Fire damages F-35A

[steakanddoritos]

Dangerous-looking wounds often just a scratch.
T-50 received serious damages but they are largely located.
Serious injuries are usually look more accurate.
F-35 small hole looks insignificantly but the area smoked fire and price tag for repair says that inside almost all burned.
Is he dead ?
http://fishki.net/picsw/072013/26/post_ ... dved/2.jpg
http://animalworld.com.ua/images/2010/M ... 9576_9.jpg
No he is alive
http://fishki.net/picsw/072013/26/post_ ... dved/1.jpg

The PAK FA fire was far worse, it was hot enough to cause the composite panels to delaminate. The F-35 fire scorched the jet, but did not cause the same problem.

[optimist]

I would put forward that it is the fire retardant differences between the materials and epoxies/resins in the layups.
https://www.google.com.au/#q=composites+fire+retardant+

a very basic example of what I'm referring too

[SpudmanWP]

From the report:
http://news.usni.org/2015/06/08/documen ... f-35a-fire

A hole (10 x 7 inches) in Panel 3331 (top of fuselage) directly above and corresponding to the hole in the engine fan case was discovered post mishap with the composite plies/fibers splayed outward (Fig-11) (Tabs J-7 thru J-8). This panel covers parts of the fuel tank that was damaged and another fuel tank (Tab J-7). Three hydraulic lines and four fuel tubes (discussed in paragraph 6.a.(3) above) were damaged or severed at this location (Tabs J-61, J-68).

In summary, most outer surfaces of the aircraft skin and panels aft of the air refueling door were damaged by the fire while the interior bays covered by these panels exhibited a layer of soot with minimal or no damage (Tabs J-5 thru J-9, S-2). The interior of the engine bay also exhibited scorching and some metal deformation due to intense heat (Tabs J-14, J-15).

[optimist]

[sprstdlyscottsmn]

So the F-35 was externally burned. A surface fire as opposed to a structural fire if you will. Nice pictures. Really doesn't look that bad, just charred up skin. Could have been a LOT worse.

[mrigdon]

So the F-35 was externally burned. A surface fire as opposed to a structural fire if you will. Nice pictures. Really doesn't look that bad, just charred up skin. Could have been a LOT worse.

The critics must be so disappointed. Although I'm sure they'll find a way to use the fire they have, even if it wasn't the one they wanted.

[spazsinbad]

At the 'SWP' USNI URL above the 2.1Mb Accident/Fire Report PDF may be downloaded from here: http://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads ... Mar-15.pdf

[SpudmanWP]

One of the critics made a seemingly valid point:

He cited MIL regulations that state a failure in the core MUST be contained by the engine case. Since in this instance it was not contained and I have not seen this mentioned anywhere else or in the report itself... any thoughts?

[popcorn]

One of the critics made a seemingly valid point:

He cited MIL regulations that state a failure in the core MUST be contained by the engine case. Since in this instance it was not contained and I have not seen this mentioned anywhere else or in the report itself... any thoughts?

I tuoughtbthatbonly applied to multi-engine platforms?

[cantaz]

He cited MIL regulations that state a failure in the core MUST be contained by the engine case. Since in this instance it was not contained and I have not seen this mentioned anywhere else or in the report itself... any thoughts?

Insufficient data.

Need to know if there's any nuances WRT the degree of failure.

[archeman]

So the F-35 was externally burned. A surface fire as opposed to a structural fire if you will. Nice pictures. Really doesn't look that bad, just charred up skin. Could have been a LOT worse.

One of the key problems with repairing this machine is that virtually every single person you would need to 'bring in' is probably already neck deep in the production ramp-up. They would have to stop their current time-critical tasks to participate in a one-time special project to revive this single airframe.
Still worth it??? no probably not. At least not right now.

