More basement dweller stupidity.

Discuss the F-35 Lightning II
  • Author
  • Message
User avatar


Active Member

Active Member

  • Posts: 221
  • Joined: 13 Nov 2006, 04:07

Unread post28 Jun 2018, 15:57

If I'm not mistaken, that was part of the reason for the test. The test pilot found that the F-35 control laws were forcing him to spend too much time getting in and out of a high-alpha state. With more authority, the pilot can get in and out more quickly, which conserves energy. Providing the pilot more authority by changing the software can then improve the energy management of the F-35. Am I wrong?


Elite 2K

Elite 2K

  • Posts: 2175
  • Joined: 20 Mar 2010, 10:26
  • Location: Parts Unknown

Unread post28 Jun 2018, 17:11

playloud wrote:If I'm not mistaken, that was part of the reason for the test. The test pilot found that the F-35 control laws were forcing him to spend too much time getting in and out of a high-alpha state. With more authority, the pilot can get in and out more quickly, which conserves energy. Providing the pilot more authority by changing the software can then improve the energy management of the F-35. Am I wrong?

I don't think we're ever going to get a detailed answer...

What is clear is that through some combination of software and tactics, pilots have been able to fly the jet such that it's a nasty dogfighter. Not that they'd ever want to get into one, but it's clear that if called upon it can more than mix it up with Fulcrums, Flankers or any other jet.

Personally I think it would be entering any WVR fight from the 4 o'clock position (or even from below!), 12 or so miles out with an AIM-9x or AMRAAM doing the deed. At that distance the NEZ is dramatically enhanced. The hapless bandit won't have any time to react, and the F-35 can then choose to press closer or simply exit the battlespace. Bad, bad day for the bandit..


Active Member

Active Member

  • Posts: 119
  • Joined: 29 Mar 2018, 01:52

Unread post29 Jun 2018, 23:27

If you want to get a better perspective on the F-35 and lay it out to people who don't understand military aviation, or who are biased to a particular program because of the contractors they work for, simply have them watch this from the Russian aerospace community:




  • Posts: 55
  • Joined: 07 Oct 2015, 20:15

Unread post30 Jun 2018, 08:54

Proof of the ability to rapidly decelerate and still climb vertical. Watch the first turn. Pilot probably left his eyeballs on the canopy.

steve2267 wrote:
juretrn wrote:Okay, so I've been reading this again: ... euvers.pdf

call me a basement dweller, but this says the F-35 was at a clear energy disadvantage vs a clean F-16 blk. 40. Often people say that AF-2 (the F-35 aircraft used in the test) is not representative of the real deal; yet this one lacked "mission systems" (whatever that is) and was flying clean; but surely the F135 engine is the same as the one in series aircraft.
Does CLAWS also somehow limit the engine performance or something? What am I missing here?

What WW said above.

Also, you are missing the knowledge of E-M diagrams that Billie Flynn references here:

steve2267 wrote:
"The F-35 is comparable or better in every one of those metrics, sometimes by a significant margin, in both air-to-air, and when we hog-up those fourth-generation fighters, for the air-to-ground mission."

If one were to overlay the energy-maneuverability (E-M) diagrams for the F/A-18, F-16 or Typhoon over the F-35's, "It is better. Comparable or better than every Western fourth-generation fighter out there," Flynn says. That applies even to the F-35 B and C models with their respective 7g and 7.5g limits. "You're not going to see any measurable difference between the aircraft," Flynn says. In terms of instantaneous and sustained turn rates and just about every other performance metric, the F-35 variants match or considerably exceed the capabilities of every fourth-generation fighter, he says.

7 Feb 2013
IN FOCUS: Lockheed claims F-35 kinematics ‘better than or equal to’ Typhoon or Super Hornet ... er-382078/

You are also missing the knowledge and experience that leads Gen Pleus to state:
steve2267 wrote:Several excellent quotes from Brig. General Scott Pleus:

"I can tell you that it is by far the best platform I've ever flown in my entire life, and at that you would have to take me on my word."

"In terms of lethality and survivability, the aircraft is absolutely head and shoulders above our legacy fleet of fighters currently fielded. This is an absolutely formidable airplane, and one our adversaries should fear."

"You never knew I was there. You literally would never know I'm there. I flew the F-35 against other fourth-generation platforms and we killed them and they never even saw us."

"If you were to engage an F-35 in say, a visual dogfight capability, the capabilities of the F-35 are absolutely eye-watering compared to a fourth-generation fighter."

"The airplane has unbelievable maneuvering characteristics that make it completely undefeatable in an air-to-air environment. So if it's a long-range contact, you'll never see me and you'll die, and if it's within visual-range contact you'll see me and you're gonna die and you're gonna die very quickly."

