRA duty while Su-22 is good for training, JTAC training in particular. However, both platforms are not well suited for effective operations during a contemporary conflict. We have those aircraft and human resources however, gathered at three bases. It would be easy to have them disbanded, but recovering this potential could take years or even decades. I am not saying that this is the most important argument for keeping those aircraft alive, but this is how life is. Thus the US still operates the A-10, not to mention the B-52”, Pszczoła said.

“Situation that we could have witnessed this year, with regards to the MiG-29, was a factor that accelerated the Harpia programme and made us go towards a 5th generation aircraft. This is the first time since the end of the War when we stand a chance of becoming a part of a club elite, globally. I agree that it would be best to upgrade everything, but our resources are limited, and something needs to be picked as opposed to some other thing, there is no golden mean here. I am responsible for the air force as an element of the air defence system. We have Wisła, Harpia is coming and medium and short range air defence systems are planned to be developed. We are, as a whole organism, placed within the NATO system”, Pszczoła stressed.

Future F-35 deals associated with the jet and the Polish industry are to be in line with the requirements of the Polish military also being beneficial for the Polish industry. At the same time the MoD does not want to impose limitations on the businesses, so that they can still carry out their activities in an overt manner. In reality, all options have been placed on the table. One can risk stating that they may emerge regardless of whether Warsaw acquires the F-35A or not.

Jędrzej Graf, Maciej Szopa, cooperation: Jakub Palowski


The Offset Committee is a consulting/advisory body working alongside the Polish Ministry of Defence, in line with the new Offset Act law, adopted in 2014. The committee involves representatives of the President, PM, Minister responsible for budget, Minister responsible for economy, Minister responsible for higher education and science, Minister responsible for internal affairs, Minister responsible for foreign affairs, President at the Public Procurement Office, President of the Polish Prosecutor General Office and heads of the Internal Security Agency, National Security Bureau and Military Counterintelligence. In case of a procedure aimed at procurement, when it is carried out in line with a procedure of negotiating the agreement with a single foreign supplier (as in case of the F-35), the offset agreement procedure is defined by the head of the MoD following an opinion of the Offset Committee.

https://www.defence24.com/poland-to-res ... g.facebook

[mixelflick]

So.... this means no F-35's for Poland?

If so, that's really too bad. If they were going to put any $ toward any weapons system, it should be the F-35. I have a sinking feeling the powers that be over there simply view it as a stealthy F-16. It's so much more than that, but that's hard to demonstrate. LM PR machine really needs to kick into high gear, as losing a sale like this is really unfortunate.

[lbk000]

As I comprehend it, basically Poland will get F-35s, but is choosing to decline further involvement in the program on the backend side because they're not well positioned to recoup the cost of the investment -- they acknowledge they've arrived too late to the party.

[ricnunes]

As I comprehend it, basically Poland will get F-35s, but is choosing to decline further involvement in the program on the backend side because they're not well positioned to recoup the cost of the investment -- they acknowledge they've arrived too late to the party.

Exactly! From what I understand the Poles are "giving away" any offsets that they or more precisely, their industry could win by buying the F-35.
Like lbk000 mentioned the Poles don't think they will have much of a chance getting much work on the F-35 ("offsets") specially when having to compete against JSF partner nations (work that could compensate the extra fee that Poland would have to pay for those same "offsets") even because back in 2008 Poland was given the chance to participate (as an "observer") on the F-35 program which was declined by Poland at that time.

Other from that, the Poles still want (or seem to want) to buy the F-35.

[Corsair1963]

As I comprehend it, basically Poland will get F-35s, but is choosing to decline further involvement in the program on the backend side because they're not well positioned to recoup the cost of the investment -- they acknowledge they've arrived too late to the party.

Exactly! From what I understand the Poles are "giving away" any offsets that they or more precisely, their industry could win by buying the F-35.
Like lbk000 mentioned the Poles don't think they will have much of a chance getting much work on the F-35 ("offsets") specially when having to compete against JSF partner nation (work that could compensate the extra fee that Poland would have to pay for those same "offsets") even because back in 2008 Poland was given the chance to participate (as an "observer") on the F-35 program which was declined by Poland at that time.

Other from that, the Poles still want (or seem to want) to buy the F-35.

Yes, either way Poland is still getting the F-35....

[mixelflick]

As I comprehend it, basically Poland will get F-35s, but is choosing to decline further involvement in the program on the backend side because they're not well positioned to recoup the cost of the investment -- they acknowledge they've arrived too late to the party.

Exactly! From what I understand the Poles are "giving away" any offsets that they or more precisely, their industry could win by buying the F-35.
Like lbk000 mentioned the Poles don't think they will have much of a chance getting much work on the F-35 ("offsets") specially when having to compete against JSF partner nations (work that could compensate the extra fee that Poland would have to pay for those same "offsets") even because back in 2008 Poland was given the chance to participate (as an "observer") on the F-35 program which was declined by Poland at that time.

Other from that, the Poles still want (or seem to want) to buy the F-35.

Funny in that Poland isn't an F-35 partner nation, but wants and will get the F-35. Yet Canada is an F-35 partner nation, and balked at getting the F-35. And as clear cut a winner as it is, there's still no guarantee they won't pull bonehead move #2, and instead orders 2nd hand F-14's from Iran

[magitsu]

Imo it just means that their offset demand would end up costing the Polish government more than it's worth.

EU rules don't even allow old type of offsets. They need to be industrial partnerships based on national security needs. For example when Finland bought Hornets it was still allowed to include totally unrelated activities as offsets, such as a symphony orchestra visiting the US. It's good that we don't need these kind of bogus political work allocations anymore to push projects through.

So maybe Poland needed to explore the things up to this point and can now declare convincingly to the public that it's not worthwhile.

[notkent]

The Poland offsets for the PATRIOT SAM started even before Poland has fully agreed to buy the Patriot. In 2014 Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) announced today that it will partner with Bumar Elektronika on the design and development of a modernized Patriot Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) antenna. This new antenna is a key element of the advanced Patriot 360 degree radar proposed by Raytheon for Poland's medium-range air and missile defense system program named "WISLA." The component will also be compatible with previous Patriot configurations, allowing for future upgrades of the existing worldwide Patriot radar fleet.

https://www.prnewswire.com/news-release ... 23101.html

Essential interests of State security are mentioned at least seven times in the act directly or in reference to the Article 346 of the European Treaty. The conclusion is clear – the essential interests of the state security are the key to understood offset and interpret the new offset law.

Don't know if most offsets take into account the 30/70 rule or are just based on the initial cost to acquire systems.

30/70 - 30% is paid when purchasing, the remaining 70% - throughout the life cycle of the equipment - usually 20-30 years.
This is why companies fight so hard to be primes on contracts, the money flow lasts much longer.