Possibility small STOVL carrier USN/USMC

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Unread post18 Nov 2009, 08:19

Thumper3181, I can understand what 'gf0012-aust' is saying, to me though it is irrelevant. What is planned today for the RAN has no relevance to this thread 'the merits of small ski jump carriers for USMC and JSF-Bs with that idea taken to the RAN as described on the first page'. Whether or not these are 'planned' has the same relevance to the 'plan' (non-existent at moment) for the USMC to get dedicated ski jump carriers (perhaps similar to RN CVFs). The thread got bogged down in stuff about current USMC flat decks and what cannot be done. My interest is what can be done in future and my interest will continue to be down that track. If this is a boring thread for you - then stay away. Your horse may be dead - mine is the one in the desert with no name. :-)
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Unread post18 Nov 2009, 08:32

spazsinbad wrote:Thumper3181, I can understand what 'gf0012-aust' is saying, to me though it is irrelevant. What is planned today for the RAN has no relevance to this thread 'the merits of small ski jump carriers for USMC and JSF-Bs with that idea taken to the RAN as described on the first page'.


hmm, I was directly responding to this:

spazsinbad wrote:Because the RN FAA are obviously smart, learning & planning how to operate the JSF-B - even before it is flying, the RAN can learn from their experience for their own future. I'll admit that most likely it would take a third specially outfitted LHD to operate JSF-Bs in the RAN likely with RAAF pilots but it is not in the realm of the impossible. Unlike some understanding what this thread is supposed to be about.
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Unread post18 Nov 2009, 09:39

gf, to my understanding you were going on and on about process and not why it is not a good idea for the RAN to have JSF-Bs on another LHD in the future. One sentence could encompass a present fact that there is no current plan, or forseeable plan, for such an item (you had me at NO). My interest would be 'why is it not a good idea' and following on 'why is there no plan'? :-) It is boring for some to learn about other countries - I can understand that. However nothing is boring to me except naysayers who give no reason for their nays than "every one says it is not happening". So what. It has been interesting for me to find various news items describing how for a long time the RN FAA has been pursuing their CVF concepts, preparing for JSF-Bs. Very inspiring stuff - bravo the RN FAA (BZ for the NavAv types).

Plans are good but plans are not the be all and end all. History shows what happens to plans. Plans show what not to do when different circumstances arise. I'll keep a keen eye on RN FAA and USMC and others operating JSF-Bs. Good luck to 'em. :-)
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Unread post18 Nov 2009, 10:53

spazsinbad wrote:gf, to my understanding you were going on and on about process and not why it is not a good idea for the RAN to have JSF-Bs on another LHD in the future. One sentence could encompass a present fact that there is no current plan, or forseeable plan, for such an item (you had me at NO).


I was going on about the realities of the ADF - and in particular the RAN. The woulda coulda shoulda debates still need to have a reality check. Otherwise we would all be breaking out the photon torpedoes... :)

spazsinbad wrote:My interest would be 'why is it not a good idea' and following on 'why is there no plan'? :-)


Assets are procured because there is tactical merit to do so within the multitude of strategic scenarios that we create to deal with likely and possible conflicts. The scenarios are tri-service - and often include people who have done long exchanges with our partners (and are usually sent off because they are part of some dream team recognised at some recent point in their career that they are forward thinkers etc... My frustration can bubble up when there appears to be a subcutaneous view that no one on the hill has remotely thought about things like fixed wing combat air for a lazarused FAA - and that if its so simple to see on the internet then by jimminy the tactical blackshoes must be asleep or not doing their job. Anyone who's been involved with this kind of issue knows that this is not even remotely so.

spazsinbad wrote:It is boring for some to learn about other countries - I can understand that. However nothing is boring to me except naysayers who give no reason for their nays than "every one says it is not happening". So what. It has been interesting for me to find various news items describing how for a long time the RN FAA has been pursuing their CVF concepts, preparing for JSF-Bs. Very inspiring stuff - bravo the RN FAA (BZ for the NavAv types).


Spaz, I spent the last 10 years overseas dealing with a number of different militaries/navies. This isn't boring for me and I'm more than interested in what our allies do because it directly impacts on my job - so I hope you don't assume that I have a sheltered view of technology use within other militaries.