'One our adversaries should fear': US Air Force General describes how the F-35 is above and beyond the competition
Amanda Macias 26 Dec 2016 ... f35-2017-1

the knowledge and eperience that lead Lt. Col. Gunn to say:
steve2267 wrote:
Pilots Say F-35 Superior Within Visual Range: Dogfight Criticisms Laid To Rest
by Colin Clark, June 19, 2017

I asked one of the Air Force pilots, Lt. Col. Scott “Cap” Gunn, here whether the F-35 would win when fighting close-up with an enemy fighter. His answer was simple: “Without a doubt.”

Gunn told reporters at a briefing here that he had gone up against a friend in an F-16 a few months ago. Though the F-35 “performed very well,” he made clear that it hadn’t been dominant. They flew again recently and the F-16 pilot was amazed by the improvement in the F-35’s performance. “What have they done to your jet?” the pilot said, according to Gunn. “The difference is we have learned how to fly the jet… and better understand where its advantages are.

Gunn went on to say that he “either never got it within visual range, or, if I’m going to be inside visual range, then it’s because I’m going to choose to be there.” That seems to make clear the aircraft’s vaunted fusion engine and advanced sensors — all tied into the pilot’s helmet — provides the pilot with enough warning and data to allow him to decide the terms of combat.

and the knowledge and experience of Norwegian pilot, Major "Dolby" Hanche who has said this:
steve2267 wrote:
Norwegian F-35 pilot: ‘We are on track’
by AIRheads/EH 3-27-2017


AHF: What has been your most memorable F-35 experience so far?

'Dolby' Hanche: "Another more specific highlight would be the first time I fought F-16s. It was impressive to see just how uneven that fight is, in favor of the F-35.”

Maj. Hanche has also commented about how quickly the F-35 can decelerate, how he can be much more aggressive in offensive maneuvers than he originally thought possible, and how the F-35 "sticks like glue" onto an opposing aircraft. In my minds eye, I believe he describes the ability to out-decelerate an opponent to gain a decisive turn radius advantage and cut inside the turn of his opponent, where he remains saddled up. But that is conjecture on my part.

I have had similar questions such as yourself, but the proof would appear to be in the pudding, and taken as a whole, these quotes or vignettes, plus the Paris Air Show demonstration by Flynn in 2017, would seem to be proof enough, in total, that whatever issues the F-35 may have been enduring at the time of that CLAWs test, have more than been laid to rest.

Regarding E-M issues, quotes by multiple pilots raving about the power of the F135 and the acceleration of the F-35 ("like a Hornet with four engines" etc etc) would seem to put to rest questions about "energy addition" from a qualitative perspective. Quotes from other F-35 pilots about being able to "rate like a Viper" but also "point the nose like a Hornet" would seem to confirm that the F-35 has indeed met it's stated "goals" of F-16 like and F-18 like performance. These statements, IMO, lend insight (and jaw dropping wonder) about the statements by Gen Pleus, Lt Col Gunn, and Maj Hanche.

Without actual E-M diagrams, and CLAWs figures, charts, and graphs, we are going to be left a bit in the dark, no matter what.


Elite 1K

Elite 1K

  • Posts: 1426
  • Joined: 27 Mar 2015, 16:05

Unread post09 Jul 2018, 02:48

This recently pop up on Twitter, the level of stupidity and BS in it is just ......unbelievable ... 1071329281


Elite 2K

Elite 2K

  • Posts: 2022
  • Joined: 16 Feb 2011, 01:30

Unread post09 Jul 2018, 03:14

eloise wrote:This recently pop up on Twitter, the level of stupidity and BS in it is just ......unbelievable ... 1071329281

Then why bring it up and thereby reward them w attention?
User avatar


Forum Veteran

Forum Veteran

  • Posts: 836
  • Joined: 02 Mar 2013, 04:22
  • Location: Texas

Unread post09 Jul 2018, 05:20

LOL. Well we can tell one thing: There's so much lunacy in that thread and feed it is self-refuting. If I knew who in the *^$# he was, it MIGHT be fun to smack him around on Twitter some. Given his apparent obsession with Manga and cartoon characters, I doubt anyone takes him serious enough to make it worth the effort though, and in any case snowflakes like that tend to block anyone that pops their bubble.
--The ultimate weapon is the mind of man.
User avatar


Elite 3K

Elite 3K

  • Posts: 3229
  • Joined: 10 Mar 2012, 15:38

Unread post10 Jul 2018, 00:19

So, that was a chain of unsupported chain of (as it turns out, false) claims and invective.
Einstein got it backward: one cannot prevent a war without preparing for it.

Uncertainty: Learn it, love it, live it.




