JASDF F-35A crashed

[steve2267]

Still... even if the gizmo was working, and he was able to keep the shiny side up... a (near) complete loss of all the other squirrels, in the soup like that, is nothing to sneeze at. Though he apparently still had comms... it sounded like his navaids were all tango uniform too. Successfully recovering from all that would have been hairy.

I lost all electrical once on base for Dayton Int'l at night. It was bad enough the family was all aboard. At least it wasn't in the soup.

[spazsinbad]

Is AutoGCAS not a player here? What is the pilot initiated automatic recovery system? The more things change, the more they stay the same.

Assuming the pilot had the backup AI in the upper right corner of the cockpit, and it was battery powered... I think your earlier comments are spot on....

Steve, there was confusion because of the SD caused by two AIs giving conflicting information when the pilot was trying to cope. Please read the quotes from the accident report or the report itself. Pilot was close to the ground (seeing the trees twice) & disorientated trying to get re-orientated however the SD has an agenda of its own. We have referred earlier to 'recognised SD but no time/altitude to recover'. This is one of those situations with Backup AI Battery Powered or not.

I did not see this mentioned in my speed reading of the report however this illusion may have played a part to bolster SD.
[quote]"...Somatogravic illusions
There are three versions of the somatogravic illusion. Both involve the body’s inability to distinguish pitch changes from acceleration.
1. The leans
This common illusion is a false sensation of roll. It gets its name because pilots lean to one side in order to cancel out the false sensation. Leaning your body is the right way to counter the leans; rolling your aircraft is the wrong response. The leans often happen when a pilot looks down at a map, radio or instruments, and the aircraft goes into a gentle, banked turn that is too slow for the vestibular system to detect. Typically, the pilot looks up, and corrects the bank. But because this correction is fast enough to be felt by the inner ear, visual and vestibular information get out of sync and the leans occur. This illusion can occur in good visual flight conditions.…" viewtopic.php?f=22&t=55255&p=421784&hilit=condition#p421784

[outlaw162]

Spaz,

You're the kinda of guy I would want on my AIB.

Steve,

I don't think the super squirrel powered the standby AI (don't remember), but the aircraft battery was theoretically good for at least 30 minutes of battery bus power IIRC.

Dayton Intl the Ohio Triangle

edit: forgot to mention the obvious for the electrics, the hydrazine, but when I had a generator oil line come loose, the hydrazine fired up momentarily and then quit. Coming off the range in clear wx. Approach end arrestment at TUS.

[spazsinbad]

I AM THAT GUY "IF IN DOUBT - PUNCH OUT" and consider this paleo-otholitico illusion0 - remember pilot just TO in cloud.

""...2.1.1 The somatogravic illusion
The somatogravic illusion is also known by various other descriptive terms, such as the dark night take-off illusion, the pitch-up illusion and the inversion illusion (Benson, 1988a; Buley & Spelina, 1970; Campbell & Bagshaw, 2002; Gillingham & Previc, 1996; Lane, 1958). At the heart of this illusion is a strong sensation of pitching up during aircraft acceleration, as would be experienced during take-off. The illusion generally occurs in conditions of poor visual cues, such as night operations or instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). During a take-off in such conditions, the vestibular system (in particular, the otolith organs) will accurately register the linear acceleration involved in the take-off process. However, in the absence of visual information that would confirm the actual flight path of the aircraft, the brain instead assumes that the linear acceleration is in fact a pitch up event. The unwitting pilot then pushes forward on the control column, in order to cancel out the sensation of too much pitch up, and to achieve a feeling of normal pitch. This manoeuvre then results in a pitching down of the aircraft, and since this illusion generally occurs during a low altitude setting with takeoff, the inherent risk is that the aircraft is flown into the ground...." https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/29971/b20070063.pdf

[Gamera]

https://flyteam.jp/news/article/124987

2020/05/25

Aomori Prefecture, Misawa AB, JASDF has 17 F-35A.
From late 2019, Auto GCAS is gradually added to them as software upgrades.

During fiscal year 2020, Misawa AB will equip four more F-35A, with Auto GCAS already installed.

[spazsinbad]

AUTiO GCASio reportedio hereio firstio 23rdio Mayio 2020io: viewtopic.php?f=22&t=55257&p=440223&hilit=GCAS#p440223

[spazsinbad]

Recent example of a fatal SD F-15 crash. https://www.airforcemag.com/investigati ... -15-crash/

Report: https://www.airforcemag.com/app/uploads ... SIGNED.pdf (2.8Mb)

[spazsinbad]

RONG PLACE - RONG TIME - go here for video commented upon below? viewtopic.php?f=22&t=56999&p=446912&hilit=anal%2A#p446912

[outlaw162]

A lot of 'that could happen to anybody' platitudes.