I am however very big on reality checked conversations. Its interesting that you praise the UK on their forward thinking when they've got people out here trying to pick up on some of our procurement processes because their's are "busted". Similarly Ashton Carter will be in Aust in the next 2 months to look at procurement modelling done in Oz as the Executive in the US are about to make sweeping changes with how they expect US companies to play in future projects - the US Exec consider that some of our modelling has merit.

None of this stuff is done in a vacuum.

spazsinbad wrote:Plans are good but plans are not the be all and end all. History shows what happens to plans. Plans show what not to do when different circumstances arise. I'll keep a keen eye on RN FAA and USMC and others operating JSF-Bs. Good luck to 'em. :-)


I'm curious as to how recent your experience with mil planning is - because everything we do is based around strategic and tactical vignettes - even those that are unlikely are planned for. No gear is bought without going through the user community and run by on potential usage.

Heaven help that we went back to procurement practices of even 6 years ago - let alone the frantic 70's and awful 80's where the only rigour was making sure things were on an asset list. There is almost zero relationship to procurement then and how we do it now. having worked with US, UK and some of the Euros I can assure you that we all have pretty similar processes on assessment - and we all share information about capabilities.

platforms are purchased because they meet a tactical and strategic imperative - the govt (and both sides of politics) expects us to do more with less. they certainly won't let us go out and gravy train capability. you only have to look at whos suffering at the moment to see that a few countries are pruning their own wishlists, so to buy a capability which is not regarded as tactically or strategically essential is a quick way to lose budgets.

/back on topic.

AFAIK (having spoken to other JSF program participants) the USMC is not after a mixed fleet. It would go against their core operational imprimature which is interfacing with the USN at various levels. the touchstone on all these debates lies with logistics. If the loggie train is going to be more complicated, then you need a damn good reason to travel that road.

SecDef is no different from DefMin as far as those issues go.
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Unread post18 Nov 2009, 11:54

gf0012-aust, I have no problem admitting that my time was for ten years finishing 35 years ago in the 'frantic 70s' as you put it. :-) [Extra Edit: I had assumed from our e-mail conversation that you were aware of my RAN experience? To be clear I have not been involved with any military procurement, so how can I comment except as a receiver/user of those goods so procured. Being a jet pilot - mostly A4G Skyhawk - I had a lot of 'beefs' about some decisions, as you might well imagine and have been an interested onlooker ever since - a "LollyGagger" in the vernacular.]

I might ask where were you in the SeaSprite debacle and why did that drag on for so long. I guess the US can learn a lot from that procurement NOT. Interesting vague comment in your last para about USMC not having a mixed fleet. I'll assume you refer to a JSF-B only fleet. Good on 'em. Buga the USN. :-) Might mean that smaller carriers might be in the pipeline if money is tight for the USN nuke carrier navy. I'm not really that interested in what they do though. Just a random thought thrown in.

Planning is not the problem. Implementing plans without adequate money becomes the problem - mixed in with political interference. I gather in the SeaSprite example that 'political' was main factor to continue after reason for purchase changed; and then 'political' not PRACTICAL when that sorry saga dragged on for a decade - without result - and a Billion Dollars lost. Nice result. Congratulations. I don't hold you personally responsible though. :-)

So - not having been involved in the Great Canberra BoonDoggle, I have a point of view only from an operational perspective. Some of that perspective can be seen in a free Video DVD download at: http://www.a4ghistory.com/ The other material on same page has been mentioned before; so I won't mention it again. Don't want to scare the dead horses. :-) Oh in my last year in the Navy I saw some different perspective being involved in the Turana project. Great fun - pity it did not work out.

Despite your explanation which is welcome and perhaps vaguely encouraging - I don't buy that much has changed 'procurement wise'. Still same old same old. No reflection on your input but just the nature of things run by humans. Mix in the politicians and it all goes off on a new direction overnight. What happened to suddenly enable the wonderful Super Hornet buy? I'll await the next plan, I'm prepared to be surprised. :-)
Last edited by spazsinbad on 18 Nov 2009, 13:50, edited 1 time in total.
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Unread post18 Nov 2009, 12:38

spazsinbad wrote:gf0012-aust, I have no problem admitting that my time was for ten years finishing 35 years ago in the 'frantic 70s' as you put it. :-) I might ask where were you in the SeaSprite debacle and why did that drag on for so long. I guess the US can learn a lot from that procurement NOT. Interesting vague comment in your last para about USMC not having a mixed fleet. I'll assume you refer to a JSF-B only fleet. Good on 'em. Buga the USN. :-) Might mean that smaller carriers might be in the pipeline if money is tight for the USN nuke carrier navy. I'm not really that interested in what they do though. Just a random thought thrown in.