[spazsinbad]

NOW unlocked again the previously locked/unlocked/originally locked AmiableButler story on page 30 of this thread: http://aviationweek.com/defense/50m-dam ... pped-parts

PLUS AvWEAK have the same PDF here: http://aviationweek.com/site-files/avia ... r%2015.pdf (2.1Mb) (see here: http://aviationweek.com/blog/read-f-35-accident-report - with some burnt bacon bits)

PHOTO From: http://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads ... Mar-15.pdf (2.1Mb) HOLE IN TOP OF F135 FAN CASE

[spazsinbad]

F-35A, T/N 10-5015; 23 JUNE 2014; Eglin AFB; Accident Report

"...Summary of Accident
On Monday, 23 June 2014, at 09:09L, the MP began a takeoff on Runway (RWY) 12 at Eglin AFB (Tabs V-2.4, J-148). At the correct rotation speed, the MP [Mishap Pilot] began to rotate, or lift the nose wheel off the ground in anticipation of takeoff. During rotation, the MA engine stalled and displayed an ENG STALL (engine stall) Integrated Caution, Advisory, Warning (ICAW) at 09:10:06L (Tab J-82). The MP heard an audible bang and felt the aircraft decelerate about the same time the MP received the ENG STALL ICAW and the MP subsequently applied the ABORT procedure at 09:10:07L (Tabs J-83, V-2.4). The MP received other warnings and cautions including FIRE FIRE (Tab V-2.4 thru V-2.5). The ENG STALL ICAW was followed at 09:10:07L by FIRE GEAR and HYD FLUID B ICAWs (Tab J-83 thru J-84). FIRE GEAR indicated that fire detection sensors located in the wheel wells detected fire. HYD FLUID B indicated that the hydraulic fluid in system B was below minimum levels. As the aircraft slowed to a stop, numerous additional ICAWs annunciated including BLD LEAK ENG, IPP FAIL and HYD FAIL B indicating that there was hot engine exhaust detected outside of the engine and hydraulic system B no longer had any fluid (Tabs J-80 thru J-89). The MP stopped the aircraft approximately 8,000 feet down the runway following the abort procedure (Fig-12 below, Tab S-9).

The MP accomplished the EGRESS procedure at approximately 09:10:38L (Tab J-86). Two witnesses and the MP reported a visible fire and thick, black smoke around the aircraft as the MP exited the cockpit and safely evacuated the scene (Tabs R-6, R-10, V-1.4, V-2.5).

The fire continued for approximately seven minutes spreading from an initial fire on top of the aircraft to a ground fire fed by leaking fluids and a subsequent internal engine bay fire. The fire damaged the aft two thirds of the aircraft before emergency responders were able to extinguish it (Tabs J-5, J-9 thru J-10, J-80 thru J-89, S-2, S-3).

f. Egress and Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE)
The MP performed a ground egress of the F-35A without injury (Tabs J-4, V-2.5 thru 2.6, X-3). The MP was wearing the appropriate AFE as directed by Joint Technical Data (JTD). The MP’s helmet, sleeved flight jacket and skeletal G-suit were inspected and were deemed to have no discrepancies or damage. (Tab X-7)..."
&
"...(1) Analysis 1 – Engine R3 Failure
Engineering analysis by P&W and the JPO indicates that during the MA’s takeoff roll at 0910L, the R3 forward integral arm catastrophically failed and liberated from the engine (Tab J-147). This failure immediately caused an engine stall as the MP began to rotate for takeoff (Tab J-148). The liberated pieces of the R3 forward integral arm subsequently punctured the engine fan case and ejected out of the top of the aircraft falling just north of the runway while the aircraft continued to roll down the runway and eventually stopped [at 8,000 feet approx.]...."
&
"...The Fire Chief reported the fire under control 7 minutes and 22 seconds after the initial engine stall was recorded on the MA [Mishap Aircraft] CSMU...."