Maybe USAF needs to go back to night overheads where you have to keep track of the aircraft basic flight parameters and actually (gasp) manually move the throttle.

This wasn't a child of the 'magenta line' problem, this is a whole service of the 'magenta line'.

BTW: this wasn't the JASDF accident.

[spazsinbad]

OOPS - wrong trousers - I'll have to get my GEEEE suit refitted.

[spazsinbad]

Recent example of a fatal SD F-15 crash. https://www.airforcemag.com/investigati ... -15-crash/

Report: https://www.airforcemag.com/app/uploads ... SIGNED.pdf (2.8Mb)

Another look at this fatal SD accident in 2 page PDF attached.

Spatial disorientation cited in fatal Lakenheath F-15C accident
April 2021 AirForces Monthly

"...The MP [mishap pilot] performed a descending left turn through IMC [instrument meteorological conditions] toward the south, lowering the MA [mishap aircraft] pitch attitude to 42º low and varying from 21º to 107º of left bank angle. The MP sustained 0.3 to 3.8 gravitational (G) forces throughout the manoeuvre and accelerated to 579 KTAS, with a maximum vertical velocity of 38,800ft per minute descent. The MP breached the briefed training floor of 4,000ft and, at approximately 1,000ft, he manoeuvred the MA to nearly wings-level and pulled 8.2 G-forces in an apparent attempt to recover the MA above the water. The MA impacted the water at 10º pitch low, 4º of left bank and 566KTAS. There was no evidence that the MP had attempted to eject from the MA.

The Accident Investigation Board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the cause of the mishap was the MP’s fixation on his intercept of the AA [exercise adversary aircraft] and failure to execute cockpit instrument visual scans when the MP encountered IMC. Reduced visibility and the lack of a discernible horizon for the MP resulted in him suffering spatial disorientation. The inability of the MP to accurately sense the pitch attitude of the MA due to the aforementioned spatial disorientation substantially contributed to the MA’s undesirable low pitch attitude, rapidly descending altitude and the resulting mishap."

Source: April 2021 AirForces Monthly Magazine April 2021 #397

[steve2267]

For the experienced fast jet jockeys here, can you explain what happens to the mind when this level of SD occurs? Does the pilot disregard the attitude reference lines in the HUD? Is the SD sensation so strong that the mind simply disregards the attitude lines as not possibly being correct and simply filters them out? Or in this case does target fixation cause the HUD / instrument scan to break down and he did not realize until too late (e.g. 1000' AGL -- "oh sh*t!" -- roll wings level and pull)?

[quicksilver]

Spacial D is a complex topic and I haven’t read the report in detail. However, it sounds like this gent had some target fixation and (as you suggest) was late recognizing the reality — with fatal consequences.

I don’t know anyone who hasn’t experienced some degree of SD. It varies by degree and circumstance, and can be recognized or unrecognized, with consequences from ‘nothing’ to fatal.

Sometimes it takes an enormous degree of mental discipline to believe the instruments when all or most of the physiological contributors to one’s spacial orientation are ‘telling’ you that the instruments are wrong. And, those moments when you are forcing yourself to believe or reorienting yourself to the spatial reality are often gobbling up the reaction time you have available to save yourself and/or your rocket ship from unrecoverable consequences.

[steve2267]

QS, copy. Thank you.

When I read above -42° angle, +500kts, and 38000+ fpm descent rate, I said that's no bueno. Very little time to recognize & recover.

[spazsinbad]

IIRC some pilots have described their notable SD experiences. I have described a night catapult disorientation in the South China Sea wayback in the dreamtime. There was no HUD to distract me - the sensation was powerful - exacerbated by the physical experience of the catapult on my inner ear - it took all my will power to look down at the ABBAJABBA (A4G all attitude indicator) to fly wings level climbing and to do JUST THAT and talk to the fighter controller to say I was doing it.

A night babblejumble thread with a great story about recovering from night SD in an A4G: viewtopic.php?f=22&t=27792&p=310503&hilit=Siebert#p310503

A4G Night Bombing Siebert Touchdown_August_2015 PRN pp2.pdf download/file.php?id=22227 {260Kb PDF}

NIGHT DIVE BOMBING aye caramba! I was on an earlier OFS where we did not do this part, later however I carried out ONE night dive bombing with parachute flares dropped from the lead aircraft (promoter of sortie our new AWI) CRIKEY! The swinging shadows from the cliff chasms at the Beecroft Range on seaward side were definitely DISORIENTING during dive.