you're confusing me now - the last series of thread responses you indicated that you were interested in the potential for USMC etc to run stumpies as it might have a bearing on other forces to do same...

spazsinbad wrote:Planning is not the problem. Implementing plans without adequate money becomes the problem - mixed in with political interference. I gather in the SeaSprite example that 'political' was main factor to continue after reason for purchase changed; and then 'political' not PRACTICAL when that sorry saga dragged on for a decade - without result - and a Billion Dollars lost. Nice result. Congratulations. I don't hold you personally responsible though. :-)



I think you missed the bit I stated prev that I've spent the last 10 years offshore. If you care to look at Seasprite in all its glory you'll see that there is no shortage of reasons as to why it derailed - scope creep being the obvious one. You are aware of course that approval for these projects at every critical path is via Govt? you are aware that there are any number of stakeholders that can veto the project if they have concerns at every critical path point? I'd suggest that researching how and why Seasprite derailed is something a little more complicated than whats goes into the mass media. A lot of the blame for the excruciating death of Seasprite can be sheeted straight home to the capability sponsors. Seasprite was a classic example of stuffing too much technology into the wrong platform due to an earlier procurement deciision to buy different skimmers which never eventuated because one of our partners turned cold. ie it has its roots in a skimmer purchase for a non allied partner who ran out of money and we elected to run with it anyway (and no, its not NZ).

You are aware I assume of the role of the sponsors (uniforms), the managers, the stakeholders, the security council and the govt at various critical paths? If you're unaware then its by the by as I assume then that your first hand exp is being backfilled by the media - that is the same media that refers to C17's as "bombers" and HMAS Sydney as a "battleship". The ubiquitous M113 is usually promoted to being a tank (which should make Sparks/Meyers et al extremely warm inside)

I'd add that planning is a problem if its not relevant to doctrine - and if its not relevant to the force structure and capability sought throughout the capability life cycle.


spazsinbad wrote:So - not having been involved in the Great Canberra BoonDoggle, I have a point of view only from an operational perspective. Some of that perspective can be seen in a free Video DVD download at: http://www.a4ghistory.com/ The other material on same page has been mentioned before; so I won't mention it again. Don't want to scare the dead horses. :-) Oh in my last year in the Navy I saw some different perspective being involved in the Turana project. Great fun - pity it did not work out.


if we're playing the experience card then I've worked on sig management, ships, UDT, aircraft evaluations and weapons systems evaluations - so I'm not a complete novice :)

spazsinbad wrote:
Despite your explanation which is welcome and perhaps vaguely encouraging - I don't buy that much has changed 'procurement wise'. Still same old same old. No reflection on your input but just the nature of things run by humans. Mix in the politicians and it all goes off on a new direction overnight. What happened to suddenly enable the wonderful Super Hornet buy? I'll await the next plan, I'm prepared to be surprised. :-)


I'm not sure why you can continue to claim that nothing has changed in procurement when it is self evident to anyone who has to work in it. The last 18months alone are akin to being on a different planet. If you're unaware of what processes bind the decisions and have been imposed upon Defence, then its worth pausing before commenting.

I am not sure whether you are reading my responses - the Shornet decision was not "overnight" - it was a 2 year decision - and that was with significant groundwork done to even fast track that decision. In fact, I can point to sites where I commented on the decision in Apr 2006 - and I'd been informed some 4 months before hand by colleagues both in Oz and in the US. that would make it a 3.5 year cycle. (and in real terms, thats slower than the JSF decision)


anyway I'm now passing on this thread as its going nowhere quickly.

I suspect that the mods might exercise the sword soon if it stays off course.
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Unread post18 Nov 2009, 12:58

gf, this thread veered off course a long time ago. To me it is interesting what you claim. Output is another thing. Whatever.
To get back on topic perhaps here is what Mr. Beedall things about some 'heat' issues with JSF-Bs amongst other things:

http://navy-matters.beedall.com/cvf1-24.htm

"Unlike the Invincible class, CVF will be fitted with a Jet Blast Deflectors (JBD). This is necessary because of the very high and potentially dangerous and destructive thrust that the F-135 engine in the JSF generates when running at maximum thrust for launch. It is hoped that with modern materials it will be possible to avoid the cost and complexity of having to use sea water to cool these - the expected use or otherwise of afterburners during launch will be a big factor in this decision.
...JBD position with "hold-back" restraints about 150 metres back from the ski-jump style bow.... The take-off run was considered sufficient for F-35B's to be launched at maximum take-off weight (MTOW) given reasonable (30kts) actual wind over deck (WOD)... But in addition the extended centre- line flight deck configuration allowed for occasional very long (over 200m) take-off runs from an unrestrained starting point right aft (like Harrier's on the current Invincible's) for heavily loaded aircraft in low WOD conditions. Some changes in this configuration may occur with the reduction in platform size.
....
Work was also carried out to map the heat and acoustic footprints on deck. Noise is a major issue for the CVF design as health and safety considerations restrict the allowable tolerance to high levels of acoustic energy. The Jan 2003 design featured two vertical landing pad for F-35B's.
Fish says that CVF and JSF offer the chance to improve STOVL operation significantly over today's Sea Harrier FA.2/Harrier GR.7A. Options for the vertical landing element include approaching over the ships stern rather than coming alongside and manoeuvring over the landing spot. This offers an improved landing rate and addresses environmental issues - such as the jet exhaust down blast associated with landing on. The F-35's improved STOVL handling and control will be a factor in allowing this, while the aircrafts electro-optical sensors offer opportunities to present the pilot with improved cueing.
During cost reduction efforts in the second half of 2003, the flight deck arrangements for CVF were considerably simplified, this was partially imposed by the reduced size of the ship. ...only a single JBD is now fitted on the axial runway, beside the aft island. The bow area was now split, with the ski jump ski jump limited to the port side, this has the significant benefit of allowing additional [although rather exposed] deck parking to starboard. The special landing pads for F-35B VL's also seem to have been dropped. The flight deck has been narrowed aft, making the provision for an angle landing lane very obvious. The Delta flight deck area is about 4 acres (nearly three times that of an Invincible-class).
Reports emerged in Q1 2005 indicated that the design team was considering the feasibility of adopting the shipborne rolling vertical landing (SRVL) technique. This offered some advantages, particularly in hot weather conditions, but issues such as bolters and fuel reserves also had to be addressed and the final decision was apparently negative." [Last sentence out of date today. Later on same page there is more up to date info about 'runny landings'.]
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Unread post18 Nov 2009, 13:03

gf, to get back to your procurement experience. That is news to me about 'we were going to buy Super Hornets all along' when specifically asked about this topic the CDF replied it had been looked at and decision was against. Yes youse guys looked at it and I understand how they could be bought so quickly (given reversal of decision NOT to buy - to BUY). Sure this is way off topic but it goes to the twists and turns of Oz procurement; which you claim has changed recently. Good to know. We'll see eh. I understand that people do their best with decisions taken and information given at the time; but nothing is set in stone.
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Unread post18 Nov 2009, 16:15

Wot Bill Sweetman has to say about the 'hot' issues with Osprey and Lightning II onboard:

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/de ... d=blogDest

Hot Hot Hot Posted by Bill Sweetman at 11/18/2009 7:38 AM CST

"US Navy amphibious ships operating MV-22B Osprey tilt-rotors will need major structural repairs after less than half their planned service lives, according to a newly released Navy document, unless a new Deck Thermal Management System (DTMS) can be developed to protect the decks from exhaust heat. The only other alternative identified so far is a heavy structural modification to the deck. The JSF is considered likely to cause similar problems.

The problem is caused when the MV-22 is preparing for a mission and parked on deck with rotors turning. The result is localized heating and expansion, which causes visible buckling of the deck after ten minutes. According to the Office of Naval Research document, announcing a joint ONR/Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) program (DARPA announcement here) to search for solutions, repeated buckling is expected to cause deck failure at 40 per cent of planned ship life.

The JSF presents a slightly different problem. Its exhaust is hotter and faster, but in normal operations will not be directed at the deck for more than two minutes. Nevertheless, the Navy expects "a severe thermo-mechanical impact" on ship decks, no doubt an immense surprise: who could possibly have thought that an 18000-pound-thrust nozzle, blasting straight down at the deck at a distance measured in inches, might be a problem?

ONR has teamed with DARPA to see if anyone out there can come up with a Rumplesnitz!-type solution that will make the fire-breathing dragons go away. It's not easy. The Navy wants a passive solution (no coolant pumps, for example) that can be laid down on the existing deck, and is no more than an inch thick so as not to complicate operations. It has to include an anti-skid coating, and as well as being able to dissipate heat, it has to survive the mechanical stress of aircraft movements and the JSF's blast.