  • Posts: 3
  • Joined: 10 Jul 2018, 22:02

Unread post10 Jul 2018, 22:09 ... farce.html

POGO declares the close air support flyoffs between the A-10 and F-35 as R-R-R-R-RIGGED!!!

And to save you a click, I'm quoting the stuff that's "closest" to reality in the entire thing:
Air Force leaders came up with a simple solution to this dilemma. They are staging an unpublicized, quickie test on existing training ranges, creating unrealistic scenarios that presuppose an ignorant and inert enemy force, writing ground rules for the tests that make the F-35 look good—and they got the new testing director, the retired Air Force general Robert Behler, to approve all of it.

According to sources closely involved with the A-10 versus F-35 fly-off, who wished to remain anonymous out of concerns about retaliation, this testing program was designed without ever consulting the Air Force’s resident experts on close air support, A-10 pilots and joint terminal attack ground controllers. The Air Force’s 422 Test and Evaluation Squadron at Nevada’s Nellis Air Force Base maintains an A-10 test division. But no one from the operational test unit contributed to the design of these tests. Even more egregiously, no Army or Marine representatives participated. Since the services fighting on the ground have a primary interest in effective close air support, excluding them from this process borders on negligence. This testing event should have been designed by the Joint Strike Fighter Operational Test Team, which is charged with designing all tests for the F-35. Rather than going through the proper channels, design of these tests was outsourced to a consultant from Tactical Air Support Inc., a company with a contract to provide adversary aircraft to serve as air-combat training opponents for the U.S. Air Force, especially for the F-35 squadrons, which it also does for foreign air forces. In other words, the test was designed by someone with a vested financial interest in the F-35 program, rather than by people whose primary interest is its performance in combat.

The testing schedule shows four days of actual testing: one at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma’s open-desert bombing training range, in southern Arizona, and three at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake’s electronic combat range, an open-desert facility in California primarily used for electronic countermeasure research.

Day One at Yuma

The first day's test—July 5, at Yuma—scheduled one F-35 two-ship flight and two A-10 pairs. Each flight was to spend one hour making attack passes at highly visible, bombed-out vehicle hulks and shipping containers simulating buildings (plus one highly visible, remote-controlled moving-vehicle target), all in flat, open terrain near a large simulated airfield target. Each A-10 carried two laser-guided 500-pound bombs, two captive-carry Maverick guided missiles, a pod of marking rockets, and only 400 30 mm cannon rounds. The F-35s carried a single 500-pound laser-guided bomb and 181 25 mm rounds, the most each plane could carry. For the last 20 minutes of each one-hour target-range session, altitude was restricted to 10,000 feet, an alleged evaluation of each plane’s ability to operate beneath low cloud cover.

The first day’s attack scenarios called for “permissive” anti-aircraft defenses consisting of simulated shoulder-fired missiles and light anti-aircraft guns. A permissive environment is one in which there are few or no threats capable of shooting down an aircraft. Despite the “permissive” description, these are the anti-aircraft weapons that close air support planes will typically encounter while supporting our troops in battle against near-peer maneuvering enemy forces. However, the simulated defenses at Yuma had no precision instrumentation to track aircraft flight paths, gun aiming, or missile launch and homing. As a result, no quantitative data regarding the actual performance of the A-10 and F-35 will have been gathered. Rather than having charts of performance data, the evaluators will simply be able to report any results they want, without any way to verify the reports.

A close look at the first day’s test scenarios reveals numerous ways in which they were designed to favor the F-35 over the A-10, including the following:

