JASDF F-35A crashed

[spazsinbad]

Simulator fidelity is actually kind of interesting. If you do motion base you really have to get it right, because otherwise there's a disconnect between what you see, what you feel, and what you've experienced. So, in many cases a fixed-base desktop simulator is better than a motion-base simulator unless the latter is particularly high fidelity.

Heheh. Never thought of that at all (because I have not been in any military/civilian simulator) and it makes sense. Nice.

[outlaw162]

....unless the latter is particularly high fidelity.

The crux of the matter.

The challenge of training in a modern Level D 6-axis motion box is to avoid training indiscriminately, but to identify where potential negative training effects may hide....and not attempt, much less credit that particular area of training for qualification.

Sims getting better, with higher levels of fidelity, to the point of drivers missing out on some of the initial satisfaction and ego stoking of checking out in the actual aircraft, particularly the single-seat only models. Of course if one flys the F-35, the ego is built in. I wonder if a cold beer tastes as good after a day in the sim?

[quicksilver]

“Of course if one flys the F-35, the ego is built in.”

Really? How many do you know?

[outlaw162]

edit: You know, I've never been in a fighter squadron where ego wasn't pervasive, plus a little flamboyance at times. I really don't think a humble, self-sacrificing group of fighter pilots is preferable.

[inst]

'inst' said above: "Put another way, the JASDF increased SD training afterwards. So is this a "duck and cover" maneuver like they taught in the 1950s in the event of a nuclear war? I'm familiar with SD in the terms of the JFK Jr. crash, but in that event, JFK Jr. wasn't instrument-rated. From the descriptions online, some forms of SD are recoverable, some forms are not. There's always going to be a risk, but skilled and trained pilots have less risk."

Not unreasonable to increase training for SD given the recent accident - note that was not done in secret either. How 'duck & cover' gets into this discussion I'm flabbergasted - please explain - I was a school kid when this advice was in vogue with a partly demolished air raid shelter in my playground (being about nine years old I thought it might be OK).

Now we go really off the reservation with a non-instrument rated pilot suffering SD in cloud? in a single engine prop A/C?

Yes for sure skilled pilots have less risk to recover from RECOGNISED SD - however if the SD is unrecognised then chances for recovery are slim - depending on other flight conditions, altitude/airspeed/flight attitude - when recovery initiated.

The duck and cover comparison is in reference to theater, i.e, JASDF implemented increased SD training to make it seem like they're dealing with the incident, when in reality their response only spends money and does nothing.

There's also the issue that the pilot called "knock it off" to abort the training mission, and the claim right now is SD, not a stroke or a heart attack, i.e, in this case, it was recognized SD, not unrecognized SD. Perhaps if the pilot had more hours in the F-35 they would have had been able to recover.

[spazsinbad]

'inst' said above: "Put another way, the JASDF increased SD training afterwards. So is this a "duck and cover" maneuver like they taught in the 1950s in the event of a nuclear war? I'm familiar with SD in the terms of the JFK Jr. crash, but in that event, JFK Jr. wasn't instrument-rated. From the descriptions online, some forms of SD are recoverable, some forms are not. There's always going to be a risk, but skilled and trained pilots have less risk."

Not unreasonable to increase training for SD given the recent accident - note that was not done in secret either. How 'duck & cover' gets into this discussion I'm flabbergasted - please explain - I was a school kid when this advice was in vogue with a partly demolished air raid shelter in my playground (being about nine years old I thought it might be OK). Now we go really off the reservation with a non-instrument rated pilot suffering SD in cloud? in a single engine prop A/C? Yes for sure skilled pilots have less risk to recover from RECOGNISED SD - however if the SD is unrecognised then chances for recovery are slim - depending on other flight conditions, altitude/airspeed/flight attitude - when recovery initiated.