Reading the Navy and DARPA documents, it seems that what is envisioned is a layer of heat-pipes buried in a mat bonded to the deck, designed to rapidly spread the heat from the spots under the exhaust across a wider area. The goal is to keep the underlying deck structure from reaching more than 200 deg. F after 90 minutes of a parked V-22 or 120 seconds of exposure to a JSF exhaust.

The Navy expects to award a contract or contract for DTMS development in October 2010, conduct land-based tests in 2013 and certify the technology for full-scale development by 2014."
RAN FAA A4G Skyhawk 1970s: https://www.faaaa.asn.au/spazsinbad-a4g/ AND https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwqC_s6gcCVvG7NOge3qfAQ/
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Unread post19 Nov 2009, 05:37

A recent prize winning essay for 'Proceedings' has this to say FWIW:

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedin ... RY_ID=1838

Extract from "Buy Fords, Not Ferraris" by Commander Henry J. Hendrix, U.S. Navy

"Another critical component of the surge force will be the Expeditionary Strike Groups and their light amphibious carriers. Long considered to be the central core of the amphibious force, these highly capable aircraft carriers can serve in new roles within surge operations. Assuming one is in dry-dock for maintenance, a force of ten LHAs can provide nine small flattops for surge operations. Five of them will go to sea with their embarked Marine Expeditionary Units serving as their primary strike assets (again, the assumption would be that two of the MEUs would either be deploying or returning from deployment at any given time) while the remaining available LHAs deploy with each of their decks and hangars populated by two squadrons of STOVL Joint Strike Fighters.

The four LPDs and four LSDs that would have normally deployed with the Joint Strike Fighter-configured LHAs can be allocated to provide such maritime lift as necessary to carry out the Marine Corps' mission. Such a configuration would provide the naval services with a wider, distributed, and more survivable strike capability and joint forcible entry options in an increasingly anti-access environment. The new LHA(R) America-class ships, lacking a well-deck, would seem particularly suited for this STOVL strike carrier role."
RAN FAA A4G Skyhawk 1970s: https://www.faaaa.asn.au/spazsinbad-a4g/ AND https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwqC_s6gcCVvG7NOge3qfAQ/
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Unread post19 Nov 2009, 07:50

spazsinbad wrote:A recent prize winning essay for 'Proceedings' has this to say FWIW:

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedin ... RY_ID=1838

Extract from "Buy Fords, Not Ferraris" by Commander Henry J. Hendrix, U.S. Navy

"Another critical component of the surge force will be the Expeditionary Strike Groups and their light amphibious carriers. Long considered to be the central core of the amphibious force, these highly capable aircraft carriers can serve in new roles within surge operations. Assuming one is in dry-dock for maintenance, a force of ten LHAs can provide nine small flattops for surge operations. Five of them will go to sea with their embarked Marine Expeditionary Units serving as their primary strike assets (again, the assumption would be that two of the MEUs would either be deploying or returning from deployment at any given time) while the remaining available LHAs deploy with each of their decks and hangars populated by two squadrons of STOVL Joint Strike Fighters.

The four LPDs and four LSDs that would have normally deployed with the Joint Strike Fighter-configured LHAs can be allocated to provide such maritime lift as necessary to carry out the Marine Corps' mission. Such a configuration would provide the naval services with a wider, distributed, and more survivable strike capability and joint forcible entry options in an increasingly anti-access environment. The new LHA(R) America-class ships, lacking a well-deck, would seem particularly suited for this STOVL strike carrier role."


Did you see who wrote the article? Do you understand he has a certain (incorrect) point of view. Did you read this article also?
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedin ... RY_ID=2023

Using Gators as light carriers is a real bad idea. The are designed to move Marines and material ashore as quick as possible. They are too slow and they do not carry enough fuel or ordinance to make a good light carrier. Their slow speed and lack of combat persistence would not be much help in a real naval air battle. If the Gators mission is no longer valid then build fewer Gators but no one should delude themselves into thinking that this can make up for fielding smaller air wings or fewer carriers.
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Unread post19 Nov 2009, 08:25

Have not read the link but I saw the point (out of many in original article) that: "The new LHA(R) America-class ships, lacking a well-deck, would seem particularly suited for this STOVL strike carrier role." However I'm not advocating anything other than the idea that in these tough economic times a small USMC STOVL carrier or two seems like a good idea - as I hope that article by Hendrix elaborates. It seems that the path down to more and more Super Carriers will be blocked after the one abuilding now. I'm no seer though. Let the USMC have all the things they have no but not compromise on having suitable light attack carriers for their use; with backup as required from any Super Carriers around. Surely that seems to be an idea that the USMC would go for. Let them keep the Helo Gators and not mix in JSF-Bs. If it is too hard to do then it is too hard. Not my concern really.