Both aircraft are given an equal one hour to attack targets, when in fact the A-10 has more than twice the F-35’s endurance over the battlefield, a key capability when friendly troops urgently need support in battles that last many hours, or even days.
Both aircraft are assigned an equal number of attack sorties—even though the A-10 has demonstrated in combat an ability to generate sorties at a rate three times greater than the maintenance-intensive F-35 has been able to demonstrate under far less demanding peacetime conditions.
Testing both planes’ critical ability to support troops under low cloud cover by imposing a 10,000-foot ceiling is irresponsibly unrealistic and clearly intended to mask the unmaneuverable and thin-skinned F-35’s inability to operate under the far lower 1,000-foot ceilings so common in Europe, Southeast Asia, Korea, Africa, and South America. The armored A-10 was specifically designed to be able to maneuver and survive the kind of ground fire expected during attacks under 1,000-foot ceilings. A-10s have demonstrated this on numerous occasions in Afghanistan, even in dangerous mountainous terrain.
The weapons load assigned to the F-35—a single 500-pound guided bomb instead of the (still inadequate) two it can carry—unrealistically lightens the F-35 in an attempt to give it a maneuverability advantage during these tests. At the same time, the 30 mm cannon, which is the A-10’s most effective weapon and the one most demanded by troops in close contact with the enemy, has been arbitrarily limited to 400 rounds instead of the 1,174 it actually carries in combat. Equally artificially, the testers loaded the A-10 with two unguided 500-pound bombs, weapons it never carries in combat because they are too inaccurate and too dangerous to friendly troops. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, the A-10 always carries a full complement of guided bombs instead of unguided ones.
The absence of specialized testing equipment to determine the accuracy of anti-aircraft gun-aiming against the evasive maneuvering flight path of the attacking plane makes it impossible to gain useful insights about relative hits on the F-35 versus the A-10—and invites the use of highly biased, speculative figures to favor a predetermined outcome. Similarly, for the shoulder-fired small surface-to-air missiles, there was not instrumentation of the precise missile launch or guidance control, no precise tracking of the attacking aircraft’s trajectory, and no validated shoulder-fired missile simulation to determine the relative success of the A-10 and F-35 in defeating or surviving shoulder-fired missiles.
Using only uncamouflaged targets—usually painted dark military green and placed in flat, open, light-colored desert terrain and thus easily seen from 15,000 feet above—completely contradicts the stark realities of actual combat, in which the enemy always has a life-and-death motivation to do whatever it takes to remain unseen as long as possible. Anyone with access to Google Earth can quickly find dozens of these targets in satellite imagery.

By testing only against highly visible targets, the test completely masks the much more restricted view out of the F-35 cockpit as compared to the A-10—along with masking the surprisingly poor video and infrared image resolution of the F-35 helmet’s display compared to the high definition of the A-10’s instrument panel display when it’s coupled to the plane’s sniper and lightening pods. On a broader level, testing only against easy-to-see, static, non-reactive targets artificially confirms the Air Force’s delusional notion that future close air support can be successfully conducted by planes flying at 15,000 feet and 450 knots relying on supposedly accurate, digitally transmitted target coordinates.

Interestingly, the Congressionally approved full operational fly-off test plan, as designed in detail by the previous testing director and the service testing agencies, avoids every one of these F-35–slanted, highly unrealistic, test-scenario biases.

Days Two, Three, and Four at China Lake

The day two schedule—July 9 at China Lake—calls for four F-35Bs to conduct a mission covering two Ospreys extracting a pilot downed in enemy territory for one hour, then four A-10s covering a similar extraction. A similar set of missions under night conditions is scheduled for the late evening of day three.

On the afternoon of day three, A-10 and F-35 pairs are to spend an hour and a quarter on the China Lake target range attacking static, visible targets similar to the Yuma targets—but these are even less realistic, as they are just simulated attacks, with no weapons released. The stated reason for moving to China Lake, despite the restrictions on actually firing weapons, is to test the A-10 and F-35 against the range’s “elevated” anti-aircraft defenses, which include simulated medium-range surface-to-air missiles, as well as shoulder-fired short-range missiles and light anti-aircraft guns.

On the afternoon of the final day, a pair of A-10s and a pair of F-35s will undergo tests to gauge their ability as airborne forward air controllers, directing the strikes of at least three sections of F-18Cs, which will simulate the bombing of more uncamouflaged targets, against the same medium- and short-range air defenses. In the late evening, a pair of F-35s and a pair of A-10s will conduct night close air support against the same targets and defenses.

These tests at China Lake show many of the same efforts to skew the events in the F-35’s favor as those at Yuma, but heavily amplified by the addition of the medium air defenses, for three main reasons:

Without instrumented test aircraft, the aircraft radar tracking at China Lake does not yield aircraft trajectories precise enough to accurately simulate a medium-range missile’s success or failure against the evasive maneuvers and countermeasures of an attacking A-10 or F-35. As in the first day of tests, this invites speculation supporting the favored outcome.
The medium-range missile defenses in this test do not incorporate the currently deployed Russian and Chinese stealth-defeating long-wavelength search radars now being used to cue their shorter-wavelength medium-missile radars. That means the F-35’s stealth will be much more effective against China Lake’s simulated medium missiles than against real-world missiles, thus severely skewing the test’s survival assessments in favor of the F-35 over the A-10.
The relevance of medium-range missile defenses to close-support scenarios is at best questionable, as previously discussed. Their significant logistical requirements and lengthy setup times make them an impediment to maneuvering units heavily engaged in combat and trying to move quickly. Medium-range missiles are far more suitable for protecting rear-area interdiction targets or the static targets seen in trench warfare. Attacking either of these target systems with close-support planes would be a waste of lives and resources.

I mean, if I really wanted to rig the test against the A-10, I'd blanket the place in Pantsirs, but what do I know...

Return to General F-35 Forum

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: Google Adsense [Bot] and 10 guests