The duck and cover comparison is in reference to theater, i.e, JASDF implemented increased SD training to make it seem like they're dealing with the incident, when in reality their response only spends money and does nothing. There's also the issue that the pilot called "knock it off" to abort the training mission, and the claim right now is SD, not a stroke or a heart attack, i.e, in this case, it was recognized SD, not unrecognized SD. Perhaps if the pilot had more hours in the F-35 they would have had been able to recover.

Earlier there is an English/Google translation of Japanese Language accident report with another follow up, links below:

viewtopic.php?f=22&t=55255&p=421486&hilit=report#p421486
&
viewtopic.php?f=22&t=55255&p=425006&hilit=report#p425006

I'd forgotten about this 'vHUD F-35 HMDS front view factoid' viewtopic.php?f=22&t=55255&p=416654&hilit=report#p416654
"...F-35 pilots report that in about 10 minutes they become accustomed to the vHUD…."

From the first URL above 'Dragon029' comments upon report:

"...In short, the F-35A had just killed 2 targets during air-to-air training and had radioed "21 (his aircraft code), 2 kills". A US military aircraft (type not disclosed) was flying nearby at 37,000ft however, so air traffic control orders the F-35A to descend to increase separation. The pilot replies with "Yes. Roger that" but is now in a slight left turn and has a serious descent rate (around 820ft/s). About 20 seconds later, ground control asks him to further separate by performing a left turn, to which the pilot changes heading by about 100 degrees and replies calmly with a "Yes, Knock it off". At this point he's at about 15,500ft and still descending. For the next 15 seconds the jet is descending at about 1000ft/s (factoring in his horizontal velocity he would have been travelling at near Mach 1), up until radar / data link contact is lost at <1000ft from the surface and the plane hits the water moments later.

Because the pilot was awake and replied with "Yes, knock it off" in a calm manner after that left turn (and didn't communicate anything else), the Japanese MoD believes that it was spatial disorientation and not G-LOC or a problem with the jet's engine, controls or electrical systems in general. That said, they will be educating their pilots on G-LOC and performing special inspections on the jets just in case (a false instrument reading might possibly resulted in the spatial disorientation)." viewtopic.php?f=22&t=55255&p=421486&hilit=report#p421486

So please be patient whilst I find the very good graphic showing the vertical flight path. [now below] Otherwise from previous comments IMHO the disagree-er speculates that JASDF just does things to save face. The disagree-er has no understanding of flight safety (especially in Western/English speaking cultures flying western miljets). The USN during WWII started the modern flight safety culture which is always improving - relying upon the honesty of all involved. Sure there are exceptions but this disagree-er provides no evidence for postulating JASDF is just a KABUKIshow. No money was wasted or is ever wasted in training pilots about all kinds of safety issues/reminders/safety stand downs.

Disagree-er said: "...Perhaps if the pilot had more hours in the F-35 they would have had been able to recover." RONG. You have again completely ignored evidence provided by many reports about SD particularly for milfastjet pilots, especially at night or in instrument flying conditions. IF the SD is unrecognised - as it seems to be in this case - the pilot had no chance to recover - this is the insidious nature of SPATIAL DISORIENTATION - a 3,000 hour pilot knows how to recover but if he does not know that he needs to recover because of SD - then he does not - and he dies - end of story.

Graphic from 'Dragon029' PDF at link above: [image] download/file.php?id=30641

[rheonomic]

IF the SD is unrecognised - as it seems to be in this case - the pilot had no chance to recover - this is the insidious nature of SPATIAL DISORIENTATION - a 3,000 hour pilot knows how to recover but if he does not know that he needs to recover because of SD - then he does not - and he dies - end of story.

Well said.

[spazsinbad]

The Disorient Express - Despite the best training & technology, why do pilots still die from not knowing which end is up?
Sep 2008 Tom LeCompte [This is a long article best read at source]

"On June 26, 2007, while on a training exercise off the Oregon coast, Major Gregory D. Young of the Air National Guard flew his F-15A fighter into the Pacific Ocean. The $32 million aircraft was destroyed and the pilot killed. There was no distress call, no attempt to eject, and no apparent aircraft malfunction. Young, 34, had 2,300 hours of flight time, more than 750 hours of it in F-15s.