The RAN / Army / RAAF will learn how useful the new 2 LHDs will be. The RAAF will learn how to use the conventional landing (A or C) model JSFs and over time something else might come of that combined experience. However that is an Australian concern. We will look to any operator of JSFs to learn from and in the case of any JSF-B notions we know who to look to including the Spanish builders / users of the LHDs.

Surely with some experience in Australia from above conditions something new will emerge.

Have read the link suggested earlier and recall without reading it again that it makes the points well for Super Carriers that USN has already. However when there is no money for more - what next. As I say - not my concern.
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Unread post19 Nov 2009, 11:18

Thumper3181 wrote:
Using Gators as light carriers is a real bad idea. The are designed to move Marines and material ashore as quick as possible. They are too slow and they do not carry enough fuel or ordinance to make a good light carrier. Their slow speed and lack of combat persistence would not be much help in a real naval air battle.


The author seems to have ignored the cardinal issue with any carrier required to undertake fixed wing combat air delivery.

its about bunkerage volume and design before its about having a large flat deck.
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Unread post19 Nov 2009, 14:50

Thumper3181 wrote:
spazsinbad wrote:A recent prize winning essay for 'Proceedings' has this to say FWIW:

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedin ... RY_ID=1838

Extract from "Buy Fords, Not Ferraris" by Commander Henry J. Hendrix, U.S. Navy

"Another critical component of the surge force will be the Expeditionary Strike Groups and their light amphibious carriers. Long considered to be the central core of the amphibious force, these highly capable aircraft carriers can serve in new roles within surge operations. Assuming one is in dry-dock for maintenance, a force of ten LHAs can provide nine small flattops for surge operations. Five of them will go to sea with their embarked Marine Expeditionary Units serving as their primary strike assets (again, the assumption would be that two of the MEUs would either be deploying or returning from deployment at any given time) while the remaining available LHAs deploy with each of their decks and hangars populated by two squadrons of STOVL Joint Strike Fighters.

The four LPDs and four LSDs that would have normally deployed with the Joint Strike Fighter-configured LHAs can be allocated to provide such maritime lift as necessary to carry out the Marine Corps' mission. Such a configuration would provide the naval services with a wider, distributed, and more survivable strike capability and joint forcible entry options in an increasingly anti-access environment. The new LHA(R) America-class ships, lacking a well-deck, would seem particularly suited for this STOVL strike carrier role."


Did you see who wrote the article? Do you understand he has a certain (incorrect) point of view. Did you read this article also?
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedin ... RY_ID=2023

Using Gators as light carriers is a real bad idea. The are designed to move Marines and material ashore as quick as possible. They are too slow and they do not carry enough fuel or ordinance to make a good light carrier. Their slow speed and lack of combat persistence would not be much help in a real naval air battle. If the Gators mission is no longer valid then build fewer Gators but no one should delude themselves into thinking that this can make up for fielding smaller air wings or fewer carriers.


The magazine in the Wasps and Tarawas is designed for helicopter munitions. In fact, during OIF they were sending the LCACs out to the stores ships to resupply them with ammo. Normal resupply methods weren't enough. If Harriers can do this, how would they keep JSF's sufficiently supplied with ordinance.
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Thumper3181

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Unread post19 Nov 2009, 15:06

gf0012-aust wrote:
Thumper3181 wrote:
Using Gators as light carriers is a real bad idea. The are designed to move Marines and material ashore as quick as possible. They are too slow and they do not carry enough fuel or ordinance to make a good light carrier. Their slow speed and lack of combat persistence would not be much help in a real naval air battle.


The author seems to have ignored the cardinal issue with any carrier required to undertake fixed wing combat air delivery.

its about bunkerage volume and design before its about having a large flat deck.

I think it's interesting to note that the author's apparent expertise is in helicopters and book writing. So it's not surprise he knows little about naval architecture and carrier operations.
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