Source: http://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads ... Mar-15.pdf (2.1Mb)

EGLIN AFB RUNWAYS (rotated) from: https://skyvector.com/files/tpp/1506/pdf/00436AD.PDF (112Kb)

[ruderamronbo]

F-35A, T/N 10-5015; 23 JUNE 2014; Eglin AFB; Accident Report

"...Summary of Accident
On Monday, 23 June 2014, at 09:09L, the MP began a takeoff on Runway (RWY) 12 at Eglin AFB (Tabs V-2.4, J-148). At the correct rotation speed, the MP [Mishap Pilot] began to rotate, or lift the nose wheel off the ground in anticipation of takeoff. During rotation, the MA engine stalled and displayed an ENG STALL (engine stall) Integrated Caution, Advisory, Warning (ICAW) at 09:10:06L (Tab J-82). The MP heard an audible bang and felt the aircraft decelerate about the same time the MP received the ENG STALL ICAW and the MP subsequently applied the ABORT procedure at 09:10:07L (Tabs J-83, V-2.4). The MP received other warnings and cautions including FIRE FIRE (Tab V-2.4 thru V-2.5). The ENG STALL ICAW was followed at 09:10:07L by FIRE GEAR and HYD FLUID B ICAWs (Tab J-83 thru J-84). FIRE GEAR indicated that fire detection sensors located in the wheel wells detected fire. HYD FLUID B indicated that the hydraulic fluid in system B was below minimum levels. As the aircraft slowed to a stop, numerous additional ICAWs annunciated including BLD LEAK ENG, IPP FAIL and HYD FAIL B indicating that there was hot engine exhaust detected outside of the engine and hydraulic system B no longer had any fluid (Tabs J-80 thru J-89). The MP stopped the aircraft approximately 8,000 feet down the runway following the abort procedure (Fig-12 below, Tab S-9).

The MP accomplished the EGRESS procedure at approximately 09:10:38L (Tab J-86). Two witnesses and the MP reported a visible fire and thick, black smoke around the aircraft as the MP exited the cockpit and safely evacuated the scene (Tabs R-6, R-10, V-1.4, V-2.5).

The fire continued for approximately seven minutes spreading from an initial fire on top of the aircraft to a ground fire fed by leaking fluids and a subsequent internal engine bay fire. The fire damaged the aft two thirds of the aircraft before emergency responders were able to extinguish it (Tabs J-5, J-9 thru J-10, J-80 thru J-89, S-2, S-3).

f. Egress and Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE)
The MP performed a ground egress of the F-35A without injury (Tabs J-4, V-2.5 thru 2.6, X-3). The MP was wearing the appropriate AFE as directed by Joint Technical Data (JTD). The MP’s helmet, sleeved flight jacket and skeletal G-suit were inspected and were deemed to have no discrepancies or damage. (Tab X-7)..."
&
"...(1) Analysis 1 – Engine R3 Failure
Engineering analysis by P&W and the JPO indicates that during the MA’s takeoff roll at 0910L, the R3 forward integral arm catastrophically failed and liberated from the engine (Tab J-147). This failure immediately caused an engine stall as the MP began to rotate for takeoff (Tab J-148). The liberated pieces of the R3 forward integral arm subsequently punctured the engine fan case and ejected out of the top of the aircraft falling just north of the runway while the aircraft continued to roll down the runway and eventually stopped [at 8,000 feet approx.]...."
&
"...The Fire Chief reported the fire under control 7 minutes and 22 seconds after the initial engine stall was recorded on the MA [Mishap Aircraft] CSMU...."

Source: http://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads ... Mar-15.pdf (2.1Mb)

EGLIN AFB RUNWAYS (rotated) from: https://skyvector.com/files/tpp/1506/pdf/00436AD.PDF (112Kb)

Awkward having to thank the Navy for posting the full report. The boat folks really do need to follow the example (ignoring the fact that Acrobat exists) of how the how the AF does these reports. Try reading this Navy report written by some JAG Officer and compare the two.

[ruderamronbo]

This has to be the most amazing thing I saw in the report "The fragments consisted of two large pieces measuring roughly 5-6 FEET in length (Tabs J-151 thru J-152)