As investigators sifted through the wreckage—what little was left—colleagues, family, and friends were left to wonder: What caused Young to guide his airplane right into the ocean at more than 600 mph? The answer, revealed in an investigative report two months later, was both profoundly unsettling and all too familiar. Young, in the prosaic terminology of the report, “experienced unrecognized (Type 1) spatial disorientation (SD), which caused him to misperceive his attitude, altitude, and airspeed. As a result, [he] was clearly unaware of his position and impacted the water.” In other words: Young never knew what hit him....

...A U.S. Air Force review of 633 crashes between 1980 and 1989 showed that spatial disorientation was a factor in 13 percent, resulting in 115 deaths. Among crashes of high-performance aircraft, the rate was higher: 25 to 30 percent. A U.S. Navy study found that in contrast to general aviation accidents, a majority of accidents in high-performance aircraft occurred in daylight and in visual flight conditions. The pilots were an average of 30 years old, with 10 years in the cockpit and 1,500 hours of pilot-in-command or instructor time, and in the prior three months they had flown an average of 25 times—all of which shows that no amount of expertise, training, or experience immunizes against spatial disorientation....

...Rogers Shaw, a director at the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute in Oklahoma City, admits that training exercises such as unusual-attitude recovery are limited by the fact that the student knows and expects to have to make a correction to return the airplane to straight-and-level flight. Spatial disorientation is so insidious, and the sensations it creates so compelling, that unless you suspect you have a problem, you would never know there is one. Unlike other airborne emergencies—an engine quitting, loss of electrical power, smoke in the cockpit—there’s no principal event to indicate anything is wrong. If the pilot does realize something is not quite right, he may react too late, or in a way that aggravates the situation. Or, as in the case of Major Young, the pilot may not react at all.

The crash of John F. Kennedy Jr. on the night of July 16, 1999, off the island of Martha’s Vineyard, which killed him, his wife, and her sister, brought public attention to the consequences of spatial disorientation. The investigation of an air crash, says Richard Bunker of the Massachusetts Aeronautical Commission, who investigated the Kennedy crash for the state, is a process of elimination. You start with the airplane. After eliminating structural or mechanical problems, you look at external factors, such as weather.

Then the investigation turns to the pilot. You examine his or her training and experience, medical history, personal life, and possible extenuating factors. Eventually, Bunker says, the evidence and the circumstances point to “well, maybe we’re looking at spatial disorientation.” Kennedy did not have an instrument rating. He was flying at night over water with visibility as low as three miles in haze, meaning there were few lights and no visual horizon for reference. About 10 miles from Martha’s Vineyard, he deviated from course and made a number of maneuvers suggesting he was lost or disoriented. The final radar track showed the airplane in a tightening right-hand turn—called a graveyard spiral—that reached a descent rate exceeding 4,700 feet per minute before the airplane hit the water.

In the case of Major Young, it was all over in less than a minute.…

...Young, call sign Grumpy One, flew the lead aircraft in a formation of two F-15s in a combat exercise against two F/A-18s over the Pacific Ocean, about 50 miles west of Cape Arch, Oregon. The visibility was 10 miles or greater, with the horizon discernible in all directions.

While Young’s wingman, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Fitzgerald, call sign Grumpy Two, engaged the two F/A-18s, Cowboy One and Two, Young began a climbing right turn that peaked at 18,800 feet, then began descending in the direction of his wingman and the other two aircraft.

As he did so, Cowboy Two, having maneuvered into position behind Grumpy Two, radioed over a common frequency monitored by all the pilots that he had “killed” one of the two F-15s. By now, Young’s descent rate had nearly doubled, to 30,000 feet per minute, and he was nearing 5,000 feet—a floor set for the exercise to allow for a margin of safety; at that altitude, Young should have broken off the engagement. Eight seconds later, Young’s airplane hit the water. Young’s wingman told investigators that all he saw was “a big white splash that reminded me of Niagara Falls.”...

