AUSTRALIAN MARITIME OPERATIONSSep 2017 2nd Editon Sea Power Centre - Australia. Royal Australian NavyPAGE Numbered 85 onwards: "...The risk of loss must be accepted as a part of the cost of conflict, however, it must also be kept in mind that warships are inherently resilient and designed to be placed in harm’s way. Resilience can be measured by the capacity of a warship to regain operational status after being damaged. The RAN’s main focus must therefore be on the competence and toughness of our people, so that we can rely on sensors and weapons being used to maximum effect.
The Role of Air Power in Achieving Sea ControlAir power has become a vital and integral facet of sea power but, apart from organic helicopters, very few navies can afford to carry their own air power with them. Although helicopters can offer significant capabilities in surface and underwater warfare, there is much that they cannot provide.
The RAN, in particular, must rely on others to provide broad area air, surface and under-sea surveillance as well as any air combat capability for counter air or strike operations. In the event of working with multinational partners without embarked air power, however, an Australian maritime task group must necessarily rely on land-based air power.There are several limitations associated with reliance on land-based air power. For operations away from the Australian mainland, ongoing air-to-air refuelling (AAR) or secure forward operating bases relatively close to the area of operations will be needed. Unfortunately the use of AAR to support aircraft beyond their unrefuelled range introduces an additional level of vulnerability while, even with such basing, assured air power will still only be available when the maritime operation enjoys a high priority for the allocation of resources. Without forward basing, the situation becomes even more problematic.
Moreover, the further aircraft have to transit from land bases and the more they will need to rely on AAR, the more they will be limited in the weapons and stores they can carry. This will affect both their time on task and their effectiveness while there. Responsiveness also becomes an issue, and the provision of a combat air patrol for a deployed maritime force is more challenging as the distance from land bases increases. The ability to respond immediately to a demand for air cover could be vital for the success of an operation and can depend on adequate threat warning. Such warning may itself depend on the availability of land-based surveillance aircraft.
A lack of available air power may, in some cases, greatly hinder or entirely compromise deployed operations. Without either surveillance or combat aircraft, or even both, surface forces must depend almost completely on their own resources. This implies a potential loss of warning time against low-flying threats and an associated dependence upon short-range detection and rapid reaction. Although the Hobart-class destroyers will have a reasonable capability to deal with such threats, particularly when networked with remote sensors, there are few of these vessels.
The absence of friendly tactical combat aircraft provides much greater freedom of action for an adversary’s air power. This translates into more thorough and accurate enemy surveillance and ultimately more attack options for an opposing force. Consequently, it also demands changes in the mode of operations for friendly surface forces, perhaps constraining where and how they operate. In extreme situations, surface operations may need to be curtailed....
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Gaining Sea Control in the FutureIn considering the challenges to be faced in gaining sea control in the future, one must first question whether it will be needed. That is, will there still be a need to maintain freedom to use the sea as and when required?
Currently, there exists no feasible alternative to the use of sea transport to move the vast amounts of raw materials, energy and manufactured goods that continue to fuel the global economy.
The continued requirement for maritime power projection also appears assured, even if rarely in the form of large-scale contested amphibious landings. A flexible range of relevant capabilities are being developed in the ADF and, although it is not possible to predict how or whether these forces will be used in combat, recent experience suggests that there is a continued demand for the projection of power across the spectrum of operations. Whether sea control is contested in such future operations cannot be determined in advance, but having sea control is something that the ADF must never take for granted....
Then from page numbered 128 there is lots of stuff about
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONSSource: http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/fi ... s_2017.pdf (11Mb)
16 Nov 2017, 20:29