...With the airplane’s flight data recorder also destroyed, investigators were limited to reconstructing the flight path using radar tracking data, videotapes of the other airplanes’ head-up displays (which project critical flight information on a transparent display above the instrument panel), and data from their flight recorders, in addition to the testimony of the other pilots. Investigators determined that Young’s airplane hit the water at an angle of 24 degrees at a speed of 630 mph.

The report says that Young’s helmet showed he was sitting head-up, indicating he was likely conscious at the time of impact. Analysis further suggested Young was looking up and slightly to the right, not at the ocean in front of him, at his head-up display, or at his instruments. His G-suit was not fully inflated, indicating that he was not pulling significant Gs to arrest his descent.

Increasingly, the evidence pointed to spatial disorientation.

As Young went from climb to descent in his final maneuver, he would have been susceptible to a somatogravic illusion making his dive angle seem much shallower than it actually was. He may, in fact, have thought he was inverted. The fact that his rate of descent increased significantly in the final seconds indicates that Young “may have even believed he was climbing in the final moments, although he was actually still descending,” the investigators’ report said...." [This is a long article best read at source]

Source: https://www.airspacemag.com/military-av ... 74780/?all

[inst]

Since we've gotten very argumentative, I think it's good to point out where we agree and disagree.

Where we agree:

-Pilots of any experience can suffer SD, and if it's undiscovered, it's usually fatal in a way independent of pilot skill.

Where we disagree:

-Did the Japanese F-35 accident occur due to recognized or unrecognized SD?

There are many other points, but most of them hinge on recoginzed vs unrecognized SD.

I think spazinbad's rebuttal is mostly extraneous, because he has been repeating the same points repeatedly and treating me as though I'm ignorant of SD. The only relevant element is the diagram he's shown of the late JASDf pilot's final flight trajectory. It is fairly obvious from the diagram that the pilot, until the last moment (see the small horizontal swerve), had unrecognized SD due to the straight flight path. Another factor is his last words; in reply to further instructions from ground control, he said roughly "affirmative, cancel the exercise".

One simple and easy proof, however, would be a statement by the Japanese Defense Minister:

""We believe it highly likely," Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya explained to reporters Monday, "the pilot was suffering from vertigo or spatial disorientation and wasn't aware of his condition. It can affect any pilot regardless of their experience." The 41-year-old major had over 3,200 flight hours, including 60 hours on the F-35, under his belt at the time of the crash."

https://taskandpurpose.com/japanese-f35-crash-pacific

[spazsinbad]

"...Where we disagree: - Did the Japanese F-35 accident occur due to recognized or unrecognized SD? There are many other points, but most of them hinge on recoginzed vs unrecognized SD.

I think spazinbad's rebuttal [which one?] is mostly extraneous, because he has been repeating the same points repeatedly and treating me as though I'm ignorant of SD. [Yep you come across as completely so] The only relevant element is the diagram he's shown of the late JASDf pilot's final flight trajectory. It is fairly obvious from the diagram that the pilot, until the last moment (see the small horizontal swerve), had unrecognized SD due to the straight flight path. Another factor is his last words; in reply to further instructions from ground control, he said roughly "affirmative, cancel the exercise".

One simple and easy proof, however, would be a statement by the Japanese Defense Minister [I thought you were proposing a 'Japanese coverup for incompetence & to save face'?]: ""We believe it highly likely," Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya explained to reporters Monday, "the pilot was suffering from vertigo or spatial disorientation and wasn't aware of his condition. It can affect any pilot regardless of their experience." The 41-year-old major had over 3,200 flight hours, including 60 hours on the F-35, under his belt at the time of the crash." https://taskandpurpose.com/japanese-f35-crash-pacific

Well blow me down - the only point of contention is 'recognised/unrecognised SD'. Are you suggesting (but not stating) that the 'horizontal swerve' indicates the pilot recognised the SD at the 'last moment'? As has been suggested sometimes there is no time nor space to recover despite 'recognition at the last moment'.

As for being relevant - you are the one bringing up KENNEDY and that WAS NOT relevant in any way except as an example of fatal SD. I managed to find an example of a fatal F-15 unrecognised SD along with KENNEDY, I oughta be congratulated.

[spazsinbad]

So as to NOT re-invent reality as per 'inst' from own words above: "...It is fairly obvious from the diagram that the pilot, until the last moment (see the small horizontal swerve), had unrecognized SD due to the straight flight path...." So as to NOT imply anything else below is a quote from attached JASDF report (PRNed reprinted into two pages for easy reading).

10 Jun 2019 JASDF Office of Air & Space Bureau Report: "...Even at low altitudes no recovery maneuver was seen, so it is presumed that the pilot had fallen into "spatial disorientation" (a state of losing balance), and is highly likely that the pilot was not aware of it...." download/file.php?id=30639

Then it may or may not be interesting to ponder how much time/altitude an F-35A might need to recover from this dive.

[Gamera]

https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2019100800829&g=pol

Tuesday, 2019/10/08:
Japanese government decides to award 'The Order of the Rising Sun, Gold and Silver Rays' medal to pilot, Major [posthumous Lieutenant Colonel] Hosomi Akinori (41).

[inst]

So as to NOT re-invent reality as per 'inst' from own words above: "...It is fairly obvious from the diagram that the pilot, until the last moment (see the small horizontal swerve), had unrecognized SD due to the straight flight path...." So as to NOT imply anything else below is a quote from attached JASDF report (PRNed reprinted into two pages for easy reading).

10 Jun 2019 JASDF Office of Air & Space Bureau Report: "...Even at low altitudes no recovery maneuver was seen, so it is presumed that the pilot had fallen into "spatial disorientation" (a state of losing balance), and is highly likely that the pilot was not aware of it...." download/file.php?id=30639

Then it may or may not be interesting to ponder how much time/altitude an F-35A might need to recover from this dive.

spazinbad, we've agreed on the subject of whether it was recognized or unrecognized SD in your favor. My other arguments fall flat because the point of evidence is removed.

If you want to know my tilt, it's that given my ethnic background (ethnic Chinese, American citizenship) as well as fondness of Japanese culture (Mishima, Oshii movies, Murakami Haruki), I think the Japanese have a habit of whitewashing weaknesses in their society. I've recently read Drea's book on the Imperial Japanese Army (https://www.amazon.com/Japans-Imperial- ... 0700616632 ), and it's an eye-opener.

So often, I cast my eyes askance on simply claiming it's good because it's Japanese, and kick the tires around a bit. Most of the time, the tires don't pop, and I'm happy with that; simply given Japan's effort at maintaining a good reputation, I'm just more critical to be sure about it.

As I've explained myself and agreed on the recognized SD point, is there anything else you think merits discussion, spazinbad?

[spazsinbad]

I have no problem explaining questions - then I hope to know what is relevant. However to counter unsubstantiated nebulous claims is not my thing. So IF I'm interested I go and find evidence - that suits me - because of my interest.

That last F-15 crash into the sea has sat in my 4.4+Gb PDF about the A4G Skyhawk and How to Deck Land along with the Naval Aviation aspects of the F-35B/C particularly since publication in 2008. It is in the back though and I had forgotten it. So if you peruse this humungous pdf you will see where my interests take me. SPATIAL DISORIENTATION is high on this list.

IF you want to download this FREE 4.4Gb pdf go here: https://www.faaaa.asn.au/spazsinbad-a4g/

[spazsinbad]

At least to me this is an interesting & humourous look at Spatial Disorientation SD at the end of WWII via USN Safety info.

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/h ... ember.html (6Mb)